United States v. Viscome , 144 F.3d 1365 ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                 [PUBLISH]
                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                          ________________________
    
                                   No. 96-3049
                            ________________________
                         D. C. Docket No. 96-4-CR-T-25(E)
    
    UNITED STATES,
                                                              Plaintiff-Appellee,
    
                                      versus
    
    MARK DALE VISCOME,
                                                            Defendant-Appellant.
                           ________________________
    
                                   No. 96-3461
                            ________________________
                         D. C. Docket No. 96-4-CR-T-25(B)
    
    UNITED STATES,
                                                              Plaintiff-Appellee,
    
                                      versus
    
    SAMUEL JOSEPH GENTILE,
                                                            Defendant-Appellant.
    
                           ________________________
    
                    Appeals from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                          _________________________
                                  (June 26, 1998)
    Before COX and HULL, Circuit Judges, and KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge.
    HULL, Circuit Judge:
    
          Appellants Mark Dale Viscome and Samuel Joseph Gentile appeal their
    
    convictions and sentences for various firearms and explosives offenses. After review,
    
    we affirm.
    
                                         I. FACTS
    
          Appellant Gentile was involved in a bitter custody fight with his estranged wife.
    
    Gentile planned to kill his wife by planting a bomb under her work vehicle and
    
    approached Appellant Viscome about making a bomb.1 Viscome agreed to make the
    
    bomb and Gentile gave him money to purchase the necessary components. Viscome
    
    later assembled the bomb with Gentile’s assistance.
    
          After assembling the bomb, Appellants Gentile and Viscome drove to the City
    
    of Palm Harbor’s Parks and Recreation Department, where Gentile’s wife was
    
    employed as a groundskeeper. Pointing out one of two parked trucks, Gentile stated
    
    to Viscome that he wanted to plant the bomb on that truck. The truck Gentile pointed
    
    out was the truck his wife always drove. Gentile was unsuccessful in persuading
    
    Viscome to plant the bomb and thus attempted to plant the bomb himself. However,
    
    Gentile aborted the attempt upon seeing someone nearby. Gentile and Viscome
    
    
    
          1
            Gentile knew that Viscome previously had made bombs. Gentile told Viscome
    that he needed a bomb because some people were trying to kill him.
    
                                              2
    initially hid but subsequently became nervous and left. Afterwards, Gentile again
    
    unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Viscome to plant the bomb. Gentile ultimately
    
    indicated that he knew someone else who would take care of it for him. Gentile later
    
    informed Viscome that “the situation had been taken care of.”
    
          The bomb never detonated but was discovered when two Parks Department
    
    employees were in the truck and someone alerted them that something was hanging
    
    beneath the truck. The occupants observed what appeared to be a bomb and contacted
    
    the authorities.   Bomb squad officers removed and disassembled the bomb,
    
    subsequently confirming that it was capable of exploding with lethal force.
    
          The police learned from an anonymous source that Appellants Gentile and
    
    Viscome made and planted the bomb. Shortly thereafter, Gentile and Viscome were
    
    arrested.
    
                              II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    
          Appellant Viscome pled guilty to, inter alia, conspiring to use a weapon of mass
    
    destruction against a person in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
    
    2332a(a)(2), and attempting to damage, by means of an explosive, a vehicle used in
    
    an activity affecting interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
    
          Appellant Gentile was charged with these same offenses, but pled not guilty and
    
    went to trial. The jury convicted Gentile of conspiring to use a weapon of mass
    
    
                                              3
    destruction against a person in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
    
    2332a(a)(2), and attempting to damage, by means of an explosive, a vehicle used in
    
    an activity affecting interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).2
    
                                     III. DISCUSSION
    
    A.    Gentile’s § 844(i) Conviction
    
          Appellant Gentile contends that the government presented insufficient evidence
    
    that the truck under which the bomb was planted was used in an activity affecting
    
    interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i).3 Section 844(i) proscribes damaging,
    
    by means of fire or an explosive, any vehicle used in interstate commerce or in an
    
    activity affecting interstate commerce, as follows:
    
          Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or
          destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other
          real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
          activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned . .
          ., fined . . ., or both . . . .
    
