United States v. Pope ( 1998 )

  •                                   United States Court of Appeals,
                                              Eleventh Circuit.
                                                No. 96-8844
                                         Non-Argument Calendar.
                   UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
                       Clifford Kelly POPE, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
                                                Jan. 9, 1998.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. (No. 5:95-CR-38-
    001-DF), Duross Fitzpatrick, Judge.
    Before COX, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
           CARNES, Circuit Judge:
           Defendant Clifford Kelly Pope appeals his conviction on three weapons charges: (1)
    possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); (2) possession of a
    firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(h); and (3) possession
    of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For each of these violations,
    Pope was sentenced to concurrent terms of eighty-seven months of imprisonment. The government
    cross-appeals Pope's sentence, contending that the district court erred in not sentencing Kelly to a
    mandatory minimum prison sentence of fifteen years as required by the Armed Career Criminal Act
    (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We conclude that Kelly's contentions are without merit, and that the
    district court erred by failing to sentence him to a minimum of fifteen years in prison as the ACCA
    requires. Consequently, we affirm Kelly's convictions on all counts, but vacate his sentence and
    remand the case for resentencing.
           Until their divorce on March 14, 1992, Clifford Kelly Pope (Pope) was married to Phyllis
    Pope (Phyllis). During their marriage, the couple obtained a Mustang Ranger Pickup that was
    secured by a loan with First Liberty Bank. For much of the time after the divorce but before Pope's
    October 7, 1994 arrest, he drove the Mustang. At some time during or after July, 1994, the Popes
    defaulted on their loan on the Mustang. Because First Liberty collection manager Ronald
    Williamson did not know who had possession of the Mustang, he contacted Phyllis to notify her of
    the bank's intent to repossess the vehicle. Although Phyllis did not have the car at the time, she told
    Williamson that the bank could repossess the car on October 7, 1994.
           On October 7, 1994, Phyllis arranged separately to meet both Pope and Williams in the
    parking lot of a Kroger grocery store. Phyllis arrived in an Explorer; Pope arrived later in the
    Mustang. Pope then got into the Explorer with Phyllis and drove away. At that point, Williamson,
    who was parked at the other end of the lot, exited his car. Philip Newell, who was assisting
    Williamson, went into the grocery store where he asked off-duty Bibb County Police Deputy DeFoe
    to assist with the repossession. DeFoe called for police backup; he, Williamson, and Newell then
    went over to the Mustang. Inside the Mustang, the men found a sawed-off shotgun, a rifle, and
    ammunition for both weapons. Shortly thereafter, Pope and Phyllis returned in the Explorer. The
    police arrested both of them. A search of the Explorer uncovered a pistol. At that time, Phyllis also
    gave the police two audiotapes of conversations that she had with Pope in which he made
    incriminating statements as well as several photographs of Pope with the sawed-off shotgun and rifle
    in his possession.
           On June 22, 1995, Pope was indicted for possession of an unregistered firearm, possession
    of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
    Before trial, Pope moved to suppress audio tapes that Phyllis had made of their conversations; the
    district court denied Pope's motion and allowed the jury to hear the tapes. After a three-day trial,
    a jury found Pope guilty on all three weapons charges. Pope moved for a new trial, and the district
    court denied his motion.
           Following Pope's conviction, the Probation Office issued a Presentence Investigation Report
    which characterized him as a career criminal. In addition to several other offenses which are not
    relevant here, the report noted that Pope had an April 3, 1984 conviction for burglary and two
    December 1, 1975 convictions for burglary. Based on those three convictions, the Government
    argued that the court was required to sentence Pope under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
    U.S.C. § 924(e), which mandates a minimum fifteen-year prison term for an offender, previously
    convicted of three violent or drug offenses, who is convicted of illegally possessing a firearm.
    However, the district court concluded that because the two December 1, 1975 burglaries occurred
    in close physical and temporal proximity with one another, they could not be counted as separate
    predicate convictions under the ACCA. Thinking that it was not bound by the ACCA, the district
    court sentenced Pope to eighty-seven months in prison, the upper boundary of Pope's non-enhanced
    guideline range.
           Pope filed a notice of appeal challenging his conviction. The Government filed a notice of
    cross-appeal, contending that the court had erred in not sentencing Pope under the ACCA.
                               II. POPE'S APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION
            Pope's first contention is that the district court erred in not permitting him to question Phyllis
    Pope about her 1968 burglary conviction. We review a district court's decision to exclude evidence
