Bishop v. Reno , 210 F.3d 1295 ( 2000 )

  •                                                                                       PUBLISH
                                 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                            FILED
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                          _______________                     ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                  APR 24 2000
                                                                               THOMAS K. KAHN
                                          No. 98-4109                               CLERK
                               D. C. Docket No. 96-2457-CV-FAM
    OF PRISONS, U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
    WARDEN, DADE COUNTY JAIL, Federal Detention
    Center, Miami, U.S. PAROLE,
                           Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the Southern District of Florida
                                        (April 24, 2000)
    Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and OWENS*, Senior District
    * Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, U.S. Senior District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia, sitting
    by designation.
    BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
            This appeal requires us to determine whether a district court has subject matter
    jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus relief for a foreign sentence of a United States
    citizen, who is serving the foreign sentence in the United States pursuant to treaty
    transfer. The district judge granted habeas relief and reduced the foreign sentence. We
    reverse and remand for dismissal.
                                       I. BACKGROUND
            In July, 1995, petitioner-appellee and United States citizen, William Bishop, was
    convicted by a Bahamian court of conspiracy to possess with intent to supply 1,956
    pounds of marijuana. He was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment and an
    $80,000 fine. If Bishop failed to pay the fine by the end of this five-year term of
    imprisonment, then the Bahamian court sentenced him to serve an additional five years
    in prison "bringing the to[t]al imprisonment to 10 years." R1-1-Exh. A-1.1
            In a March 22, 1996, letter to the Attorney General of the Bahamas, the United
    States Department of Justice ("DOJ") requested that Bishop be transferred to the
    United States to serve the remainder of his sentence pursuant to the Council of Europe
    Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867,
    T.I.A.S. No. 10824 (entered into force in the United States on July 1, 1985) ("Treaty"),
         The Bahamian prison authorities subsequently accorded Bishop a "[r]emission" of three
    years and four months that commuted his imprisonment term to six years and eight months,
    which made him "due for discharge on the 11th March, 2002. 11/3/2002." R1-1-Exh.1-2.
    to which the United States and the Bahamas are signatories.                    The DOJ letter
    specifically states that "[t]he United States will apply the 'continued enforcement'
    provision of the [Treaty] to the United States nationals transferred from the Bahamas
    to serve their sentences in the United States." R1-11-Exh. D, Attachment C. In
    accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4108, a United States magistrate judge conducted a
    hearing in the Bahamas that included Bishop and other similarly sentenced offenders
    to verify their consent to the transfer.
            At this April 10, 1996, hearing, Bishop and the other convicted transferees were
    represented by an assistant federal public defender from the Southern District of New
    York. That counsel subsequently testified at an evidentiary hearing that he advised the
    transferees "that a sentence can only be modified or set aside by a proceeding brought
    in the Bahamas and not in the United States."2 R2-9. During the hearing, the
    magistrate judge explained the consequences of the convicts' consent to transfer. He
    informed the sworn transferees collectively: "[Y]ou understand that your conviction
    or sentence can only be modified or set aside through appropriate proceedings brought
    by you, or on your behalf, in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. " R1-11-Exh. E-13.
    Bishop raised his hand acknowledging his understanding. Pursuant to individual
         The assistant federal public defender testified that he informed Bishop that the worst case
    scenario was that he would serve ten years of imprisonment "[l]ess good time" earned in the
    Bahamas and in the United States. R2-14.
    questioning as to understanding of the result of the transfer, Bishop stated that he
    understood the consequences. See id. at 18. In the presence of the magistrate judge,
    Bishop additionally signed a verified consent form, showing his agreement to being
    transferred to the United States to serve the remainder of his Bahamian sentence.3
             Because Bishop did not pay his imposed fine, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP")
    calculated his sentence to include the additional five-year incarceration ordered by the
    Bahamian court if the fine was not paid.4 This five-year term subsequently was
    translated by the United States Parole Commission ("Parole Commission") into
    supervised release.5 An assistant federal public defender in the Southern District of
    Florida wrote the BOP on Bishop's behalf that his imprisonment for his inability to pay
    his fine violated the United States Constitution under Tate v. Short, 
    401 U.S. 395
    , 91
            In relevant part, the verified consent states:
                      My conviction or sentence can only be modified or set aside
                      through appropriate proceedings brought by me or on my behalf in
                      the Commonwealth of The Bahamas;
                      COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS
              R1-11-Exh. F.
