Jarron Draper v. Atlanta Public School District , 377 F. App'x 937 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-15576
MAY 5, 2010
________________________
JOHN LEY
D.C. Docket No. 07-00224-CV-MHS-1
JARRON DRAPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ATLANTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 5, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BARKETT and BALDOCK, * Circuit Judges.
*
Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Jarron Draper appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
suit arising under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. We
are convinced the district court did not err when it concluded the doctrine
of res judicata bars Plaintiff’s claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Defendant Atlanta Independent School System misdiagnosed
Plaintiff with a mild intellectual disability when he was in fifth grade.
Defendant failed to reevaluate Plaintiff, so he spent most of his school
years in a special education classroom for children with mild intellectual
disabilities. In tenth grade, he was finally diagnosed with the specific
learning disorder of dyslexia. In November 2004, Plaintiff filed a due
process complaint with the Georgia Office of State Administrative
Hearings, claiming Defendant denied him a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482. The administrative law
judge (ALJ) who heard Plaintiff’s case found that Plaintiff was entitled to
a choice of compensatory education services from Defendant. Plaintiff
elected to attend the Cottage School, a private school of his choice, with
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Defendant paying up to $15,000 per year for his tuition until June 2009 or
receipt of his diploma, whichever came earlier.
Plaintiff and Defendant both appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Defendant
challenged the award in its entirety, and Plaintiff challenged the tuition
limits. In an order issued on March 19, 2007, the district court affirmed
the ALJ’s ruling but modified the remedy by ordering Defendant to pay up
to $38,000 per year for Plaintiff’s education at the Cottage School until
June 2011 or Plaintiff’s receipt of his diploma, whichever came earlier.
Draper v. Atlanta Indep. School Sys., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1354 n. 11
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (Draper I). Defendant appealed, and we held the district
court did not abuse its discretion in modifying Plaintiff’s compensation
under the IDEA. Draper v. Atlanta Indep. School Sys., 518 F.3d 1275,
1290 (11th Cir. 2008).
On January 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging
violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The
district court granted Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata
barred his suit. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the district court erred in
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concluding his § 504 claims were barred by res judicata and in not
reopening Draper I and consolidating the two actions.
“Questions of law raised by the application of res judicata are
reviewed de novo.” In re Atlanta Retail, Inc., 456 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2006). “Res judicata bars the filing of claims which were raised or
could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.” Ragsdale v.
Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
Such claims are barred if “(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2)
the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
parties . . . are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is
involved in both cases.” Id. Plaintiff agreed at oral argument that the
first three elements of res judicata are met.
We have explained:
In this circuit, the determination of whether the causes of
action in two proceedings are the same is governed by whether
the primary right and duty are the same. The test is one of
substance, not form. Res judicata applies “not only to the
precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to
all legal theories and claims arising out of the same ‘operative
nucleus of fact.’”
Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 1992)
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(quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990)
(internal citations omitted)).
When asked at oral argument whether “the same cause of action is
involved in both cases,” Plaintiff’s counsel responded: “It goes beyond
that . . . to whether there is an exception to that rule.” Plaintiff seems to
be asking us to apply a narrow “rights and duties” test, which he views as
an exception to our usual “transactional” or “nucleus of operative fact”
test for res judicata. Under Plaintiff’s narrow “rights and duties” test, he
argues his claim under § 504 involves different rights and duties than his
IDEA claim because his § 504 claim involves discrimination against him
rather than only the denial of a FAPE. For this argument, Plaintiff relies
on I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th
Cir. 1986), in which we stated: “The principal test for determining
whether the causes of action are the same is whether the primary right and
duty are the same in each case.” At oral argument, the parties discussed
whether in Durbin we first adopted a “rights and duties” test separate from
a test considering the nucleus of operative fact, whether Durbin is an
“outlier” in our res judicata jurisprudence, and whether such a separate
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“rights and duties” test exists today. Despite the apparent confusion at
oral argument, we have used the same rights and duties language in our
res judicata analysis since we were part of the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Ray
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 677 F.2d 818, 821 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The
principal test for determining whether the causes of action are the same is
whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each case.”);
White v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. Unit A
Aug. 1981) (“[T]he principal test recognized by this Court for comparing
causes of action is whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the
same in each action.”). We have continued using this same language since
Durbin. See, e.g., Adams v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 1276,
1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In determining whether the causes of action are
identical, we have indicated that the analysis centers on whether the
‘primary right and duty are the same.’” (quoting Manning, 953 F.2d at
1358)); Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239 (“In the Eleventh Circuit, ‘[t]he
principal test for determining whether the causes of action are the same is
whether the primary right and duty are the same in each case.’” (quoting
Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir.
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1990))). Nevertheless, in cases before and after Durbin, we have
consistently considered the substance and factual circumstances of each
cause of action rather than merely inquiring what rights and duties are
involved. See, e.g., Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239 (“[I]f a case arises out of
the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual
predicate, as a former action, . . . the two cases are really the same ‘claim’
or ‘cause of action’ for purposes of res judicata.”). Plaintiff seems to
request we construe such rights and duties language as a distinct exception
to our test for the fourth element of res judicata. But we have never
endorsed a separate rights and duties test; nor have we ever recognized a
rights and duties exception to our usual res judicata test. Our res judicata
analysis has always required a consideration of the facts and legal theories
of two causes of action as well as the rights and duties involved in each
case. See Manning, 953 F.2d at 1359 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that it
is an oversimplification to focus on rights and duties alone and that we
must compare the factual issues of each case as well). We have
consistently concluded that when the substance and facts of each action
are the same, res judicata bars the second suit. See, e.g., Ragsdale, 193
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F.3d at 1239; Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1502 (11th Cir. 1991).
In this case, as in Draper I, Plaintiff seeks a remedy for the improper
education he received from Defendant. Though the cases involve different
statutory schemes for relief, the substance of and primary right at issue in
each action is the same: Defendant failed to properly educate Plaintiff.
Plaintiff now alleges Defendant did so in a discriminatory manner.
Though the relief sought under § 504 in this case differs from that sought
under the IDEA in Draper I, the transaction and nucleus of operative fact
are the same, as Plaintiff’s counsel admitted at oral argument. Moreover,
nothing prevented Plaintiff from demanding relief under § 504 in Draper I
when he appealed the ALJ’s decision to the district court. Because Draper
I and the instant case involve Plaintiff’s same primary right to receive a
proper education, Defendant’s same duty to provide a proper education,
and the same nucleus of operative fact, they involve the same cause of
action for the purposes of res judicata.
Plaintiff also argues the district court erred when it did not reopen
Draper I and consolidate this suit with that one. He emphasizes that the
same judge presided over both cases, had not entered a final judgment in
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Draper I when the instant case was filed, and could have consolidated the
cases. We review a district court’s ruling on whether consolidation is
appropriate for abuse of discretion. Hargett v. Valley Fed. Sav. Bank, 60
F.3d 754, 760 (11th Cir. 1995). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the district
court may consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact
but is not required to do so. We see no evidence indicating that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen Draper I and
consolidate the actions.
The district court did not err in concluding res judicata bars this suit
or in refusing to reopen Draper I and consolidate the instant action with it.
The district court’s order in this case, therefore, is AFFIRMED.
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