    
    
          2
           Viscome also pled guilty to, and Gentile also was convicted of, using and
    carrying a firearm during and in relation to a federal crime of violence in violation of
    18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Further, Viscome pled guilty to both making and possessing
    a destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861, and Gentile was convicted of
    only possessing a destructive device under that same statute.
          3
            In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the government and draw all inferences and credibility choices
    in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Castleberry, 
    116 F.3d 1384
    , 1387-88
    (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 341
     (1997).
    
                                               4
    18 U.S.C. § 844(i). This statute creates a two-prong test for criminal liability. Gentile
    
    was indicted and convicted under the second prong of § 844(i) on the theory that the
    
    truck that he attempted to bomb was used “in an activity affecting interstate or foreign
    
    commerce.” Id.4
    
          Gentile asserts that this court’s decision in United States v. Denalli, 
    73 F.3d 328
    
    (11th Cir.), modified, 
    90 F.3d 444
     (11th Cir. 1996), interprets the Supreme Court’s
    
    Lopez decision as requiring the government to show that the truck was used in an
    
    activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. In Denalli, this court held that
    
    a private home destroyed by the defendant was not used in interstate commerce. This
    
    court further held that the government must show that the private residence “was used
    
    in an activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce” in order to convict
    
    the defendant under § 844(i). Denalli, 90 F.3d at 444. Gentile contends that the
    
    government has not met this burden here.
    
          In Denalli, this court did hold that a conviction under the second prong of §
    
    844(i) is valid only if the property at issue was used in an activity that had “a
    
    
    
    
          4
           Because Gentile was not indicted under the first prong of § 844(i), we need not
    decide whether Gentile could have been convicted under that prong on the theory that
    the truck that he attempted to bomb was “property used in interstate or foreign
    commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
    
                                                5
    substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id.5 However, subsequent to the Denalli
    
    decision involving a private residence, this court has indicated that if business
    
    property is involved, then the property need only have been used in an activity that in
    
    the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States v.
    
    Chowdhury, 
    118 F.3d 742
    , 745 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). In Chowdhury, this
    
    court explained that a “case concerning the destruction of business property, when
    
    considered in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
    
    because business property will almost invariably be an element of a much broader
    
    commercial market.” Id. (citing Russell v. United States, 
    471 U.S. 858
    , 862 (1985));6
    
    see also United States v. Grimes, ___ F.3d ___, No. 96-2916, slip op. at 2688 (11th
    
    
          5
           In Denalli, the defendant was convicted under § 844(i) for burning down the
    home of his neighbors, the Federles. At trial, the government introduced evidence
    showing that Mr. Federle occasionally used his home computer to produce
    memoranda printed out at home and hand-delivered to co-workers at Harris
    Corporation, a company engaged in international business. See Denalli, 73 F.3d at
    330-31. Because this evidence “did not prove any impact of the memoranda on
    Harris’ contract with the Canadian government,” the Denalli court concluded that “no
    substantial effect on interstate commerce was proved.” Id.
          6
            The requirement that business property need only be used in an activity that
    in the aggregate affects interstate commerce is employed by the Ninth Circuit, which
    issued the seminal § 844(i) case upon which the Denalli court relied. See Denalli, 73
    F.3d at 330 (citing United States v. Pappadopoulos, 
    64 F.3d 522
     (9th Cir. 1995)); see
    also United States v. Gomez, 
    87 F.3d 1093
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a § 844(i)
    conviction for bombing a rental apartment because, “when considered in the
    aggregate, this commercial market undeniably has a substantial effect on interstate
    commerce.”).
    
                                              6
    Cir. June 8, 1998) (relying on Russell for the proposition that the legislative history
    
    of § 844(i) indicates that Congress intended to protect all business property).7
    
           Other decisions of this court either have recognized possible tensions created
    
    by Denalli or have suggested that it be limited to its facts. See Belflower v. United
    
    States, 
    129 F.3d 1459
    , 1461 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“We recognize that
    
    there is disagreement over whether the analysis applied by this Court in Denalli is
    
    consistent with other precedent in this circuit applying Lopez . . . .”), cert. denied, ___
    
    U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___ (1998);8 United States v. Chisolm, 
    105 F.3d 1357
    , 1357-58
    
    n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“Denalli involved a special case: the arson of a
    
    private residence.”). In the case sub judice, however, we do not address either the
    
    scope of Denalli or any tension created thereby, because even assuming arguendo that
    
    Denalli’s standard applies here, we conclude that government’s evidence was
    
    sufficient to sustain Gentile’s § 844(i) conviction.
    
