Brian Stone v. Todd Martin ( 2017 )


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  •                                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 17-1150
    ________________
    BRIAN J. STONE;
    ELLEN A. STONE,
    Appellants
    v.
    TODD A. MARTIN;
    JASON DUNLAP
    ________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (M.D. Pa. No. 3-15-cv-01632)
    District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
    ________________
    Argued on September 19, 2017
    Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: November 22, 2017)
    Brian J. Stone, Esquire    [Argued]
    21509 Island Club Road
    Tilghman, MD 21671
    Counsel for Appellants
    Gerard J. Geiger, Esquire [Argued]
    Robert J. Kidwell, III, Esquire
    Newman Williams Mishkin Corveleyn Wolfe & Fareri
    712 Monroe Street
    Stroudsburg, PA 18360
    Counsel for Appellees
    ________________
    OPINION*
    ________________
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge
    Brian and Ellen Stone live on a 75-acre plot off Route 115 in Monroe County,
    Pennsylvania. The couple’s home and Brian Stone’s law office are on the plot though in
    separate buildings many yards apart. Neither the house nor the law office can be seen
    from public property. Both can be accessed by a long driveway from Route 115. The
    Stones’ mailbox and a sign advertising the law office are at the entrance to the driveway,
    and it can be closed off by a locked gate. Signs posted along the driveway read “Keep
    Out” and state that the property is private.
    On May 29, 2015, Monroe County Deputy Sheriff Jason Dunlap was tasked with
    serving on Ellen Stone a small claims notice of suit. He had until June 29, 2015, to
    complete service. Dunlap attempted to visit the Stones’ residence on the mornings of
    June 8, June 11, and June 16, 2015, but each time found the gate to the driveway locked.
    He left his card in the mailbox, but no one picked it up.1 Around noon on June 17,
    finding the gate still locked and his card still in the mailbox, Dunlap parked his car, went
    around the locked gate on foot, and walked up the driveway toward the Stones’ house.
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    1
    The record does not reflect any other attempts by Dunlap to serve process on Ellen
    Stone, such as going to her usual place of business, calling her, or visiting the Stones’
    residence in the evening rather than the morning.
    2
    When he reached the end of the driveway, however, he turned away from the sidewalk
    that lead to the Stones’ house and instead approached the detached law office building,
    where he saw a woman standing inside an open garage. He told the woman he was
    looking for Ellen Stone, and the reply was “You found me.” Dunlap served Stone, at
    which point her husband, Brian Stone, approached and asked Dunlap to identify himself
    and explain why he was on their property. He briefly answered Brian Stone’s questions
    and then left the way he came.
    The Stones seek relief under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . They claim that Dunlap conducted
    an unreasonable search and seizure of their property. They contend also that Sheriff
    Todd Martin violated their Fourth Amendment rights by setting department policy that
    permitted Dunlap’s conduct. They further assert Pennsylvania constitutional and state
    law violations against both defendants.
    The District Court had original jurisdiction over the federal claims under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1343(a)(3) and supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (a). It granted summary judgment in favor of Dunlap and Martin on the
    Fourth Amendment claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
    Pennsylvania constitutional and state law claims, and dismissed the case.
    The Stones timely appealed. Our jurisdiction is under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review the District Court’s summary judgment determination de novo, viewing the facts
    and drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Doe v.
    Luzerne Cty., 
    660 F.3d 169
    , 174 (3d Cir. 2011). Our review of the District Court’s
    3
    decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is for abuse of discretion. See Hedges
    v. Musco, 
    204 F.3d 109
    , 124 (3d Cir. 2000).
    A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when ‘there is some meaningful
    interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [her or his] property.’” Soldal v.
    Cook Cty., Ill., 
    506 U.S. 56
    , 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 
    466 U.S. 109
    ,
    113 (1984)). For example, real property in Soldal was “seized” when a mobile home was
    wrenched from its water connections and hooked to a tractor. Id. at 58. Similarly, in
    Jacobsen DEA agents “seized” a package when they “assert[ed] dominion and control”
    over it (though the Court held the seizure to be reasonable in that case). 
    466 U.S. at
    120-
    21. Dunlap’s brief presence on the Stones’ property and short conversation with the
    Stones did not approach the meaningful possessory interference contemplated by the
    Fourth Amendment. Hence there was no seizing of their property.
