USCA11 Case: 22-12922 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 03/14/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12922
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PATRICK CONNOLLY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cr-00047-MSS-DCI-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12922
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Connolly, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of the government’s motion to authorize a payment
of the funds in Connolly’s Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) trust account
towards his outstanding criminal restitution judgment. Connolly
argues that because the district court imposed a payment schedule
that began upon his release from prison, the district court did not
have the authority to authorize a payment of funds from his BOP
trust account while he was still incarcerated. Further, Connolly
argues that the funds did not qualify as “substantial resources” for
purposes of
18 U.S.C. § 3664(n).
We review the district court’s order directing the BOP to re-
mit funds from an inmate’s trust account for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. White,
663 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011).
For context, an inmate trust account allows the BOP to maintain
an inmate’s money while he is incarcerated, including money re-
ceived from family, friends, and prison employment. See
28 C.F.R.
§§ 506.1, 545.11.
The relevant statutory scheme for the issuance and enforce-
ment of restitution orders is contained in
18 U.S.C. §§ 3572, 3613,
and 3664. The district court, not the government, is charged with
determining how a defendant is to pay restitution. See
18 U.S.C. §
3664(f)(2) (“Upon determination of the amount of restitution owed
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22-12922 Opinion of the Court 3
to each victim, the court shall . . . specify in the restitution order
the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the res-
titution is to be paid . . . .”). A person who owes restitution must
pay immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court pro-
vides for payment on a date certain or in installments.
Id. §
3572(d)(1). A defendant must notify the court “of any material
change” in his economic circumstances that might affect his ability
to pay, and upon notice, the court may, on its own motion or mo-
tion of any party, adjust the payment schedule, “or require imme-
diate payment in full, as the interests of justice require.” Id. §
3572(d)(3).
Sections 3613 and 3664 allow the government to enforce an
order of restitution as if it were a lien or civil judgment. See id. §
3613(a), (c), (f); id. § 3664(m). Thus, the enforcement can be against
all the defendant’s property or rights to property except property
exempt from levy for payment of federal income taxes, which in-
cludes (1) wearing apparel and school books, (2) fuel, provisions,
furniture, and personal effects; (3) books and tools of a trade; (4)
unemployment benefits; (5) undelivered mail; (6) certain annuity
and pension payments; (7) workmen’s compensation; (8) judg-
ments for support of minor children; (9) certain service-connected
disability payments; and (10) assistance under the Job Training
Partnership Act.
18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1);
26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)(1)-(8),
(10), (12). And the government may enforce an order of restitution
by “all other available and reasonable means.”
18 U.S.C. §
3664(m)(1)(A). Section 3664 further states that, upon notice of a
material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances, the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12922
court may, on its own motion, or the motion of any party, adjust
the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, “as
the interests of justice require.”
18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). Finally,
[i]f a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a
fine, receives substantial resources from any source,
including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment,
during a period of incarceration, such person shall be
required to apply the value of such resources to any
restitution or fine still owed.
Id. § 3664(n).
Here, the district court did not err in granting the govern-
ment’s motion. The statutory scheme supports the district court’s
order granting the government’s motion to authorize the payment
from Connolly’s trust account to pay his outstanding criminal judg-
ment balance. See
18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). Under the MVRA and §
3664, the government is responsible for collecting restitution for
victims, and a defendant who receives substantial resources from
any source while incarcerated is required to apply its value to res-
titution still owed.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3612(c), 3664(m)(1)(A), (n). Be-
cause the funds in Connolly’s trust account came from his wife,
which constitutes “any source,” the district court had authority to
grant the government’s motion to seize the funds from Connolly’s
account. See
18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), (f);
18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). Addition-
ally, the restitution order constituted a lien against all of Connolly’s
property and rights to property, and that lien attached to the funds
in Connolly’s BOP trust account. See
id. § 3613(a), (c), (f); id. §
3664(m). And, because the property is cash, it does not fall within
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22-12922 Opinion of the Court 5
the exemptions in § 3613(a)(1). See id. § 3613(a)(1) (12);
26 U.S.C.
§ 6334(a)(1)-(8), (10). While the schedule of payments does note
that Connolly’s required monthly payments will begin upon his re-
lease from custody, the language of § 3664 does not preclude the
court from altering the payment schedule or requiring another
form of payment upon a defendant’s receipt of more resources.
§ 3664(k), (n). Further, the court’s grant of the government’s mo-
tion to authorize the payment from Connolly’s account effectively
modified the payment plan by requiring a payment before the start
of the original plan, as it was permitted to do under § 3664(k) and
§ 3572(d)(3).
AFFIRMED.