    only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Van Dorn, 
    925 F.2d 1331
    , 1335 (11th Cir.1991).
            At trial, Pope sought to introduce evidence of Phyllis' 1968 burglary conviction. Federal
    Rule of Evidence 609(b) creates a strong presumption against the use for impeachment purposes of
    stale convictions, such as this one, which was twenty-eight years old at the time of this trial. When
    a conviction is more than ten years old, it is not admissible unless the district court determines that
    its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. See Fed.R.Evid. 609(b); United
    States v. Pritchard, 
    973 F.2d 905
    , 908 (11th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Tisdale, 
    817 F.2d 1552
    , 1555 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that convictions older than ten years should be admitted for
    impeachment purposes only very rarely). Given the facts of this case, it was not an abuse of
    discretion for the district court to conclude that the probative value of Phyllis's 1968 conviction did
    not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect, and to refuse to allow Pope to use it for
    impeachment purposes.
            The second contention Pope makes is that the district court erred in denying his motion for
    a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The newly discovered evidence was the actual
    record of Phyllis' 1968 burglary conviction. We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new
    trial due to newly discovered evidence only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Starrett,
    55 F.3d 1525
    , 1554 (11th Cir.1995).
            The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that the "court on motion of defendant may
    grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. This
    Circuit has refined and limited that broad language to require that a party moving for a new trial
    based on newly discovered evidence must satisfy four conditions: (1) the evidence must be newly
    discovered and have been unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence must be
    material, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) the evidence must be such that it will
    probably produce an acquittal; and (4) the failure to learn of such evidence must not be due to a lack
    of due diligence on the part of the defendant. See United States v. Sjeklocha, 
    843 F.2d 485
    , 487
    (11th Cir.1988).
            The records concerning the 1968 burglary conviction relate solely to the impeachment of
    Phyllis, thus failing the second requirement. In addition, nothing in the record suggests that those
    records would probably produce an acquittal. The records do not change the fact that the conviction
    was twenty-eight years old at the time of trial. Thus, the newly discovered evidence fails the third
    requirement, also. Because at least two of the four requirements for a new trial based on newly
    discovered evidence are not met, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pope's motion
    for a new trial.
            Pope's third contention is that the district court erred when it excluded evidence that tended
    to cast doubt on Phyllis Pope's character for truthfulness. Pope attempted to introduce two lines of
    evidence in this regard: (1) two warrants that Phyllis had signed against Pope for threatening her
    with a gun and illegally possessing a firearm, charges that were later dismissed at a preliminary
    hearing; and (2) that Phyllis had attempted to fabricate evidence in a custody hearing against her
    sister-in-law. The purpose of this evidence was to impeach Phyllis. However, Federal Rule of
    Evidence 608(b) states that specific instances of conduct to show character for untruthfulness cannot
    be proven through extrinsic evidence. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to admit
    that extrinsic evidence.
            The fourth contention that Pope raises is that the district court erred in allowing the jury to
    hear two audiotapes which contained admissions by Pope that he had committed the crimes with
    which he was charged in the indictment. Pope contends that the jury should not have had the
    opportunity to hear the tapes because inaudible sections of the tapes renders them unreliable.
            The district court is required to exclude a recording only if the inaudible or unintelligible
    portions "are so substantial as to render the whole recording untrustworthy." United States v.
    656 F.2d 1181
    , 1200 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.1981);               accord Sherman v. Burke
    Contracting, Inc., 
    891 F.2d 1527
    , 1533 (11th Cir.1990). This determination of reliability is left to
    the sound discretion of the trial judge. See id. After reviewing the tapes, we cannot say that the
    district court abused its discretion in concluding that the tapes were sufficiently complete to be
    reliable. Consequently, Pope's challenge to the admission of the audiotapes fails.
            The final contention Pope raises on appeal is that because the indictment only mentions
    Pope having possession of a firearm on or about October 7, 1994, evidence tending to show that he
    possessed a firearm on other dates close in time to October 7 constitute "other acts" evidence which
    should have been excluded under Rule 404(b). However, the indictment charges that the illegal
    conduct occurred "on or about" October 7, 1994, and time is not an essential element of the offense,
    so long as the government establishes that the conduct occurred reasonably near the date that the
    indictment mentions. See, e.g., United States v. Champion, 
    813 F.2d 1154
    , 1168 (11th Cir.1987)