         Although his statutory release date was set as August 17, 2004, his projected satisfaction
    date with anticipated adjustments was July 26, 2003. See R1-1-Exh. C at 3.
        After an evidentiary hearing, the Parole Commission reduced Bishop's incarceration term
    from 120 months to 60 months to be followed by 60 months of supervised release.
    4 S. Ct. 668
     (1971). While the BOP acknowledged that a defendant's imprisonment
    because of his inability to pay a fine would be unconstitutional in the United States, it
    explained that "the sentence is enforceable in the United States as required by the
    treaty. The defendant was fully aware of, and accepted, the conditions under which the
    transfer was made." R1-1-Exh. D at 5 (BOP Bahamian Foreign Treaty Sentences
    memorandum). The BOP response further advised "that the defendant's method of
    relief should be taken up with the Bahamian courts or by way of a petition for a writ
    of habeas corpus with the federal court." Id. at 6.
          The assistant federal public defender then filed a petition for writ of habeas
    corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in federal court for the Southern District of Florida and
    asserted that a prison term imposed for indigence "may not be enforced and a federal
    court has authority to release an inmate from service of such an illegal sentence." R1-
    1-3. In a consolidated response for respondents Attorney General Janet Reno, the BOP
    Director, and the Federal Detention Center Warden, the government asserted that the
    district court was without jurisdiction under the Treaty to modify Bishop's Bahamian
    sentence. Because of his verified and documented consent to the conditions of his
    transfer to the United States to serve the remainder of his Bahamian sentence, the
    government alternatively argued that Bishop had waived his right to challenge his
    Bahamian sentence in a United States court.
          Following two reports and recommendations by a magistrate judge that Bishop's
    habeas corpus petition be granted as well as an evidentiary hearing, the district judge
    conducted a status conference in Bishop's case and the other transferee cases presenting
    the same issue. With respect to Bishop, the following exchange occurred between the
    assistant federal public defender and the district judge:
          [COUNSEL]: When Mr. Bishop filed his initial petition, he had a ten year
          sentence. The Parole Commission has reduced that to five years, which
          was the imprisonment relief he sought by way of this petition, but they
          tacked on a five year period of supervised release to follow.
                  As to Mr. Bishop, our request is for the Court to strike the five year
          period of supervised release which would make his sentence longer in
          THE COURT: What authority do I have to do that? I either vacate — you
          get the whole thing or nothing.
          [COUNSEL]: You could. That is an alternative you have. You can either
          strike — you can vacate the treaty transfer determination of the Parole
          Commission completely. They can hold a new hearing or you can just
          strike that portion of it which offends the constitution which at this point
          is the supervised release portion of five years.
    R3-4, 5 (emphasis added). The government maintained its position that the district
    judge was without jurisdiction to strike any part of Bishop's sentence based on his
    Bahamian sentence.
          Thereafter, the district judge granted Bishop's habeas petition by striking the
    Bahamian five-year sentence for failure to pay his fine: "The terms of imprisonment
    that were imposed shall be ADAPTED, in accordance with the U.S. - Bahamas Treaty,
    Art. 10 § 2, Art. 9 § 3, to include only that portion of the sentence which was actually
    imposed, and not the remaining portion which is optional upon the payment of a fine."
    R1-36-2. Although Bishop has completed the incarceration portion of his sentence, he
    remains on supervised release pending this appeal. On appeal from the grant of habeas
    relief to Bishop, the government pursues its argument that the district court lacked
    jurisdiction to reduce Bishop's Bahamian sentence.6
                                          II. DISCUSSION
            Subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is a legal question that we review
    de novo. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 
    72 F.3d 844
    , 846 (11th Cir. 1996). "Federal
    courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and "possess only that power authorized by
    Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377,
    114 S. Ct. 1673
    , 1675 (1994); see Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 
    514 U.S. 300
    , 307, 
    115 S. Ct. 1493
    , 1498 (1995) (stating that the jurisdiction of "federal courts . . . is grounded
    in, and limited by, statute"). "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
    jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
          The government also maintains on appeal its alternative argument that, even if the district
    court has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief on a foreign sentence being served in the United
    States, Bishop's sworn consent to transfer to the United States to serve the remainder of his
    sentence waived such a collateral challenge. Because we decide that a district court lacks
    jurisdiction to grant habeas relief for a foreign sentence being served in the United States
    pursuant to the Treaty, we need not address this alternative waiver argument.
    jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675 (citation omitted). "As
    courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal district courts possess no warrant to create
    jurisdictional law of their own." Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des
    Bauxites de Guinee, 
    456 U.S. 694
    , 711, 
    102 S. Ct. 2099
    , 2109 (1982).
