Ludem Semprit v. U.S. Attorney General , 379 F. App'x 931 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13602 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 20, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
Agency No. A079-428-833
LUDIM SEMPRIT,
a.k.a. Ludim Bastidas,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(May 20, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ludim Semprit, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitions for review of the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) decision affirming the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ’s”) order finding her removable and denying her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). Semprit argues that the
BIA erred in finding that she had failed to show that it was more likely than not
that she would suffer future persecution if she returned to Venezuela. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
Semprit was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging that she was
subject to removal under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), as a non-immigrant who remained in
the country longer than permitted. She appeared before an IJ, admitted the
allegations contained the NTA, and conceded removability.
Semprit subsequently filed an application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the CAT, stating that she feared persecution based
on her political opinion and membership in a particular social group. Semprit
asserted that she would be harmed if she returned to Venezuela, because she would
express her opposition to the government of Hugo Chavez. Semprit also stated
that her two children, who were United States citizens, would be persecuted
because of their citizenship. Semprit acknowledged that neither she nor her family
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members had been associated with any organizations or groups in Venezuela, and
that neither she nor her family, friends, or colleagues had experienced harm,
mistreatment, or threats in Venezuela.
At the removal hearing, Semprit testified that she had not been a member of
a political party in Venezuela. However, in 1996 or 1997, while studying at a
technical school, Semprit and other students voiced their support of Salas Romer,
Chavez’s opponent in the presidential race. Semprit would meet with other
students every week, discuss the election, and “talk against Chavez.” Semprit
acknowledged that she was not a leader of the group of students and, when asked
whether the group had a name, she responded, “[w]e were opposers.” Semprit
stated that she voted for Romer in the presidential election. She testified that she
had never been physically harmed, arrested, attacked, or kidnaped in Venezuela.
The IJ found that Semprit’s asylum application was statutorily barred
because it was untimely. The IJ also found that there was no evidence that anyone
in Venezuela had any interest in Semprit, or that Semprit’s children would be
persecuted based on the fact that they were born in the United States. Ultimately,
the IJ denied Semprit’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief.
Semprit filed a notice of appeal with the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in
finding that she was ineligible for asylum, denying her applications for
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withholding of removal and relief under the CAT, and finding that she had failed to
show that she would suffer future persecution if she returned to Venezuela. In a
brief in support of her appeal, Semprit argued that her eight-year-old son was
unable to speak Spanish and would “stand out” in Venezuela and cause others to
realize that he was from the United States. Semprit asserted that her children’s
United States citizenship would subject her family to persecution because “[t]he
United States is the shining example of everything the Chavez government is
against.” Semprit also argued that her plans to participate in political activities
opposing the Chavez government would increase the likelihood that she would
suffer persecution.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Semprit’s asylum application as
untimely. It also found that Semprit failed to establish a nexus between any
purported persecution and a protected ground and, therefore, failed to meet her
burden of proof on her claim for withholding of removal. The BIA stated that it
considered Semprit’s belief, that she would be persecuted because of her
opposition to Chavez’s government or the citizenship of her children, to be “not
only too vague and generalized, but highly speculative.” It also found that Semprit
had abandoned any challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT relief. Accordingly, the
BIA dismissed Semprit’s appeal.
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II.
We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the BIA
expressly adopts the IJ’s opinion or reasoning. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, we review only the BIA’s decision, because
the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s reasoning. When considering a petition to
review a BIA final order, we review legal issues de novo. Hernandez v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 513 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Hernandez v. Mukasey, 129
S.Ct. 44 (2008). The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed under the substantial
evidence test. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1283-84. Under this test, we must affirm the
BIA’s decision if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. at 1284. “To reverse a factual
finding by the BIA, we must find not only that the evidence supports a contrary
conclusion, but that it compels one.” Farquharson v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 246 F.3d
1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001).
Under the INA, an alien shall not be removed to her country of origin if her
life or freedom would be threatened in that country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). “The alien bears the burden of demonstrating
that it is more likely than not [that] she will be persecuted or tortured upon being
returned to her country.” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th
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Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). If an alien fails to establish past persecution, she is
entitled to withholding of removal only if she shows that it is more likely than not
that (1) she would be persecuted in the future on account of one of the five
enumerated grounds; and (2) she could not avoid this future threat to her life or
freedom by relocating, if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to
expect relocation. Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2006),
citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept, requiring
more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation . . . [m]ere
harassment does not amount to persecution.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231(quotations omitted).
III.
In her appellate brief, Semprit challenges only the BIA’s denial of
withholding of removal. Accordingly, Semprit has abandoned any challenge to the
BIA’s denial of asylum and CAT relief, and we address only her claim for
withholding of removal. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1228 n.2 (noting that, “[w]hen
an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned”).
Semprit clearly has failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal
based on past persecution, because in her asylum application and at her removal
hearing, Semprit stated that she had not experienced harm, mistreatment, or threats
in Venezuela. Semprit has also failed to show that she, more likely than not, would
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be persecuted if she returned to Venezuela. Semprit testified and stated in her
asylum application that she was never involved in any political groups or
organizations in Venezuela. In fact, her only involvement in politics prior to
leaving Venezuela was voting for Romer and discussing her support for Romer
with other students. Semprit was not persecuted or even harassed for these actions
and she does not explain why she would be persecuted for similar actions in the
future. Furthermore, although Semprit stated that she would be involved in politics
upon returning to Venezuela, she did not identify any particular groups or
organizations in which she would be involved, or otherwise explain why she would
be singled out for persecution.
With respect to Semprit’s claims that she and her children would be
persecuted because of their American citizenship, Semprit fails to explain why
anyone would impute an anti-Chavez political opinion to her simply because her
children were born in the United States. Moreover, Semprit provides no evidence
that American citizens are persecuted in Venezuela solely because of their
citizenship or because of a political opinion that is imputed to them based on their
citizenship. Accordingly, because Semprit has failed to show that she, more likely
than not, will be persecuted upon returning to Venezuela, we deny her petition for
review.
PETITION DENIED.
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