    ("[P]roof of a date reasonably near to the specified date is sufficient."); Russell v. United States, 
    429 F.2d 237
    , 238 (5th Cir.1970) ("[T]he time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense
    charged in the indictment and, "within reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the
    indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.' ") (citation omitted).
            In this case, the district court admitted evidence tending to show that Pope illegally
    possessed firearms on September 17, 1994 and October 4, 1994. These dates are reasonably near
    to October 7, 1994 so as to be "on or about" that date. The evidence that Pope contends was
    admitted in error was direct evidence of Pope's guilt with respect to the crimes charged in the
    indictment and therefore it did not fall within Rule 404(b).
                            III. THE GOVERNMENT'S CROSS-APPEAL
            The government contends that because Pope had previously been convicted of three violent
    felonies, the district court erred in not sentencing him to a minimum of fifteen years pursuant to the
    Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). That provision requires that if a felon
    with three previous convictions for violent or drug offenses that are "committed on occasions
    different from one another" is convicted of illegal possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
    the court must impose a prison sentence of "not less than fifteen years...." Id. At the sentencing
    hearing, the Government introduced evidence that Pope had previously been convicted of three state
    law burglaries—one on April 3, 1984, and two on December 1, 1975. The parties agree that these
    burglaries are violent offenses within the meaning of the ACCA.
           Because Pope committed the last two of these burglary offenses on the same day, the district
    court ruled that sentencing under § 924(e)(1) was not mandated. The court thought that because two
    of the burglaries occurred on the same night and were of buildings that were within 200 yards of one
    another, they constituted a single criminal incident for purposes of sentencing under the ACCA.
    Instead of sentencing Pope in accordance with the ACCA, the court sentenced him to an
    eighty-seven month term of imprisonment, which was the top of the applicable non-enhanced
    guideline range.
            Resolution of the government's cross-appeal turns on whether the district court correctly
    concluded that burglaries of two separate buildings approximately 200 yards apart on the same
    evening do not constitute crimes committed on "occasions different from one another" within the
    meaning of the ACCA. The question is one of statutory interpretation. We review questions of
    statutory interpretation de novo. See United States v. McLeod, 
    53 F.3d 322
    , 324 (11th Cir.1995);
    see also, e.g., United States v. Tisdale, 
    921 F.2d 1095
    , 1098 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that
    application of distinct offenses requirement to particular factual situation is legal determination
    subject to de novo review).
           A defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922 is subject to the minimum mandatory sentence
    of fifteen years that the ACCA imposes, if the defendant has previously been convicted of three
    drug-related or violent crimes on "occasions different from one another." Interpreting that language
    this Court, like other courts of appeals, has held that a defendant is subject to the sentence
    enhancement of the ACCA if each of the three previous convictions arose out of a separate and
    distinct "criminal episode." See United States v. Greene, 
    810 F.2d 999
    , 1000 (11th Cir.1986); see
    also, e.g., United States v. Towne, 
    870 F.2d 880
    , 889 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Schoolcraft,
    879 F.2d 64
    , 74 (3d Cir.1989). Therefore, we must determine whether the two 1975 burglaries,
    which Pope committed in immediate succession by breaking into and robbing two offices that were
    200 yards apart from one another, should be considered separate criminal episodes for purposes of
    the ACCA.
           Although this Court has not addressed this issue in the precise context that the facts of this
    case presents, other circuits, employing a similar "criminal episode" standard, have decided cases
    where two or more of the predicate crimes occurred in close temporal and physical proximity to one
    another. A review of those decisions suggests that so long as some temporal "break" occurs between
    the two crimes, they will be held to constitute distinct criminal episodes. The rule of those decisions
    appears to be that the ACCA should apply to criminals who commit three crimes in temporal and
    physical proximity to one another if the perpetrator had a meaningful opportunity to desist his
    activity before committing the second offense.
           Mere temporal proximity is ordinarily insufficient to merge multiple offenses into a single
    criminal episode. Distinctions in time and place are usually sufficient to separate criminal episodes
    from one another even when the gaps are small. See, e.g., United States v. Antonie, 
    953 F.2d 496
    499 (9th Cir.1991)(holding two armed robberies committed forty minutes apart to be separate
    offenses because they occurred at different times and places and affected different victims). When
    a criminal simultaneously robs several people by committing a single act, all of those robberies do
    constitute a single episode. See United States v. Petty, 
    828 F.2d 2
    , 3 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that
