Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited, a Florida Limited Partnership vs Mitchell Cypress , 415 F. App'x 207 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 24, 2011
No. 10-10304
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-60016-WPD
HOLLYWOOD MOBILE ESTATES
LIMITED, a Florida Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MITCHELL CYPRESS, Chairman, Seminole
Tribe of Florida, RICHARD BOWERS,
Vice Chairman, Seminole Tribe of Florida,
MAX B. OSCEOLA, JR., ROGER SMITH,
DAVID CYPRESS, Council Members,
Seminole Tribe of Florida, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 24, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BLACK and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hollywood Mobile Estates, Ltd., (HME) appeals the district court’s
dismissal of its lawsuit against various officials of the Seminole Tribe of Florida
for lack of jurisdiction. The district court held the tribal defendants were entitled
to sovereign immunity from HME’s request for an injunction compelling them to
restore HME to possession of certain leased premises and for “restitutionary
relief” compelling the defendants to return rents collected from subleasees. The
court held the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which provides a
limited exception to sovereign immunity for certain suits against individual
defendants, did not apply because: (1) the relief sought by HME was not
prospective in nature; and (2) the requested relief implicated special sovereignty
issues. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that HME’s request for the return
of collected rents does not fall within the Ex parte Young exception and is thus
barred by sovereign immunity. We remand to the district court for consideration
of HME’s request for an injunction restoring it to the premises.
I. DISCUSSION
“We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for
sovereign immunity.” Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1285
(11th Cir. 2001). “‘[A]n Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has
authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.’” Id. (quoting Kiowa
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Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1988)). This immunity
extends to tribal officials “when they act in their official capacity and within the
scope of their authority.” Tamiami Partners, Ltd. ex rel. Tamiami Dev. Corp. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999).
When tribal officials act beyond their authority, however, they are subject to
suit under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. Id. The Young doctrine allows suits
against officers “seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing violations
of federal law.” McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256
(11th Cir. 2001). The Young doctrine does not apply where the relief requested
“implicates special sovereignty interests.” See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261, 281 (1997) (holding Ex parte Young did not allow a suit that was the
“functional equivalent of a quiet title action”).
A. HME’s Request for “Restitutionary Relief”
The district court held the Ex parte Young doctrine did not apply to HME’s
request for “restitutionary relief” compelling the defendants to return collected
rents because this request was not prospective in nature. We agree this is a
retrospective claim for damages rather than a prospective request for relief. We
therefore affirm the district court’s holding that the tribal defendants are entitled to
sovereign immunity on this claim.
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B. HME’s Request for an Injunctive Relief Restoring HME to Possession of the
Leased Premises
The district court concluded HME’s request for an injunction compelling
the defendants to return possession of the leased premises to HME could not
proceed under Ex parte Young because: (1) it was not prospective in nature; and
(2) it implicated special sovereignty interests and was thus barred by Coeur
D’Alene.
We first consider the district court’s conclusion that HME’s requested relief
was not prospective in nature. HME’s complaint alleges the defendants exceeded
the scope of their authority under 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2)(E) and 25 C.F.R. 162.110
by unilaterally ejecting HME from the premises and by continuing to possess
property that HME is entitled to occupy under the lease.1 The district court
1
We note that although the defendants claim the ejection was justified under the lease
based on alleged breaches by HME, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs has
concluded no material breach occurred.
We also note that we need not evaluate the merits of HME’s claim at this stage of the
litigation nor decide whether the tribal defendants’ conduct in fact constituted a violation of
federal law. In determining whether the Ex parte Young exception applies, “a court need only
conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quotations and citation omitted). “[T]he
inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis of the merits of
the claim.” Id. at 646 (noting the parties disputed whether federal law had been violated or even
governed the dispute); see also Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281 (“An allegation of an on-going
violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke
the Young fiction.”).
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concluded HME’s request for an injunction restoring it to the property was not
prospective because “it would remedy past, rather than future, harms” and “really
requests an undoing of what was done in the past.”
We disagree. HME has alleged the defendants are depriving it of its present
right to occupy the property under the terms of the lease, in violation of federal
law. HME’s request for an injunction directing the tribal defendants to restore it
to the property is prospective relief that will cure this ongoing violation. Cf. State
Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 96 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting
in the context of unlawful termination claims that “[e]very Circuit to have
considered the issue . . . has held that claims for reinstatement to previous
employment satisfy the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment’s
sovereign immunity bar”); Elliott v. Hinds, 786 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“[R]einstatement . . . is clearly prospective in effect and thus falls outside the
prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment.”). As such, we conclude the district
court erred in its determination that HME sought retrospective relief, and we hold
that HME’s requested injunction is prospective equitable relief of the type
permissible under Young.
