Gulf Power v. United States , 187 F.3d 1324 ( 1999 )


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                    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    
                             FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                    FILED
                             ___________________________
                                                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                                             ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                      No. 98-2403                 09/09/99
                             ___________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
                             D.C. Docket No. 3:96cv381/LAC         CLERK
    
    
    
    GULF POWER COMPANY, ALABAMA
    POWER COMPANY, an Alabama corporation,
    et al.,
                                                                Plaintiffs - Appellants,
                                                                Cross-Appellees,
    
                                            versus
    
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
    
                                                                Defendants - Appellees,
                                                                Cross-Appellants.
    
                             ____________________________
    
                       Appeals from the United States District Court
                           for the Northern District of Florida
                           ____________________________
                                  (September 9, 1999)
    
    Before EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and WATSON*, Senior Judge.
    
    _____________________
    *
     Honorable James L. Watson, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by
    designation.
    
    CARNES, Circuit Judge:
          The plaintiffs–Gulf Power Co., Alabama Power Co., Georgia Power Co.,
    
    Mississippi Power Co., Ohio Edison Co., Duke Power Co., and Florida Power
    
    Corp.–are electric utility companies who brought suit against the United States and
    
    the Federal Communications Commission seeking a declaration that the 1996
    
    amendment to the Pole Attachment Act, as codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224(f), is
    
    facially unconstitutional because it effects a taking of their property without an
    
    adequate process for securing just compensation, in violation of the Fifth
    
    Amendment. The district court agreed that the amendment effected a taking of
    
    property, but granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants after
    
    concluding the amendment did not deny the utilities an adequate process for
    
    securing just compensation. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district
    
    court’s judgment.
    
                                    I. BACKGROUND
    
          The plaintiffs, like other electrical utilities in this country, own vast
    
    networks of poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way which are used to supply
    
    electricity to consumers. Power lines are strung across public and private lands
    
    and millions of poles support those lines.1 Ducts and conduits–usually
    
    
    
          1
           For example, plaintiff Duke Power owns 1.8 million distribution poles
    located on 74,134 miles of public and private rights-of-way.
                                               2
    underground pipes encased in concrete–house electric conductors. Although the
    
    utilities were able to negotiate privately with some land-owners to secure rights-of-
    
    way, they also received substantial assistance from state governments in acquiring
    
    their networks. States routinely delegated to utilities their sovereign power of
    
    eminent domain so that they could acquire the needed rights-of-way. In addition,
    
    states allowed utilities to locate their network facilities, e.g., poles, on public
    
    rights-of-way.
    
          As with electric utilities, cable television companies must have a physical
    
    carrier for their cables in order to supply television signals to their customers.
    
    Because “underground installation of the necessary cables is impossible or
    
    impracticable[,] [u]tility company poles provide . . . virtually the only practical
    
    physical medium for the installation of television cables.” FCC v. Florida Power
    
    Corp., 
    480 U.S. 245
    , 247, 
    107 S. Ct. 1107
    , 1109 (1987). With the advent of cable
    
    television in the 1950's, it became common practice for cable companies to lease
    
    access to utility companies’ poles.
    
          Over time, however, cable companies grew upset with the access rates and
    
    complained to Congress that utilities “were exploiting their monopoly position by
    
    engaging in widespread overcharging.” Id. at 247, 107 S. Ct. 1109-10. Congress
    
    responded in 1978 by enacting the Pole Attachments Act, which was codified at 47
    
    U.S.C. § 224. In that act, Congress empowered the Federal Communications
    
                                                3
    Commission (“FCC”), in those states in which access rates were not already
    
    regulated, to determine "just and reasonable" rates a utility could charge cable
    
    companies for access to its poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way. See 47
    
    U.S.C. § 224(b). Congress restricted the FCC, however, to setting a rate within a
    
    statutorily defined range of minimum to maximum rates. See 47 U.S.C. §
    
    224(d)(1).2 Significantly, the Pole Attachments Act, as originally enacted in 1978,
    
    did not require a utility to provide cable companies access to its property. Instead,
    
    it provided that if a utility voluntarily chose to provide access, the rate charged for
    
    that access was subject to FCC regulation.
    
          Things stayed that way until 1996, when telecommunication carriers joined
    
    cable companies in demanding a right of access to utilities’ networks of poles,
    
    ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way. Telecommunication carriers were interested in
    
    using wire communications to carry their signals and, like cable companies, needed
    
    
    
          2
             Section 224(d)(1) provides: “[a] rate is just and reasonable if it assures a
    utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole
    attachments, nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of
    the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which
    is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual
    capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-
    way.” 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he
    minimum measure is thus equivalent to the marginal cost of attachments, while the
    statutory maximum measure is determined by the fully allocated cost of the
    construction and operation of the pole to which the cable is attached.” FCC v.
    Florida Power Corp. 480 U.S. at 253, 107 S. Ct. at 1113.
                                                4
    a physical carrier for their wires. Congress responded to these demands by
    
    amending the Pole Attachments Act as part of the Telecommunications Act of
    
    1996. For the purposes of this case, the most significant amendment is a
    
    mandatory access provision which provides that a "utility shall provide a cable
    
    television system or any telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access
    
    to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it." 47 U.S.C. §
    
    224(f)(1). The only exceptions to a utility’s mandatory obligation to provide
    
    access are where there is insufficient capacity or some safety, reliability, or other
    
    engineering problem. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2).
    
          Although Congress amended the Pole Attachments Act to require utilities to
    
    provide access to their property, it left intact the FCC’s authority to determine the
    
    compensation a utility is entitled to receive for providing that access. Hence, as
    
    before, the FCC determines the compensation a utility may receive for providing
    
    access by setting a “just and reasonable” rate within the range of minimum to
    
    maximum rates Congress set forth in the Act3; 47 U.S.C. § 224(d) describes the
    
    range of rates for cable companies’ access, while 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) describes the
    
    range of rates for telecommunication carriers’ access.
    