          Questions of statutory and treaty interpretation present legal questions that are
    subject to plenary review. See United States v. MacAllister, 
    160 F.3d 1304
    , 1306 (11th
    Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 
    120 S. Ct. 318
     (1999); United States
    v. Puentes, 
    50 F.3d 1567
    , 1575 (11th Cir. 1995). "[I]t is a well established axiom of
    statutory interpretation that in construing a statute, courts must first look to the plain
    meaning of the statute itself." Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 
    758 F.2d 1426
    , 1430 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). "When the text of the statute is clear,
    our interpretive inquiry ends." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 517
    , 538, 
    114 S. Ct. 1023
    , 1035 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). "'In expounding a statute, we must not
    be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of
    the whole law, and to its object and policy.'" Philbrook v. Glodgett, 
    421 U.S. 707
    , 713,
    95 S. Ct. 1893
    , 1898 (1975) (citation omitted). Penal laws are construed strictly
    because legislatures, not courts, define crimes and establish punishments. See Yates
    v. United States, 
    354 U.S. 298
    , 304, 
    77 S. Ct. 1064
    , 1069 (1957), overruled on other
    grounds, Burks v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 1
    98 S. Ct. 2141
     (1978). Therefore, "we
    must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences." Jay v.
    351 U.S. 345
    , 357, 
    76 S. Ct. 919
    , 927 (1956).
              "When interpreting a treaty, we 'begin "with the text of the treaty and the
    context in which the written words are used."'" Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
    v. Schlunk, 
    486 U.S. 694
    , 699, 
    108 S. Ct. 2104
    , 2108 (1988) (citations omitted). In
    construing treaties, "'"we may look beyond the written words to the history of the
    treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.'"" Id. at
    700, 108 S.Ct. at 2108. Under the Supremacy Clause, "an Act of Congress, which
    must comply with the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty." 7 Reid v. Covert,
    354 U.S. 1
    , 18, 
    77 S. Ct. 1222
    , 1231 (1957). While we construe treaties and statutes
    alike in determining meaning from the terms, see United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
    504 U.S. 655
    , 663, 
    112 S. Ct. 2188
    , 2193 (1992), the "rule of equality" prohibits
    implementing statutory law that renders any treaty term nugatory, Asakura v. City of
    265 U.S. 332
    , 341, 
    44 S. Ct. 515
    , 516, amended on other grounds, 
    44 S. Ct. 634
          The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
    which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
    the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI,
    cl. 2. We note that this case does not involve a statute that is subsequent to and inconsistent
    with a treaty, which would render the treaty void to the extent of the conflict. See Reid, 354 U.S.
    at 18, 77 S.Ct. at 1231; see also Herrmann v. Meese, 
    849 F.2d 101
    , 103 (3d Cir. 1988)
    (concluding that the preceding statutes that implement this Treaty were intended to apply to
    future treaties).
            To decide if the district court had jurisdiction to grant collateral, habeas relief
    on a foreign sentence is to delineate the interaction between the Treaty and the
    implementing statutes, which determine the procedure in the United States for
    administering a foreign-imposed sentence to be completed here. See Cannon v. U.S.
    Dep't of Justice, 
    973 F.2d 1190
    , 1197 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Procedural legislation which
    makes operation of a Treaty more convenient cannot amend or abrogate a self-
    executing Treaty.").       The Treaty signatories recognized "that foreigners who are
    deprived of their liberty as a result of their commission of a criminal offense should be
    given the opportunity to serve their sentences within their own society" and "that this
    aim can be achieved by having them transferred to their own countries." 8 Treaty, 35
    U.S.T. at 2870 (preamble)9; see Kanasola v. Civiletti, 
    630 F.2d 472
    , 474 (6th Cir.
          The Treaty defines "'sentence'" as "any punishment or measure involving deprivation of
    liberty ordered by a court for a limited or unlimited period of time on account of a criminal
    offence," and "'judgment' means a decision or order of a court imposing a sentence." Treaty, art.
