United States v. Timothy McNeal , 591 F. App'x 760 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13161
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 7:12-cr-00007-HL-TQL-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TIMOTHY MCNEAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(November 17, 2014)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Timothy McNeal appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine base with
intent to distribute,1 possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,2 and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 3 McNeal challenges the district
court’s admission of his prior drug trafficking convictions, the court’s limiting
instruction regarding those convictions, and the admission of certain evidence over
his authentication and hearsay objections.
I.
McNeal first argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of his two prior state-court marijuana convictions. McNeal’s federal
criminal trial took place in March 2013 following his September 2010 arrest. His
first prior conviction was from August 10, 2001, for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute. The second was from November 11, 2002, for sale of
marijuana.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s admission of evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189,
1205 (11th Cir. 2005). A district court abuses its discretion when it rests its
1
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
2
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D).
3
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(e).
2
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decision on “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an
improper application of law to fact.” Id. at 1202.
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But such evidence “may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Id. 404(b)(2). To be admissible, evidence of a prior act must (1) be relevant to an
issue other than the defendant’s character, (2) be sufficiently proven to allow a jury
to find that the defendant committed the prior act, and (3) have probative value that
is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or the other risks
listed in Federal Rule of Evidence 403.4 United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298,
1314 (11th Cir. 2012). Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that “allows extrinsic
evidence unless it tends to prove only criminal propensity.” Id.Extrinsic evidence is relevant to show intent — thus satisfying the first
prong of Rule 404(b) admissibility — if the state of mind required for the charged
and extrinsic offenses is the same. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1345
(11th Cir. 2007). Entering a not guilty plea “makes intent a material issue” and
4
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
3
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“imposes a substantial burden on the government to prove intent, which it may
prove [using] qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the
defendant to remove intent as an issue.” Id. A conviction is sufficient proof that a
defendant committed the extrinsic act and satisfies the second prong of the test.
United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). In making a
determination on the final prong, the district court has broad discretion to make “a
common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic
offense, including prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act
and the charged offense, [and] temporal remoteness.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted).
Evidence of prior drug dealings is highly probative of intent to distribute a
controlled substance. Sanders, 668 F.3d at 1314. Further, we have held that prior
drug offenses do not tend to incite a jury to an irrational decision. United States v.
Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995). Although remoteness in time may
diminish a prior act’s probative value, when a defendant is incarcerated the
majority of the time between the prior crime and the current offense the impact of
that period on the crime’s probative value is itself diminished. United States v.
LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 926 (11th Cir. 2006).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted McNeal’s
prior marijuana convictions. First, the convictions were relevant to intent, an issue
4
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other than McNeal’s character, because the state of mind required for the
convictions and the current offenses — the intent to distribute a controlled
substance — is the same. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1345. By pleading not guilty
to the current offenses McNeal made intent a material issue, and he did not later
affirmatively remove that issue from the case. See id. Moreover, he acknowledges
he challenged the government’s evidence of intent to some extent at trial. Second,
the government sufficiently proved McNeal’s extrinsic acts by submitting certified
copies of his convictions. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1282.
Finally, McNeal’s convictions possessed probative value that was not
substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. The prior convictions and the
current offenses were almost identical drug trafficking offenses, making the
convictions highly probative of McNeal’s intent. See Sanders, 668 F.3d at 1314.
Although McNeal argues that the prosecutorial need for the evidence was low, the
government’s evidence of intent was not overwhelming, and McNeal contested the
intent element on cross-examination. The age of the convictions did not
substantially diminish their probative value, because McNeal spent more than half
of the time between his oldest conviction (August 10, 2001) and the current
offenses (September 29, 2010) in prison.5 See LeCroy, 441 F.3d at 926. And the
5
Specifically, McNeal was in prison for four years and nine months out of the nine years
and one month between the offenses.
5
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admission of the convictions was not unduly prejudicial, as prior drug offenses do
not tend to incite a jury to an irrational decision. See Delgado, 56 F.3d at 1366.
The district court did not err when it admitted the evidence of McNeal’s prior
convictions.
II.
McNeal challenges the district court's initial limiting instruction, given
during the government's case in chief, regarding the evidence of his prior
convictions. That initial instruction told the jurors that, if other evidence
convinced them beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the charged acts,
they could consider the prior convictions for intent, motive, opportunity, plan,
preparation, or identity, or to determine whether the acts were committed
accidentally. Though he did not object at trial, McNeal now contends that the
instruction was plainly erroneous. Specifically, he argues that the instruction
invited the jury to use the convictions improperly as propensity evidence because
the instruction (1) was not limited to the issue of intent, and (2) instructed the jury
that Rule 404(b) evidence can be used to prove a defendant's identity.
Where a defendant makes no objection to a jury instruction at trial, we
review the instruction for plain error. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265,
1270 (11th Cir. 2000). Under plain error review, we reverse where there is
“(1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights. . . . [and] (4) the
6
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error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007).
District courts have broad discretion in formulating jury instructions, and we will
not reverse a conviction on the basis of a jury charge unless “the issues of law were
presented inaccurately or the charge improperly guided the jury in such a
substantial way as to violate due process.” Prather, 205 F.3d at 1270. So long as
an instruction accurately expresses the applicable law without confusing or
prejudicing the jury, “there is no reason for reversal even though isolated clauses
may, in fact, be confusing, technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism.”
United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996). We have
previously held that it is not error to give the Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction
on Rule 404(b) evidence. United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1072–73
(11th Cir. 2011).
