Mitchell v. Farcass , 112 F.3d 1483 ( 1997 )

  •                                                             PUBLISH
                         FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                               No. 96-3026
                  D.C. Docket No. 96-201-CIV-FTM-25   HLA
    DAVE FARCASS, Superintendent,
    Hendry Correctional Institution,
    J. KING, Inspector Hendry
    Correctional Institution,
              Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Middle District of Florida
                              (May 6, 1997)
    Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and LAY*,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    HATCHETT, Chief Judge:
      Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
    Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
           In this prisoner civil rights action, we consider challenges
    to provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"
    or "the Act"), Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
    and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
    1321 (Apr. 26, 1996).   We hold that: (1) the provisions of the
    PLRA codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) apply to cases pending
    prior to the Act's passage; (2) the filing fee requirements of
    the PLRA do not violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal
    protection; (3) to the extent the PLRA's filing fee requirements
    conflict with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), the
    Act's provisions control; (4) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6) standards govern our review of dismissals under section
    1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (5) the district court erred in dismissing
    the appellant's First Amendment retaliation claim under section
                                I. BACKGROUND
           On January 29, 1996, appellant Henry Mitchell, a Florida
    prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit pursuant to 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 against Dave Farcass, Superintendent of the Hendry
    Correctional Institution ("HCI"), and J. King, an inspector at
    HCI.   The district court granted Mitchell's motion to proceed in
    forma pauperis ("IFP").    Mitchell's complaint alleges the
    following factual scenario.
           In late December 1995, Mitchell, then an inmate at HCI,
    wrote a letter to the Naples, Florida office of the National
    Association for the Advancement of Colored People in which he
    complained about the religious services at HCI.      Mitchell also
    sent copies of this letter to several officials of Florida's
    correctional system, including Farcass.      On January 15, 1996,
    Mitchell submitted an inmate request to Farcass, asking him to
    explain "why no black culture churches were being allowed to come
    into [HCI] like the [S]panish culture churches and the white
    churches."   In this request, Mitchell claimed that HCI's
    religious services did not comply with the provision of the
    Florida Administrative Code that governs chaplaincy services at
    state correctional institutions.       According to Mitchell, around
    eighty other inmates had submitted requests "asking the same
    question or pertaining to that subject."
         The following day, January 16, a prison employee told
    Mitchell to report to "C-Building."      Upon his arrival, Mitchell
    met with Farcass, other HCI officials and another inmate.
    Farcass had in his possession the inmate requests concerning the
    chaplaincy services, including Mitchell's request.      Mitchell
    guesses that the officials requested his and the other inmate's
    presence at this meeting because they considered the two inmates
    "to be the leaders."   Farcass told the inmates that the amount of
    requests upset him and that "some one could be charged with
    [in]citing a riot."    Farcass, however, also told Mitchell and the
    other inmate that the "meeting was to address the issue presented
    in the requests" and that they "were not being charged with
    anything, . . . were not going to get locked up, [and] were not
    going to get transfer[r]ed."    Farcass informed the inmates that
    officials had to process paperwork in order for representatives
    from black churches to begin visiting HCI.
            The next day, January 17, an HCI employee told Mitchell to
    report to the chaplain, and Mitchell wound up meeting with the
    chaplain, assistant chaplain and assistant superintendent of HCI.
    The assistant superintendent stated that the purpose of the
    meeting was for the chaplain to explain the procedures churches
    had to comply with before they could be permitted to provide
    religious services at HCI.    During the meeting, someone called
    the assistant superintendent from the room.    Upon returning, the
    assistant superintendent reported that Farcass and King had
    ordered Mitchell placed in administrative confinement while HCI
    officials investigated whether he was responsible for inciting a
            HCI officials placed Mitchell in administrative confinement
    that same day.    When officials brought Mitchell his property, he
    found that his legal materials had been "smashed" and "crushed."
    Later, in the evening, three correctional officers entered
    Mitchell's cell, handcuffed him behind his back, and "smashed"
    his legal work and property.    Thereafter, Mitchell submitted
    another inmate request to Farcass, this time asking that he be
    placed in "protective management" because he feared further
    retaliation from the HCI staff.
            Mitchell asserts that Farcass and King breached his rights
    under the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; he
    seeks monetary relief.      On June 18, 1996, the district court
    addressed Mitchell's complaint.      Recognizing Mitchell's IFP
    status, the court assessed his pleading under the provisions of
    section 804(a) of the PLRA that are now codified at 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2).      The court held, "[a]fter reading Plaintiff's
    complaint in a liberal fashion," that Mitchell could "prove no
    set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
    relief."      Therefore, the court dismissed Mitchell's complaint sua
    sponte pursuant to section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1
           Thereafter, Mitchell moved in the district court to proceed
    IFP on appeal.      On July 31, 1996, the court granted the motion
    (thus allowing Mitchell to proceed without prepaying the entire
    $105 appellate docketing and filing fee) and applied the filing
    fee provisions of PLRA section 804(a), see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a),
    (b) (West Supp. 1997).      As a result, the court ordered Mitchell
