Armanda Coles v. Post Master General United States Postal Services , 711 F. App'x 890 ( 2017 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15364
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00845-RBD-DAB
ARMANDA COLES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
POST MASTER GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 26, 2017)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Armanda Coles, a longtime United States Postal Service (“USPS”)
employee, sued the Postmaster General under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., on race and age discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile work environment theories. She asserted that the Postmaster discriminated
against her by twice terminating her, urging her (but not her white or under-40
coworkers) to retire, giving her unfavorable work assignments, shouting at her,
improperly searching her vehicle, investigating her absences, and warning her that
her job assignment would be eliminated. The district court granted the Postmaster
summary judgment as to each of Coles’s claims. Having thoroughly reviewed the
record, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Coles, an African American woman over the age of forty, began working as
a mail handler for USPS in 1986. Since 1990, she has worked at USPS’s mid-
Florida postal plant. Coles became eligible for retirement in or around 1995, after
thirty years of federal service. USPS terminated Coles in 1999, ostensibly for
taking medical leave without prior approval, and then again in 2005, for reasons
that the record does not fully explain. Each time, Coles appealed to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), which reinstated her, and filed complaints
with USPS’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office (“EEO complaints”) alleging
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racial discrimination—one in 1999 and two in 2005.1 The dispositions of these
prior EEO complaints are not apparent from the record.
Shortly after Coles’s 2005 reinstatement, USPS’s Human Resources
personnel sent her two notices informing her of her eligibility to retire. Coles
requested that USPS stop sending her these notices unless it was sending them to
all retirement-eligible employees, and the notices ceased. Several other USPS
employees eligible for retirement, including a white man named Chip Shron, did
not receive similar notices.
Within USPS, mail handlers bid for their preferred job assignments, which
were meted out according to seniority. At all relevant times, Coles’s bid
assignment was “Spurs Cancellation/010/Other Duties As Assigned.” Doc. 31-2 at
3. 2 The “010” designation refers to the plant’s arrival and cancellation function.
“Spurs” referred to “small parcels and rolls”; working the spurs belt entailed
manually processing packages too big or awkwardly shaped to process by
machine. Fernando Aguilar, manager of distribution operations at the mid-Florida
plant and Coles’s direct supervisor from 2009 to 2015, was responsible for
assigning Coles other necessary duties. Most days, too little spurs processing work
1
Whether Coles’s second termination, as well as her associated MSPB appeal and one or
both of her associated EEO complaints, occurred in 2004 or 2005 is not entirely clear from the
record. We assume all relevant events occurred in 2005, but whether these events took place in
2004 or 2005 is immaterial to the disposition of Coles’s claims.
2
All citations to “Doc. _” refer to numbered entries on the district court docket.
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had accumulated by the time Coles began her shift to justify having her perform
spurs duties. When too little spurs work was available, Aguilar would often assign
Coles to work the culling belt, which involved interacting with a conveyor belt;
Coles disliked culling belt duties due to her motion sickness. All employees at
Coles’s plant occasionally were assigned culling belt duties when they did not have
other work to do. Coles was assigned to work the culling belt over 100 times. On
one occasion, she told Aguilar that she wished to file a grievance with her union
steward over her culling belt assignments. Aguilar began to shout at Coles, telling
her he could make her work wherever he wanted. Aguilar asserted that he was
raising his voice to be heard over nearby machines, although he and Coles were in
a quiet location within the plant. According to Coles, Aguilar never shouted at a
white, Hispanic, or under-40 mail handler.
In 2012, Dorothea Reda, Aguilar’s manager and the USPS official who had
made the decision to terminate Coles in 2005, received a notification from Human
Resources that a USPS employee had been observed selling snacks and beverages
at the plant, in violation of the Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. § 107 et seq.
The employee in question was described as a “stocky black woman,” Doc. 31-5 at
3, who drove a silver Mercedes station wagon and frequently parked in a
handicapped space. No employee at the mid-Florida plant but Coles matched that
description. Reda requested that Aguilar investigate the matter. Aguilar
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confronted Coles, who denied the misconduct. Reda and Aguilar located and
searched a champagne or beige-colored Mercedes SUV, which belonged to Coles,
in a handicapped parking space in the employee parking lot. Reda and Aguilar,
who had not received Coles’s permission to search the vehicle, looked into the
SUV’s windows. They denied searching inside the vehicle, but two witnesses
observed a USPS manager open the trunk of Coles’s SUV and then shut it. No
contraband was found in Coles’s vehicle, and she was not found to have acted
improperly. No other mail handler’s vehicle was searched.