    robbing six people in restaurant "stick up" constituted single episode despite defendant's six robbery
    convictions); see also United States v. Graves, 
    60 F.3d 1183
    , 1187 (6th Cir.1995) (holding that
    burglary and assault on police officer constituted single episode of criminal conduct where crimes
    were committed at same location, and defendant had not yet left scene of first crime when he
    committed the second). However, when the crimes occur at distinctly different times, completion
    of the first crime before commencement of the second indicates that they are distinct criminal
           The Sixth Circuit has held that offenses committed at different locations and involving
    different victims constitute separate criminal episodes for purposes of the ACCA even though the
    crimes are committed during a short period of time. In United States v. Brady, 
    988 F.2d 664
    , 666
    (6th Cir.1993) (en banc), the court held that two robberies the defendant committed within thirty
    minutes of each other were to be treated as separate criminal episodes within the meaning of the
    ACCA. The Brady court noted that once the defendant had committed his first robbery, he could
    have decided to refrain from additional criminal activity. Instead, he made a conscious decision to
    proceed to another location and to commit another robbery. That conscious decision, the court
    concluded, justified counting the robberies separately for the purposes of the ACCA. See id. at 669-
           The Seventh Circuit has employed similar reasoning. To determine whether separate
    offenses constitute distinct criminal episodes, the Seventh Circuit has asked whether the defendant
    "successfully" completed the first offense before committing the second. See United States v.
    894 F.2d 909
    , 913 (7th Cir.1990). In Schieman, the defendant after burglarizing a store
    had left it and walked several blocks away when a police officer approached and pursued him. The
    defendant then assaulted the officer. The Seventh Circuit found that once the defendant left the
    store, he had "successfully" completed the burglary offense, effectively concluding the burglary
    episode. Therefore, the subsequent assault on the police officer was a separate criminal episode
    even though the two crimes were committed less than ten minutes apart and were closely connected.
    See id. at 913. That the crimes occurred in sequence (instead of simultaneously), required separate
    acts of aggression, and were directed towards different victims made them separate criminal
    episodes under the ACCA. See id.; see also United States v. Godinez, 
    998 F.2d 471
    , 472-73 (7th
    Cir.1993) (holding that because crimes reflected "distinct aggressions," kidnaping of woman was
    distinct crime from robbery of convenience store where crimes were committed an hour apart and
    defendant kidnaped victim to procure car for commission of robbery).
           The Seventh Circuit later extended its Schieman holding to a situation more factually similar
    to Pope's 1975 burglaries, holding that the burglaries of three stores in a strip mall that were
    committed within a half-hour period were separate criminal episodes within the meaning of the
    ACCA. See United States v. Hudspeth, 
    42 F.3d 1015
    , 1019 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc). Citing
    Schieman, the Hudspeth court held that the test for whether crimes are distinct under the ACCA is
    simple: "were the crimes simultaneous or were they sequential?" Id. at 1021. The court reasoned
    that although the three burglaries were closely connected, each reflected a distinct aggression and
    had a different victim. See Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1022. Furthermore, each successive burglary
    reflected a deliberate decision to commit an additional crime. See id.
           The Hudspeth court explained that its test comports with the purposes of the ACCA. See id.
    The court reasoned that a defendant who has the opportunity to withdraw before committing
    additional crimes deserves harsher punishment than a criminal who, because he commits several
    crimes simultaneously, has no separate opportunity to desist. See id. Because the ACCA enhances
    the penalties for a criminal who deliberately chooses to commit multiple crimes, sequential crimes
    resulting from separate conscious decisions should be treated as distinct criminal episodes.
           Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held that crimes committed in sequence constitute distinct
    criminal episodes under the ACCA even when the offenses follow in immediate succession. In
    United States v. Tisdale, 
    921 F.2d 1095
    , 1099 (10th Cir.1990), it held that burglaries of three
    separate stores within a shopping mall on the same evening constituted three distinct criminal
    episodes for purposes of the ACCA. The court emphasized that after the defendant had committed
    each burglary, he was free to leave and desist from further criminal conduct. See id. Because the
    defendant had to break into a separate store to commit each burglary, each subsequent crime
    required additional criminal intent and conduct. As a result, each burglary constituted a separate
    offense under the ACCA despite the temporal and physical proximity of the three crimes. See id.
           This line of reasoning has not been without its dissenters. The dissenting judges have
    pointed out that this narrow definition of a criminal episode has the effect of making career criminals
    out of those who, prior to their § 922 conviction for firearms possession, never really engage in more