    to tender payment of a fee equal to twenty percent of his average
    monthly deposits to his prison account (this fee totalled $4) and
    make monthly payments (submitted with updated account statements)
    equal to twenty percent of the income credited to his account
    each preceding month, until he paid the full docketing and filing
    fee.       Mitchell filed his notice of appeal on July 3, 1996.
           In his pro se brief to this court, Mitchell argued, among
    other things, that the district court erred in applying section
    1915(e)(2) to his complaint because he commenced this lawsuit
           Farcass and King were never served with Mitchell's
    prior to the PLRA's enactment on April 26, 1996, and that the
    filing fee provisions of the PLRA violated constitutional norms.
    This court appointed Mitchell a lawyer and placed this case on
    the oral argument calendar.    The United States intervened in this
    action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), and the State of Florida
    participated as amicus curiae.
                             II. DISCUSSION
         The first issue we address is whether section 1915(e)(2)
    applies to cases pending prior to the enactment of the PLRA.    The
    district court's determination of this issue was one of law; we
    review it under the de novo standard.     E.g., Goldsmith v. City of
    996 F.2d 1155
    , 1159 (11th Cir. 1993).
         Prior to the passage of the PLRA, section 1915 permitted a
    court to dismiss a case authorized under that section if
    "satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."    28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(d) (1994).   As amended by the PLRA, however, section 1915
    now provides that a court "shall dismiss the case at any time" if
    it determines that the "action or appeal" is "(i) frivolous or
    malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
    granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
    is immune from such relief."   28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West
    Supp. 1997).   As stated, the district court dismissed Mitchell's
    complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
         "Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 
    511 U.S. 244
    114 S. Ct. 1483
    128 L. Ed. 2d 229
     (1994), provides the analytical framework
    for determining whether newly enacted statutory provisions are
    applicable to pending cases."    Hunter v. United States, 
    101 F.3d 1565
    , 1569 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), petition for cert. filed,
    65 U.S.L.W. 3648
     (U.S. Mar. 10, 1997) (No. 96-1443).    Under
    Landgraf, our first inquiry is "to determine whether Congress has
    expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach."    114 S. Ct. at
    1505.    Here, however, Congress has simply not spoken on the
    issue.    Accordingly, we should apply section 1915(e)(2) to
    pending cases unless doing so would engender a "retroactive
    effect."    Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505; see also Hunter, 101 F.3d
    at 1570.    A new statute has a retroactive effect if, in applying
    it to a pending case, it (1) impairs rights a party possessed
    when he or she acted, (2) increases a party's liability for past
    conduct, or (3) imposes new duties with respect to transactions
    already completed.    Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505; Hunter 101 F.3d
    at 1570.
            The second and third indices of statutory retroactive effect
    outlined above clearly have no application to this case, and
    Mitchell makes no argument to the contrary.    The issue for us to
    consider then, is whether the application of section 1915(e)(2)
    to this case "would impair rights [Mitchell] possessed when he
    acted."    Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505.   Mitchell states that
    under pre-PLRA section 1915, the first test of the sufficiency of
    his complaint would probably have come after the defendants had
    filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6), after which time he could have amended his complaint in
    light of the defendants' motion.       Therefore, Mitchell contends,
    the application of the PLRA amendments to his case deprived him
    of the more liberal procedural treatment he had anticipated
    receiving under the old provisions of section 1915(d).
         We have little difficulty in concluding that Mitchell's
    position fails.   As this court stated in Hunter, "the term
    `rights' as used in this context should not be construed broadly
    so as to sweep within its ambit mere expectation interests under
    procedural or remedy rules."   101 F.3d at 1572.     Mitchell
    concedes, as he must, that the PLRA amendments at issue are
    "wholly procedural"; moreover, we cannot say that Mitchell has
    anything more than an expectation interest in having pre-PLRA
    section 1915 applied in his case.      Indeed, we find the
    appellants' position in Hunter (i.e., that applying the
    certificate of appealability provisions of the Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to pending cases would
    produce a retroactive effect), which this court sitting en banc
    unanimously rejected, much more compelling than Mitchell's
    argument.   See Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1568-73.      Consequently, we
    agree with the Ninth Circuit that section 1915(e)(2) "raises no
    retroactivity concerns under Landgraf."       Marks v. Solcum, 
    98 F.3d 494
    , 496 (9th Cir. 1996).
         We next consider whether the filing fee provisions of the
    PLRA (1) withstand equal protection review and (2) are superseded
    by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a).   These issues
    present legal questions that we address in plenary fashion.
    E.g., Collins v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 
    105 F.3d 1368
    , 1370
    (11th Cir. 1997).
         Section 804(a) of the PLRA refashioned the procedures
    prisoners must observe when seeking to proceed IFP in civil
    actions.   Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) now provides:
         A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a
         judgment in a civil action or proceeding without
         prepayment of fees or security therefor, in addition to
         filing the affidavit filed under paragraph (1), shall
         submit a certified copy of the trust fund account
         statement (or institutional equivalent) for the
         prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding
         the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal,
         obtained from the appropriate official of each prison
         at which the prisoner is or was confined.
    28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).   Section 1915(b) now
         (b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner
         brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma
         pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the
         full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess
         and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of
         any court fees required by law, an initial partial
         filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of--
              (A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's
         account; or
              (B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's
         account for the 6-month period immediately preceding
         the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.
         (2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee,
         the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments
         of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited
         to the prisoner's account. The agency having custody
         of the prisoner shall forward payments from the
         prisoner's account to the clerk of the court each time
         the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing
         fees are paid.
           (3) In no event shall the filing fee collected exceed
           the amount of fees permitted by statute for the
           commencement of a civil action or an appeal of a civil
           action or criminal judgment.
           (4) In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from
           bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or
           criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has
           no assets and no means by which to pay the initial
           partial filing fee.
    28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b) (West Supp. 1997).
           Mitchell contends that the PLRA's filing fee requirements
    fail equal protection rational basis review and thus deny him due
    process under the Fifth Amendment.2     "The first step in
    determining whether legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny
    is identifying a legitimate government purpose--a goal--which the
    enacting government body could have been pursuing."     Haves v.
    City of Miami, 
    52 F.3d 918
    , 921 (11th Cir. 1995).     "The second
    step of rational-basis scrutiny asks whether a rational basis
    exists for the enacting governmental body to believe that the
               In his brief to this court, Mitchell's counsel made clear
           Mr. Mitchell does not contend that the amended statute's
           different treatment of indigent prisoners implicates the
           line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Griffin v.
    351 U.S. 12
     (1956), which generally prohibits
           making access to the appellate process dependent on the
           appellant's ability to pay. . . . Mr. Mitchell also does
           not contend that prisoners (or specifically indigent
           prisoners) are a suspect class for purposes of his equal-
           protection claim.
    Appellant's Br. at 17-18. We note that both the Fourth and Sixth
    Circuits have considered and rejected each of these contentions in
    denying challenges to the PLRA. See Roller v. Gunn, 
    107 F.3d 227
    231-33 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 
    106 F.3d 1281
    , 1284-87
    (6th Cir. 1997).
    legislation would further the hypothesized purpose."    Haves, 52
    F.3d at 922.
         After reviewing the statutory framework of the PLRA, this
    court recently concluded that Congress promulgated the Act to
    curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions
    litigation.    Anderson v. Singletary, No. 96-2697, --- F.3d ---,
    --- (11th Cir. 1997); see also Hampton v. Hobbs, 
    106 F.3d 1281
    1286 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The legislation was aimed at the
    skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners--many of which
    are meritless--and the corresponding burden those filings have
    placed on the federal courts."); Santana v. United States, 
    98 F.3d 752
    , 755 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Congress enacted the PLRA
    primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, most of which concern
    prison conditions and many of which are routinely dismissed as
    legally frivolous.").    Clearly, Congress had a rational basis to
    believe that the fee requirements of the PLRA would further this
    objective.    As the Sixth Circuit recently found:
         Congress sought to put in place economic incentives
         that would prompt prisoners to "stop and think" before
         filing a complaint. Congress's rationale for placing
         the fee requirements on prisoners is captured in the
         statements of Senator Kyl:
                      Section 2 will require prisoners to pay
                 a very small share of the large burden they
                 place on the Federal judicial system by
                 paying a small filing fee upon commencement
                 of lawsuits. In doing so, the provision will
                 deter frivolous inmate lawsuits. The modest
                 monetary outlay will force prisoners to think
                 twice about the case and not just file
                 reflexively. Prisoners will have to make the
                 same decision that law-abiding Americans must
                make: Is the lawsuit worth the price?
                Criminals should not be given a special
                privilege that other Americans do not have. .
                . .
                     The volume of prisoner litigation
                represents a large burden on the judicial
                system, which is already overburdened by
                increases in nonprisoner litigation. Yet
                prisoners have very little incentive not to
                file nonmeritorious lawsuits. Unlike other
                prospective litigants who seek poor person
                status, prisoners have all the necessities of
                life supplied, including the materials
                required to bring their lawsuits. For a
                prisoner who qualifies for poor person
                status, there is no cost to bring a suit and,
                therefore, no incentive to limit suits to
                cases that have some chance of success.
                     The filing fee is small enough not to deter a
                prisoner with a meritorious claim, yet large
                enough to deter frivolous claims and multiple
         141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
         (statement of Sen. Kyl) (citations omitted).
    Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286-87.   In addition to the foregoing, we
    note that prisoners "often have free time on their hands that
    other litigants do not possess."      Roller v. Gunn, 