USPS regulations require regular attendance of employees. Coles was
absent without excuse on four occasions within a 30-day period during May and
June 2012. Coles acknowledged her absences, but asserted that she had submitted
paperwork to receive medical leave. A week after Aguilar shouted at Coles, he
administered an investigative interview questionnaire to Coles concerning her
unscheduled absences. Coles did not explain her absences to Aguilar, instead
asserting her “right to remain silent.” She was not disciplined for her absences.
USPS’s regional management decided to reorganize Florida mail processing
operations. Several months after the vehicle search incident, Coles’s union
president, Felix Rodriguez, informed Coles that Reda had told him Coles’s bid
assignment would be abolished. Coles and several other mail handlers asked
Aguilar whether the 010 operation would be moved to a different plant. Aguilar
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told them that to the best of his knowledge, the 010 operation would be relocated.
The plant’s entire 010 operation, consisting of about fifteen to thirty employees,
ultimately was relocated to Orlando in 2013. Due to her seniority, however, Coles
was able to select a new bid assignment at the plant.
Coles filed an EEO complaint, which resulted in a ruling favorable to the
Postmaster. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission affirmed and
notified Coles that she had 90 days to file a suit in the district court. Coles then
filed a complaint against the Postmaster in the district court, raising claims of
disparate treatment, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court
granted the Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment as to all counts. Coles
moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the district court, in granting
the Postmaster summary judgment on her retaliation claim, had erred in requiring
her to establish a prima facie case and in applying too stringent a standard in
determining whether she had suffered an adverse employment action. The district
court rejected Coles’s first argument but agreed that it had erred with respect to its
adverse employment action analysis. It nonetheless declined to alter its judgment,
concluding that even if Coles had established a prima facie case of retaliation, she
had failed to show that the Postmaster’s given reasons for these adverse actions
against her were pretextual. Coles timely appealed.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-movant. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002).
“[A]n affidavit stating only that the affiant ‘believes’ a certain fact exists is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment by creating a genuine issue of fact about
the existence of that certain fact.” Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278-79
(11th Cir. 2002). We may affirm a district court’s judgment on any ground that the
record supports, even if the district court did not rely on or even consider that
argument. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
A party must file a motion to alter or amend a judgment no later than 28
days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We review a district
court’s decision on whether to alter or amend judgment for abuse of discretion.
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1343 n.20 (11th Cir. 2010).
“[T]he only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence
or manifest errors of law or fact. A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate
old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to
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the entry of judgment.” Id. at 1344 (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Seven distinct episodes involving Coles and USPS are relevant to the Title
VII and ADEA analysis that follows: the (1) vehicle search, (2) investigative
interview, (3) culling belt assignments, (4) prior terminations, (5) retirement
reminders, (6) shouting incident, and (7) bid elimination warning.
A. Coles Failed to Show She Suffered an Adverse Employment Action.
Coles argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the
Postmaster as to her race- and age-based employment discrimination claims. To
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show
she suffered an adverse employment action. Coles argues that the Postmaster’s
search of her vehicle, investigative interview relating to her absences, and
assignments of culling belt work, whether taken individually or collectively, were
adverse employment actions. 3 These acts, although viewed in the light most
favorable to Coles, do not rise to that level. The district court thus properly
determined that Coles had not established her prima facie case.
3
Coles does not argue that the prior terminations, retirement reminders, bid elimination
warning, or shouting incident constituted race- or age-based discrimination, and so has
abandoned those arguments. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th
Cir. 2014).
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An employer may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to
h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “All personnel actions
affecting employees . . . in the United States Postal Service” likewise “shall be
made free from any discrimination based on race.” Id. § 2000e-16(a). An
employer may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to h[er]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
We analyze race discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence
under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To succeed, a plaintiff must first prove her prima
facie case by showing that “(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he
was qualified for the position; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) [s]he was replaced by a person outside h[er] protected class or was treated
less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside h[er] protected class.”
Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel. Univ. of
S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). Should the plaintiff succeed in
making her prima facie case, “the burden of production shifts to the employer . . .
to introduce evidence of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision.” Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir.
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2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must then show the
employer’s given reason is pretextual. Id.We also use McDonnell Douglas’s framework to evaluate age discrimination
claims based on circumstantial evidence. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla.,
Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999). To prove her prima facie case of age
discrimination, a plaintiff must show she was (1) “a member of the protected group
of persons between the ages of forty and seventy;” (2) “subject to adverse
employment action;” (3) replaced by or passed over for “a substantially younger
person;” and (4) “qualified to do the job for which she was rejected.” Id. at 1359.
The defendant can then offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action,
which the plaintiff may then seek to rebut as pretextual. Id. at 1361.