    
    
    
          3
          For convenience, we will hereinafter use the term “Act” to refer to the Pole
    Attachments Act as amended in 1996.
                                               5
          The FCC’s rate order, however, is not final. If a utility believes the rate set
    
    by the FCC fails to provide adequate compensation, it may seek relief by appealing
    
    directly to a United States Court of Appeals. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). Among other
    
    things, the court of appeals is empowered to enter “a judgment determining the
    
    validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, in whole or in part” the
    
    FCC’s order. 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a).
    
          As mentioned earlier, the plaintiffs are seven electric utility companies.
    
    Each falls within the Act’s definition of a “utility”4 and is therefore required to
    
    provide cable companies and telecommunication carriers access to its poles, ducts,
    
    conduits, and rights-of-way under the Act’s mandatory access provision. See 47
    
    U.S.C. § 224(f). The plaintiffs brought this suit in federal district court against the
    
    United States and the FCC (the “defendants”) seeking a declaration that the Act’s
    
    mandatory access provision is facially unconstitutional because it constitutes a
    
    taking of property without an adequate process for securing just compensation, as
    
    required by the Fifth Amendment. They also sought to permanently enjoin and
    
    restrain the defendants from enforcing the mandatory access provision.
    
    
    
    
          4
             The Act defines “utility” as “any person who is . . . an electric . . . public
    utility, and who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used in
    whole or in part, for any wire communications.” 47 U.S.C. § 224(a).
                                                6
          After the plaintiffs filed suit, the Association for Legal Telecommunication
    
    Services, which is a non-profit, national trade association representing
    
    telecommunications companies, and American Communication Services, which is
    
    a telecommunications service provider, intervened as party defendants. In
    
    addition, several national and state cable television associations participated as
    
    amici curiae supporting the defendants.
    
          The plaintiffs, defendants, and intervenors all moved for summary judgment.
    
    The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the Act’s mandatory access
    
    provision effected a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. However, it
    
    concluded the plaintiffs’ facial challenge failed because the Act provided an
    
    adequate process for securing just compensation for that taking. Accordingly, the
    
    district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment but granted the
    
    defendants' and intervenors' motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs
    
    appealed, contending that the district court erred in not finding that the Act’s
    
    mandatory access provision was unconstitutional. The defendants cross-appealed
    
    the court’s determination that the Act’s mandatory access provision effected a
    
    taking of property.
    
                                     II. DISCUSSION
    
          The plaintiffs’ contention that the Act’s mandatory access provision is
    
    facially unconstitutional requires us to address the following two issues. First,
    
                                               7
    does the Act’s mandatory access provision effect a taking of property? Second, if
    
    it does, is an adequate process available to a utility to secure just compensation for
    
    that taking? We address each issue in turn, applying a de novo standard of review.
    
    See, e.g., Rodriguez ex. rel. Rodriguez v. United States, 
    169 F.3d 1342
    , 1346 (11th
    
    Cir. 1999) (de novo standard applies to determination of a statute’s
    
    constitutionality). In addition, we note that because the plaintiffs are bringing a
    
    facial challenge to the Act, they must “establish that no set of circumstances exists
    
    under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 
    481 U.S. 739
    , 745,
    
    
    107 S. Ct. 2095
    , 2100 (1987) (emphasis added). See also New York State Club
    
    Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 
    487 U.S. 1
    , 11, 
    108 S. Ct. 2225
    , 2233 (1988) (“to
    
    prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged law . . .
    
    could never be applied in a valid manner.”) (quotation and citation omitted);
    
    Jacobs v. The Florida Bar, 
    50 F.3d 901
    , 906 n.20 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[w]hen a
    
    plaintiff attacks a law facially, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law
    
    could never be constitutionally applied.”)
    
     A. THE ACT’S MANDATORY ACCESS PROVISION EFFECTS A TAKING
                          OF PROPERTY
    
          In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
    458 U.S. 419
    , 102 S.
    
    Ct. 3164 (1982), the Supreme Court considered whether a statute which required
    
    landlords to permit permanent, physical occupation of their property by cable
    
    
                                               8
    companies constituted a taking. The Court held that it did and, in doing so,
    
    announced the following takings rule: “[A] permanent physical occupation
    
    authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it
    
    may serve.” Id. at 426, 102 S. Ct. at 3171. Among other arguments the Court
    
    rejected in announcing that rule was the argument that the statute was merely a
    
    “permissible regulation of the use of real property.” Id. at 439, 102 S. Ct. at 3178.
    
    The Court held that although property is subject to broad regulatory power, a
    
    regulation becomes a taking when the government authorizes permanent physical
    
    occupation by a third party. Id. at 439-40, 102 S. Ct. at 3178-79.
    
          We agree with the district court that Loretto dictates the conclusion that the
    
    Act’s mandatory access provision, 47 U.S.C. § 224(f), effects a taking of a utility’s
    
    property. Under § 224(f), a utility has no choice but to permit a cable company or
    
    telecommunication carrier to permanently occupy physical space on its poles,
    
    ducts, conduits and rights-of-way. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1) (“[a] utility shall
    
    provide a cable television system or any telecommunication carrier with
    
    nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or
    
    controlled by it.") (emphasis added). Such a permanent, physical occupation of
    
    property falls squarely within the Loretto rule.
    
          Our conclusion in that regard is consistent with FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,
    
    
    480 U.S. 245
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 1107
     (1987), in which the Supreme Court unanimously
    
                                              9
    reversed this circuit’s holding in Florida Power Corp. v. FCC, 
    772 F.2d 1537
     (11th
    
    Cir. 1985), that the pre-1996 version of this Act effected a taking of property under
    
    Loretto. In reaching that result, the Supreme Court stressed that unlike the statute
    
    in Loretto where the landlord was required to submit to permanent physical
    
    occupation, the pre-1996 version of the Act did not require a utility to give a third
    
    party access to its property. Without the “element of required acquiescence,” there
    
    was no taking under Loretto. FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252, 107 S.
    