    107 F.3d 227
    234 (4th Cir. 1997).   Moreover, prisoners have unique incentives
    to file meritless or frivolous lawsuits, e.g., to attempt to
    obtain a "short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse,"
    Cruz v. Beto, 
    405 U.S. 319
    , 327 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
    dissenting), or to harass prison officials or correctional
    officers.   See, e.g., Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Correction,
    64 F.3d 951
    , 953-54 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting that
    "all too often" prisoner litigation is initiated to harass prison
    officials), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 1273
     (1996).     In short,
    "[d]eterring frivolous prisoner filings in the federal courts
    falls within the realm of Congress's legitimate interests, and
    the specific provisions in question are rationally related to the
    achievement of that interest."    Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1287; accord
    Roller, 107 F.3d at 230-31, 233-34.
         Mitchell bases his equal protection challenge on Rinaldi v.
    384 U.S. 305
     (1966).     In that case, the Court struck down
    a New Jersey statute that required unsuccessful criminal
    appellants who were incarcerated, but not unsuccessful criminal
    appellants who were not imprisoned, to reimburse the state for
    the costs of trial transcripts.    384 U.S. at 308.    In so doing,
    the Court found that the classification at issue did not further
    any of the purported bases for the law -- reimbursement,
    administrative convenience or deterrence of frivolous appeals.
    384 U.S. at 309-11.   Mitchell argues that the "distinction made
    in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) between incarcerated indigent [litigants]
    and all other indigent [litigants] is nearly identical to the
    distinction made in Rinaldi."
         We find Rinaldi inapposite.       Unlike the situation here, that
    case involved an "unreasoned distinction," i.e., the Court could
    not find any justification for the classification the New Jersey
    statute made.   See Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309-10.      In enacting the
    PLRA, however, Congress had ample justification (e.g., prisoners
    often have an abundance of free time, live in a nearly cost-free
    environment, and have unique incentives to file meritless or
    frivolous lawsuits) in differentiating between indigent prisoners
    and other litigants.    See Roller, 107 F.3d at 234 n.2.
         Next, Mitchell contends that the fee provisions of the PLRA
    stand in apparent conflict with Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 24(a), which states that once a district court grants a
    party's motion to proceed IFP, "the party may proceed without
    further application to the court of appeals and without
    prepayment of fees or costs in either court or the giving of
    security therefor."    Fed. R. App. P. 24(a).3   The Fifth Circuit
    recently considered this issue and cited authority for the
    proposition that "a statute passed after the effective date of a
    federal rule repeals the rule to the extent that it actually
    conflicts."   Jackson v. Stinnett, 
    102 F.3d 132
    , 135 (5th Cir.
    1996).   The court went on to hold that "[t]o the extent that the
    Rules Enabling Act (as expressed in Rule 24(a)) actually
    conflicts with the PLRA, we hold that the statute repeals the
    Rule."   Jackson, 102 F.3d at 136.    We adopt the analysis and
    holding of the Jackson court.    See 102 F.3d at 134-36; see also
    Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 
    105 F.3d 274
    , 278 (6th Cir.
    1997) ("[T]o the extent that Rule 24(a) conflicts with the PLRA,
    we hold that the statute repeals Rule 24(a).").
          Although Mitchell discussed this issue in his brief, he did
    not formally assert it. He did, however, pursue the issue at oral
    argument, and therefore we address it.   See Beckwith v. City of
    Daytona Beach Shores, 
    58 F.3d 1554
    , 1561 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995).
         Finally, we address the propriety of the district court's
    dismissal of this action, i.e., whether the district court
    correctly concluded that Mitchell failed to state a claim on
    which relief may be granted.   The language of section
    1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in
    reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).    Of course,
    we review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, viewing the
    allegations in the complaint as true.    E.g., South Fla. Water
    Management Dist. v. Montalvo, 
    84 F.3d 402
    , 406 (11th Cir. 1996).
         "To state a first amendment claim for retaliation, a
    prisoner need not allege violation of a separate and distinct
    constitutional right. . . .    The gist of a retaliation claim is
    that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free
    speech."   Thomas v. Evans, 
    880 F.2d 1235
    , 1242 (11th Cir. 1989).
    In Bridges v. Russell, 
    757 F.2d 1155
    , 1157 (11th Cir. 1985), we
    reversed the dismissal of a complaint where the prisoner-
    appellant alleged that officials transferred him to another
    facility because he (1) filed a grievance against his work
    supervisor alleging racial discrimination in the assignment of
    work duties; (2) actively encouraged other inmates to sign a
    petition in protest of this treatment; and (3) prepared a similar
    grievance on behalf of another inmate.   In our view, it does not
    appear beyond doubt that Mitchell can prove no set of facts that
    would entitle him to relief on his First Amendment claim for
    retaliation.   See Bridges, 757 F.2d at 1157; see also Wildberger
    v. Bracknell, 
    869 F.2d 1467
    , 1468 (11th Cir. 1989); Wright v.
    795 F.2d 964
    , 968 (11th Cir. 1986).   Accordingly, we
    reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings on
    this issue.
                            III.   CONCLUSION
         For the foregoing reasons, we hold that: (1) the PLRA's
    filing fee provisions easily pass equal protection rational basis
    review; (2) to the extent those provisions conflict with Federal
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), the PLRA controls; (3) the
    district court was correct in concluding that 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2) applied in this case; (4) Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6) standards govern our review of dismissals
    under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (5) the district court erred
    in dismissing Mitchell's First Amendment retaliation claim
    pursuant to section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).   As a result, we remand to
    the district court for further proceedings.