An “adverse employment action” under Title VII is “a serious and material
change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of
Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). The ADEA’s test for “adverse
employment action” is the same. See Trask v. Sec’y, Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
822 F.3d 1179, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2016). Although Title VII and the ADEA do
“not require proof of direct economic consequences in all cases, the asserted
impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the
plaintiff’s employment.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239. “[T]he employee’s subjective
view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling;
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the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable
person in the circumstances.” Id.The Postmaster’s actions did not amount, individually or collectively, to an
adverse employment action against Coles.4 The one-time search of Coles’s vehicle
may have caused her personal distress, but it did not result in any disciplinary
action against her or otherwise cause her to experience any “serious and material
change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment.” Davis,
245 F.3d at 1239. Indeed, as Coles acknowledged during her deposition, the terms
and conditions of her employment with USPS allowed Reda and Aguilar to inspect
her vehicle without her consent. The search thus was consistent with the terms and
conditions of her employment, not a change to them.
Nor did the investigative interview constitute adverse employment action.
Coles faced no discipline arising out of the interview. Although the Postmaster
placed the interview into Coles’s personnel file, Coles offers no evidence beyond
mere “speculati[on],” id., that this adversely affected her position. Indeed, she
4
In determining whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case at the summary
judgment stage, we consider “the total weight” of the complained-of actions “collectively.”
Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Coles argues the district court erred in failing to consider the Postmaster’s
behavior collectively. In fact, the district court, citing Shannon, determined that “[e]ven
considering the [a]lleged [d]iscriminatory [a]cts collectively, . . . no reasonable jury could
conclude that [Coles] suffered an adverse employment action.” Doc. 35 at 6. Coles’s contention
that the district court erred in failing to consider the Postmaster’s conduct collectively thus is
meritless.
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acknowledged during her deposition that the interview has had no adverse impact
on her promotional opportunities.
Coles’s culling belt assignments did not amount to adverse employment
action either. Aguilar’s undisputed testimony shows that all USPS employees
were required to work the culling belt from time to time, that there often was too
little accumulated spurs belt work at the start of Coles’s shift for Coles to perform
spurs duties, and that as a result Coles frequently had time to perform other duties.
Coles conceded that there often was little spurs belt work for her to complete at the
start of her shift. Her bid assignment, which included “Other Duties As Assigned,”
Doc. 31-2 at 3, contemplated that Coles might be assigned work beyond the spurs
belt. She suggests that being required to work the culling belt violated her union
agreement, but identifies no evidence as to this claim, much less evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The vehicle search, investigative interview, and culling belt assignments,
taken individually or collectively, were not adverse employment actions. As such,
she has failed to establish a prima facie case of race- or age-based discrimination.
Coles argues that because the McDonnell Douglas framework “is not, and
never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary
judgment motion in an employment discrimination case,” Smith v. Lockheed-
Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), she was not required to show
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that she suffered an adverse employment action to defeat summary judgment.
Although a “plaintiff’s failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom
the plaintiff’s case,” and a “plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if
[s]he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the
employer’s discriminatory intent,” id., we have never suggested that a plaintiff can
survive summary judgment without any evidence that she experienced any adverse
employment action at all. Allowing a plaintiff to go beyond the McDonnell
Douglas framework to prove her employer’s discriminatory intent does not abolish
the requirement that the plaintiff have suffered an adverse employment action.
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting the Postmaster
summary judgment as to Coles’s race- and age-based discrimination claims. 5
B. Coles Waived Her Argument That the Postmaster’s Actions Were a
Pretext for Retaliation.
Coles argues that the district court erred in determining, with respect to her
race- and age-based retaliation claims, that the Postmaster’s given reasons for her
actions were not pretextual. She failed to raise this argument before the district
court, however, and offers no reason why we should excuse that failure. Coles has
thus waived her pretext argument.
5
Because we conclude that Coles failed to establish a prima facie case of race- or age-
based employment discrimination, we need not consider whether the Postmaster’s given reasons
for taking actions against her were pretextual.
