Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 1 of 13
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11171
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20615-MGC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LOUIS ROBAINA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 28, 2020)
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 2 of 13
Louis Robaina appeals following his conviction for one count of conspiring
to commit health care fraud and wire fraud and two counts of money laundering,
and his 85-month total sentence. The charges arose out of Robaina’s involvement
in a scheme to fraudulently obtain kickbacks and reimbursements from Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Florida (BCBS-FL) via two Florida corporations: Culumbia Rehab
Medical Center Corporation (Culumbia) and Esmeralda Medical Center
Corporation (Esmeralda Medical). The indictment alleged Robaina, the registered
agent and President of Culumbia, conspired with Ibelis Hernandez, the registered
agent and President of Esmeralda Medical, and others to defraud BCBS-FL by
paying kickbacks to patient recruiters who referred patients to Culumbia and
Esmeralda Medical for health care services that were never provided and then
submitting the fraudulent claims to BCBS-FL for reimbursement.
On appeal, Robaina raises three issues. First, Robaina argues the district
court erroneously admitted extrinsic other acts evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Second, he contends the district court erred by failing to give a
curative instruction following the prosecutor’s improper statements during closing
arguments. Lastly, Robaina argues the district court erred in calculating his
guideline range because it improperly (1) determined the amount of loss for which
he was responsible, (2) imposed an aggravating role enhancement, and
(3) enhanced his offense level for obstruction of justice.
2
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 3 of 13
After review, we affirm.
I. RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE
Robaina first challenges the district court’s admission of other acts evidence
that he insists constituted impermissible propensity evidence. Prior to trial, the
government filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence that Robaina previously
owned and (along with Hernandez) operated Staffing Solutions and More (Staffing
Solutions), a staffing company that purported to provide licensed physical
therapists to HHAs when, in reality, it sent unlicensed therapists to visit patients
and obtain their signatures on medical documents. The court ruled that the
evidence would not be admitted generally, but would be admissible if Robaina
“opened the door” in some way. At trial Robaina testified in his own defense and,
on cross-examination, claimed he had no knowledge that Hernandez had engaged
in any fraudulent conduct while working at Staffing Solutions. At that point, the
Staffing Solutions evidence was admitted, and Robaina did not object.
The district court did not err in admitting the Staffing Solutions evidence.1
While evidence of uncharged, criminal activities generally is considered
1
The parties dispute the standard of review we should apply to the admission of this
evidence. Ordinarily, a district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Flanders,
752 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014). If, however, a party
fails to preserve an evidentiary objection through contemporaneous objections, we review only
for plain error. United States v. Turner,
474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007); see also United
States v. Wilson,
788 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015). The government argues we should apply
plain-error review, as Robaina did not offer a contemporaneous objection when the evidence was
admitted at trial, though he did contest the government’s initial notice of intent to introduce the
3
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 4 of 13
inadmissible, extrinsic evidence under Rule 404, intrinsic evidence is admissible if
it is “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the
crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense.” United States v. McLean,
138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Staffing Solutions evidence falls into the third category and thus was
not subject to exclusion under Rule 404(b). This Court addressed a similar issue in
United States v. Nerey,
877 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2017). There, the defendant was
charged with various crimes related to his role as a patient recruiter and his receipt
of kickbacks in a complex healthcare fraud
scheme. 877 F.3d at 962. We held the
district court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant’s involvement with
other HHAs because it was inextricably intertwined with, and probative of, how
the defendant became familiar with the HHAs involved in the charges against him,
and the evidence explained the full extent of his relationship with other
co-conspirators.
Id. at 975, 977.
Similarly, here, Robaina’s involvement with Staffing Solutions provided
necessary background information concerning how he came to work with
Hernandez and how he came to operate the clinics that engaged in the fraudulent
evidence. We need not resolve this dispute here, however, as we affirm the district court’s
evidentiary ruling even under an abuse of discretion standard of review.
