Katherine Garfield v. United States , 131 F. App'x 677 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAY 13, 2005
    No. 04-10832                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket Nos. 01-08036-CV-CO-S
    98-00282-CR-CO
    KATHERINE GARFIELD,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (May 13, 2005)
    Before ANDERSON, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Katherine Garfield, a federal prisoner serving a 151-month sentence for
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine,
    appeals the district court’s denial of her counseled 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion to
    vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence.1 After review, we affirm.
    Garfield pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1),
    841(b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court sentenced her to 151 months’
    imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Garfield appealed her sentence,
    and this Court affirmed. United States v. Garfield, No. 99-12418 (11th Cir. May
    16, 2000).
    On or about July 23, 2001, Garfield filed the instant § 2255 motion raising
    challenges to both her conviction and sentence, including a Sixth Amendment
    challenge to the determination of drug quantity at sentencing.
    On December 12, 2003, the magistrate judge issued a report recommending
    that the district court deny Garfield’s § 2255 motion. On January 20, 2004, the
    district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report in its entirety and denied
    Garfield’s § 2255 motion. Garfield filed a motion in the district court for a COA,
    which the district court also denied.
    1
    Because Garfield filed her motion after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective
    Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
     (1996), the provisions
    of that act apply.
    2
    After the district court denied Garfield’s § 2255 motion and motion for a
    COA, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
     (2004), on June 24, 2004. Blakely extended the rule in Apprendi and
    concluded that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
    sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
    verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 
    124 S. Ct. at 2537
     (emphasis in
    original).
    This Court initially denied Garfield’s application for a COA. On August 9,
    2004, however, this Court reconsidered its denial and granted Garfield’s motion
    for a COA on the following issue: “Is Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
     (2004), retroactive to cases on collateral review pursuant to Teague v.
    Lane, 
    489 U.S. 288
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 1060
    , 
    103 L. Ed.2d 334
     (1989)?”2
    2
    After we issued Garfield a COA, the Supreme Court further explained that the holding in
    Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005). To the extent Garfield’s appeal turns on the application of Blakely, it also turns on
    the application of Booker.
    Further, in addition to the issue stated above, this Court also granted a COA on two other
    issues: (1) “[I]s appellant procedurally barred from raising the instant constitutional challenge to her
    sentence because it was not raised on direct appeal?”; and (2) “If the claim is not procedurally barred,
    does appellant’s 151-month sentence violate Apprendi, as explained in Blakely?” Because we have
    determined that Booker is not retroactive to cases on collateral review, we need not address these
    two issues.
    3
    On appeal, Garfield argues that Blakely is available to her on collateral
    review.
    When reviewing the denial of a § 2255 motion, this Court “review[s]
    questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” Varela v. United
    States, 
    400 F.3d 864
    , 867 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). In Varela, this Court held that
    “Booker’s [and Blakely’s] constitutional rule falls squarely under the category of
    new rules of criminal procedure that do not apply retroactively to § 2255 cases on
    collateral review.” Id. at 868. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Garfield’s §
    2255 motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-10832

Citation Numbers: 131 F. App'x 677

Filed Date: 5/13/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021