USCA11 Case: 22-10229 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 04/10/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10229
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEEMON JACQUES DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00401-WFJ-CPT-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10229
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Keemon Davis appeals his 180-month sentence imposed af-
ter Davis pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition
by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(e). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Before Davis’s sentencing, a probation officer prepared a
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). The PSI determined that
Davis had at least three prior convictions for “serious drug of-
fenses” and was, thus, subject to an enhanced sentence under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). As predicate offenses for
the ACCA-enhancement, the PSI identified three separate 2010
Florida convictions for the sale of cocaine. The district court im-
posed a sentence of 180 months: the mandatory minimum sen-
tence under the ACCA.
On appeal, Davis challenges his designation as an armed ca-
reer offender. Briefly stated, Davis contends that the ACCA’s defi-
nition of “serious drug offense” was amended by the First Step Act *
to include (in pertinent part) only those offenses for which the de-
fendant served more than 12 months’ imprisonment. Because Da-
vis served less than 12 months on each of his 2010 Florida drug
* First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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22-10229 Opinion of the Court 3
convictions, Davis says those convictions do not qualify as predi-
cate offenses for purposes of the ACCA.
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.
See United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga,
681 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir.
2012). When interpreting a statute, we first consider the plain stat-
utory language, “the specific context in which that language is
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”
Id. “If
this analysis reveals that the provision has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case and the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, then our inquiry is
complete.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is subject to a man-
datory minimum 15-year sentence if he has three or more prior
convictions for a “violent felony” or -- as in this case -- a “serious
drug offense.” See
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A “serious drug offense”
is defined in pertinent part as “an offense under State law, involving
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufac-
ture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102
of the Controlled Substances Act (
21 U.S.C. § 802)), for which a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed
by law.” See
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The district court deter-
mined that Davis’s 2010 Florida drug convictions satisfied this def-
inition.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10229
Davis contends that the district court erred in concluding
that the ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” remained un-
changed by the First Step Act. We disagree.
Section 401(a) of the First Step Act amended expressly pro-
visions of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). In particular,
section 401(a) struck the term “felony drug offense” from
21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1) and replaced it with the term “serious drug felony.” See
First Step Act § 401(a);
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). The term “serious
drug felony” is defined in part as “an offense described in [
18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)], for which . . . the offender served a term of imprison-
ment of more than 12 months.” See First Step Act § 401(a);
21
U.S.C. § 802(57).
Contrary to Davis’s assertion, the plain and unambiguous
language of section 401(a) amends only the CSA, not the ACCA.
Nor does the statutory language -- alone or viewed in context --
make clear that Congress intended the CSA’s definition of the term
“serious drug felony” (found in Title 21) to replace or amend the
ACCA’s definition of the term “serious drug offense” (found in Ti-
tle 18). That some prior drug convictions might constitute predi-
cate offenses for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under
ACCA but not under the CSA does not render the statutory lan-
guage ambiguous or incoherent.
The pertinent statutory language of the ACCA, the CSA,
and the First Step Act are clear and unambiguous: not truly open
to more than one interpretation. We must reject Davis’s argument
that the statutory language should be construed in his favor under
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22-10229 Opinion of the Court 5
the rule of lenity. See United States v. Phifer,
909 F.3d 372, 383-84
(11th Cir. 2018) (“Under the rule of lenity, when a criminal law is
ambiguous, we resolve doubts in favor of the defendant.”).
The district court concluded properly that Davis’s Florida
drug convictions qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA’s
definition of “serious drug offense” and that Davis was, thus, sub-
ject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.
AFFIRMED.
