Sherri Williams v. Bill Pryor , 240 F.3d 944 ( 2001 )


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                      IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    
                                FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                          FILED
                                 ________________________               U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                          ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                               JAN 31 2001
                                        No. 99-10798
                                                                           THOMAS K. KAHN
                                  ________________________                       CLERK
    
                             D. C. Docket No. 98-01938-CV-S-NE
    
    SHERRI WILLIAMS, B. J. BAILEY, et al.,
    
                                                              Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    
                                                versus
    
    BILL PRYOR, in his official capacity
    as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama,
    
                                                              Defendant-Appellant.
    
                                  ________________________
    
                          Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the Northern District of Alabama
                                _________________________
                                      (January 31, 2001)
    
                             ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
    
    Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, BLACK and HALL*, Circuit Judges.
    
    BLACK, Circuit Judge:
    
    
           *
             Honorable Cynthia Holcomb Hall, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
          The opinion filed in this case on October 12, 2000, is withdrawn, and the
    
    following opinion is substituted in its place. The petition for rehearing filed by
    
    Appellees is otherwise DENIED.
    
          In 1998, a statute enacted by the legislature of the State of Alabama
    
    amended the obscenity provisions of the Alabama Code to make the distribution of
    
    certain defined sexual devices a criminal offense. Vendors and users of such
    
    devices filed a constitutional challenge to the statute. The district court declined to
    
    hold the statute violated any constitutional right but determined the statute was
    
    unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis. The court permanently enjoined
    
    enforcement of the statute. We reverse and remand.
    
                                        I. BACKGROUND
    
          The case was tried by the district court from the parties’ extensive stipulated
    
    facts, reprinted in full in the district court’s published opinion. See Williams v.
    
    Pryor, 
    41 F. Supp. 2d 1257
    , 1261-1273 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
    
          After the 1998 amendment, the Alabama Code obscenity provisions provide,
    
    in pertinent part, the following:
    
          It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess
          with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene
          material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for
          the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary
          value.
    
    
    
                                               2
    Id. at 1259 (quoting Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1998)).1 A first
    
    violation is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 and up to
    
    one year of jail or hard labor; a subsequent violation is a class C felony. See id.
    
    The State has conceded the statute’s proscription of the distribution of sexual
    
    devices in Alabama does not apply to devices acquired as gifts or by purchases in
    
    another state. See id. at 1265. The statute also does not restrict possession or use
    
    of a sexual device by an individual, but only the commercial distribution of the
    
    devices. See id.
    
           The plaintiffs-appellees are vendors or users of sexual devices. See id. at
    
    1261-65. The stipulated facts contain two expert opinions that describe the
    
    standard medical and psychological therapeutic uses of sexual devices, including
    
    their frequent prescription in marital and non-marital sexual or relationship
    
    counseling—often as a necessary component for successful therapy. See id. at
    
    1265-73. The facts also describe a number of other sexual products the
    
    distribution of which is not prohibited by the statute, such as ribbed condoms or the
    
    virility drug Viagra. See id. at 1265.
    
    
    
    
           1
            We adopt the district court’s usage of the shorthand term “sexual device” in place of the
    cumbersome phrase “device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of the
    human genital organs.”
    
                                                   3
          The district court performed a careful evaluation of the plaintiffs’
    
    constitutional challenges. After considering Supreme Court precedent, the court
    
    determined the statute does not implicate previously recognized fundamental
    
    constitutional rights. See id. at 1275-84. The court also declined to extend those
    
    rights to provide a fundamental right to the use of sexual devices, a right that
    
    would be burdened by the statute. See id. The district court next reviewed the
    
    statute under rational basis scrutiny and concluded the statute lacked a rational
    
    basis. See id. at 1284-1293. The court accordingly held the statute
    
    unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction against its enforcement. See id.
    
    at 1293.
    
          We review de novo the district court’s decision on the constitutionality of a
    
    statute. See, e.g., Mason v. Florida Bar, 
    208 F.3d 952
    , 955 (11th Cir. 2000); David
    
    Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 
    200 F.3d 1325
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2000); United
    
    States v. Hester, 
    199 F.3d 1287
    , 1289 (11th Cir. 2000).
    
