United States v. Celace Poliard ( 2020 )


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  •            Case: 19-11005   Date Filed: 01/03/2020   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-11005
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20907-FAM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CELACE POLIARD,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 3, 2020)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 19-11005       Date Filed: 01/03/2020        Page: 2 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Celace Poliard appeals his conviction and 180-month sentence for being a
    felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).* No
    reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
    On appeal, Poliard argues that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional both on
    its face and as applied to him. Poliard also challenges the constitutionality of his
    sentence, which was enhanced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act
    (“ACCA”). Because Poliard raises these arguments for the first time on appeal, we
    review only for plain error. See United States v. Peters, 
    403 F.3d 1263
    , 1270 (11th
    Cir. 2005).
    Poliard first contends that section 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause.
    As Poliard concedes, his facial challenge under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed
    by our binding precedent. “We have repeatedly held that Section 922(g)(1) is not a
    facially unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause
    because it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.” United States v. Jordan,
    *
    Poliard also pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i). Poliard raises no challenge on appeal to these
    convictions or to the sentences imposed for these counts of conviction.
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    Case: 19-11005     Date Filed: 01/03/2020   Page: 3 of 4
    
    635 F.3d 1181
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2011). We also reject Poliard’s argument that
    section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because -- as Poliard has
    stipulated -- the guns that Poliard possessed in Florida were manufactured outside
    of Florida and, thus, had traveled in interstate commerce. See United States v.
    Wright, 
    607 F.3d 708
    , 715-16 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that section 922(g) “only
    requires that the government prove some ‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce,
    which it may accomplish by ‘demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in
    interstate commerce’”).
    Poliard next challenges section 922(g)(1) under the Tenth Amendment. As
    Poliard acknowledges in his appellate brief, this argument is also foreclosed by
    binding precedent. See Hiley v. Barrett, 
    155 F.3d 1276
    , 1277 (11th Cir. 1998)
    (adopting the reasoning of the district court in Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., Inc. v.
    Barrett, 
    968 F. Supp. 1564
    , 1577-78 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (“Because § 922(g)(9) is a
    valid exercise of Congress’ commerce authority, it cannot violate the Tenth
    Amendment.”)); see also Cheffer v. Reno, 
    55 F.3d 1517
    , 1521 & n.7 (11th Cir.
    1995) (concluding that no Tenth Amendment violation occurs when legislation
    falls within Congress’ Commerce Clause power).
    Poliard next contends that his ACCA-enhanced sentence violates the Fifth
    and Sixth Amendments because his prior convictions were not charged in the
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    Case: 19-11005     Date Filed: 01/03/2020   Page: 4 of 4
    indictment or admitted to at the change-of-plea hearing. The Supreme Court has
    held, however, that a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence need not be
    alleged in the indictment or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 226-27 (1998). We have also
    rejected previously the constitutional argument raised by Poliard, concluding that
    “neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment prevents the district court from finding
    the fact of [a defendant’s] prior convictions, or using them to designate him an
    Armed Career Criminal.” See United States v. Smith, 
    775 F.3d 1262
    , 1266 (11th
    Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted) (citing Almendarez-Torres).
    Because Poliard has demonstrated no error -- plain or otherwise -- we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
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