    Ct. at 1112. The Court went on to note, however, that it was not deciding “what
    
    the application of [Loretto] would be if the FCC in a future case required utilities,
    
    over objection to enter into . . . pole attachment agreements.” Id. at 251-52 n. 6,
    
    107 S. Ct. at 1111-12 n.6. Today, that “future case” is before us: the “element of
    
    required acquiescence” lacking in the pre-1996 version the of the Act is now
    
    present in § 224(f). Because § 224(f) requires a utility to acquiesce to a permanent,
    
    physical occupation of its property, we conclude that the Act’s mandatory access
    
    provision effects a per se taking of a utility’s property under the Fifth Amendment.
    
          We are unconvinced by the defendants’ attempt to distinguish Loretto. In
    
    contending the mandatory access provision does not effect a taking, the defendants
    
    do not deny that § 224(f) compels a utility to submit to a permanent, physical
    
    occupation of its property. Instead, their primary contention is that there is no
    
    taking because the utilities covered by the Act, including the plaintiffs, never had
    
                                              10
    an absolute right to exclude permanent, physical occupation of their poles, ducts,
    
    conduits, and rights-of-way where that permanent occupation is for a public
    
    purpose authorized by the sovereign.
    
          The defendants’ argument in support of this contention that the utilities’
    
    bundle of rights never included the power to exclude, runs as follows. Utilities
    
    obtained the rights-of-way on which they constructed their poles, ducts, and
    
    conduits via the eminent domain power which states had conferred upon them.5
    
    Necessary to the utilities' ability to obtain property via eminent domain was that a
    
    public purpose was being served. That is so because private property may only be
    
    taken under the eminent domain power for a “public use.” See, e.g., Hawaii
    
    Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 
    467 U.S. 229
    , 245, 
    104 S. Ct. 2321
    , 2331 (1984).
    
    Because the utilities took the property with the understanding that they would have
    
    to put it to a public use, they were necessarily on notice that, in the future, the
    
    sovereign could require them to allow permanent occupation of their property by
    
    another entity also serving the public interest.6
    
          5
            The defendants concede some of the rights-of-way were obtained without
    resort to eminent domain, but argue these were acquired in the shadow of eminent
    domain because private parties knew that utilities could resort to eminent domain if
    their efforts to negotiate an agreement failed. So, we should treat all the rights-of-
    way as though obtained through the use of eminent domain, the defendants reason.
          6
             In addition, the defendants argue that the Act’s provision for payment to a
    utility for the permanent, physical occupation of its property somehow makes that
    occupation less of a taking. Although the fact of payment is, of course, relevant to
                                               11
          We find that argument unpersuasive. The Supreme Court has expressly
    
    recognized that the fact property was taken for a public use to begin with does not
    
    mean that it may be taken again for another public use without the payment of just
    
    compensation to its owner. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.
    
    Co., 
    195 U.S. 540
    , 573, 
    25 S. Ct. 133
    , 142 (1904), the Supreme Court stated: “The
    
    “right of way of a railroad is property devoted to a public use, and . . . as such is
    
    subject, to a certain extent, to state and Federal control. . . . But it has always been
    
    recognized . . . that a railroad right of way is so far private property as to be
    
    entitled to that provision of the Constitution which forbids its taking, except under
    
    the power of eminent domain and upon payment of [just] compensation.” The
    
    Court has also noted that “the property of a public utility, although devoted to the
    
    public service and impressed with a public interest, is still private property, and
    
    neither the corpus of that property nor the use thereof constitutionally can be taken
    
    for a compulsory price which falls below the measure of just compensation.”
    
    United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 
    280 U.S. 234
    , 249, 
    50 S. Ct. 123
    , 125 (1930),
    
    overruled on other grounds by, Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
    
    
    320 U.S. 591
    , 
    64 S. Ct. 281
     (1944).
    
    
    
    
    the just compensation issue, we fail to see how it makes the taking any less a
    taking. By analogy, a tort is not any less a tort because some compensation will be
    paid for the injury suffered.
                                               12
          Consistent with these principles, we conclude that the fact a utility gained its
    
    property knowing it would be subject to extensive regulation for the public use
    
    does not means its property may be taken for a public purpose without payment of
    
    just compensation, however laudable that public purpose might be. See also GTE
    
    Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission, 
    900 P.2d 495
    , 504 (Or. 1995) (en
    
    banc) (“[t]he facts that an industry is heavily regulated, and that a property owner
    
    acquired the property knowing that it is heavily regulated, do not diminish a
    
    physical invasion to something less than a taking.”). The defendants’ position that
    
    a property owner who initially obtained his property for public use should
    
    henceforth be on notice that the sovereign can authorize permanent occupation of
    
    his property without payment of just compensation has it backwards. A property
    
    owner is entitled to expect that the property it acquired via eminent domain, and
    
    paid just compensation for, came with the right all property has – not to be subject
    
    to government-coerced, permanent physical occupation without just compensation.
    
          We also find unpersuasive the three arguments raised by the amici in support
    
    of the defendants’ position that the mandatory access provision does not effect a
    
    taking of property. First, the amici argue the mandatory access provision should be
    
    viewed merely as part of Congress’ broad power to regulate property being used
    
    for the public interest. Because a utility’s rights-of-way are regularly used for
    
    serving the public, a utility may not exclude others whom Congress has determined
    
                                              13
    require access, amici argue. That argument fails because it ignores the Loretto rule
    
    that “[a] permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
    
    without regard to the public interests that it may serve.” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426,
    
    102 S. Ct. at 3171 (emphasis added).
    
           Next, amici point out that the Supreme Court in Duquesne Light Co. v.
    
    Barasch, 
    488 U.S. 299
    , 307, 
    109 S. Ct. 609
    , 615 (1989), recognized that a utility
    
    has a “partly public, partly private status.” That status, they argue, distinguishes a
    
    utility from the purely private property owner who suffered the taking in Loretto.
    
