Shawntae Jones v. Triple Z, Inc. , 679 F. App'x 986 ( 2017 )

Case: 16-11290 Date Filed: 03/07/2017 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11290
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-01823-ODE
SHAWNTAE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRIPLE Z, INC.,
d.b.a. Pars Cars,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 7, 2017)
Before MARCUS, WILSON, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 16-11290 Date Filed: 03/07/2017 Page: 2 of 4
Shawntae Jones appeals the unfavorable jury verdict in her workplace sexual
harassment and retaliation lawsuit, brought against Triple Z., Inc. (Pars Cars),
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. On
appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred by failing to properly instruct the
jury as to her retaliation claims, which prevented the jury from considering and
rendering a complete verdict. After a careful review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm.
I.
Jones worked as a used car sales representative for Pars Cars. She was
based at the Mount Zion location, which was the flagship store. Jones alleges that
shortly after she began working there, her sales manager, Lance Dawkins, began
sexually harassing her. Among other things, Jones contends that she was retaliated
against after she complained to her superiors about Dawkins’s behavior and filed
an EEOC charge. Pars Cars denied all allegations.
II.
We generally review jury instructions de novo to determine “whether they
misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.”
Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “If, however, we find that the instructions
accurately reflect the law, the district court has wide discretion as to the
2
Case: 16-11290 Date Filed: 03/07/2017 Page: 3 of 4
instructions’ style and wording.” Id. “When reviewing a district court’s failure to
give a requested instruction, even if the requested instruction correctly states the
law, we will only reverse if (1) the contents of the requested instruction are not
adequately covered by the jury charge and (2) the requesting party suffers
prejudicial harm.” Id.
In order to preserve an issue on appeal, we also require a party to object to a
jury instruction, distinctly explaining the matter and grounds for the objection prior
to jury deliberations. See Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329
(11th Cir. 1999). Generally, “[a] party who fails to raise an objection to a jury
instruction prior to jury deliberations waives its right to raise the issue on appeal.”
Id. But we have recognized two limited “exceptions to this rule: first, where a
party has made its position clear to the court previously and further objection
would be futile; and second, where it is necessary to correct a fundamental error or
prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Jones did properly preserve objections with respect to (1) the jury
instructions’ exclusion of the EEOC charge as a form of protected activity, and (2)
the prohibition on going to or selling cars from the Mount Zion location as an
adverse action. However, the given instructions did not misstate the law or
mislead the jury. The district court correctly defined both protected activity and
3
Case: 16-11290 Date Filed: 03/07/2017 Page: 4 of 4
adverse actions. And those definitions sufficiently covered both the EEOC charge
and the prohibition from going to or selling at Mount Zion. Finally, there was no
prejudicial harm. The jury was fully aware that there were various retaliatory
actions and Jones was permitted to argue as much in closing arguments.
IV.
As to her other objections—the jury instructions failure to include (1) the
retaliatory act of Jones’s name being left off of car sales, (2) the protected actions
of her rejecting her sales manager’s behavior and complaining to her managers
about it, and (3) the burden of production for each of her retaliation claims—Jones
waived her right to challenge those issues. Because Jones did not clearly object to
the jury instructions based on those exclusions before jury deliberations, she failed
to preserve those issues for appeal. Consequently, Jones may only prevail if either
of the two exceptions applies; they do not. Jones did not make her positions on
these issues clear to the court. In fact, she continually took inconsistent positions
when asked to identify the protected activities and retaliatory actions throughout
the course of the proceedings. Furthermore, no fundamental error exists.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in instructing the jury on Jones’
retaliation claims. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
4