Walton-Horton v. Hyundai of AL etc. , 402 F. App'x 405 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 21, 2010
No. 10-10147 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-00268-WKW-CSC
ELIZABETH WALTON-HORTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HYUNDAI OF ALABAMA,
TOMMY CERTAIN,
ERIC GEORGE,
Defendants-Appellees,
GABRIELLA SMITH,
Team Relations Representative,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 21, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Elizabeth Walton-Horton, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Hyundai Motor
Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (Hyundai), in her employment-discrimination suit
filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a).
I. Background
Walton-Horton worked for Hyundai as a technical support specialist. From
June 2005 until she was fired, she worked in the paint shop. Tommy Certain and
Eric George were also technical support specialists, but they worked in other
departments. Certain and George would sometimes make jokes or use foul
language, which initially did not bother Walton-Horton, but she did report Certain
several times after he made sexual remarks. The supervisors advised Certain that
such remarks were inappropriate. In early 2006, Walton-Horton reported to a
Team Relations member that Certain and George had been making comments that
were demeaning to women. By this time, Walton-Horton’s relationship with
Certain and George had deteriorated, and the two men had filed their own
complaints against Walton-Horton.
In March 2006, Gabriella Smith, a Team Relations representative,
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interviewed Walton-Horton as part of an investigation into Certain’s and George’s
complaints. Smith also interviewed other employees, who stated that Walton-
Horton had used foul language, made inappropriate sexual comments at work, and
exposed herself to other employees. Although Walton-Horton denied the
allegations against her and claimed that Smith was biased, she was terminated for
“behav[ing] in a manner that created a hostile work environment of a sexual
nature.” In addition, as a result of the investigation, Certain received a serious
misconduct letter after he admitted using profanity and making inappropriate
remarks.
Walton-Horton then sued Hyundai and in an amended complaint alleged that
it had engaged in gender discrimination and retaliation when it terminated her
employment after she complained of sexual harassment. In addition to her Title
VII claims, she asserted state law claims for defamation, libel, slander, and
negligent supervision.
Hyundai moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
The district court found that Walton-Horton had failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination or retaliation. The court explained that Walton-Horton had
not shown that similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably than
she was because Certain’s conduct was less serious than hers. The court further
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found that, although there was close temporal proximity between Walton-Horton’s
complaints and her termination, Smith had not been aware of Walton-Horton’s
complaints before she began her investigation.
Walton-Horton filed a timely motion to alter or amend judgment, which the
court denied on December 8, 2009. Walton-Horton then filed a notice of appeal,
indicating her intent to appeal the December 8 order.
II. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we review de novo questions concerning our
subject-matter jurisdiction. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir.
2006). “The general rule in this circuit is that an appellate court has jurisdiction to
review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are specified in an
appellant’s notice of appeal.” Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d
1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). But we will liberally
construe a notice of appeal when “(1) unnoticed claims or issues are inextricably
intertwined with noticed ones and (2) the adverse party is not prejudiced.” Hill v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation
marks omitted). Specifically, we have held that a pro se notice of appeal from an
order on a tolling post-judgment motion must be construed as an appeal from the
original judgment also, where it is clear that the appellant intended to appeal from
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the underlying judgment. Kicklighter v. Nails By Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 738
n.1 (5th Cir. 1980).1
Here, although Walton-Horton’s notice of appeal only referenced the denial
of her tolling motion to alter or amend judgment, it is clear that Walton-Horton
intended to challenge the grant of summary judgment. Moreover, there is no
indication that Walton-Horton’s limited notice of appeal prejudiced or misled
Hyundai. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the underlying order granting
summary judgment.
III. Discussion 2
We “review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Rowell v.
BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 798 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
court held that all decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit before the close of business
on September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
2
Walton-Horton has abandoned her challenges to the district court’s denial of her
motion to amend judgment, the district court’s finding that her state-law claims were time-
barred, and the order granting summary judgment on those claims. Access Now, Inc. v.
Southwest Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
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56(c); Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). “A fact is material
only when the dispute over it has the potential to change the outcome of the lawsuit
under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant.” Zaben v. Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1997). Speculation or
conjecture from a party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See
Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). “A mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not suffice to
overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d
859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).
A. Discrimination
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual
because of that individual’s sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as here, a
plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence to prove a claim of discrimination, we
evaluate the claim using the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Chapman v. AI Transp., 229
F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Under this approach, if a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
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employment decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer
meets this burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
reasons given were a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination
under Title VII by showing that she (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was
qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was
treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside her protected
class. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
Only the fourth element is at issue here.
When a plaintiff alleges discriminatory discipline, “to determine whether
employees are similarly situated, we evaluate whether the employees are involved
in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.”
Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (quotation marks omitted); Silvera v. Orange
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the most
important factors “are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the
punishment imposed”). We “require that the quantity and quality of the
comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-
guessing employers’ reasonable decisions.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364,
1368 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323, n.2 (noting that
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two lines of cases developed interpreting the “similarly situated” prong, and
holding that we are bound by the “earliest case” doctrine to use the “nearly
identical” standard). We do “not sit as a super-personnel department that
reexamines an entity’s business decisions,” and our “inquiry is limited to whether
the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at
1030.
Here, Walton-Horton failed to identify any male comparators who engaged
in conduct “nearly identical” to that for which she was discharged. Although she
alleged that Certain’s behavior was inappropriate, Smith’s investigation included
statements from witnesses that Walton-Horton’s conduct extended beyond
inappropriate comments. Walton-Horton’s bare assertions that Certain is a
comparator are insufficient to make a prima facie showing. Accordingly, because
Walton-Horton failed to show any similarly situated male employee was treated
more favorably, summary judgment was proper on this claim.
B. Retaliation
Title VII prohibits retaliation in the employment context:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
We apply the same McDonnell Douglas framework to claims of retaliation
based on circumstantial evidence. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564-66 (11th
Cir. 1997). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) she
engaged in statutorily protected expression, (2) her employer subjected her to an
act that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job
applicant, and (3) there is some causal relation between the two events. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-69 (2006).
Statutorily protected expression includes internal complaints of
discrimination to superiors, complaints lodged with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and discrimination-based lawsuits. Pipkins v. City of
Temple Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish a causal
connection, a plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker was aware of the
protected activity and that there is “a close temporal proximity between this
awareness and the adverse . . . action.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220
(11th Cir. 2004). “[T]emporal proximity alone is insufficient to create a genuine
issue of fact as to causal connection where there is unrebutted evidence that the
decision maker did not have knowledge that the employee engaged in protected
conduct.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir.
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2000) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[e]mployers need not suspend previously
planned [adverse employment actions] upon discovering [protected activity].”
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (holding that if, after
discovering protected activity, employers proceed “along lines previously
contemplated, though not definitively determined,” their actions are not evidence
of causality).
In this case, Walton-Horton failed to prove a prima facie case of retaliation
because the undisputed facts show no causal connection between her complaints
and her discharge. Smith, who recommended Walton-Horton be discharged, had
no knowledge of Walton-Horton’s pre-investigation complaints, and
Walton-Horton only complained to Smith after Smith had already begun
investigating her behavior. Because Smith was unaware of the protected activity at
the time she recommended Walton-Horton’s termination, the fact that she later
learned of Walton-Horton’s complaints does not establish a causal connection.
Accordingly, summary judgment was proper on this claim as well.
AFFIRMED.
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