    
           7
            Neither Chowdhury nor Grimes cites Denalli.
           8
            In Belflower, this court examined a sheriff’s deputy’s law enforcement duties
    in the aggregate to determine whether his patrol car was used in an activity–namely,
    his law enforcement duties–that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See
    id. at 1462. This court, however, recognized the distinction between commercial and
    non-commercial property, and did not adopt a broad rule, similar to the one
    recognized in Chowdhury, that law enforcement duties “almost invariably” have a
    substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. To the contrary, the court expressly
    declined to “establish a categorical rule that law enforcement is per se an activity that
    affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. at 1462 n.5.
    
                                                7
          The government’s evidence showed that the truck at issue here was the subject
    
    of an interstate lease at the time of Gentile’s attempted bombing. The truck was
    
    leased by the City of Palm Harbor, Florida from Ford Motor Company in Atlanta,
    
    Georgia. Because interstate truck leasing is itself a tangible component of interstate
    
    commerce, the truck necessarily was used in an activity that in the aggregate has a
    
    substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Chowdhury, 118 F.3d at 745; Denalli,
    
    90 F.3d at 444. Affirming Gentile’s conviction thus poses no risk of “embrac[ing]
    
    effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them . . .
    
    would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
    
    . . . .”   Denalli, 
    73 F.3d 330
     (quoting Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 526-27).
    
    Consequently, the government’s evidence satisfied the interstate nexus element of §
    
    844(i).9
    
    
          9
            If this court were not bound by Denalli, the government makes a strong
    argument that the second prong of § 844(i) requires no more than its language
    indicates: namely, that the property at issue be used in “any activity affecting
    interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Even a minimal effect on
    interstate commerce, therefore, would be sufficient.
           Lopez imposes no additional requirement. Lopez holds simply that Congress
    may regulate non-economic activity if Congress has a rational basis to determine that
    the proscribed activity (here, arson) substantially affects interstate or foreign
    commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 
    514 U.S. 549
    , 559 (1995); cf. United States
    v. Wright, 
    117 F.3d 1265
    , 1270 (11th Cir.) (“Congress had a rational basis to
    determine that a total ban on machine guns would have a substantial effect on
    interstate commerce.”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    118 S. Ct. 584
     (1997), vacated in
    part on other grounds, 
    133 F.3d 1412
     (11th Cir. 1998). A statute regulating non-
    
                                              8
    B.    Viscome’s § 844(i) Conviction
    
          Appellant Viscome also attacks the sufficiency of the government’s evidence
    
    regarding the interstate nexus element. However, Viscome’s guilty plea waived all
    
    non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings against him; and Viscome’s sufficiency
    
    of the evidence challenge is non-jurisdictional. See United States v. Fairchild, 
    803 F.2d 1121
    , 1124 (11th Cir. 1986). In any event, Viscome’s contention is without merit
    
    for the reasons discussed above regarding Appellant Gentile.
    
    
    economic activity necessarily satisfies Lopez if it includes a “jurisdictional element
    which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,” that the defendant’s particular
    offense “affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also United States
    v. Olin Corp., 
    107 F.3d 1506
    , 1509 (11th Cir. 1997).
           The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of
    “substantial effect” to sustain a conviction under § 844(i)’s second prong is consistent
    with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 
    135 F.3d 116
    , 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to
    show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i)), cert.
    denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    118 S. Ct. 1581
     (1998); United States v. Hicks, 
    106 F.3d 187
    ,
    190 (7th Cir.) (holding that § 844(i) requires the government only to “establish a
    minimal connection between the property at issue and some aspect of interstate
    commerce . . . .”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    117 S. Ct. 2425
     (1997); United States
    v. Melina, 
    101 F.3d 567
    , 573 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the contention that the
    government must show a “substantial effect” to satisfy the interstate commerce
    requirement under § 844(i)). This conclusion also is consistent with decisions of this
    court construing other statutes with the same relevant language as § 844(i)–namely,
    the “activity affecting interstate commerce” language. See United States v.
    Castleberry, 
    116 F.3d 1384
    , 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding after Lopez that the
    interstate nexus element of the Hobbs Act still requires the government to show only
    a minimal connection to interstate commerce); United States v. McAllister, 
    77 F.3d 387
    , 390 (11th Cir.) (holding the same regarding § 922(g)(1)), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
    ___, 
    117 S. Ct. 262
     (1996).
    