    1, §§ a, b, 35 U.S.T. at 2870. The terms "'sentencing State,'" meaning "the State in which the
    sentence was imposed on the person who may be, or has been, transferred," and "'administering
    State,'" meaning "the State to which the sentenced person may be, or has been, transferred in
    order to serve his sentence" because he is a citizen of that country, id. at art. 1, §§ c, d, also are
    referenced respectively in this opinion as "sentencing country" and "administering country."
    We additionally include the reasoning of other circuit courts that have addressed similar transfer
    treaties with analogous provisions.
         Explaining the general considerations behind the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced
    Persons, the Council of Europe stated:
                          In facilitating the transfer of foreign prisoners, the
                   convention takes account of modern trends in crime and penal
                   policy. . . . As penal policy has come to lay greater emphasis
                   upon the social rehabilitation of offenders, it may be of paramount
    1980) (per curiam) (acknowledging that our country enters into transfer treaties with
    foreign nations "to permit an American citizen convicted of a crime in a foreign
    country to serve his sentence in a prison at home where conditions are much better").
    Nevertheless, "[a] sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses
    against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents
    to surrender its jurisdiction." Wilson v. Girard, 
    354 U.S. 525
    , 529, 
    77 S. Ct. 1409
    , 1412
    (1957). Furthermore, provisions of our Constitution, including the writ of habeas
    corpus, "have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United
    States against the laws of a foreign country"; an American citizen who commits a
    crime in a foreign country is subject to trial and punishment under the laws of that
    country. Neely v. Henkel, 
    180 U.S. 109
    , 122, 123, 
    21 S. Ct. 302
    , 307 (1901).
          "A sovereign does not lose its power to keep a convict in custody by turning the
    convict over to another sovereign for service of a sentence. . . .'[T]he question of
                  importance that the sanction imposed on the offender is enforced
                  in his home country rather than in the state where the offence was
                  committed and the judgment rendered. This policy is also rooted
                  in humanitarian considerations: difficulties in communication by
                  reason of language barriers, alienation from local culture and
                  customs, and the absence of contacts with relatives may have
                  detrimental effects on the foreign prisoner. The repatriation of
                  sentenced persons may therefore be in the best interests of the
                  prisoners as well as of the governments concerned.
    Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons
    at 6-7, ¶ 9 (1983) (hereinafter "Explanatory Report").
    jurisdiction and custody is one of comity between the two governments and not a
    personal right of the prisoner.'" Tavarez v. U.S. Attorney General, 
    668 F.2d 805
    , 809
    (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). Because foreign governments
    likely would not consent to the transfer of United States citizens serving sentences in
    their countries for crimes committed while abroad if the United States were to
    disregard the convictions and sentences of transferees in this country, jurisdictional
    exclusivity is a reasonable treaty term. See Rosado v.Civiletti, 
    621 F.2d 1179
    , 1200
    (2d Cir. 1980) ("In assessing the interacting interests of the United States and foreign
    nations, 'we must move with the circumspection appropriate when [a court] is
    adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international relations.'"
    (quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 
    358 U.S. 354
    , 383, 
    79 S. Ct. 468
    , 486 (1959) (alteration in original)).
          A "sentence" under the Treaty means imprisonment for a criminal conviction.
    See Treaty, art. 1, § a, 35 U.S.T. at 2870. The Treaty "applies only" to implementing
    this "deprivation of liberty . . . regardless of whether the person concerned is already
    serving his sentence or not." Explanatory Report at 8, ¶ 13. Upon agreement between
    the sentencing country and the administering country to a prisoner's transfer, see
    Treaty, art. 3, § 1, ¶ f, 35 U.S.T. at 2872, enforcement of the sentence is suspended in
    the sentencing country, see Treaty, art. 8, § 1, 35 U.S.T. at 2876, and the administering
    country must either continue or convert the sentence of the sentencing country, see
    Treaty, art. 9, § 1, 35 U.S.T. at 2876. See also Asare v. United States Parole Comm'n,
    2 F.3d 540
    , 541 (4th Cir. 1993) (interpreting this Treaty).   The distinction between
    "continued enforcement" and "conversion of sentence" in the administering country is
    that the former "continues to enforce the sanction imposed in the sentencing state,"
    although it may be adapted in accordance with the Treaty, while the latter converts the
    sentence "into a sanction of the administering state, with the result that the sentence
    enforced is no longer directly based on the sanction imposed in the sentencing state."