    Because a utility has a “partly public” status, the argument goes, a utility lacks a
    
    right to exclude others whom Congress has determined must have access to serve
    
    the public. But Duquesne’s discussion of utilities was not in the context of a
    
    takings case dealing with the permanent occupation of property. Nothing in
    
    Duquesne suggests a utility’s property is less subject to protection against
    
    permanent, physical occupation than anyone else’s property. It is not. Put
    
    differently, we do not believe that Duquesne carved out an exception to the Loretto
    
    rule for the property of utilities.
    
           Third, amici characterize the mandatory access provision as a simple
    
    regulatory condition designed to prevent utilities from exercising monopoly control
    
    over their network of poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of way, and which is
    
    thereby intended to promote the Telecommunications Act of 1996's general goal of
    
                                              14
    fostering competition in the communications market. Such a regulation is
    
    particularly necessary, they say, because the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
    
    among its other provisions, made it easier for electric utilities to enter and compete
    
    in the communications market. This argument is meritless. Characterizing the
    
    mandatory access provision as a regulatory condition, even one allegedly designed
    
    to foster competition, cannot change the fact that it effects a taking by requiring a
    
    utility to submit to a permanent, physical occupation of its property. However
    
    laudatory its motive, Congress’ power to regulate utilities does not extend to taking
    
    without just compensation the right of a utility to exclude unwanted occupiers of
    
    its property.
    
          Finally, we reject the intervenors’ argument that the mandatory access
    
    provision is not a taking because electric utilities, such as the plaintiffs, could
    
    avoid the effect of the Act by refraining from using their poles, ducts, conduits, and
    
    rights-of-way for wire communications. This argument is made possible because
    
    the Act’s definition of a “utility” subject to the mandatory access provision covers
    
    only electric utilities who use their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way for
    
    wire communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(a). We see the point, but we think this
    
    argument is foreclosed by Loretto. The protection against a permanent, physical
    
    occupation of one’s property does not hinge on the choice of use for that property.
    
    See Loretto 458 U.S. at 439 n.17, 102 S. Ct. at 3178 n.17 (“A landlord’s ability to
    
                                               15
    rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation
    
    for a physical occupation. [This] broad ‘use-dependency’ argument proves too
    
    much. . . . The right of a property owner to exclude a stranger’s physical
    
    occupation of his land cannot be so easily manipulated.”). Put another way, the
    
    bundle of rights that a utility has in its property includes the right to permit its use
    
    for wire communications, and exercise of that right may not be conditioned on
    
    being forced to submit to a permanent, physical occupation of its property without
    
    payment of just compensation.
    
          In sum, we agree with the district court’s holding that the mandatory access
    
    provision effects a per se taking of property under the Fifth Amendment, which
    
    leads us to the issue of whether the Act provides an adequate process for obtaining
    
    just compensation for the taking.
    
    B. THE ACT PROVIDES AN ADEQUATE PROCESS FOR OBTAINING JUST
     COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING EFFECTED BY THE MANDATORY
                         ACCESS PROVISION
    
          The fact that the Act’s mandatory access provision effects a taking of
    
    property does not, by itself, make it unconstitutional. “The Fifth Amendment does
    
    not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just
    
    compensation.” Williamson County Regional Planning Com’n v. Hamilton Bank,
    
    
    473 U.S. 172
    , 194, 
    105 S. Ct. 3108
    , 3120 (1985). The Supreme Court has made
    
    the requirements clear: “[A]ll that is required is that a reasonable, certain, and
    
                                               16
    adequate provision for obtaining compensation exist at the time of the taking. If
    
    the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and
    
    if resort to that process yields just compensation, then the property owner has no
    
    claim against the Government for a taking.” Id. at 194-95, 105 S. Ct. at 3120-21
    
    (internal citation and quotations omitted).
    
          The plaintiffs contend the Act fails to provide a constitutionally adequate
    
    process for obtaining just compensation, for two reasons. First, they argue the
    
    process is constitutionally inadequate because it violates separation of power
    
    principles by delegating to the FCC, instead of a court, the initial task of
    
    determining the compensation a utility receives. Second, they argue the Act’s
    
    provision limiting the FCC to awarding a “just and reasonable” rate within the
    
    range of rates set by Congress, see 47 U.S.C. § 224(b), will prevent a utility from
    
    receiving the constitutionally required rate of just compensation. We address each
    
    argument in turn.
    
                1. Whether the Act Violates Separation of Power Principles
    
          In support of their argument that the Act’s process for providing
    
    compensation violates separation of power principles, the plaintiffs rely primarily
    
    on Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 
    148 U.S. 312
    , 
    13 S. Ct. 622
    
    (1893). In that case, the Supreme Court had before it a statute in which Congress
    
    had imposed limits on the amount of compensation a property owner could receive
    
                                              17
    after Congress had authorized the taking of his property. The property owner
    
    contended that under Congress’ limitations, he had not received just compensation.
    
    The Supreme Court agreed, rejecting the notion Congress could both authorize a
    
    taking and conclusively determine the level of just compensation due. The Court
    
    stated:
    
          By this legislation [C]ongress seems to have assumed the right to determine
    
          what shall be the measure of compensation. But this is a judicial, and not a
    
          legislative, question. The legislature may determine what private property is
    
          needed for public purposes; that is a question of a political and legislative
    
          character. But when the taking has been ordered, then the question of
    
          compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the
    
          property, through [C]ongress or the legislature, its representative, to say
    
          what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the rule of
    
          compensation. The [C]onstitution has declared that just compensation shall
    
          be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry.
    
    Id. at 327, 13 S. Ct. at 626. The Court went on to note that “[t]he right of the
    
    legislature . . . to apply the property of the citizen to the public use, and then to
    
    constitute itself the judge of its own case, to determine what is the ‘just
    
    compensation’ it ought to pay therefor, . . . cannot for a moment be admitted or
    
    
    
                                               18
    tolerated under our [C]onstitution.” Id. at 327-28, 13 S. Ct. at 627 (internal
    
    quotation and citation omitted).
    