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An employer may not discriminate against an employee “because [s]he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]” or
“made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
“The ADEA federal-sector provision was patterned directly after Title VII’s
federal-sector discrimination ban” and bars retaliation against federal employees
“based on the filing of an age discrimination complaint.” Gomez-Perez v. Potter,
553 U.S. 474, 479, 487 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The burden of
proof in Title VII retaliation cases is governed by the framework established in
McDonnell Douglas.” Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162-63 (11th
Cir. 1993). “[T]o prevail, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by
showing (1) statutorily protected expression, (2) adverse employment action, and
(3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action.” Id.The defendant then “may come forward with legitimate reasons for the
employment action to negate the inference of retaliation.” Id. “[T]he plaintiff then
bears the burden of proving . . . that the reasons offered by the defendant are
pretextual.” Id.The Postmaster argued in her motion for summary judgment that even if
Coles could make out a prima facie case of race- or age-based retaliation, she had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for each challenged act, and Coles could not
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establish pretext. In her response to the Postmaster’s motion, Coles laid out
boilerplate law on pretext but did not argue that the Postmaster’s explanations for
her actions were a pretext for discrimination. Nor did she raise this argument
before the district court at any other time. Coles abandoned her pretext argument
in the district court by offering mere “passing references to it . . . without
supporting arguments.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
(11th Cir. 2014). We “generally will not consider a legal issue or theory unless it
was presented to the trial court.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741
F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1984).
We may exercise discretion to consider an abandoned argument under
“certain exceptional circumstances,” id., but Coles has failed to show that any such
exception applies here. She was represented by counsel in the district court, a fact
that weighs against allowing her to raise her pretext argument for the first time on
appeal. Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d
982, 990 (11th Cir. 1982). Coles has thus abandoned the argument. Because the
district court’s pretext determination was an independent ground for granting the
Postmaster summary judgment on Coles’s retaliation claims, we affirm. See
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680 (“When an appellant fails to challenge properly on
appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, [s]he is
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deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and . . . the judgment is
due to be affirmed.”).
C. Coles Failed to Show She Experienced a Hostile Work Environment.
Coles argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
the Postmaster on her hostile work environment claims. To show a hostile work
environment under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must show she experienced
harassment based on a protected characteristic. Coles identified no evidence that
the Postmaster’s treatment of her was due to her race or age; indeed, the
Postmaster furnished several legitimate reasons for her actions, which Coles failed
to call into doubt. The district court thus did not err in granting the Postmaster
summary judgment on Coles’s hostile work environment claims.
Title VII is violated “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). To make out a prima facie case for a hostile
work environment claim, a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) that [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) that [s]he has been
subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have
been based on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as
national origin; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create
a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the
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employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of
vicarious or of direct liability.
Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). While
“Title VII prohibits discrimination, including harassment that discriminates based
on a protected category such as sex,” it “does not prohibit harassment alone,
however severe and pervasive.” Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala.,
480 F.3d 1287, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2007). To show disparate treatment based on a
comparator, a plaintiff must identify an employee or employees “similarly situated
in all relevant respects.” Trask, 822 F.3d at 1192.
We have assumed, but never decided, that hostile work environment claims
are also cognizable under the ADEA. See EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997). Several of our sister
Circuits have held that such claims are viable, 6 while others have assumed their
viability. 7 Courts that recognize hostile work environment theories under the
ADEA apply essentially “the same” analysis that applies to Title VII hostile work
environment claims. Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d
Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit, for example, has held that a plaintiff bringing a
hostile work environment claim under the ADEA must show that
6
See Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 2011); Brennan v. Metro.
Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d
830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996).
7
Racicot v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 414 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2005); Burns v. AAF-
McQuay, Inc., 166 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 1999).
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1. [she] is 40 years old or older;
2. [she] was subjected to harassment, either through words or actions,
based on age;
3. [t]he harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with
[her] work performance and creating an objectively intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment; and
4. [t]here exists some basis for liability on the part of the employer.
Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834-35 (6th Cir. 1996). These
elements are materially identical to those that a hostile work environment plaintiff
must show under Title VII. See Miller, 277 F.3d at 1275. We assume, without
deciding, that a plaintiff must show them to prevail on a hostile work environment
theory under the ADEA. Cf. Shields v. Fort James Corp., 305 F.3d 1280, 1282
(11th Cir. 2002) (observing that hostile work environment claims are analyzed
under the same framework whether brought under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
Coles asserts that seven episodes, taken individually or collectively, created
a hostile work environment: the (1) prior terminations, (2) retirement reminders,
(3) shouting incident, (4) SUV search, (5) bid elimination warning, (6)
investigative interview, and (7) culling belt assignments. She identifies no triable
issue, however, as to whether the Postmaster acted “based on” her race or age.
Miller, 277 F.3d at 1275; Crawford, 96 F.3d at 834.
Coles alleges that her prior terminations and retirement reminders were
based on her race or age, but identifies no evidence to support these assertions.
