Christopher E. Huminski v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 679 F. App'x 926 ( 2017 )

Case: 16-12400 Date Filed: 02/15/2017 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-12400
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. 024158-14 L
CHRISTOPHER E. HUMINSKI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
U.S.Tax Court
________________________
(February 15, 2017)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 16-12400 Date Filed: 02/15/2017 Page: 2 of 5
Christopher Huminski, proceeding pro se, appeals from the U.S. Tax Court’s
orders: (1) granting the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and
sustaining its proposed levy to collect Huminski’s unpaid tax liabilities for tax
years 2005 through 2010; and (2) denying Huminski’s related motion to vacate or
revise.1 On appeal, Huminski argues that the Tax Court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner because “the IRS deliberately
manufactured false evidence” when it calculated his tax deficiencies for tax years
2005 through 2010. He also challenges the Tax Court’s denial of his
reconsideration motion. According to Huminski, this motion “challenged the
integrity of the tax court proceedings on the basis that the actions of [the IRS]
perpetrated a fraud on the court,” and this fraud resulted in an incorrect calculation
of his tax deficiencies. Accordingly, he argues that the Tax Court erred by
summarily rejecting his fraud-on-the-court argument without allowing him the
opportunity to conduct discovery to obtain those materials. Finally, Huminski
assigns error to the Tax Court’s failure to “state its findings of fact” with respect to
his fraud-on-the-court argument.
1
Huminski’s appeal in this case is related to his appeal in Case No. 16-11677. The
related appeal in Case No. 16-11677 concerns the U.S. Tax Court’s denial of: (1) Huminski’s
“motion for leave to vacate” the Tax Court’s November 2012 order accepting the
Commissioner’s deficiency calculations following Huminski’s petition for a redetermination of
tax deficiencies for tax years 2005 through 2008; and (2) his related motions for reconsideration
thereof.
2
Case: 16-12400 Date Filed: 02/15/2017 Page: 3 of 5
We review de novo the Tax Court’s grant of summary judgment, reviewing
the facts and applying the same legal standards as the Tax Court. Baptiste v.
C.I.R., 29 F.3d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1994). We review the Tax Court’s denial of
leave to file a motion to vacate for abuse of discretion. Davenport Recycling
Associates v. C.I.R., 220 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). The Tax Court’s denial
of a motion for reconsideration is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Byrd’s Estate v. C.I.R., 388 F.2d 223, 234 (5th Cir. 1967). We liberally construe
briefs filed by pro se litigants. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.
2008). However, we may affirm the Tax Court’s decision “on any ground that
finds support in the record.” Long v. Commissioner of IRS, 772 F.3d 670 (11th Cir.
2014).
During a collection due process hearing, a taxpayer is accorded certain, but
limited, procedural safeguards in collection matters. A taxpayer may raise “any
relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy.” 26 U.S.C. §
6330(c)(2)(A). However, a taxpayer may only challenge the existence or amount
of the underlying tax liability if he “did not receive any statutory notice of
deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute
such tax liability.” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
The Tax Court did not err by granting the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment and sustaining the IRS’s proposed levy. In this case, the only
3
Case: 16-12400 Date Filed: 02/15/2017 Page: 4 of 5
challenge that Huminski has raised to the IRS’s collection process, both in the Tax
Court and on appeal, is his argument that the IRS committed fraud on the Court
when it calculated his tax deficiencies for tax years 2005 through 2010. However,
Huminski unsuccessfully challenged his tax liability for tax years 2005 through
2008 in his previous Tax Court case. Furthermore, as Huminski affirmatively
concedes, the Commissioner issued him—and he received—statutory notices of
deficiency for tax years 2009 and 2010 in 2013. However, Huminski did not file a
petition in the Tax Court challenging the 2009 or 2010 tax deficiencies and
penalties within the 90 day time limitation. Accordingly, Huminski was precluded
from challenging his underlying tax liability in the instant collection action,
because he received statutory notices of deficiency for all of the relevant tax years
and had an opportunity to dispute same. See 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).2 Thus, the
Tax Court did not err by granting the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment based on § 6330(c)(2)(B).
Likewise, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Huminski’s
motion for reconsideration. See Byrd’s Estate, 388 F.2d at 234. The only argument
Huminski raised in this motion was that the Tax Court erred by failing to make
2
As mentioned in note 1, supra, Huminski’s related appeal No. 16-11677 sought to reopen
his challenge of the tax deficiencies for years 2005 through 2008. This Court has now affirmed
the Tax Court’s denial of Huminski’s motion to reopen his challenge with respect to those years.
Thus, with respect to the years 2005 through 2008, Huminski not only had an opportunity to
challenge the deficiencies, he did so and lost. And as we note in the text above, Huminski had an
opportunity to challenge the deficiencies for the years 2009 and 2010, but failed to do so within
the 90 day time limit.
4
Case: 16-12400 Date Filed: 02/15/2017 Page: 5 of 5
specific findings concerning his argument that his underlying tax liabilities were
the product of IRS fraud. Although the Tax Court denied Huminski’s motion for
reconsideration in a summary fashion, remand is not required because a complete
understanding of the issues may be had without the aid of separate findings. See
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 n.16 (11th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the
requirement, from Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), that a district court must make findings of
fact and conclusions of law in the record). Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo,
that the Tax Court erred by failing to explain its reasoning, we may affirm “on any
ground that finds support in the record.” Long, 772 F.3d at 675. As discussed
previously, supra, Huminski was precluded from challenging his underlying tax
liability because he received statutory notices of deficiency for tax years 2005-
2010. Accordingly, the Tax Court did not err by declining to address Huminski’s
fraud-on-the-court argument, because it only pertained to the existence and amount
of his underlying tax liability. Thus, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Huminski’s motion for reconsideration, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
5