                                       II. ANALYSIS
    
          Whether a statute is constitutional is determined in large part by the level of
    
    scrutiny applied by the courts. Statutes that infringe fundamental rights, or that
    
    make distinctions based upon suspect classifications such as race or national origin,
    
    are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the statute be narrowly tailored to
    
    
    
                                               4
    achieve a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 
    507 U.S. 292
    ,
    
    301-02, 
    113 S. Ct. 1439
    , 1447 (1993); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
    515 U.S. 200
    , 227, 
    115 S. Ct. 2097
    , 2113 (1995). Most statutes reviewed under the very
    
    stringent strict scrutiny standard are found to be unconstitutional. But see United
    
    States v. Virginia, 
    518 U.S. 515
    , 532 n.6, 
    116 S. Ct. 2264
    , 2275 n.6 (1995) (“strict
    
    scrutiny . . . is not inevitably fatal in fact”) (quotation omitted). On the other hand,
    
    “if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
    
    uphold the [law] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”
    
    Romer v. Evans, 
    517 U.S. 620
    , 632, 
    116 S. Ct. 1620
    , 1627 (1996); see also, e.g.,
    
    Washington v. Glucksberg, 
    521 U.S. 702
    , 728, 
    117 S. Ct. 2258
    , 2271 (1997); FCC
    
    v. Beach Communications, Inc., 
    508 U.S. 307
    , 314, 
    113 S. Ct. 2096
    , 2101 (1993).
    
    Almost every statute subject to the very deferential rational basis scrutiny standard
    
    is found to be constitutional. Cf., e.g., Panama City Med. Diag. Ltd. v. Williams,
    
    
    13 F.3d 1541
    , 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing “arguable” rational bases for
    
    statute). We consider first the district court’s determination that the statute is
    
    unconstitutional because it fails rational basis scrutiny.
    
    
    
    
                                               5
    A. Rational Basis Review
    
          Rational basis scrutiny is a highly deferential standard that proscribes only
    
    the very outer limits of a legislature’s power. A statute is constitutional under
    
    rational basis scrutiny so long as “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
    
    that could provide a rational basis for the” statute. FCC v. Beach Communications,
    
    Inc., 
    508 U.S. 307
    , 314, 
    113 S. Ct. 2096
    , 2101 (1993) (emphasis added). The
    
    Supreme Court has explained that:
    
          Where there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is
          at an end. This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial
          restraint. . . .
    
                   On rational-basis review, . . . a statute . . . comes to us bearing a
          strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of
          the [statute] have the burden to negative every conceivable basis
          which might support it. Moreover, because we never require a
          legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely
          irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason
          . . . actually motivated the legislature. . . . In other words, a legislative
          choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on
          rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Only
          by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of
          legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its
          rightful independence and its ability to function.
    
    Id. at 313-15, 113 S. Ct. at 2101-02 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis
    
    added). In addition, “the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a
    
    perceived problem incrementally,” even if its incremental approach is significantly
    
    over-inclusive or under-inclusive. Id. at 316, 113 S. Ct. at 2102; see also, e.g.,
    
                                                6
    Heller v. Doe by Doe, 
    509 U.S. 312
    , 321, 
    113 S. Ct. 2637
    , 2643 (1993); Haves v.
    
    City of Miami, 
    52 F.3d 918
    , 923 (11th Cir. 1995). Only in an exceptional
    
    circumstance will a statute not be rationally related to a legitimate government
    
    interest and be found unconstitutional under rational basis scrutiny.2
    
           The district court systematically considered whether the Alabama sexual
    
    devices distribution criminal statute has a rational basis. See 41 F. Supp. 2d at
    
    1284-1293. First, the court examined three interests it believed had been relied
    
    upon by the State: banning the public display of obscene material, banning “the
    
    commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake, unrelated to
    
    marriage, procreation, or familial relationships,” and banning the commerce in
    
    obscene material. Id. at 1286-87. The district court concluded each of these
    
    interests was a legitimate interest the State constitutionally could pursue. See id.
    