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The circumstances surrounding her prior terminations are unclear from the record,
and Coles offers only “unsupported speculation” that the Postmaster terminated
her—then sent her unwanted retirement reminders following her reinstatement—
due to her race or age, which “does not meet [her] burden of producing some
defense to a summary judgment motion.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d
1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Coles likewise fails to show that Aguilar shouted at her based on her race or
age. Even if Aguilar intended to demean and scare Coles, as she asserts, the only
evidence that he did so due to her race or age is Coles’s sworn testimony that
Aguilar never shouted or yelled at white, Hispanic, or under-40 USPS employees.
These employees are not valid comparators, as Coles has identified no individuals,
much less evidence they were “similarly situated [to her] in all relevant respects.”
Trask, 822 F.3d at 1192. Coles thus shows no triable issue as to whether Aguilar’s
shouting created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.
With respect to the remaining incidents, the Postmaster gave legitimate
reasons for each action she took, and Coles identifies no evidence rebutting them.
As to the SUV search, undisputed evidence showed that Reda and Aguilar received
notice that a USPS employee who fit Coles’s description allegedly had been selling
food and beverages at the plant in violation of federal law. The employee in
question was described as a “stocky black woman,” Doc. 31-5 at 3, who frequently
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parked her silver Mercedes station wagon in a handicapped space; Coles testified
that she drove a champagne or beige Mercedes SUV and usually parked in a
handicapped space. Reda’s and Aguilar’s investigation gave them a legitimate
reason to search Coles’s vehicle.8 Although Coles identified other mail handlers—
a Hispanic woman who is younger than Coles and two Hispanic men—whose
vehicles were not searched, they are not valid comparators because she identified
no evidence that they were “similarly situated” to her “in all relevant respects.”
Trask, 822 F.3d at 1192. Coles cites no other evidence to cast doubt on the
Postmaster’s legitimate explanation for the search of her SUV—she makes only
conclusory allegations that Reda and Aguilar acted in retaliation, which create no
genuine issue of material fact. See Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC,
827 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[C]onclusory allegations without specific
supporting facts have no probative value for a party resisting summary judgment.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
As to the warning that her bid would be abolished, undisputed evidence
showed that the Postmaster transferred Coles’s bid assignment to a different plant
as part of a large-scale reorganization. This reorganization gave the Postmaster a
legitimate reason to inform Coles that her bid assignment might move to a different
8
Although a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Reda and Aguilar opened the
SUV’s window or trunk, that issue is immaterial to whether they had a legitimate reason for
investigating Coles’s vehicle.
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plant. Coles testified that she believed the Postmaster had instructed Rodriguez to
tell her that her bid assignment would be abolished so as to induce her retirement,
but such “unsupported speculation” does not show a genuine issue of material fact.
Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1181 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to the investigative interview, undisputed evidence showed that Coles
was absent without explanation on four occasions within a thirty-day period.
Coles’s unexcused absences gave the Postmaster a legitimate reason to administer
an investigative interview questionnaire. Although the evidence showed that Coles
properly submitted paperwork to request medical leave, it does not show that the
Postmaster had approved her request.
Finally, as to the culling belt assignments, undisputed evidence showed that
Coles’s bid assignment included “Other Duties As Assigned,” that Aguilar was
responsible for assigning Coles additional work, and that oftentimes too little spurs
belt work had accumulated at the start of Coles’s shift to justify having her perform
spurs belt duties. Aguilar testified that he would assign Coles culling belt duties
when she could not perform spurs belt duties, and that all employees at the plant
were required to work the culling belt from time to time. Coles identifies no
evidence that casts doubt on Aguilar’s testimony. Although Coles argues that her
culling belt assignments denied her the benefit of her seniority, she cites no
evidence that the assignments were based on her race or age.
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For these reasons, Coles has failed to identify any genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Postmaster acted based on her age or race. The district court
thus did not err in granting the Postmaster summary judgment on Coles’s Title VII
and ADEA hostile work environment claims.
D. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Coles’s Motion to Alter the
Judgment.
Finally, Coles argues the district court erred in denying her motion to alter
the judgment. She identifies no “newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of
law or fact” that warrant reversing the district court’s order. Jacobs, 626 F.3d at
1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). Coles moved to alter the judgment on the
ground that the district court applied the wrong legal framework in determining
that she had failed to make a prima facie case of retaliation. But the district court
denied Coles’s motion on the ground that even if she had made a proper prima
facie case, she had not shown that the Postmaster’s stated reasons for acting were
pretextual. As we have already explained, Coles abandoned her challenge to the
district court’s pretext determination by failing to address the issue below.
Because we affirm the district court’s judgment as to Coles’s retaliation claims on
the ground that she failed to show that the Postmaster’s reasons were pretextual,
Coles cannot show the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to
alter the judgment. Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1327.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Postmaster.
AFFIRMED.
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