    than a single course of criminal conduct. For example, in his dissent in Hudspeth, Judge Ripple
    contended that looking at the nature of the crimes, the identities of the victims, and the locations of
    the crimes is insufficient to determine whether two crimes are distinct. Instead, Judge Ripple
    asserted that courts should look critically at the facts that surround the predicate convictions to
    determine whether the crimes were sufficiently closely connected so as to constitute a single
    criminal episode. Because the proximity of the stores was a factor in making each of the stores a
    particularly attractive target for the defendants, Judge Ripple reasoned that the three burglaries could
    only be seen as a single criminal episode. See Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1034-35 (Ripple, J., concurring
    in part and dissenting in part); see also Brady, 988 F.2d at 677 (Jones, J., dissenting) (proposing
    similar test).
            The judges who have dissented from the majority holdings on this issue argue that the
    legislative purpose behind the ACCA favors their position. See Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1034 (Ripple,
    J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brady, 988 F.2d at 676-77 (Jones, J., dissenting). The
    increase in sentence the ACCA requires was intended to punish habitual offenders, who Congress
    found to be responsible for the disproportionate number of violent crimes. See Hudspeth, 42 F.3d
    at 1034 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Armed Career Criminal Act:
    Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary Comm.,
    98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1984); S.Rep. No. 97-585 at 20 (1982)); see also Tisdale, 921 F.2d at
    1100 (noting that ACCA was intended to provide additional punishment for armed, recidivist
            However, neither the wording of the ACCA nor its legislative history reveals any intent that
    the predicate offenses be separated by some substantial amount of time. As originally enacted in
    1984, the ACCA had no express requirement that the defendant commit the predicate offenses on
    different occasions. In 1988, Congress amended the Act by inserting the requirement that the
    predicate offenses be committed "on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
    Congress added this language to the statute after the Eighth Circuit had held that an incident in
    which a defendant was convicted of six counts of robbery for simultaneously robbing six restaurant
    patrons during one "stick up" was sufficient to apply the ACCA. See United States v. Petty, 
    798 F.2d 1157
    , 1159-60 (8th Cir.1986), vacated, 
    481 U.S. 1034
    107 S. Ct. 1968
    95 L. Ed. 2d 810
    Congress added the phrase "committed on occasions different from one another" to avoid outcomes
    like that in Petty, where a single action by a defendant results in a sentence enhancement under the
    ACCA. See Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1023 ("Thus a single multicount conviction could still qualify
    where the counts related to crimes committed on different occasions, but a robbery of multiple
    victims simultaneously (as in Petty) would count as only one conviction.") (quoting 134 Cong. Rec.
    S17,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988)(remarks of Sen. Biden)). Therefore, it seems that the different
    occasion requirement was intended to prevent counting simultaneous crimes separately, not to
    prevent the separate counting of crimes that the defendant committed in connection with, but distinct
    from, one another.
            Given the broad sweep of the language of the ACCA, even as amended, we find persuasive
    the virtually unanimous voice with which the other courts of appeals have stated that the
    "successful" completion of one crime plus a subsequent conscious decision to commit another crime
    makes that second crime distinct from the first for the purposes of the ACCA. Accordingly, we hold
    that so long as predicate crimes are successive rather than simultaneous, they constitute separate
    criminal episodes for purposes of the ACCA. A showing that the crimes reflect distinct aggressions,
    especially if the defendant committed the crimes in different places, is particularly probative of the
    sequential nature of those crimes.
           In this case, the district court found that Pope's 1975 burglary convictions were for breaking
    into and robbing two different doctors' offices, which were located 200 yards apart. We can find no
    meaningful distinction between the facts of this case and both Hudspeth and Tisdale. In each case,
    the defendant completed one burglary then, after going a short distance, made a conscious decision
    to break into another building and commit another robbery. In each case, the defendant could have
    chosen to desist after completing his first crime. Because Pope had completed his first burglary
    when he made the decision to commit the second burglary by breaking into another office 200 yards
    away, the two crimes were committed on "occasions different from one another." Accordingly, Pope
    should have been sentenced as a three time offender under the ACCA, and the district court erred
    in not sentencing him to the mandatory fifteen-year term of imprisonment.
                                           IV. CONCLUSION
           We find no error that warrants reversal of Pope's convictions. However, we do hold that the
    district court erred in not imposing the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM Pope's convictions, but VACATE his sentence and REMAND this case
    to the district court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