    Second, the court considered whether prohibiting the distribution of sexual devices
    
    
           2
              An example of such an exceptional circumstance recognized by this Court is the
    irrationality of government attempts to regulate the dress and grooming of adults. See DeWeese
    v. Town of Palm Beach, 
    812 F.2d 1365
    , 1368-70 (11th Cir. 1987) (invalidating town ordinance
    requiring male joggers to wear shirts); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 
    470 F.2d 659
    , 662-63
    (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (adopting presumption that state’s interests in education and
    educational environment did not rationally justify hair-length regulation at junior college,
    although under Karr v. Schmidt, 
    460 F.2d 609
     (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), those interests
    presumptively could rationally justify dress and grooming regulations in high schools); also
    compare Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 
    519 F.2d 273
     (5th Cir. 1975) (holding under
    Lansdale that junior college could not fire faculty member for refusing to shave beard), with
    Domico v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 
    675 F.2d 100
     (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that school board
    may apply dress code to employees of high school), and Kelley v. Johnson, 
    425 U.S. 238
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 1440
     (1976) (sustaining hair grooming regulation in police department).
    
                                                   7
    is rationally related to these legitimate interests. For each interest, the court
    
    concluded the law did not rationally advance the State’s objective. See id. at 1288-
    
    93. With respect to public decency, the district court found the ban on the
    
    distribution of sexual devices to be “absolutely arbitrary” because “[i]nnumerable
    
    measures far short of an absolute ban on the distribution of sexual devices would
    
    accomplish the State’s goals.” Id. at 1288. The court also determined the ban was
    
    irrationally related to the interest in discouraging commerce in auto-eroticism
    
    because the ban, by its very terms, also interfered with the very sexual stimulation
    
    and eroticism related to marriage and procreation with which the State disclaimed
    
    any intent to interfere. See id. at 1288-90. Finally, the court concluded the statute
    
    was an irrational means of banning obscenity because Alabama “banned the
    
    distribution of all sexual devices in an effort to prohibit the few which may be
    
    found obscene.” Id. at 1293. The court therefore held the statute failed rationally
    
    to advance any legitimate state interest and accordingly was unconstitutional. See
    
    id.
    
          We conclude the district court erred in determining the statute lacks a
    
    rational basis. The State’s interest in public morality is a legitimate interest
    
    rationally served by the statute. The crafting and safeguarding of public morality
    
    has long been an established part of the States’ plenary police power to legislate
    
    
    
                                                8
    and indisputably is a legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny.
    
    See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
    501 U.S. 560
    , 569, 
    111 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462
    
    (1991) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 
    478 U.S. 186
    , 196, 
    106 S. Ct. 2841
    , 2846
    
    (1986)); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 
    413 U.S. 49
    , 61, 
    93 S. Ct. 2628
    , 2637
    
    (1973); Roth v. United States, 
    354 U.S. 476
    , 
    77 S. Ct. 1304
     (1957)).3 A statute
    
    banning the commercial distribution of sexual devices is rationally related to this
    
    interest. Alabama argues “a ban on the sale of sexual devices and related orgasm
    
    stimulating paraphernalia is rationally related to a legitimate legislative interest in
    
    discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex” and that “it is enough for a
    
    legislature to reasonably believe that commerce in the pursuit of orgasms by
    
    artificial means for their own sake is detrimental to the health and morality of the
    
    State.” Appellant’s Brief at 13, 16. The criminal proscription on the distribution
    
    of sexual devices certainly is a rational means for eliminating commerce in the
    
    devices, which itself is a rational means for making the acquisition and use of the
    
    devices more difficult. Moreover, incremental steps are not a defect in legislation
    
    under rational basis scrutiny, so Alabama did not act irrationally by prohibiting
    
    only the commercial distribution of sexual devices, rather than prohibiting their
    
           3
             In fact, the State’s interest in public morality is sufficiently substantial to satisfy the
    government’s burden under the more rigorous intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny
    applicable in some cases. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., ___ U.S. ___, 
    120 S. Ct. 1382
    ,
    1395-97 (2000); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569, 
    111 S. Ct. 2462
    . For purposes of consistency in this
    case, however, we will refer to the interest as legitimate.
    
                                                      9
    possession or use or by directly proscribing masturbation with or without a sexual
    
    device. Thus, we hold the Alabama sexual devices distribution criminal statute is
    
    constitutional under rational basis scrutiny because it is rationally related to at least
    
    one legitimate State interest.
    