                                               9
    C.    Gentile’s § 2332a(a)(2) Conviction
    
          Appellant Gentile challenges the constitutionality of the version of §
    
    2332a(a)(2) under which he was convicted. Prior to sentencing, Gentile argued for
    
    the first time that the version of § 2332a(a)(2) under which he was convicted was
    
    unconstitutional.10 Thus, Gentile did not timely challenge the constitutionality of §
    
    2332a(a)(2) in the district court and, consequently, did not properly preserve this
    
    constitutional challenge for appeal. United States v. Walker, 
    59 F.3d 1196
    , 1198 (11th
    
    Cir. 1995) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 30). Nonetheless, this court, in its discretion, may
    
    review for plain error issues not preserved below. Id. Exercising our discretion, we
    
    review Gentile’s challenge to § 2332a(a)(2) for plain error.
    
          The version of § 2332a(a)(2) under which Gentile was convicted proscribed,
    
    inter alia, the use of weapons of mass destruction against a person within the United
    
    States, as follows:
    
          § 2332a. Use of weapons of mass destruction
    
           (a) Offense.—A person who uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a
          weapon of mass destruction—
           ...
            (2) against any person within the United States
           ...
          shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results,
    
    
          10
             Appellant Viscome never challenged the constitutionality of § 2332a(a)(2) in
    the district court.
    
                                              10
          shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for
          life.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) (1994). In April 1996, Congress amended § 2332a(a)(2) to
    
    include an element requiring the government to show in each case that the defendant’s
    
    conduct affects interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)
    
    (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) (1994)).11
    
          Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez, Gentile argues
    
    that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the
    
    
    
    
          11
            In its current form, § 2332a(a)(2) states as follows:
    
          § 2332a. Use of weapons of mass destruction
    
           (a) Offense against a national of the United States or within the United
          States.–A person who, without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or
          attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction . . .
           ...
            (2) against any person within the United States, and the results of such
          use affect interstate or foreign commerce or, in the case of a threat,
          attempt, or conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign
          commerce
           ...
          shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results,
          shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for
          life.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
    
                                              11
    version of § 2332a(a)(2) under which he was convicted.12 In Lopez, the Supreme
    
    Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) as exceeding
    
    Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. In so doing,
    
    the Court noted (a) that the GFSZA did not regulate any economic activity, (b) that
    
    it contained no interstate nexus requirement to “ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
    
    that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce,” and (c) that
    
    Congress made no findings regarding the effects of the proscribed activity on
    
    interstate commerce. Id. at 561-63.
    
          The version of § 2332a(a)(2) under which Gentile was convicted differed from
    
    the GFSZA in one important aspect. In enacting the original § 2332a(a)(2), Congress
    
    made explicit findings that the proscribed activity in issue substantially affected
    
    interstate commerce, as follows:
    
          The Congress finds that the use and threatened use of weapons of mass
          destruction, as defined by subsection (b) of this section, gravely harm the
          national security and foreign relations interests of the United States,
          seriously affect interstate and foreign commerce, and disturb the
          domestic tranquility of the United States.
    
    H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-405, at 46 (1991). Considering Congress’s experience in
    
    
          12
            Gentile also argues that the fact that Congress, after Lopez, amended §
    2332a(a)(2) to include an interstate nexus element proves as a matter of law that the
    original § 2332a(a)(2) was unconstitutional. We disagree. For purposes of
    determining whether a conviction under a statute is valid, the courts independently
    must determine whether that statute is constitutional.
    
                                              12
    regulating explosives and their effects,13 we accord these findings substantial
    
    deference. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, ___
    
    U.S. ___, 
    117 S. Ct. 1174
    , 1189 (1997) (“In reviewing the constitutionality of a
    
    statute, ‘courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of
    
    Congress.’”).14 Based on these findings, we conclude that Congress acted within its
    