McNeal fails on the first two prongs of the plain error rule because the
instruction was not erroneous, much less plainly so. The instruction was
essentially the same as the one we approved in Dominguez. See 661 F.3d at 1072–
73. It accurately stated the law, in particular instructing the jury not to use the
prior convictions to determine whether McNeal committed the charged acts. See
Beasley, 72 F.3d at 1525. Although the instruction did not focus solely on intent,
7
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nothing in it was inaccurate. Further, the court’s final jury charge 6 removed the
reference to the identity use of 404(b) evidence, removing any chance that the
initial instruction improperly guided the jury so as to affect McNeal’s substantial
rights. See Prather, 205 F.3d at 1270. For these reasons, the district court’s
limiting instruction was not error.
III.
McNeal argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a
property receipt pursuant to the business-record exception to the hearsay rule. This
receipt listed the chain of custody for several pieces of evidence.
We review a district court’s decision to admit business-record evidence only
for an abuse of discretion . United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016, 1018 (11th
Cir. 1997). The record of a regularly conducted activity is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule if (1) the record was “made at or near the time by . . .
someone with knowledge”; (2) “the record was kept in the course of [an
organization’s] regularly conducted activity”; (3) “making the record was a regular
practice of that activity”; (4) “all these conditions are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or another qualified witness”; and (5) “neither the source of
6
“If other evidence leads you to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the charged acts, you may consider evidence of similar acts done on other occasions
to decide whether the defendant had the state of mind or intent necessary for the crimes charged,
acted according to a plan or to prepare a [sic] commit a crime, or committed the charged acts by
accident or mistake.”
8
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information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Admission of such records requires
evidence sufficient to support the trustworthiness of the document, and to prove
that it was prepared in the usual course of business. United States v. Hawkins, 905
F.2d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir. 1990). A “custodian or another qualified witness” is
someone who can testify to the record-keeping procedure used. Garnett, 122 F.3d
at 1018–19.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the property
receipt. Mark Williams and Sean Ladson, both officers in the Colquitt County
Sheriff’s Office (CCSO), testified about the receipt’s creation and provenance.
Ladson testified that he created the property receipt “at the scene of the evidence.”
Williams testified that the CCSO regularly keeps property receipts and confirmed
that the exhibit in this case was such a receipt. See Garnett, 122 F.3d at 1018–19.
In addition, persons with knowledge of the evidence transfers made the transfer
entries on the receipt at the time of the transfers. See Fed R. Evid. 803(6)(A). For
example, Williams testified that he and Ladson updated the receipt when he
received the marijuana evidence from Ladson for testing and again when he
returned the evidence to Ladson. Although McNeal argues that the source of
information and the circumstances of the receipt’s preparation indicate a lack of
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trustworthiness, he points to no specific evidence to support that claim.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the receipt.
IV.
The government, in making its case, introduced into evidence packaged
quantities of crack cocaine and marijuana, a pistol, digital scales, a police scanner,
and “other alleged accoutrements of the drug trade.” McNeal argues that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting those items into evidence without
establishing a chain of custody or laying an adequate foundation.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s evidentiary rulings.
United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 946 (11th Cir. 2006). A proponent of
evidence “must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is
what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The government only
needs to present “some competent evidence” to support authentication, and that
evidence can be purely circumstantial. United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489,
1493 (11th Cir. 1990). The government satisfies this burden when it submits
“sufficient evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn” of the
evidence’s original acquisition and later custody as well as its connection to the
accused and the charged offense. United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 724 F.2d 898,
900 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Garcia, 718 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir.
1983). Beyond this, proof of the connection of physical evidence with a defendant
10
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and gaps in the chain of custody go to the weight, not the admissibility, of
evidence. Sarmiento-Perez, 724 F.2d at 900.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence
that McNeal claims lacked an adequate chain of custody and foundation. Through
the testimony of CCSO officers Ladson and Williams and the property receipt, the
government presented competent evidence to authenticate all of the exhibits that
McNeal challenges. Ladson testified that he was responsible for picking up and
logging evidence, sending it for testing, filling out proper paperwork, and making
sure the evidence arrived at the court. Ladson and Williams testified that the items
introduced at trial were the same items seized from McNeal’s home, identified
items in photographs taken at McNeal’s home, and testified that the items were in
the same or substantially the same condition as when they were seized. 7 Further,
Ladson testified that all of the evidence was stored in his locked office. Although
that office was accessible to other drug-enforcement officers, nothing about the
condition of the evidence bags suggested tampering.8 The district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
7
Ladson, for example, testified that the crack cocaine “looked exactly how it did that day
except for the discoloration because of the age on it now.” McNeal’s attorney noted that the
cocaine had been “tested, opened, [and] examined,” resulting in the evidence’s change in
appearance.
8
Further, absent evidence to the contrary, a judge is entitled to presume that an official
would not tamper with the evidence. Garcia, 718 F.2d at 1534.
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V.
McNeal argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting and
playing for the jury a recording of a conversation between him and his brother.
We review a district court’s ruling on authentication of a recording only for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1092 (11th Cir.
2009). The government has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to show
that a recording is an authentic reproduction of a conversation. Id. To authenticate
a recording, the government must normally show “(1) the competency of the
operator; (2) the fidelity of the recording equipment; (3) the absence of material
deletions, additions, or alterations in the relevant part of the tape; and (4) the
identification of the relevant speakers.” Id. But if there is independent evidence of
the recording’s accuracy, we will be extremely reluctant to disturb the district
court’s decision, even where the government failed to fully authenticate the
recording. Id. at 1092–93 (holding that the government presented independent
evidence of accuracy when a law enforcement agent who overheard the original
conversation testified that it was the same as the recording played at trial.)
The government presented independent evidence of the recording’s accuracy
when McNeal’s brother — the other participant in the recorded conversation —
established the identities of the persons on the recording, identified the recording
as the conversation between him and McNeal, and testified independently to its
12
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content. See id. at 1092–93. Admitting the recording was not an abuse of
discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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