          In addition, the district court’s application of rational basis scrutiny to the
    
    three state interests it considered was erroneous because the court relied heavily
    
    upon three Supreme Court decisions, Romer v. Evans, 
    517 U.S. 629
    , 
    116 S. Ct. 1620
     (1996), Turner v. Safley, 
    482 U.S. 78
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 2254
     (1987), and City of
    
    Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
    473 U.S. 432
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 3249
     (1985), in
    
    concluding the statute does not rationally advance the State’s interests the district
    
    court conceded were legitimate. See 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1288, 1293. These cases do
    
    not support the district court’s application of rational basis scrutiny in this case.
    
          First, the Turner v. Safely decision established a deferential reasonableness
    
    standard as the level of scrutiny to be applied when a prison regulation infringes an
    
    inmate’s constitutional interests. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S. Ct. at
    
    2261-63. Although similar in part (and sometimes in description) to ordinary
    
    rational basis review, the Turner standard requires a more searching, four-part
    
    inquiry. The first prong considers whether the prison regulation is rationally
    
    related to a legitimate penological interest (a class of interests more narrow than
    
    
    
                                               10
    those considered under ordinary rational basis review); the other prongs address
    
    whether the inmate has alternative means of exercising the constitutional right, the
    
    burden on the prison in accommodating the right, and whether the regulation is an
    
    exaggerated response to prison concerns. See id. at 89-91, 107 S. Ct. at 2261-63;
    
    see also, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
    482 U.S. 342
    , 349-53, 
    107 S. Ct. 2400
    ,
    
    2404-07 (1987); Pope v. Hightower, 
    101 F.3d 1382
    , 1384 (11th Cir. 1996); Harris
    
    v. Thigpen, 
    941 F.2d 1495
    , 1516 (11th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, cases decided
    
    under the Turner standard, and Turner itself, are inapplicable to cases, like this
    
    one, concerning the constitutional protection accorded by ordinary rational basis
    
    scrutiny to citizens in free society.
    
          Second, the district court also erred by applying Romer v. Evans. In Romer,
    
    the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Colorado state constitution that
    
    imposed a special limitation on participation in the political process upon one
    
    group, homosexuals. Applying rational basis scrutiny, the Court held that
    
    Colorado’s provision was unconstitutional. See 517 U.S. at 632, 116 S. Ct. at
    
    1627. As described by the Court, the provision “withdraws from homosexuals, but
    
    no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and
    
    it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies,” id. at 627, 116 S. Ct. at 1625,
    
    “bars homosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that these
    
    
    
                                              11
    public-accommodations laws address,” and “operates to repeal and forbid all laws
    
    or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination
    
    by every level of Colorado government,” id. at 629, 116 S. Ct. at 1626, resulting in
    
    a situation in which “[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy
    
    or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against
    
    discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State
    
    Constitution.” Id. at 631, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. The Court then noted that “[t]he
    
    resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific
    
    protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. . . . It is not within
    
    our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. . . . A law declaring that in
    
    general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
    
    aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
    
    most literal sense.” Id. at 633, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. The significance of Romer,
    
    therefore, is the Court’s holding that Colorado’s provision had not been enacted in
    
    pursuit of any legitimate government interest: the provision was “an exceptional
    
    and . . . invalid form of legislation.” Id. at 632, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. The State had
    
    no legitimate interest in imposing an inability to obtain the protection of anti-
    
    discrimination laws (without amending the state constitution) on any particular
    
    
    
    
                                               12
    group, including homosexuals.4 Cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 
    114 F.3d 1097
    , 1110 (11th
    
    Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“Romer . . . struck down an amendment to a state constitution
    
    as irrational because the amendment’s sole purpose was to disadvantage a
    
    particular class of people”); id. at 1126 (Birch, J., dissenting) (“the Court rejected
    
    the state’s rationale, declaring that animosity toward the class of homosexuals is
    
    not a legitimate basis for state action”) (quotation omitted). The statute at issue in
    
    this case, however, raises no similar concerns. The district court agreed the three
    
    state interests it discussed were legitimate, see 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87, and we
    
    have held there is at least one legitimate state interest, the regulation of public
    
    morality, that justifies this statute. Consequently, Romer’s holding that the
    
    Colorado provision was supported by no legitimate state interest has no bearing in
    
    this case.
    