    Commerce Clause authority in enacting the pre-amendment version of § 2332a(a)(2);
    
    thus, the district court did not commit plain error in not declaring § 2332a(a)(2)
    
    unconstitutional.15
    
          13
             See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 842-43 (prohibiting,
    among other things, the storage of explosives without a federal permit); 116 CONG.
    REC. 35,298-99 (1970) (detailing evidence showing the need for federal regulation of
    explosives and explaining the provisions of a proposed bill designed to achieve that
    end–the subsequently enacted Organized Crime Control Act of 1970); Russell v.
    United States, 
    471 U.S. 858
    , 860 n.5 (1985) (noting the evidence and hearings leading
    to the congressional regulation of explosives in 1970); see also United States v. Kirk,
    
    105 F.3d 997
    , 1001-02 (5th Cir.) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (noting that the
    federal government has regulated explosives heavily for over twenty-five years), cert.
    denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 47
     (1997); United States v. Dawson, 
    467 F.2d 668
    , 673 (8th
    Cir.1972) (“There being a rational basis upon which Congress properly could have
    determined that the misuse of explosive materials is one activity which, as a class,
    affects commerce, the Government need not specifically allege and prove a connection
    between interstate commerce and the conduct made criminal by § 842(h).”).
          14
           See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 
    512 U.S. 622
    , 666 (1994) (stating that the courts’ role is “to assure that, in formulating its
    judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
    evidence.”).
          15
            Gentile also argues that the original § 2332a(a)(2) was impermissibly broad
    to the extent it covered activities with no effect on interstate commerce. We do not
    
                                               13
    D.    Viscome’s § 2332a(a)(2) Conviction
    
          While Appellant Viscome also challenges the constitutionality of the original
    
    § 2332a(a)(2), the government contends that Viscome has waived this challenge by
    
    virtue of his guilty plea. We pretermit the issue regarding whether Viscome waived
    
    his challenge to the constitutionality of the pre-amendment § 2332a(a)(2) because,
    
    as discussed above, the district court did not commit plain error in not declaring the
    
    original § 2332a(a)(2) unconstitutional.16
    
                                     IV. CONCLUSION
    
          For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ convictions and sentences are
    
    
    
          AFFIRMED.
    
    
    consider this contention because, as discussed above, Gentile’s conduct had the
    requisite effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Raines, 
    362 U.S. 17
    , 21
    (1960) (“One to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
    attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
    other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.”).
          16
             Appellants also contend (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support
    Appellants’ convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and (2) that the district court
    erroneously sentenced them under § 924(c)(1). Additionally, Gentile contends that
    (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Gentile’s abusive
    acts toward his estranged wife; (2) the district court should have declared a mistrial
    based on an improper jury instruction; (3) his sentence constituted cruel and unusual
    punishment; and (4) the district court at sentencing (a) erred in finding that Gentile’s
    offense involved an offer of money and (b) engaged in impermissible double
    counting. Each of these contentions is without merit.
    
                                              14
    

Document Info

DocketNumber: 96-3049

Citation Numbers: 144 F.3d 1365

Filed Date: 6/26/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/6/2017

Authorities (23)

United States v. Denalli , 73 F.3d 328 ( 1996 )

United States v. McAllister , 77 F.3d 387 ( 1996 )

United States v. Chisholm , 105 F.3d 1357 ( 1997 )

United States v. Wright , 117 F.3d 1265 ( 1997 )

United States v. Chowdhury , 118 F.3d 742 ( 1997 )

Belflower v. United States , 129 F.3d 1459 ( 1997 )

United States v. James Griggs Raines , 362 U.S. 17 ( 1960 )

Russell v. United States , 471 U.S. 858 ( 1985 )

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC , 512 U.S. 622 ( 1994 )

United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549 ( 1995 )

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC , 520 U.S. 180 ( 1997 )

The United States v. James Dawson, A/K/A Roach , 467 F.2d 668 ( 1972 )

United States v. Ralph Leo Fairchild , 803 F.2d 1121 ( 1986 )

United States v. James Walker, A/K/A Gregory Glenn Harrell , 59 F.3d 1196 ( 1995 )

United States v. Katherine Pappadopoulos , 64 F.3d 522 ( 1995 )

96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4955, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7973 ... , 87 F.3d 1093 ( 1996 )

United States v. Gregory Lee Melina , 101 F.3d 567 ( 1996 )

United States v. William Joseph Kirk , 105 F.3d 997 ( 1997 )

United States v. Joey J. Hicks , 106 F.3d 187 ( 1997 )

Usa, Acting at Request of the Administrator of the United ... , 107 F.3d 1506 ( 1997 )

View All Authorities »