          According to the plaintiffs, Monongahela requires us to hold that the Act
    
    fails to provide a utility an adequate process to obtain just compensation for the
    
    taking of its property. That is so, they argue, because under the Act, the FCC has
    
    the initial task of determining the compensation a utility receives for the taking of
    
    its property by setting a “just and reasonable” rate within the range of minimum to
    
    maximum rates established by Congress. The plaintiffs assert that such a
    
    legislative delegation of power to the FCC usurps their right, as recognized in
    
    Monongahela, to a judicial ascertainment of just compensation.
    
          The plaintiffs also seek to support their position by citing our opinion in
    
    Florida Power Corp. v. FCC, 
    772 F.2d 1537
     (11th Cir. 1985), a decision which was
    
    reversed by the Supreme Court, see, FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 
    480 U.S. 245
    ,
    
    
    107 S. Ct. 1107
     (1987). As mentioned earlier, we held in Florida Power that an
    
    FCC rate order issued pursuant to the pre-1996 version of the Act constituted a
    
    taking under Loretto. That holding led us to also address whether the utility had
    
    received just compensation for that taking. The pre-1996 version of the Act was
    
    identical to the current Act insofar as it assigned to the FCC the initial task of
    
    setting the compensation a utility received for providing access to its property.
    
    
    
                                               19
          We said in Florida Power that this process was unconstitutional under
    
    Monongahela because it “does not allow for a judicial determination of what
    
    constitutes just compensation.” Id. 772 F.2d at 1546. It was our view at the time
    
    that Congress had prescribed in the Act “a ‘binding rule’ in regard to the
    
    ascertainment of just compensation” and therefore had “usurped what has long
    
    been held an exclusive judicial function.” Id. The plaintiffs concede that in light of
    
    the Supreme Court’s reversal of our Florida Power decision, our statements
    
    concerning the adequacy of the process for obtaining just compensation are not
    
    binding under the prior panel precedent rule.7 Nonetheless, they argue our
    
    reasoning in that prior decision supports their position that the Act’s process for
    
    providing just compensation is constitutionally inadequate.
    
          Although the concerns raised by the plaintiffs and discussed in our opinion
    
    in Florida Power merit consideration, we are unpersuaded that the Act’s process
    
    
          7
            The plaintiffs are correct to concede that our Florida Power decision is not
    binding. For any part of a decision to be binding under the prior panel precedent
    rule, the decision must not have been vacated or reversed by the Supreme Court--it
    must have survived the possibility of Supreme Court review. Our statements about
    the constitutional adequacy of the process for obtaining just compensation do not
    meet that test, because the Supreme Court had no occasion to address the issue in
    light of its holding that the pre-1996 version of § 224 did not result in a taking of a
    utility’s property. See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 254 n.8, 117 S. Ct.
    at 1113 n.8 ( “Our disposition of the takings question makes it unnecessary to
    review on the merits the Court of Appeals’ holding that Congress may not establish
    standards under which the initial determination of compensation will be made by
    an administrative authority subject to final judicial review.”).
                                              20
    for providing a utility with compensation amounts to an impermissible invasion of
    
    the judicial branch’s realm. True, it is ultimately the responsibility of the judicial
    
    branch to ensure that the compensation awarded for a taking satisfies the
    
    constitutional standard of just compensation. See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 327,
    
    13 S. Ct. at 626. Thus, if Congress (or the executive branch) attempts to impose a
    
    limitation on the measure of compensation for a taking, a court must evaluate that
    
    standard to see if it is consistent with the constitutionally mandated level of just
    
    compensation, and a court is not bound to follow that standard in making judicial
    
    determinations of the compensation due if the standard fails to secure just
    
    compensation.
    
          However, the fact that our constitutional scheme dictates that the judicial
    
    branch is entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that just
    
    compensation is awarded does not mean the other branches of government must be
    
    excluded from the process of determining the proper level of just compensation.
    
    Nothing in Monongahela or any other Supreme Court precedent compels such a
    
    conclusion. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated that “all that is required
    
    is that a reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation
    
    exist at the time of the taking. If the government has provided an adequate process
    
    for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process yields just compensation,
    
    then the property owner has no claim against the Government for a taking.”
    
                                              21
    Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95, 105 S. Ct. at 3120-21 (citation and
    
    quotation omitted). While a process in which the judicial branch does not make
    
    the final determination of what constitutes just compensation may be
    
    constitutionally inadequate, we see no constitutional problem with a process that
    
    employs an administrative body, such as the FCC, to determine just compensation
    
    in the first instance. Indeed, use of an administrative body with some technical
    
    expertise over the subject matter of the property to be valued likely will aid the
    
    judiciary in arriving at a more reliable determination of the proper level of just
    
    compensation. So long as an administrative body’s decision concerning the level
    
    of compensation owed for a taking remains subject to judicial review to ensure just
    
    compensation, use of an administrative body can be a valid part of “provid[ing] an
    
    adequate process for obtaining compensation.” Id.
    
          Our conclusion that an administrative body may participate in the process of
    
    determining just compensation where its decision is subject to judicial review is
    
    consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Wisconsin Central Limited v.
    
    Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
    95 F.3d 1359
    , 1369 (7th Cir. 1996). In
    
    that case, some railroads argued that the procedures Wisconsin had provided for
    
    obtaining just compensation for a taking were constitutionally inadequate because
    
    the Wisconsin legislature had authorized an administrative body to set the level of
    
    compensation in the first instance. But the administrative determination was
    
                                              22
    subject to judicial review in the Wisconsin courts. The Seventh Circuit decided
    
    that: “The railroads are quite correct that a decision concerning the just
    
    compensation owed one whose property is taken is the province of judicial -- not
    
    legislative -- determination. However, as Williamson County illustrates, this
    
    requirement is satisfied by the availability of judicial review. The Fifth
    
    Amendment does not require a judicial determination of just compensation in the
    
    first instance on each occasion of a taking of private property.” Id. at 1369.
    
             Accordingly, we conclude that the fact that the Act assigns to the FCC, an
    
    administrative body with some special expertise in the technical aspects of pole
    
    attachments, the task of initially determining a utility’s compensation does not, by
    
    itself, render the process for providing compensation constitutionally inadequate.
    