Document Info

DocketNumber: 96-8844

Filed Date: 1/9/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014

Authorities (21)

Vaney Russell v. United States , 429 F.2d 237 ( 1970 )

United States v. Glen Sutherland, Edward Maynard and Grace ... , 656 F.2d 1181 ( 1981 )

United States v. Samuel Petty , 798 F.2d 1157 ( 1986 )

United States v. James Alfonso Greene , 810 F.2d 999 ( 1986 )

United States v. Stanford Champion, Gene Slusser, Eldon L. ... , 813 F.2d 1154 ( 1987 )

United States v. Johnny Tisdale , 817 F.2d 1552 ( 1987 )

United States v. Paul Sjeklocha, A/K/A Paul Cutter and ... , 843 F.2d 485 ( 1988 )

United States v. Edwin A. Towne, Jr. , 870 F.2d 880 ( 1989 )

United States v. David D. Schoolcraft , 879 F.2d 64 ( 1989 )

51-fair-emplpraccas-bna-1640-52-empl-prac-dec-p-39576-29-fed-r , 891 F.2d 1527 ( 1990 )

United States v. David Thomas Schieman , 894 F.2d 909 ( 1990 )

United States v. Benjamin Thomas Tisdale, III , 921 F.2d 1095 ( 1990 )

united-states-v-edward-van-dorn-daniel-samela-aka-danny-the-baker , 925 F.2d 1331 ( 1991 )

United States v. John R. Antonie , 953 F.2d 496 ( 1991 )

United States v. Thomas Reginald Pritchard , 973 F.2d 905 ( 1992 )

United States v. Michael James Brady , 988 F.2d 664 ( 1993 )

United States v. Ricardo A. Godinez , 998 F.2d 471 ( 1993 )

United States v. Thomas L. Hudspeth , 42 F.3d 1015 ( 1994 )

United States v. Jackie McLeod , 53 F.3d 322 ( 1995 )

united-states-v-james-walter-starrett-timothy-kevin-duke-michael-lee , 55 F.3d 1525 ( 1995 )

View All Authorities »