    Explanatory Report at 15, ¶ 46.
          When the administering country elects continued enforcement, as in this case,
    the Treaty provides:
                                    Continued enforcement
          1. In the case of continued enforcement, the administering State shall be
          bound by the legal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by
          the sentencing State.
          2. If, however, this sentence is by its nature or duration incompatible with
          the law of the administering State, or its law so requires, that State may,
          by a court or administrative order, adapt the sanction to the punishment
          or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offense. As to its
          nature, the punishment or measure shall, as far as possible, correspond
          with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced. It shall not aggravate,
          by its nature or duration, the sanction imposed in the sentencing State, nor
          exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the administering State.
    Treaty, art. 10, 35 U.S.T. at 2876. Consequently, the administering country "is bound
    by" two conditions of the sentence as imposed by the sentencing country: the legal
    nature and the duration of the sentence. Explanatory Report at 16, ¶ 49. "Legal
    nature" means "the kind of penalty imposed where the law of the sentencing state
    provides for a diversity of penalties involving deprivation of liberty, such as penal
    servitude, imprisonment or detention." Id. "Duration" is the term of the sentence to
    be served in the administering country, subject to that country's decision on conditional
    release or remission corresponding to the original sentence and "taking into account
    the time served and any remission earned in the sentencing state up to the date of
    transfer." Id.
          When the sentencing country and the administering country "have different
    penal systems with regard to the division of penalties or the minimum and maximum
    lengths of sentence," Explanatory Report at 16, ¶ 50, the Treaty permits the
    administering country to adapt the sentence in accordance with "the punishment or
    measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence," Article 10, § 2 . This
    adaptation by the administering country, however, is restricted: the administering
    country may adapt the original sentence so long as it does not render a more severe
    detention in nature or duration than the sentence imposed by the sentencing state "and
    it must not exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the administering state."
    Explanatory Report at 16, ¶ 50. Under the adaptation procedure of Article 10, § 2, the
    administering country adapts the original sentence "to an equivalent sanction
    prescribed by its own law in order to make the sentence enforceable" and "thus
    continues to enforce the sentence imposed in the sentencing state, but it does so in
    accordance with the requirements of its own penal system." Id.; see Herrmann v.
    849 F.2d 101
    , 102-03 (3d Cir. 1988) (interpreting the same Treaty with the
    Explanatory Report, the Third Circuit determined that Article 10, § 2 is applicable only
    if the government chooses to adapt the foreign sentence). In contrast to the adaptation
    procedure of Article 10, § 2, the sentence conversion of Article 11 "substitutes a
    sanction for that imposed in the sentencing state." Explanatory Report at 16, ¶ 50.
          Additionally, Article 13 provides that "[t]he sentencing State alone shall have
    the right to decide on any application for review of the judgment." Treaty, art. 13, 35
    U.S.T. at 2878. The Treaty defines "judgment" as the sentencing order of the court in
    the sentencing country. See Treaty, art. 1, § b; Explanatory Report at 8, ¶ 14. While
    the convicted prisoner may challenge his sentence factually and legally, the exclusive
    jurisdiction of the sentencing country to review the sentence is justified because such
    "review proceedings are not part of enforcement" in the administering country.
    Explanatory Report at 18, ¶ 60. Under the plain meaning of its terms, "[t]he Treaty
    does not create new rights which enable a foreign convict to have a review of an
    otherwise final foreign judgment." Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 
    615 F.2d 873
    , 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming denying habeas relief to United States citizen
    serving remainder of Mexican sentence in federal penitentiary).
          Significantly, the DOJ's letter informed the Bahamian government that the
    United States would continue Bishop's Bahamian sentence. Under the Treaty, that
    election committed the United States to maintain the nature and duration of Bishop's
    Bahamian sentence, although adaptation in accordance with our penal law was
    permissible. See Treaty, art. 10, 35 U.S.T. at 2876; Herrmann, 849 F.2d at 102-03.
    The Treaty terms, therefore, required the United States to retain Bishop's Bahamian
    sentence of five years of imprisonment for his drug crime, with an additional five years
    of imprisonment for his failure to pay his $80,000 fine as imposed by the Bahamian
             Our implementing legislation governing treaty transferees who are completing
    their foreign sentences in the United States, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3244 and 4100 et seq.,11 is
          Because this appeal relates only to Bishop's original Bahamian sentence, we do not address
    specifically any credits or adjustments applied to that sentence either in the Bahamas or in the
    United States.