    The more relevant issue is whether the judicial review of the FCC’s determination
    
    that is available ensures that the final and conclusive determination of the just
    
    compensation owed to a utility is made by the judicial branch. We turn now to that
    
    issue.
    
             A utility that believes the rate ordered by the FCC fails to provide just
    
    compensation for the taking of its property may appeal the FCC’s rate order
    
    directly to a federal appeals court. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (providing generally for
    
    appeals from FCC orders). The appeals court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment
    
    concerning the validity of the FCC’s order and may enforce its judgment with an
    
                                                23
    injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (“The court of appeals . . . has exclusive
    
    jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the
    
    validity of . . . all final orders of the [FCC] made reviewable by [47 U.S.C. §
    
    402(a)]”; 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (“The court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction
    
    to make and enter . . . a judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting
    
    aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.”). In addition, 5
    
    U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) provides:
    
          To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
    
          court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
    
          and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
    
          of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . . hold
    
          unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
    
          to be . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
    
          immunity . . .
    
    (emphasis added). The issue of whether the rate ordered by the FCC provides a
    
    utility just compensation for a taking effected by the Act is, of course, a
    
    constitutional issue. Thus, the federal appeals court to which an appeal is taken has
    
    jurisdiction to decide that an FCC rate order is constitutionally invalid because it
    
    does not provide just compensation. Under the statutory scheme, it is the judicial
    
    
    
                                               24
    branch which will, consistent with Monongahela, make the ultimate determination
    
    of just compensation due for a taking of a utility’s property under the Act.
    
          To be sure, an appellate court is not the usual forum in which factual issues
    
    such as the proper level of just compensation are resolved, and is not the forum we
    
    would have chosen. But Congress has the right to specify the process so long as it
    
    is adequate for a judicial determination of just compensation. An appellate court
    
    has at least five means at its disposal to gather the information needed to determine
    
    just compensation, and those means are sufficient to provide a utility with a full
    
    and fair opportunity to submit for judicial consideration all relevant evidence
    
    bearing on the question of just compensation. The five means are as follows:
    
          1) The court may rely on the evidentiary submissions in the record
    
          from the FCC proceeding when they are sufficient for the task.
    
          2) If the court determines the record from the FCC proceeding is
    
          insufficient, it may remand the case and direct the FCC to supplement
    
          the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (the court of appeals may “order .
    
          . . additional evidence . . . to be taken by the agency” where requested
    
          to do so by one of the parties).
    
    
    
    
                                             25
          3. The court may transfer the case to the district court for a full
    
          hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3).8
    
          4. The court may appoint a special master pursuant to F.R.A.P. 48 to
    
          hold hearings and gather any additional information the court needs to
    
          decide the just compensation issue.
    
          5. The court may fashion any other "appropriate modes of procedure" to
    
          gather the evidence it needs to conduct its factual inquiry pursuant to its
    
          authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C § 1651. See Harris v. Nelson,
    
          
    394 U.S. 286
    , 299, 
    89 S. Ct. 1082
    , 1090-91 (1969) (recognizing that courts
    
          may rely on their authority under the All Writs Act "in issuing orders
    
          appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries.").
    
    Depending on the particular facts of a case, one or some combination of those five
    
    means will provide the appellate court with a sufficient basis to determine the
    
    proper level of just compensation owed to a utility. That part of the process is
    
    adequate.
    
    
    
          8
            We note that the option of transferring the case to the district court for a
    hearing is available only when the FCC has not conducted a formal hearing prior to
    issuing its rate order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3). Of course, if the FCC has
    conducted a hearing, we would expect the record available to the appellate court to
    be more complete and hence there would be less need for transferring the case to
    the district court for a hearing. Any incompleteness in the FCC hearing record
    could also be rectified by a remand to the FCC.
                                              26
          Once the appellate court has made a determination of the proper level of just
    
    compensation owed, it is positioned to resolve a utility’s appeal of the FCC rate
    
    order and ensure that the utility does not suffer a taking without just compensation.
    
    If the court, based on its determination of the proper level of just compensation,
    
    concludes the rate awarded by the FCC provides just compensation, then it will
    
    simply affirm the FCC’s rate order. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
    467 U.S. 986
    , 1013, 
    104 S. Ct. 2862
    , 2878 (1984) (where statutory arbitration procedure for
    
    providing compensation for a taking of property results in payment of just
    
    compensation, property owner has no claim against the government for a taking
    
    without just compensation).
    
          On the other hand, if the court determines the FCC rate fails to provide just
    
    compensation and the rate which would do so falls within the range of rates
    
    specified in 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)-(e) which the FCC is authorized to award, then the
    
    court will set aside the FCC rate order and order (or as the relevant statutory
    
    provision says, “enjoin”) the FCC to enter a new rate order designed to provide
    
    that the utility receives just compensation calculated from the date the cable
    
    company or telecommunication carrier first obtained access under the Act’s
    
    mandatory access provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (“The court of appeals . . .
    
    has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter . . . a judgment determining the
    
    validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, . . the [FCC’s] order . . . .”)
    
                                               27
    Directing the FCC to issue a rate order providing that a utility receive the just
    
    compensation rate from the date it was first required to provide access under the
    
    mandatory access provision will ensure a utility receives just compensation both
    
    prospectively and in the period prior to the court’s determination of the just
    
    compensation rate. Cf. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
    
    Co., 11 FCC Rcd. 11202, 11216 (1996) (in the event “the recomputed rates are in
    
    excess of that paid by [the attacher], we require [the attacher] to pay the difference,
    
    with interest, to [the utility].”). Such an order ensures that a utility is not forced to
    
    continue to provide mandatory access to its property unless it receives just
    
    compensation, as determined by a court, for the taking. See Williamson County,
    
    473 U.S. at 194, 105 S. Ct. at 3120 (“[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the
    
    taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.”)
    