4
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 5 of 13
activity at issue. His involvement with Staffing Solutions was temporally and
circumstantially related to his charged offenses because he incorporated Staffing
Solutions four years before he incorporated Culumbia, both companies committed
similar fraudulent activities involving the purported provision of medical treatment
to health care beneficiaries, and he and Hernandez were significant actors in both
companies. See United States v. Williford,
764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.
1985) (“Evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of
events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted
if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral
and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of
the crime for the jury.”).
Moreover, even assuming the evidence were extrinsic, it would still have
been admissible under Rule 404(b). Extrinsic evidence of uncharged conduct is
admissible under Rule 404(b) for non-propensity purposes, “such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); see United States v.
Lehder-Rivas,
955 F.2d 1510, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1992). Here, Robaina claimed
that he did not know that Hernandez had participated in other fraudulent schemes
and did not know that she was committing fraud through Culumbia, and his
involvement with her in a prior insurance fraud scheme was admissible to show
5
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 6 of 13
that his acts were without mistake and with the intent to defraud health care
companies. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
II. PROSECUTOR’S STATEMENTS
Robaina next challenges the district court’s failure to issue a curative
instruction following two statements during the prosecutor’s closing argument.
The first concerned Robaina’s contention he did not commit fraud because he used
all the cash he withdrew from Culumbia’s accounts to purchase new equipment for
the clinic. The prosecutor asked the jury whether they “actually believe that
[Robaina] spent $195,000 on all of this [new equipment], and, yet, there is not a
single record?” Robaina objected that this impermissibly shifted the burden to him
to produce exculpatory evidence. The second statement was in response to
Robaina’s testimony that he trusted Hernandez. The prosecutor stated that “[s]he
might be one of the last people in Miami-Dade County that I would have trusted
with giving the keys to my business to, one of the absolute last people.” Robaina
objected that in making the statement, the government had impermissibly offered
its opinion of a witness.
The district court overruled the objections. As to the first statement, the
district court found it did not impermissibly shift the burden because Robaina had
been the one who had “brought in” the issue by testifying he had used the money
he withdrew to purchase new equipment. As to the second statement, the district
6
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 7 of 13
court acknowledged it may have been improper, but found it unlikely the comment
“would have influenced the outcome” as it was such a “de minimis” part of the
prosecutor’s overall closing argument. The district court further noted it had
cautioned the jury through the trial that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.
The district court did not err in failing to give a curative instruction
following the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument. 2 Prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments, such as an improper burden-shifting
argument, requires a new trial only where (1) the prosecutor’s remarks were
improper, and (2) the remarks prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial
rights.
Nerey, 877 F.3d at 970. The second prong of the test is met where there is
a reasonable probability that, but for the improper statements, the outcome of the
case would have been different.
Id.
The challenged remarks here were not improper because they merely urged
the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. See
United States v. Reeves,
742 F.3d 487, 505 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The purpose of
closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing the evidence, and although a
prosecutor may not exceed the evidence presented at trial during her closing
argument, she may state conclusions drawn from the trial evidence.”).
2
We review determinations regarding prosecutorial misconduct de novo.
Nerey, 877
F.3d at 969.
7
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 8 of 13
Moreover, even assuming the statements were improper, they did not affect
Robaina’s substantial rights. See
Nerey, 877 F.3d at 970. That is, there is no
reasonable probability the prosecutor’s statements affected the outcome of the trial.
The jury had before it ample evidence from which it could have drawn the
conclusions the prosecutor was urging. And, importantly, although the district
court did not offer a specific curative instruction, it did instruct the jury that (1) the
law did not require Robaina to produce any evidence, and (2) the lawyers’
statements were not evidence. Robaina has therefore failed to show the
prosecutor’s statements, even if improper, require reversal. Accordingly, we
affirm as to this issue.