           The Transfer of Offenders To and From Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4100 et seq.
    (1977), authorizes the Attorney General "to make regulations for the proper implementation of
    such treaties in accordance with this chapter and to make regulations to implement this chapter."
    18 U.S.C. § 4102(4). Thus, the various provisions establish the procedure by which the foreign
    sentence of a Treaty transferee is translated into a United States sentence appropriate for
    domestic penal enforcement. "Upon the receipt of an offender who is on parole from the
    authorities of a foreign country, the Attorney General shall assign the offender to the Parole
    Commission for supervision." 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(a). The Sentencing Guidelines apply to the
    sentences of transferees whose convictions occurred after November 1, 1987, as in this case. See
    18 U.S.C. § 4106A(c); Cannon, 973 F.2d at 1196 & n.36.
            The Parole Commission is designated to adapt the foreign sentence so that it can be
    administered under the laws of the United States and to determine a "release date" from
    incarceration together with the period and conditions of supervised release "as though the
    offender were convicted in a United States district court of a similar offense." See 18 U.S.C. §
    4106A(b)(1)(A); see Tramel v. United States Parole Comm'n, 
    100 F.3d 129
    , 130 (11th Cir. 1996)
    (per curiam) (stating that the Parole Commission "ha[s] jurisdiction to determine a release date
    and a period of supervised release for each [transferred] prisoner"). "The combined periods of
    imprisonment and supervised release" determined by the Parole Commission "shall not exceed
    the term of imprisonment imposed by the foreign court" on the transferee. 18 U.S.C. §
    4106A(b)(1)(C); see Cannon, 973 F.2d at 1197 & n.42 (recognizing that "the [Parole]
    Commission is not free to vary the total sentence of a Treaty prisoner," consisting of
    incarceration plus supervised release); see also Tramel, 100 F.3d at 131 ("When the applicable
    sentencing guideline range exceeds the full term of the sentence imposed by a foreign court, a
    transfer treaty prisoner's foreign sentence should be treated by the Parole Commission as
    analogous to a § 5G1.1(a) 'guideline sentence.'"). Consequently, the Parole Commission is in an
    analogous position to that of the district court relative to the convicted transferee, and the United
    States court of appeals for the circuit where the transferee is imprisoned at the time of the Parole
    Commission's determination has jurisdiction for an appeal therefrom. See 18 U.S.C. §
    4106A(b)(2)(A); Trevino-Casares v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 
    992 F.2d 1068
    , 1069, 1070 (10th Cir.
    1993) (explaining that, because the Parole Commission translates the transferee's foreign
    consistent with the Treaty in establishing procedure in the United States for
    administering foreign sentences. Section 3244 provides:
          When a treaty is in effect between the United States and a foreign country
          providing for the transfer of convicted offenders—
                  (1) the country in which the offender was convicted shall
                  have exclusive jurisdiction and competence over
                  proceedings seeking to challenge, modify, or set aside
    sentence into an imprisonment release date and supervised release under § 4106A(b)(1)(A), "it is
    in procedure, substance, and effect tantamount to the imposition of a federal sentence," and thus,
    § 4106(b)(2)(A) "expressly makes the [Parole] Commission's determination directly appealable
    to the circuit level"); see also Asare, 2 F.3d at 542 (addressing this Treaty and the implementing
    statutes). "[T]he [Parole] Commission's order is not subject to collateral attack," Bennett v.