           Third, the Equal Protection Clause as-applied analysis of City of Cleburne
    
    has little relevance to the fundamental rights facial challenge raised by the
    
           4
              The Romer Court also discussed whether the Colorado provision was rationally related
    to a government interest. The Court determined the provision’s “sheer breadth is so
    discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
    but animus toward the class it affects,” id. at 632, 116 S. Ct. at 1627, and that “[t]he breadth of
    the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to
    credit them.” Id. at 635, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. Although discussed in terms of the rationality of the
    relationship of means to ends, in effect the Court reasoned that the type of means adopted
    showed that no legitimate end was being pursued: “[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the
    inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
    persons affected,” id. at 634, 116 S. Ct. at 1628, amounting to “a classification of persons
    undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.” Id. at 635,
    116 S. Ct. at 1629.
    
                                                    13
    plaintiffs in this case. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that the Equal
    
    Protection Clause is violated (in cases in which heightened scrutiny does not
    
    apply) when the plaintiff—whether a class, group, or simply one
    
    individual—proves “that she has been intentionally treated differently from others
    
    similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
    
    Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
    120 S. Ct. 1073
    , 1074 (2000) (holding that
    
    plaintiff stated constitutional Equal Protection Clause cause of action by alleging
    
    that village acted irrationally, wholly arbitrarily, and out of malice toward plaintiff
    
    when it demanded 33-foot easement from plaintiff, contrary to 15-foot easements
    
    obtained from others similarly situated). In City of Cleburne, the Court had
    
    applied this principle in holding that the city had violated the Equal Protection
    
    Clause by requiring a special use permit for a group home for mentally disabled
    
    persons but not for many other similar kinds of group homes. After rejecting the
    
    application of heightened scrutiny, see 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S. Ct. at 3255, the
    
    Court considered the city’s arguments that the permit requirement was based on the
    
    following government interests: neighbors’ negative opinions and fears of elderly
    
    neighbors, proximity to a junior high school, location on a flood plain, size of the
    
    home and number of residents it would house, fire hazards, neighborhood serenity,
    
    and danger to neighbors. See id. at 448-50, 105 S. Ct. at 3259-60. The Court did
    
    
    
                                               14
    not discount the legitimacy of these interests, but rather found that, in creating the
    
    means used to carry out these interests, the city had adopted a classification that
    
    had no rational basis:
    
           The city does not require a special use permit . . . for apartment
           houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or
           sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums,
           nursing homes for convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane
           or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or
           fraternal orders, and other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a
           special permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the District
           Court found, because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded. .
           . . But this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston
           home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate
           interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as
           boarding houses and hospitals would not. Because in our view the
           record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the
           Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city’s
           legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds
           the ordinance invalid as applied in this case.
    
    Id. at 447-48, 105 S. Ct. at 3258 (emphasis added).5 In this case, by contrast, the
    
    plaintiffs have presented a fundamental rights facial challenge to the Alabama
    
    statute; they have not alleged an Equal Protection Clause violation, much less
    
    argued that the statute would make any irrational classifications among persons in
    
    
    
    
           5
              Similar to Romer, the City of Cleburne Court noted that “requiring the permit in this
    case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.” Id. at 450,
    105 S. Ct. at 3260. Unlike Romer, however, this conclusion was directed not to the legitimacy of
    the city’s ends, but rather bolstered the Court’s determination that the classification of persons
    drawn by the city in carrying out its ends was constitutionally irrational.
    
                                                   15
    its enforcement. Accordingly, the rational basis analysis of City of Cleburne does
    
    not support the district court’s conclusion that this statute lacks a rational basis.
    
          Finally, the plaintiffs maintain the district court did not err in finding the
    
    statute to be constitutionally irrational because Alabama’s statute is contrary to a
    
    wide spectrum of public and professional opinions. The plaintiffs argue these
    
    opinions recognize numerous legitimate and beneficial uses of sexual devices,
    
    especially the necessity of sexual devices for some persons to achieve medical or
    
    emotional health. However misguided the legislature of Alabama may have been
    
    in enacting the statute challenged in this case, the statute is not constitutionally
    
    irrational under rational basis scrutiny because it is rationally related to the State’s
    
    legitimate power to protect its view of public morality. “The Constitution
    
    presumes that . . . improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
    
    democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
    
    matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Vance v.
    