Document Info

DocketNumber: 96-3026

Citation Numbers: 112 F.3d 1483

Filed Date: 5/6/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/27/2017

Authorities (20)

Jackson v. Stinnett,et al , 102 F.3d 132 ( 1996 )

Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach , 58 F.3d 1554 ( 1995 )

Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 ( 1956 )

Rinaldi v. Yeager , 384 U.S. 305 ( 1966 )

Cruz v. Beto , 405 U.S. 319 ( 1972 )

Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244 ( 1994 )

Johnny Bridges v. R. Russell, Dep. Warden, Scc L. Davis, ... , 757 F.2d 1155 ( 1985 )

James Wright v. Lanson Newsome, Warden , 795 F.2d 964 ( 1986 )

Leon Wildberger v. Sgt. David Bracknell, Lt. Robert Simmons,... , 869 F.2d 1467 ( 1989 )

Albert Thomas v. David C. Evans , 880 F.2d 1235 ( 1989 )

62-fair-emplpraccas-bna-769-63-empl-prac-dec-p-42642-delphine , 996 F.2d 1155 ( 1993 )

Stanley Haves, Marjorie Haves, His Wife v. City of Miami, a ... , 52 F.3d 918 ( 1995 )

ghulam-mohammed-nasim-and-ghulam-ahmed-nasim-abdul-karim-nasim-v-warden , 64 F.3d 951 ( 1995 )

96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7702, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,... , 98 F.3d 494 ( 1996 )

Ernesto Santana v. United States of America, Ernesto Santana , 98 F.3d 752 ( 1996 )

Charles Edward Hunter v. United States of America, Henry C. ... , 101 F.3d 1565 ( 1996 )

Dorothy Floyd v. United States Postal Service, Donald ... , 105 F.3d 274 ( 1997 )

pens-plan-guide-cch-p-23935f-10-fla-l-weekly-fed-c-704-gregory , 105 F.3d 1368 ( 1997 )

Lee Hampton v. Ron Hobbs , 106 F.3d 1281 ( 1997 )

gary-lee-roller-v-william-e-gunn-executive-director-of-the-south , 107 F.3d 227 ( 1997 )

View All Authorities »

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