Undre Smith v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 381 F. App'x 885 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-16080 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 3, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 09-00004-CV-5
UNDRE SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 3, 2010)
Before BARKETT, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Undre Smith filed suit against CSX Transportation, Inc. in the
Superior Court of Coffee County, Georgia in April 2008, and CSX removed the case
based upon diversity of citizenship. Smith claims that a sidetrack CSX placed and
operates near his home constitutes a nuisance under Georgia law. CSX moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted CSX’s motion, holding that Smith’s
state-law nuisance claim is preempted by the plain language of the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (R.3-50
at 5.) Smith appeals.
Smith contends that the Act should be interpreted to only preempt state law
claims demanding remedies affecting the core operations of railroads that are
identified in the Act. He concedes that a plaintiff’s claim is preempted when the
plaintiff seeks a remedy that changes a railroad’s core operation. But, Smith contends
that when a plaintiff seeks a remedy demanding an insubstantial change to incidental
operations, the claim is not preempted. CSX responds that under the plain language
of the Act, state law remedies directed at sidetracks are preempted.
The Act created the Surface Transportation Board. The Act provides that the
Board’s jurisdiction over
the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance
of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks . . . is exclusive.
Except as otherwise provided under this part, the remedies provided
under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.
§ 10501(b)(2).
2
Congressional intent “primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-
emption statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.” Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250-51 (1996) (citation omitted).
Although courts begin the preemption analysis “with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States are not to be superseded,” the presumption against
preemption dissipates when the intention of Congress is “clear and manifest.” Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008) (quotations and
citation omitted). Here, Congress’s intent is clear that any state law involving where
to construct or how to operate a sidetrack is preempted.1 For the reasons stated by the
district court (R.3-50 at 3-5), we hold that the text of the Act expressly preempts
Smith’s state-law nuisance claim.
AFFIRMED.
1
This court has considered the Act’s preemption before in Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City of
West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). Smith’s reliance on that case is misplaced, as
it involved a municipal ordinance not directed to railroad operations. Instead, the ordinance was
directed at a private distribution business operating on leased railroad property.
3