    Bradley, 
    440 U.S. 93
    , 97, 
    99 S. Ct. 939
    , 942-943 (1979). This Court does not
    
    invalidate bad or foolish policies, only unconstitutional ones; we may not “sit as a
    
    superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
    
    determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
    
    
    
    
                                               16
    along suspect lines.” New Orleans v. Dukes, 
    427 U.S. 297
    , 303, 
    96 S. Ct. 2513
    ,
    
    2517 (1976).
    
          For the foregoing reasons, we hold the Alabama statute challenged in this
    
    case has a rational basis. We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment to the
    
    contrary.
    
    B. Fundamental Rights Analysis
    
          In their fundamental rights arguments, the plaintiffs challenged the
    
    constitutionality of the statute on its face and as applied. We conclude the district
    
    court correctly rejected the facial challenge, but we remand the as-applied
    
    challenges.
    
    1. Facial Challenge
    
          “A facial challenge to be successful ‘must establish that no set of
    
    circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’” Gulf Power Co. v.
    
    United States, 
    187 F.3d 1324
    , 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
    
    Salerno, 
    481 U.S. 739
    , 745, 
    107 S. Ct. 2095
    , 2100, 
    95 L. Ed. 2d 697
     (1987)); see
    
    also United States v. Frandsen, 
    212 F.3d 1231
    , 1235 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that
    
    “no set of circumstances” is the general rule for evaluating facial challenges in this
    
    circuit); Jacobs v. Florida Bar, 
    50 F.3d 901
    , 906 n.20 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen a
    
    plaintiff attacks a law facially, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law
    
    
    
                                               17
    could never be constitutionally applied”) (citing New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v.
    
    City of New York, 
    487 U.S. 1
    , 11, 
    108 S. Ct. 2225
    , 2233, 
    101 L. Ed. 2d 1
     (1988)).
    
    Unless the statute is unconstitutional in all its applications, an as-applied challenge
    
    must be used to attack its constitutionality.
    
          Initially, we must determine how to frame the nature and scope of a
    
    constitutional right that would facially invalidate the Alabama statute. Alabama
    
    maintains the plaintiffs are claiming simply a “right to sell or buy” sexual devices.
    
    Such a right would receive little constitutional protection because ordinary
    
    economic and commercial regulations are subject only to rational basis scrutiny.
    
    See, e.g., Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314, 113 S. Ct. at 2101 (“In areas of
    
    social and economic policy, . . . any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
    
    could provide a rational basis for the” statute is sufficient to sustain its
    
    constitutionality); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 
    348 U.S. 483
    , 489,
    
    
    75 S. Ct. 461
    , 465 (1955). The plaintiffs respond that a right of greater
    
    constitutional significance is at stake: in the narrowest sense, the plaintiffs assert a
    
    fundamental “right to use” sexual devices; more generally, the plaintiffs invoke the
    
    Supreme Court’s cases establishing a constitutionally protected fundamental right
    
    to privacy. The district court narrowly framed the analysis as the question
    
    “whether the concept of a constitutionally protected ‘right to privacy’ protects an
    
    
    
                                               18
    individual’s liberty to use [sexual devices] when engaging in lawful, private,
    
    sexual activity.” 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1275; see also id. at 1281 & n.30. For purposes
    
    of the facial challenge, the right is more precisely stated as whether the
    
    Constitution protects such liberty of every individual.
    
          In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Population Services
    
    International, 
    431 U.S. 678
    , 
    97 S. Ct. 2010
     (1977), we conclude the district court
    
    correctly framed the fundamental rights analysis in this case. Following its
    
    decisions holding a state may not criminalize every sale or distribution of
    
    contraceptives, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 
    381 U.S. 479
    , 
    85 S. Ct. 1678
     (1965);
    
    Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
    405 U.S. 438
    , 
    92 S. Ct. 1029
     (1972), the Supreme Court struck
    
    down a narrower New York law criminalizing the sale of contraceptives to persons
    
    under 16 years of age and the sale of contraceptives by non-pharmacists. See
    
    Carey, 431 U.S. at 681-82, 97 S. Ct. at 2014. The Court explained that:
    
          [T]he Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
          childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State. Restrictions on
          the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to make
          such decisions. . . . This is so not because there is an independent
          fundamental “right of access to contraceptives,” but because such
          access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of
          decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of
          the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.
    