    United States Parole Comm'n, 
    83 F.3d 324
    , 328 (10th Cir. 1996), and "circuit courts of appeal
    have no original jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions," Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at
    1070. Although the Parole Commission transforms the foreign sentence into a federal sentence,
    its function is discrete: "[t]he [Parole] Commission is authorized to determine a release date and
    period of supervised release, not to sentence the transferred prisoner." Navarrete v. United
    States Parole Comm'n, 
    34 F.3d 316
    , 319 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
             Separate from the Parole Commission's translation of a transferee's foreign sentence into
    a surrogate sentence that complies with United States penal law for service in this country is the
    BOP's implementation of that sentence of the convicted transferee with its determination of
    foreign and domestic good-time credits in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a), (b). See 18
    U.S.C. § 4105(c)(1); Ajala v. United States Parole Comm'n, 
    997 F.2d 651
    , 656 (9th Cir. 1993)
    ("[T]he calculation and award of foreign and domestic credits is not part of the [Parole]
    Commission's § 4106A determination, but is a matter for the Bureau of Prisons."); see also 18
    U.S.C. § 4105(a) ("[A]n offender serving a sentence of imprisonment in a foreign country
    transferred to the custody of the Attorney General shall remain in the custody of the Attorney
    General under the same conditions and for the same period of time as an offender who had been
    committed to the custody of the Attorney General by a court of the United States for the period
    of time imposed by the sentencing court."). Pursuant to § 4105(c)(1), "the application of service
    credits is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a), which indicates, uncontroversially, that such credits
    are applied to the sentence of confinement the prisoner is serving." Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at
    1072 (emphasis added). Dissatisfaction with the BOP's determination is addressed in federal
    district court by a habeas corpus petition. See Asare, 2 F.3d at 544. Thus, the distinct functions
    performed by the Parole Commission and the BOP "have separate procedural routes for judicial
    review." Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1069.
                  convictions or sentences handed down by a court of such
                  (3) all proceedings instituted by or on behalf of an offender
                  transferred to the United States pertaining to the manner of
                  execution in the United States of the sentence imposed by a
                  foreign court shall be brought in the United States district
                  court for the district in which the offender is confined or in
                  which supervision is exercised . . . .
    18 U.S.C. § 3244(1), (3) (emphasis added). With respect to § 3244, jurisdiction in the
    Bahamian courts or federal district court turns on whether Bishop's habeas corpus
    proceeding is one "to challenge, modify, or set aside" his Bahamian sentence, §
    3244(1), which plainly reserves jurisdiction in the sentencing court in the foreign
    country,12 or pertains solely "to the manner of execution in the United States" of his
          The House Report explains the policy concerns behind limiting jurisdiction to challenge a
    foreign sentence to the sentencing country and specifically addresses habeas corpus relief:
                     [Section 3244(1), formerly 28 U.S.C. § 2256,] provides that exclusive
            jurisdiction of any proceeding seeking to challenge, modify, or set aside
            convictions or sentences shall be in the country in which the offender was
            convicted and sentenced. Some question has been raised as to whether this is an
            improper limitation o[n] an individual's right, under the United States
            Constitution, to seek a writ of Habeas Corpus. This provision does not, in any
            way, suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus. It merely states that certain types of
            challenges—to foreign convictions and sentences—may not be brought in
            American courts.
                     Witnesses before the Subcommittees of both the House and Senate
            Judiciary Committees were unanimous that such a provision is constitutionally
            valid. . . . [I]t is important to note that these provisions were considered essential
            in protecting the integrity of the judicial process of the respective countries and in
            securing approval for prisoner exchange treaties, in the past and presumably in
            the future. The Departments of Justice and State indicated that neither the United
            States nor any other country which is currently a party or expected to become a
            party to a treaty for the execution of penal sentences would have acquiesced to a
    Bahamian sentence, § 3244(3), which places jurisdiction in the district court in the
    district where the convicted transferee is imprisoned or supervised.13 Once a sentence
    has been imposed by a foreign sentencing court and translated by the Parole
    Commission into a sentence under our penal law, it is the BOP's determination of
    service credits that has been challenged in habeas corpus proceedings under "manner
    of execution."14 See Kass v. Reno, 
    83 F.3d 1186
    , 1191 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Congress
    made it clear that despite the provision barring United States courts from reviewing the
    validity of a foreign conviction or sentence, 'a transferred offender may challenge in
             provision which would permit the courts of the Receiving State to set aside or
             modify a sentence imposed by the courts of the Transferring State. Otherwise the
             fundamental sovereignty of a nation over crimes committed within its territorial
             boundaries would be impugned.
    H.R. Rep. No. 95-720, at 41-42 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3164-3165
    (emphasis added); see 28 U.S.C. § 4100(c) ("An offender shall not be transferred to or from the
    United States if a proceeding by way of appeal or of collateral attack upon the conviction or
    sentence be pending.").
          See Boyden v. Bell, 
    631 F.2d 120
    , 121 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that 18 U.S.C.