          Nonetheless, the plaintiffs contend that even if the court can guarantee the
    
    award of just compensation in some cases, there might be cases in which it could
    
    not do so. Specifically, they raise the possibility that the just compensation rate
    
    might exceed the statutory maximum rate, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)-(e),
    
    which the FCC is authorized to award. Were that to occur, they assert that the
    
    court could not order the FCC to award a rate above the maximum rate specified in
    
    the Act and that a utility would therefore not receive the just compensation rate.
    
    
    
                                               28
    Accordingly, they argue that because the process fails to ensure that a utility
    
    receives just compensation in those situations, the Act is unconstitutional.
    
          That argument does not fit in this lawsuit, because this is a facial challenge.
    
    “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
    
    mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
    
    exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 
    481 U.S. 739
    , 745, 
    107 S. Ct. 2095
    , 2100 (1987) (emphasis added). See also New York
    
    State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 
    487 U.S. 1
    , 11, 
    108 S. Ct. 2225
    , 2233
    
    (1988) (“[t]o prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
    
    challenged law . . . could never be applied in a valid manner.”); Jacobs v. The
    
    Florida Bar, 
    50 F.3d 901
    , 906 n.20 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[w]hen a plaintiff attacks a
    
    law facially, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law could never be
    
    constitutionally applied.”)
    
          The plaintiffs have not carried that burden in this case. As we have already
    
    discussed, there are a readily identifiable set of circumstances in which the Act
    
    provides a constitutionally adequate process for ensuring a utility receives just
    
    compensation. Specifically, where the court determines that the rate awarded by
    
    the FCC provides just compensation, the court can affirm the FCC rate order.
    
    Conversely, if the FCC rate does not provide just compensation, the court can
    
    direct the FCC to enter a new order providing the just compensation rate, at least in
    
                                              29
    those circumstances where the just compensation rate falls within the statutory
    
    range specified in 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)-(e).
    
          Even if the plaintiffs are correct in stating that the court could not direct the
    
    FCC to award a rate exceeding the statutory maximum -- an issue we need not
    
    decide here -- the plaintiffs have identified, at most, one hypothetical set of
    
    circumstances in which the Act would not provide an adequate process to ensure a
    
    utility receives just compensation. But conjuring up one hypothetical set of
    
    circumstances in which the Act could operate in an unconstitutional manner does
    
    not suffice to establish that the Act is facially unconstitutional.9
    
          In sum, we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the Act fails to provide an
    
    adequate process for a utility to obtain just compensation because it violates
    
    
          9
            We use the word “hypothetical” because the plaintiffs have not pointed to
    any evidence demonstrating that the just compensation rate will ever exceed the
    statutory maximum rate. Their failure to do so is significant for another reason as
    well. Three Supreme Court Justices have recently questioned Salerno’s “no set of
    circumstances” formulation of the facial challenge standard and suggested that a
    plaintiff can prevail on a facial challenge by merely showing the Act is
    unconstitutional in most cases. See City of Chicago v. Morales, – U.S. –, –, 119 S.
    Ct. 1849, 1858-59 n.22 (1999) (plurality op.) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg,
    J.); Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 
    517 U.S. 1174
    , 1175 & n.1, 
    116 S. Ct. 1582
    ,
    1583 & n.1 (1996) (Memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari.) (Stevens, J.).
    See also Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 
    87 F.3d 457
    , 459
    (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing disagreement among the Justices concerning “how
    high the threshold for facial invalidation should be set.”). Because the plaintiffs
    have not shown the just compensation rate will ever fall outside the statutory range,
    let alone that it will do so in most cases, their facial challenge fails even under the
    more permissive formulation suggested by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
                                               30
    separation of power principles. Had the Act eliminated all possibility of judicial
    
    review and made the FCC the final arbiter of a utility’s compensation, we would be
    
    faced with a different situation, but the Act does not do that. Instead, as we have
    
    explained, the Act merely provides that the FCC has the first cut at fashioning the
    
    compensation a utility receives for the taking of its property. Allowing an
    
    administrative body, such as the FCC, a role in the process of determining just
    
    compensation for a taking is permissible so long as its order is subject to judicial
    
    review to ensure that a court makes the ultimate determination of just
    
    compensation. That is what we have here: the FCC’s rate order is subject to
    
    review by an appellate court which has the power both to determine the proper
    
    level of just compensation and to ensure that the utility receives just compensation,
    
    at least where the just compensation rate falls within the statutory range of rates
    
    specified in 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)-(e).
    
     2. Whether Limiting the FCC to Awarding a “Just and Reasonable” Rate Makes
     the Act’s Process for Awarding Just Compensation Constitutionally Inadequate
    
          We turn now to the plaintiffs’ alternative argument in support of their
    
    position that the Act fails to provide a constitutionally adequate process for a utility
    
    to obtain just compensation. They argue the Act’s provision limiting the FCC to
    
    awarding a “just and reasonable” rate within the range of rates set by Congress, see
    
    47 U.S.C. § 224(b), will prevent the FCC from awarding a utility the
    
    
                                              31
    constitutionally required rate of just compensation. The plaintiffs begin by noting
    
    that the Act’s “just and reasonable” rate formula is the same formula the FCC was
    
    required to apply in calculating compensation for access to a utility’s property
    
    before the mandatory access provision was added to the Act. Hence, a utility’s rate
    
    of compensation for forced access to its property (a taking) is governed by the
    
    same standard as when it voluntarily provided access. The plaintiffs say that fact
    
    renders the process for awarding just compensation for the taking constitutionally
    
    inadequate.
    
          According to the plaintiffs, because a utility’s property is now being taken,
    
    the rate it was able to collect when it was voluntarily providing access is no longer
    
    appropriate. That is so, they argue, because the standard for determining just
    
    compensation for a taking should be more rigorous than that for determining a rate
    
    for providing voluntary access. Citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 
    488 U.S. 299
    , 307, 
    109 S. Ct. 609
    , 615 (1989), the plaintiffs point out that the rate a utility is
    
    entitled to receive for providing access voluntarily must only be “not so unjust as
    
    to be confiscatory.” In contrast, they say, the Supreme Court has defined “just
    
    compensation” more expansively. (citation and quotation omitted). For example,
    
    in United States v. Miller, 
    317 U.S. 369
    , 374, 
    63 S. Ct. 276
    , 280 (1943), the Court
    
    defined just compensation as “fair market value,” which is "what it fairly may be
    
    believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given.” (citation and
    
                                               32
    quotation omitted). Thus, the plaintiffs contend, by providing that a utility receive
    
    the same rate for forced access as it received for voluntary access, the Act fails to
    
    provide an adequate process for a utility to obtain just compensation. Cf.
    
    Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 
    912 F.2d 1262
    , 1314-19 (11th Cir. 1990) (en
    
    banc) (Tjoflat, C.J., dissenting) (endorsing the proposition that the “just
    
    compensation price” a utility receives for a taking should satisfy a “more stringent
    
    standard” than the standard that applies in setting rates, because in one instance the
    
    utility is acting under compulsion while in the other instance it has “voluntarily
    
    undertaken to operate in a regulated industry”), vacated, City Gas Co. v.
    
    Consolidated Gas Co., 
    499 U.S. 915
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 1300
     (1991).
    
          As an initial matter, we do not believe this issue is ripe for decision. Shorn
    
    of its packaging about the regulatory price versus the just compensation price, the
    
    issue comes down to whether the Act is unconstitutional because it says the FCC
    
    shall order a “just and reasonable” rate instead of saying it shall order a rate that
    
    provides “just compensation.” At this point, however, we are merely dealing with
    
    abstractions and not with concrete facts; it would require sheer speculation for us
    
    to conclude that the actual rates ordered by the FCC will fail to provide just
    
    compensation. Even the plaintiffs seem to concede this point when they note in
    
    their reply brief that they are not challenging the Act’s “formula” for providing
    
    compensation. In light of the speculative nature of the inquiry, this issue is not
    
                                               33
    “fit[] . . . for judicial decision” at this juncture. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
    
    
    387 U.S. 136
    , 148-49, 
    87 S. Ct. 1507
    , 1515 (1967) (“basic rationale” of the
    
    ripeness requirement is “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
    
    adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements”).
    
          We do not mean to imply that if this issue were ripe for decision we would
    
    be persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument. The Duquesne decision they rely upon was
    
    not interpreting any aspect of this Act, either before or after its 1996 amendment.
    
    Instead, that decision merely held that in a regulated industry the level of
    
    compensation set by the government must not be so low as to be confiscatory. See
    
    Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 307, 109 S. Ct. at 615. There is nothing in Duquesne, or in
    
    the record before us, which indicates that the rate of compensation provided in this
    
    Act ( before its amendment) for voluntarily provided access was just above
    
    confiscation. We have no reason to assume that the rate under the prior version of
    
    the Act was only minimally adequate to meet constitutional requirements for
    
    voluntary access, and thus, in the plaintiffs’ view, constitutionally inadequate
    
    under the current Act for forced access situations. Indeed, for all we know, it is
    
    just as likely that the earlier rate formula gave the utilities industry more than the
    
    constitutional minimum.
    
          In any event, as we have explained, the FCC’s determination of the
    
    compensation a utility receives is not conclusive under the Act. A utility that
    
                                               34
    believes the FCC’s rate order fails to provide just compensation may appeal that
    
    order to the court of appeals. The court will then make a judicial determination of
    
    the proper level of just compensation and ensure that the utility is not required to
    
    provide access to its property at a rate that does not provide just compensation.10
    
    That said, we decide nothing about the relationship between the “just and
    
    reasonable” rate specified in the Act and just compensation required by the
    
    Constitution, because that issue is not ripe for decision.
    
                                    III. CONCLUSION
    
          To sum up, we conclude the Act’s mandatory access provision effects a
    
    taking of a utility’s property but that the Act is not facially unconstitutional under
    
    the Fifth Amendment, because, at least in most cases, it provides a constitutionally
    
    adequate process which ensures a utility does not suffer that taking without
    
    obtaining just compensation. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment in favor of
    
    the defendants is AFFIRMED.
    
    
    
    
          10
             As with our discussion of the first argument, we are assuming here that the
    just compensation rate falls within the statutory range specified in 47 U.S.C. §
    224(d)-(e) and, in the absence of any evidence that the just compensation rate will
    ever fall outside that range, we leave for another day the issue of what happens if it
    does.
                                              35
    

Document Info

DocketNumber: 98-2403

Citation Numbers: 187 F.3d 1324

Filed Date: 9/9/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016

Authorities (21)

Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States , 148 U.S. 312 ( 1893 )

Western Union Tel. Co. v. PENN. RR , 195 U.S. 540 ( 1904 )

United Rs. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore v. West , 280 U.S. 234 ( 1930 )

United States v. Miller , 317 U.S. 369 ( 1943 )

Power Comm'n v. Hope Gas Co. , 320 U.S. 591 ( 1944 )

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136 ( 1967 )

Harris v. Nelson , 394 U.S. 286 ( 1969 )

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. , 458 U.S. 419 ( 1982 )

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff , 467 U.S. 229 ( 1984 )

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986 ( 1984 )

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank ... , 473 U.S. 172 ( 1985 )

FCC v. Florida Power Corp. , 480 U.S. 245 ( 1987 )

United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 ( 1987 )

New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York , 487 U.S. 1 ( 1988 )

Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch , 488 U.S. 299 ( 1989 )

Florida Power Corporation v. Federal Communications ... , 772 F.2d 1537 ( 1985 )

Consolidated Gas Company of Florida, Inc. v. City Gas ... , 912 F.2d 1262 ( 1990 )

harry-n-jacobs-richard-r-mulholland-david-w-singer-v-the-florida-bar , 50 F.3d 901 ( 1995 )

wisconsin-central-limited-an-illinois-corporation-fox-valley-western , 95 F.3d 1359 ( 1996 )

60-socsecrepser-523-12-fla-l-weekly-fed-c-589-marciano-rodriguez , 169 F.3d 1342 ( 1999 )

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