    Nor did Dunlap conduct an impermissible search. A Fourth Amendment search
    occurs either when the Government violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of
    privacy, see Katz v. United States, 
    389 U.S. 347
    , 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), or
    “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons,
    houses, papers, or effects,” Florida v. Jardines, 
    569 U.S. 1
    , 5 (2013). Under the latter
    physical-intrusion analysis, a search is (1) an effort to find something or obtain
    information coupled with (2) a trespass. United States v. Jones, 
    565 U.S. 400
    , 408 n.5
    (2012). However, under either analysis “open fields” have no Fourth Amendment
    protection, see Oliver v. United States, 
    466 U.S. 170
    , 177 (1984), even if they are on
    private property, 
    id. at 183-84
    .
    4
    The District Court held that the Stones’ Fourth Amendment rights were not
    violated because “there is no indication that . . . Dunlap attempted to obtain any
    information or find something when he entered on the property.” Stone v. Martin, No.
    CV 3:15-1632, 
    2016 WL 7404607
    , at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2016). Even if we were to
    disagree with this statement, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Dunlap
    did not intrude on a protected area or privacy interest. Although he entered onto the
    Stones’ private property without permission, it is well established that “[t]he law of
    trespass . . . forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment would not
    proscribe.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183. In United States v. Dunn, 
    480 U.S. 294
    , 301 (1987),
    the Supreme Court set out a nonexclusive, four-factor test to determine whether an area
    falls within a home’s curtilage2—which enjoys Fourth Amendment protection “as part of
    the home itself,” Jardines, 
    569 U.S. at
    6—or is instead an unprotected open field.
    The first factor, “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,”
    Dunn, 
    480 U.S. at 301
    , cuts against the Stones. The detached law office building that
    Dunlap approached was many yards away from the Stones’ house. The second factor,
    “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,” 
    id.,
     also goes
    against the Stones. There is no enclosure surrounding the Stones’ house itself.3
    2
    The “curtilage” is “the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home.”
    Oliver, 
    466 U.S. at 180
    . “This area around the home is ‘intimately linked to the home,
    both physically and psychologically,’ and is where ‘privacy expectations are most
    heightened.’” Jardines, 
    569 U.S. at 7
     (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 
    476 U.S. 207
    , 213
    (1986)).
    3
    Neither the wooded area surrounding the Stones’ property line nor the locked gate at the
    driveway affects our analysis of this factor. See Oliver, 
    466 U.S. at 174
     (rejecting a
    5
    However, the sidewalk connecting the driveway to the house only begins where the
    parking area outside the law office ends. There are trees planted at the base of the
    sidewalk leading to the house between the law office and the house. The sidewalk layout
    and the trees create some physical separation between the two buildings. The third
    factor, “the nature of the uses to which the area is put,” 
    id. at 301
    , also weighs against the
    Stones. Because the detached building in this case was a law office, the building and the
    paved area leading up to it were not “being used for intimate activities of the home.” 
    Id. at 302
    . Finally, the fourth factor, “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
    observation” by passersby, 
    id. at 301
    , is in the Stones’ favor. Unlike in Dunn, the Stones’
    house and law office cannot be seen from public property, either through the surrounding
    woods or at the base of the driveway. Cf. 
    id. at 303
     (“[T]he various interior fences on
    respondent’s property . . . were designed and constructed to corral livestock, not to
    prevent persons from observing what lay inside the enclosed areas.”). The Stones also
    erected a lockable gate at the only entrance to their property and posted signs warning
    away trespassers.
    However, given this case’s factual similarities to Oliver and Dunn and because
    three of the four Dunn factors fail to support the Stones, we hold that Dunlap walked only
    through open fields. Because “the government’s intrusion upon the open fields is not one
    court’s reasoning that a secluded area “bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and
    embankments [that] cannot be seen from any point of public access” is not an open field);
    Dunn, 
    480 U.S. at 297-98
     (holding officers who “crossed over the [ranch’s] perimeter
    fence and one interior fence” and two “barbed wire fence[s]” to approach a barn on the
    property had remained in open fields).
    6
    of those ‘unreasonable searches’ proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment,”
    Oliver, 
    466 U.S. at 177
    , his trespass onto the Stones’ property did not violate the Fourth
    Amendment. The District Court properly dismissed their Fourth Amendment claims on
    summary judgment.
    In addition, the Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice
    the state constitutional and state law claims. It “may decline to exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction” over state law claims if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has
    original jurisdiction . . . .” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3). It “must decline” to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction in such circumstances “unless considerations of judicial
    economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for
    doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 
    204 F.3d 109
    , 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original)
    (quoting Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 
    45 F.3d 780
    , 788 (3d Cir.1995)). The
    Court here reasonably found that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and
    fairness to the parties did not provide a justification for keeping this case in federal court.
    We thus affirm.
    7