The tribal defendants have argued, however, that even if HME’s requested
relief generally satisfies the requirements of Young, it is nonetheless barred under
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the doctrine of Coeur d’ Alene because it implicates special sovereignty interests.
In Coeur d’Alene, the Supreme Court held Ex parte Young did not allow relief
where the underlying lawsuit was “the functional equivalent of a quiet title action
which implicates special sovereignty interests.” 521 U.S. at 281. The Court noted
the suit in question effectively sought a determination that certain submerged
lands “are not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State,” and the relief
requested would “diminish, even extinguish, the State’s control over a vast reach
of lands and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory.”
Id. at 282.
Here, the tribal defendants contend HME’s requested relief implicates
special sovereignty interests because it could only be obtained by: (1) ordering the
tribal council members into session; (2) compelling them to place matters on the
agenda contrary to established procedures; and (3) forcing members to abandon
their obligations of office and vote as the court has directed, contrary to the
interests of the Tribe. The district court agreed Coeur d’Alene applied, holding
HME’s requested relief would require the court “to tell the Tribal Council to
convene and what to do.”
As an initial matter, we note a void in the record that complicates our review
of this issue. In keeping with their contention that only the Tribal Council as a
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whole has the authority to manage lands, the tribal defendants contend in their
brief that HME was initially removed from the leased property pursuant to the
“official deliberative act of a majority vote of a quorum of the Tribal Council
Members, acting collectively while in legal session, wherein the Tribal Council
authorized the sovereign government of the Tribe to undertake a self-help remedy
expressly authorized” under the lease. However, the record does not contain any
such ordinance or resolution ejecting HME from the leased property,2 nor does any
document in the record describe a formal vote ejecting HME. This absence is
particularly puzzling in light of Article IV of the Tribe’s bylaws, which requires
that all ordinances and resolutions of the Tribal Council be numbered
consecutively and made available for public inspection. The record simply
reflects that Mitchell Cypress, Chairman of the Tribal Council, sent a letter on
June 17, 2008, stating HME was in breach of the lease and if defaults were not
cured, the Tribe would exercise its right to re-enter and retake the premises. The
record also reflects the Tribe exercised this right on July 15, 2008, after HME
denied any default existed. Nowhere does the record demonstrate this action was
taken by the Tribal Council pursuant to a majority vote, as the tribal defendants
2
This was confirmed at oral argument by counsel for the defendants.
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have claimed in their brief and as their description of their limited individual
authority would seem to require.
The record’s failure to support the tribal defendants’ assertion that HME
was removed pursuant to an official deliberative act calls into question the tribal
defendants’ assertions about the process generally required to effect a change in
possession of the leased property and leaves this Court without a means to assess
precisely what relief would be required to restore HME to possession in this case.
If the ejection was not in accordance with the tribe’s required procedures, it is
unclear why a formal vote is necessary to correct it.
In any case, assuming the tribal defendants’ description of the steps required
to restore HME to the premises is accurate, we hold HME’s requested relief does
not implicate “special sovereignty interests” of the type the Court found to be
protected in Coeur d’Alene. As we explained in Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v.
Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999), “the remedy in Coeur d’Alene would
have resolved, for all time, Idaho’s property interests in the disputed submerged
lands.” Such relief was barred because it was the “functional equivalent” of a
quiet title action against the state. Id.Here, the requested injunction would merely affect the tribe’s possessory
rights to the property for the remainder of the lease term. It would not remove the
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land from the tribe’s jurisdiction or permanently deprive the tribe of its property
interests. The fact the tribal officials may have to take a vote to effect compliance
with such an injunction does not create a “special sovereignty interest.” We
therefore hold that the district court erred in concluding the relief sought
implicates special sovereignty interests. Instead, we hold, based on this record and
these parties, that HME’s request for an injunction restoring it to the premises is
not barred by tribal sovereign immunity. We do not address whether the actual
entry of such an injunction would be appropriate under the circumstances of this
case, nor do we address whether the tribal officials’ actions were in fact in
violation of federal law. We decide only that tribal sovereign immunity is not a
jurisdictional bar to HME’s claim for injunctive relief restoring it to the premises.
II. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of HME’s claim for the return of
collected rents. However, because we have determined the district court erred in
holding tribal sovereign immunity bars HME’s claim for an injunction to be
restored to the premises, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of this claim. We
remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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