    431 U.S. at 687-89, 97 S. Ct. at 2017-18; see also id. at 689-91, 97 S. Ct. at 2108-
    
    19 (concluding that New York law fails strict scrutiny for lack of compelling state
    
                                              19
    interest). Similarly, because the statute prohibiting the distribution of sexual
    
    devices would burden an individual’s ability to use the devices, the analysis in this
    
    case must be framed not in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell
    
    or buy sexual devices, but rather in terms of whether there is a fundamental
    
    constitutional interest—broad or narrow—that encompasses a right to use sexual
    
    devices and invalidates this statute on its face.
    
           We conclude there is no controlling precedent that specifically establishes
    
    the facial unconstitutionality of this statute.6 The fundamental constitutional rights
    
    of privacy recognized to date by the Supreme Court in the area of sexual activity
    
    each have followed from the Court’s protection of a person’s right to make the
    
    decision not to procreate without governmental interference. Specifically, the
    
    Court has repeatedly sustained a right to prevent pregnancy through the use of
    
    contraceptives, see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479, 85 S. Ct. at 1678; Eisenstadt, 405
    
    
           6
             Alabama suggests two precedents interpreting similar statutes, Sewell v. Georgia, 
    435 U.S. 982
    , 
    98 S. Ct. 1635
     (1978), and Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 
    648 F.2d 1020
     (5th Cir.
    June 1981) (binding authority under Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th
    Cir.1981) (en banc)), establish the constitutionality of this statute. We conclude neither decision
    is controlling here. The Supreme Court in Sewell dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court
    of Georgia for want of a substantial federal question, see 435 U.S. at 982, 98 S. Ct. at 1635, a
    disposition that “prevent[s] lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise
    issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Langelier v. Coleman, 
    861 F.2d 1508
    , 1511 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 
    432 U.S. 173
    , 176, 
    97 S. Ct. 2238
    ,
    2240 (1977)) (emphasis added). The only issues necessarily decided in Sewell, however, were
    First Amendment obscenity arguments. See Sewell v. State, 
    233 S.E.2d 187
    , 188-89 (Ga. 1977).
    Similarly, Vance decided only a First Amendment obscenity challenge. See 648 F.2d at 1027-
    28.
    
                                                    20
    U.S. at 438, 92 S. Ct. at 1029; Carey, 431 U.S. at 678, 97 S. Ct. at 2010, as well as
    
    a woman’s qualified right to terminate a pregnancy, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood
    
    v. Casey, 
    505 U.S. 833
    , 
    112 S. Ct. 2791
     (1992); Roe v. Wade, 
    410 U.S. 113
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 705
     (1973). More than half a century ago, the Court also protected the right
    
    to procreate, invalidating a state’s provision for involuntary sterilization of habitual
    
    criminals. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
    316 U.S. 535
    , 
    62 S. Ct. 1110
     (1942). The
    
    Court also has recognized other fundamental rights, including rights of privacy
    
    unrelated to sexual activity, that protect personal autonomy from governmental
    
    intrusion. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 
    497 U.S. 186
    ,
    
    
    110 S. Ct. 2841
     (1990) (sustaining right to refuse medical treatment); Loving v.
    
    Virginia, 
    388 U.S. 1
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1817
     (1967) (invalidating ban on interracial
    
    marriage). None of these cases, however, is decisive on the question whether the
    
    Constitution protects every individual’s right to private sexual activity and use of
    
    sexual devices from being burdened by Alabama’s sexual device distribution
    
    criminal statute.
    
          We therefore must determine whether we may, in this case, recognize an
    
    “extension of the ‘right to privacy[,]’ which the Supreme Court has recognized as
    
    fundamental in certain contexts,” that is broad enough to facially invalidate the
    
    Alabama statute. 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1275; see id. at 1282. This circuit has
    
    
    
                                              21
    recognized that a state may regulate materials deemed harmful to minors. See
    
    American Booksellers v. Webb, 
    919 F.2d 1493
    , 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1990); see also
    
    Ginsberg v. New York, 
    390 U.S. 629
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1274
     (1968) (state may
    
    constitutionally regulate well-being of minors, and within this power to regulate is
    
    the power to restrict access to materials rationally deemed to be harmful to
    
    minors). Application of Alabama's statute to those who sell sexual devices to
    
    minors, to such extent that those devices are deemed harmful to minors, would not
    
    violate any fundamental right. The statute has possible constitutional applications
    
    and therefore is not facially unconstitutional. The district court correctly rejected
    
    the plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the statute.
    
