Luis Lopez v. J. Taylor , 667 F. App'x 604 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUL 14 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LUIS ALEJANDRO LOPEZ,                            No. 15-35422
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00506-CL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    J. TAYLOR,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 7, 2016**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: BEA and OWENS, Circuit Judges and BURNS,*** District Judge.
    Luis A. Lopez, an Oregon state court prisoner, appeals from the district
    court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Larry A. Burns, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. As the parties are familiar with the facts,
    we do not recount them here.
    Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), it was
    not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined
    by the United States Supreme Court, for the Oregon Court of Appeals to hold that
    specific performance of Lopez’s prior agreement with the Multnomah County
    District Attorney’s Office was an adequate remedy for the District Attorney’s
    Office’s breach of that agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
    According to Supreme Court precedent as established in Santobello v. New
    York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    (1971), a state violates an individual’s due process rights when
    it breaches a plea agreement, and that individual is entitled to a remedy. 
    Id. at 262.
    The state court, however, has discretion to craft an appropriate remedy, as it is “in
    a better position to decide” the type of remedy that “the circumstances of [the] case
    require.” 
    Id. at 263.
    One possible remedy the Supreme Court mentioned was
    specific performance of the agreement. 
    Id. As is
    evident from Santobello, and as Lopez does not dispute, it is within the
    state court’s discretion to determine the remedy for breach of a plea agreement.
    See 
    id. The Oregon
    Court of Appeals held that specific performance in this
    case—requiring the District Attorney’s Office to provide the bargained-for letter
    2
    recommending Lopez’s release, and requiring a new hearing in front of the Parole
    Board once the letter was received—was an adequate remedy. Lopez contends that
    the Parole Board will “always believe[] that the DA did not truly stand behind the
    content of the compelled letter,” and a new hearing can therefore never be an
    adequate remedy. Lopez, however, does not point to any case law showing that
    specific performance under the circumstances of his case is such an unreasonable
    remedy that no reasonable jurist could find it adequate. Instead, the Supreme
    Court has rejected similar arguments based on the idea that it is “too late to
    ‘unring’ the bell.” Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 139 (2009).
    Accordingly, it was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
    federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, for the Oregon
    Court of Appeals to hold that specific performance of Lopez’s agreement with the
    Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office was an adequate remedy for the
    state’s breach of the plea agreement. Thus, the district court did not err in denying
    Lopez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-35422

Citation Numbers: 667 F. App'x 604

Filed Date: 7/14/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023