United States v. Corey James Bolden , 407 F. App'x 370 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12840 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JANUARY 4, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00337-ODE-ECS-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
COREY JAMES BOLDEN,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 4, 2011)
Before CARNES, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Corey James Bolden pleaded guilty and was convicted of one count of
conspiracy to commit carjacking with force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and
372, one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and one count of
discharging a firearm while committing the felony of carjacking, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2. Bolden’s guidelines range was calculated to be
162 to 181 months.
At sentencing the district court took into account Bolden’s lack of prior
convictions, the support he received from his family, his cognitive impairments,
his remorsefulness, and the seriousness of the offenses he committed. In light of
those considerations, district court imposed a 60-month concurrent sentence on the
two carjacking counts and a consecutive 84-month sentence on the firearm count
for a total sentence of 144 months imprisonment. Bolden contends that the district
court did not adequately account for his cognitive impairments and that his 144-
month sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary
to comply with the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
“Since the Supreme Court’s Booker decision it has been ‘pellucidly clear
that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate
review of sentencing decisions.’” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct.
586, 594 (2007)). “‘A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford
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consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error
of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d
1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “In the context of sentencing, the proper
factors are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and a district court commits a clear error
in judgment when it weighs those factors unreasonably, arriving at a sentence that
does not achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in § 3553(a).” Irey, 612
F.3d at 1189 (quotation marks omitted). “We may set aside a sentence only if we
determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing judge, that
the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” Id. at 1191. The burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable lies with the party who challenges it.
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
Bolden has failed to show that his 144-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Bolden’s sentence represents a downward variance of 18 months
below the low end of his applicable guidelines range of 162 to 181 months, and
his sentence is 36 months below the statutory maximum of 15 years imprisonment.
The district court fully explained its rationale in sentencing Bolden to 144 months,
stating that it had considered Bolden’s individual characteristics, including his
familial support. The district court expressly stated that “in fashioning this
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sentence in determining what’s reasonable” it considered Bolden’s lack of
criminal history and recognized that “he has some cognitive impairment.” The
district court did not commit a clear error of judgment in balancing the § 3353(a)
factors. Instead, the court’s statements during the sentence hearing clearly show
its understanding that the “goal is to lock in a sentence that is not too short and not
too long, but just right to serve the purposes of § 3553(a).” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1197.
AFFIRMED.
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