    2. As-Applied Challenges
    
           We conclude the district court did not adequately consider the as-applied
    
    fundamental rights challenges raised by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we remand for
    
    the district court to consider these claims in the first instance.
    
           The district court failed to specifically consider the as-applied challenges
    
    raised by the four “user” plaintiffs. Betty Faye Haggermaker and Alice Jean Cope
    
    are married women who use sexual devices with their husbands. See 41 F.
    
    Supp. 2d at 1264. Sherry Taylor-Williams and Jane Doe began using sexual
    
    devices in marital intimacy but both are now single. See id. at 1264-65. Although
    
    
    
                                                22
    the statute is not facially unconstitutional because, in light of Webb and Ginsberg,
    
    it may constitutionally be applied to those who sell to minors sexual devices which
    
    are deemed harmful to minors, the as-applied challenges raised by the plaintiffs,
    
    married or unmarried, implicate different and important interests in sexual privacy.
    
    See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86, 85 S. Ct. at 1682 (“Would we allow the police
    
    to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms . . ? The very idea is repulsive
    
    to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”); Glucksberg, 521
    
    U.S. at 720, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citing Griswold as holding the Constitution
    
    protects a fundamental right “to marital privacy”); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 898,
    
    112 S. Ct. at 2831 (invalidating provision requiring notification of married
    
    woman’s spouse before abortion could be performed because “[w]omen do not
    
    lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution
    
    protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of
    
    governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit
    
    of a member of the individual’s family”); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at
    
    1033 (“[T]he rights of the individual to [have] access to contraceptives . . . must be
    
    the same for the unmarried and married alike.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 
    478 U.S. 186
    , 209 n.4, 
    106 S. Ct. 2841
    , 2853 n.1 (1986)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
    
    (questioning validity of categorizations of sexual activity depending on marital
    
    
    
                                              23
    status); id. at 216, 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt and
    
    Carey as holding that fundamental rights protection in sexual matters “extends to
    
    intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons”).
    
          We remand the as-applied challenges for due consideration by the district
    
    court because the record and stipulations in this case simply are too narrow to
    
    permit us to decide whether or to what extent the Alabama statute infringes a
    
    fundamental right to sexual privacy of the specific plaintiffs in this case. In
    
    Glucksberg, its most recent case in which an argument for recognition of a new
    
    fundamental right was presented, the Supreme Court instructed that a fundamental
    
    right must be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and
    
    “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
    
    would exist if [the right] were sacrificed.” 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S. Ct. at 2268
    
    (citations and quotations omitted). In concluding the Constitution did not include
    
    such a fundamental right of physician-assisted suicide, the Court discussed at
    
    length not only the long history of the proscription of suicide and assisting suicide
    
    but also the considerable contemporary nationwide legislative action to preserve
    
    such laws. See id. at 710-19, 117 S. Ct. at 2262-67. By contrast, in this case the
    
    district court considered in two paragraphs only whether the “use of sexual
    
    devices” is a deeply rooted and central liberty. See 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1283-84 &
    
    
    
                                               24
    n.33. The court analyzed neither whether our nation has a deeply rooted history of
    
    state interference, or state non-interference, in the private sexual activity of married
    
    or unmarried persons nor whether contemporary practice bolsters or undermines
    
    any such history. The record is bare of evidence on these important questions.
    
    Absent the kind of careful consideration the Supreme Court performed in
    
    Glucksberg, we are unwilling to decide the as-applied fundamental rights analysis
    
    and accordingly remand those claims to the district court.
    
                                     III. CONCLUSION
    
           The Alabama statute making it a criminal offense to commercially distribute
    
    sexual devices in the State is rationally related to the State’s legitimate government
    
    interest in public morality. The district court therefore erred invalidating the
    
    statute under rational basis scrutiny. The statute also survives the plaintiffs’ facial
    
    challenge asserting fundamental constitutional rights. We conclude, however, the
    
    plaintiffs’ as-applied fundamental rights challenges must be considered further by
    
    the district court.
    
           REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    
    
    
    
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