    § 3244(3) "confers jurisdiction upon the district court of the district in which the transferring
    prisoner is confined to hear any challenges to the manner of execution of a sentence imposed by
    a foreign court").
          Since the administration of service credits, including calculation, awarding, and
    withholding, is done by the BOP under 18 U.S.C. § 3624, this process involves the execution
    rather than the imposition of sentence; thus, this function of the BOP is a matter for habeas
    corpus review in the district court. See Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070; Boyden, 631 F.2d at
    122-23 (challenging award of remission credits affecting parole); see also Jones v. Cunningham,
    371 U.S. 236
    83 S. Ct. 373
     (1963) (holding that parole constitutes custody amenable to habeas
    corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); United States v. Tubwell, 
    37 F.3d 175
    , 177 (5th Cir.
    1994) (upholding denial of parole, the Fifth Circuit recognized that a habeas petition under 28
    U.S.C. § 2241 "challeng[es] the manner in which [a] sentence is being executed rather than the
    validity of [the] conviction and sentence").
    the [United States] . . . the manner of the execution of his confinement' and '[a]ny
    challenge in the courts of the [United States], other than to the foreign conviction or
    sentence is not precluded by [the implementing statutes], or any treaty.'" (quoting H.R.
    Rep. No. 95-720, at 43 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3165)
    (alterations in original) (emphasis added)). The district judge adopted the magistrate
    judge's conclusion that Bishop's habeas petition "involve[d] questions concerning both
    the nature of the sentence and the execution of the sentence." R1-32-4. Accordingly,
    the district judge determined that he properly had jurisdiction to consider Bishop's
    habeas petition pursuant to § 3244(3), and that is the argument of Bishop's counsel in
    this court.
           We disagree. Although the district judge purported to have adapted Bishop's
    Bahamian sentence, he actually converted it into a new sentence by impermissibly
    eliminating the additional five-year imprisonment term of Bishop's sentence for failure
    to pay the $80,000 fine imposed by the Bahamian court. Because the United States had
    informed the Bahamian government that it would continue the original sentence, the
    district judge had no jurisdiction to convert or override Bishop's Bahamian sentence
    by fiat, when neither the Treaty nor the implementing statutes authorizes a district
    judge to convert a foreign-imposed sentence. Furthermore, the district judge did not
    even have jurisdiction to adapt Bishop's Bahamian sentence because Congress has
    charged the Parole Commission with the authority to translate a foreign sentence of a
    transferee into a sentence recognized under United States law. See 18 U.S.C. § 4106A;
    Asare, 2 F.3d at 542 (recognizing that the Treaty and statutory scheme do not authorize
    the Parole Commission to impose a new sentence but to translate the original, foreign
    sentence into one that can be administered under United States law).
             As we have explained, the term of Bishop's sentence, as adapted by the Parole
    Commission to retain his Bahamian sentence, was consistent with and not "in violation
    of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."15 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
    The implementing statutes clarify "that while the laws of the receiving nation shall
    govern the manner in which the sentence is served, the laws of the sentencing nation
    shall continue to govern both the validity of the conviction and the term of the
    sentence." Tavarez, 668 F.2d at 808. Therefore, we reverse the district judge's grant
    of habeas relief to Bishop because the judge had no jurisdiction to entertain Bishop's
    habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence, much less to eliminate the supervised
    release established by the Parole Commission to retain the original Bahamian sentence.
    See Bennett v. United States Parole Comm'n, 
    83 F.3d 324
    , 328 (10th Cir. 1996).
                                       III. CONCLUSION
           To the extent that Bishop argues that this appeal and issues regarding his sentence are
    moot, our explanation of his original sentence, as appropriately adapted in compliance with the
    Treaty and implementing statues by the Parole Commission and not the district judge, nullifies
    this argument.
          This appeal concerns whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to
    consider habeas corpus relief for a foreign-imposed sentence of a United States citizen
    who is to serve the remainder of his sentence in the United States pursuant to Treaty
    transfer. As analyzed, we conclude that the district judge did not have jurisdiction to
    grant Bishop collateral relief as to the five-year term of supervised release imposed by
    the Parole Commission for his failure to pay the fine imposed for his drug crime by the
    Bahamian court.       Accordingly, the grant of habeas corpus relief to Bishop is
    REVERSED, and we REMAND with instructions that the district judge dismiss this
    case for lack of jurisdiction.