Stephen Lustig vs Bear Stearns Residential Mortgage Corporation , 411 F. App'x 224 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                     FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-10654                   ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JANUARY 25, 2011
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-14419-DLG
    STEPHEN LUSTIG,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    BEAR STEARNS RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 25, 2011)
    Before HULL, MARTIN and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Stephen Lustig filed suit in district court against Bear Stearns Residential
    Mortgage Corporation (“Bear Stearns”) for declaratory relief, violations of the Florida
    Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), recission, fraudulent
    inducement, and breach of contract.1 Lustig contends that Bear Stearns misled him
    with respect to the interest rate on his Adjustable Rate Promissory Note (“the Note”),
    and his monthly payment. On appeal, Lustig contends that the district court erred in
    granting summary judgment to Bear Stearns.
    The subject of this litigation is a $720,000 promissory note payable to Bear
    Stearns executed in August 2006 by Lustig through his attorney-in-fact, William J.
    Provost, for the purchase of a home located in Fort Pierce, Florida. Lustig alleges
    that the note is inherently and patently deceptive. Lustig also alleges that Bear
    Stearns deceived him by leading him to believe that the monthly minimum payment
    of $2850 applied to both principal and interest or at a minimum covered the entire
    amount of interest due on the Note.
    The district court granted summary judgment to Bear Stearns. The court found
    that the documents executed by Lustig, through his attorney-in-fact, Provost, clearly
    disclosed every risk associated with the loan, including the fact that making the
    minimum payment would result in negative amortization. Lustig appeals.
    Lustig contends that the district court erred: (1) in not addressing the issue of
    whether an inaccurate Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement supports a finding that
    FDUTPA was violated; (2) in determining that the damages claimed by Lustig in the
    1
    The breach of contract claim was dismissed, and is not at issue on this appeal.
    2
    FDUTPA claim were consequential damages–not actual damages; (3) in determining
    that the record did not create a genuine issue of material fact; and (4) in finding that
    Provost had a reasonable opportunity to learn, at closing, the essential terms of the
    Note. We have considered each of these contentions, and find them without merit.
    The contention that the district court erred in not addressing Lustig’s Truth-in-
    Lending argument is meritless because the district court found that Lustig had failed
    to present any evidence to establish that a deceptive or unfair practice had been
    committed by Bear Stearns (R.3-85 at 7) and a deceptive or unfair practice is an
    essential element of a FDUTPA claim.2 And, the argument that the court erred in
    deciding that the damages claimed under FDUTPA were consequential is irrelevant
    given our conclusion that the court found no FDUTPA violation. “A consumer claim
    for damages under FDUTPA has three elements: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice;
    (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.” City First Mortg. Corp. v. Barton, 
    988 So. 2d 82
    , 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 
    951 So. 2d 860
    , 869
    (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Because Lustig failed to prove the first element, his claim failed
    without requiring the district court to address the remaining elements.
    2
    We need not, and do not, decide whether a Truth-in-Lending violation may ever form the
    basis of a FDUTPA claim.
    3
    As to Lustig’s contentions that the record created a genuine issue of material
    fact, and that the district court erred by its finding that Provost had no reasonable
    opportunity to learn, at closing, the essential terms of the note, these contentions were
    considered by the district court. (R.3-85.) And, we conclude that the district court’s
    conclusions were well-reasoned and correct. It is clear from the record that the
    documents signed in conjunction with the execution of the Note expressly stated that
    a monthly payment of only $2850, the minimum payment, would result in negative
    amortization. Consequently, we find meritless Lustig’s contentions that Bear Stearns
    acted unfairly or deceptively.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-10654

Citation Numbers: 411 F. App'x 224

Judges: Cox, Hull, Martin, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 1/25/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023