United States v. James R. Young ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-13106    Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2023   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-13106
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JAMES R. YOUNG,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 1:94-cr-01036-AW-GRJ-1
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 22-13106      Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2023     Page: 2 of 3
    2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13106
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and
    ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    James R. Young, a former federal prisoner serving a term of
    supervised release, appeals pro se the order of the district court
    denying his motion for recusal and rehearing. 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    (a)-(b). The United States moves for a summary affirmance
    and to stay the briefing schedule. Because “the position of [the
    United States] . . . is clearly right as a matter of law so that there
    can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,”
    Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 
    406 F.2d 1158
    , 1162 (5th Cir.
    1969), we grant the motion for summary affirmance and deny as
    moot the motion to stay the briefing schedule.
    Summary affirmance is appropriate because there is no sub-
    stantial question that the district court did not abuse its discretion
    in denying Young’s motion for recusal and rehearing. 
    Id.
     Young
    argued that the district court judge had a “personal interest in pro-
    tecting himself from criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting”
    his predecessor, who presided over Young’s 1994 trial and who al-
    legedly conspired with the government to allow false testimony
    against Young. But in his opening brief, Young clarifies that his “in-
    tent was not to seek recusal” but to have a court address the merits
    of his wrongful-conviction argument. Young’s challenge to the va-
    lidity of his conviction must be brought in a motion to vacate, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast,
    USCA11 Case: 22-13106      Document: 15-1       Date Filed: 03/14/2023     Page: 3 of 3
    22-13106                Opinion of the Court                          3
    Inc., 
    851 F.3d 1076
    , 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Young’s initial
    motion to vacate was dismissed in 2001, so he must obtain our per-
    mission to file a successive motion to vacate. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (h). Because Young failed to obtain our permission, his
    wrongful-conviction argument was not properly before the district
    court, so the district court did not err by not addressing its merits.
    Insofar as Young maintains that the district court judge should
    recuse because he denied one of Young’s previous filings, “judicial
    rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or par-
    tiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994).
    And Young did not point to any portion of the record that suggests
    extrajudicial bias or impartiality. See United States v. Patti, 
    337 F.3d 1317
    , 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2003).
    We GRANT the motion for summary affirmance, AFFIRM
    the denial of Young’s motion for recusal and rehearing, and DENY
    AS MOOT the motion to stay the briefing schedule.