Estate of William Hein v. United States ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 30 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ARLENE HEIN; ESTATE OF WILLIAM                  No.    17-35953
    HEIN,
    D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00055-SPW
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
    DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 17, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: KLEINFELD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY, ** District
    Judge.
    Arlene Hein and the Estate of William Hein (together, the “Heins”) appeal
    the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the United States
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    and dismissing the Heins’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    We review appeals of summary judgment de novo and “employ the same
    standard used by the trial court.” See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food &
    Drug Admin., 
    836 F.3d 987
    , 988 (9th Cir. 2016). “As required by that standard,
    we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
    determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and decide
    whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” 
    Id. at 989.
    The Heins own several parcels of land in Montana bounded to the north by
    the Yellowstone River or abutting both sides of Arrow Creek (the “Lots”). A 1922
    government survey used meander lines to mark where the Lots abutted the
    Yellowstone River and Arrow Creek. However, the Heins have no evidence that
    the meander lines surveyed in 1922 were coterminous with the ordinary high-water
    mark of the Yellowstone River or Arrow Creek. Nor have they presented any
    evidence demonstrating that their ownership rights are riparian. Indeed, the patents
    conveying the Lots do not state whether the boundaries of the Lots extended to the
    high-water mark of the Yellowstone River or Arrow Creek.
    On April 29, 2014, the Heins brought this action under the Quiet Title Act,
    28 U.S.C. § 2409a (the “QTA”), against the United States to quiet title to: (1) land
    2                                    17-35953
    abutting the Lots between the high-water mark and the low-water mark of the
    Yellowstone River; (2) land formed by accretion between the meander lines of the
    Lots and the current high-water mark of the Yellowstone River; and (3) land
    formed by the reliction of Arrow Creek.
    “The running of the twelve-year limitations period deprives the federal
    courts of ‘jurisdiction to inquire into the merits’ of an action brought under the
    QTA.” See Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 
    541 F.3d 1189
    ,
    1195–96 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Block v. North Dakota, 
    461 U.S. 273
    , 292
    (1983)). QTA “action[s] shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff
    or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the
    United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g).
    To determine whether a party “knew or should have known” of the
    Government’s adverse claims to its land, courts must determine whether the
    Government’s “actions would have alerted a reasonable landowner that the
    [G]overnment claimed an interest in the land.” Shultz v. Dep’t of Army, 
    886 F.2d 1157
    , 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). “It is irrelevant whether the United States’s
    [claims] . . . were meritorious; the QTA limitations period accrues as soon as the
    United States makes a claim that creates even a cloud on a plaintiff’s ownership
    interest.” 
    Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1198
    (quotation marks omitted).
    The Heins’ claims for land between the high- and low-water marks of the
    3                                    17-35953
    Yellowstone River are time-barred because, at the latest in 1958, the United States
    asserted an adverse claim to the riverbed of the Yellowstone River through various
    acts of Congress. See Act of May 19, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-420, 72 Stat. 121
    (1958) (restoring “tribal ownership of all vacant and undisposed-of ceded lands” to
    the Crow Tribe, with a northern boundary of the midchannel of the Yellowstone
    River); Act of Aug. 14, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-628, 72 Stat. 575 (1958)
    (repurchasing land from the Crow Tribe with a northern boundary of the
    midchannel of the Yellowstone River). By claiming the riverbed, the Government
    clouded the Heins’ title to land between the high- and low-water marks, which
    could only belong to the Heins if Montana, rather than the United States, owned
    the riverbed. See Fid. Expl. & Prod. Co. v. United States, 
    506 F.3d 1182
    , 1184–86
    (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an act of Congress setting a boundary at the “middle
    of the channel of” a river was sufficient to put a claimant on notice that the
    Government had an adverse claim to the riverbed); see also Montana v. United
    States, 
    450 U.S. 544
    , 551 (1981) (explaining the general rule that riparian owners
    only own up to the high-water mark); Mont. Power Co. v. Rochester, 
    127 F.2d 189
    ,
    192 (9th Cir. 1942) (“The general rule, of course, is that patents of the United
    States to lands bordering navigable waters, in the absence of special circumstances,
    convey only to high water mark.”).
    The Heins’ claims for accreted land between the meander lines and the
    4                                      17-35953
    current high-water mark of the Yellowstone River and land formed by the reliction
    of Arrow Creek are time-barred as well. Specifically, to state a claim for accreted
    or relicted land, the Heins would had to have been riparian owners. See United
    States v. Milner, 
    583 F.3d 1174
    , 1187 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he [riparian] property
    owner gains when land is gradually added through accretion, the accumulation of
    deposits, or reliction, the exposure of previously submerged land.”). Because the
    Heins offered nothing on summary judgment demonstrating that their Lots extend
    beyond the meander lines, there is no evidence that such land was ever conveyed.
    And because the 1958 acts of Congress restored tribal ownership to the Crow Tribe
    and then repurchased for the United States “all vacant and undisposed-of ceded
    lands” south of the midchannel of the Yellowstone River, the Heins were on notice
    that the Government had an adverse claim to the land in dispute. 72 Stat. at 121;
    72 Stat. at 575; see 
    Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1198
    .
    For these reasons, the district court properly granted summary judgment in
    the Government’s favor and dismissed the Heins’ QTA action.
    AFFIRMED.
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