III. SENTENCING ISSUES
Finally, Robaina challenges three aspects of the district court’s application
of the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) the loss amount for which he was held
responsible; (2) its imposition of an aggravating-role enhancement; and (3) its
imposition of an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. We address each issue in
turn.3
3
This Court reviews de novo the district court's interpretation of the guidelines and its
application of guidelines to the facts. Findings of fact by the trial court at sentencing, however,
are reviewed for only clear error. United States v. Medina,
485 F.3d 1291, 1297, 1303 (11th Cir.
2007) (loss amount); United States v. Shabazz,
887 F.3d 1204, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018)
(aggravating role); United States v. Singh,
291 F.3d 756, 763 (11th Cir. 2002) (obstruction of
justice).
8
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 9 of 13
A. Loss Amount
Robaina argues the district court improperly included claims filed by
Esmeralda Medical (of which Hernandez was the registered agent and President) in
the loss amount. According to Robaina, only the claims filed by Culumbia should
have been used to calculate the loss attributable to him.
In kickback cases such as this one, the base offense level should be
increased, under § 2B1.1, “[i]f the greater of the value of the bribe or the benefit
conferred . . . exceeded $6,500.” U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1(b)(1)(B). The “value of the
improper benefit conferred” refers to “the value of the action to be taken or
effected in return for the bribe.”
Id. § 2B4.1 comment. (n.2). Where the criminal
activity is jointly undertaken, “the relevant conduct includes acts and omissions of
others that were (1) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (2)
in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (3) reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.”
Nerey, 877 F.3d at 978.
The district court here did not clearly err in calculating the amount of loss
for which Robaina was responsible. While Robaina may, on paper, have been
involved only with Culumbia, the losses resulting from the fraudulent claims filed
by Esmeralda Medical were nonetheless foreseeable in connection with the
conspiracy. See
id. at 978. The evidence at trial showed that (1) Robaina and
Hernandez conspired together to file fraudulent healthcare claims, (2) Culumbia
9
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 10 of 13
and Esmeralda Medical occupied the same office space, (3) Robaina regularly
visited both clinics, (4) Hernandez testified she and Robaina operated the clinics
together, (5) Culumbia and Esmeralda Medical shared the same assistant (who
Robaina paid), and (6) the clinics paid kickbacks to the same recruiters.
Given this evidence, we cannot say it was clear error for the district court to
include fraudulent claims filed by Esmeralda Medical in the loss amount
attributable to Robaina.
B. Aggravating Role
Robaina next contends the district court improperly imposed an
enhancement based on its finding he was an organizer or leader of the conspiracy.
He insists there was no evidence he directed the recruiters, billers, doctors, or
therapists.
Section 3B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines calls for a
four-level enhancement in a defendant’s base offense level if he was an organizer
or leader of a criminal activity that involved either five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). To establish a defendant acted as an
organizer or leader, “section 3B1.1 requires the exercise of some authority in the
organization, the exertion of some degree of control, influence, or leadership.”
United States v. Martinez,
584 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks
10
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 11 of 13
and alterations omitted). In assessing whether a defendant was an organizer or
leader, we consider the following factors:
(1) the exercise of decision making authority, (2) the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense, (3) the recruitment of
accomplices, (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing the
offense, (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and (7) the
degree of control and authority exercised over others.
Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 1222.
Here, the district court did not err in determining that Robaina was an
organizer or leader. The evidence showed that he incorporated Culumbia and was
its registered agent and President. It further showed Robaina made the decision to
pay one of the patient recruiters as a “consultant” for Culumbia, signed the
recruiter’s checks (as the sole signatory on Culumbia’s bank account) and
instructed that the recruiter be paid in laundered funds. This provided a sufficient
basis for the district court to find Robaina exercised significant decision-making
authority, and the court did not err in increasing his base offense level based on his
role in the conspiracy.
C. Obstruction of Justice
Robaina’s last objection to the district court’s guidelines calculation
concerns the court’s imposition of an enhancement for obstruction of justice. The
district court found Robaina’s trial testimony “went beyond . . . merely justifying
11
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 12 of 13
his behavior” and “showed a consistent and calculated effort to misrepresent his
behavior and his role in the offense.”
The Guidelines provide that a defendant’s offense level can be enhanced by
two levels if he willfully obstructed or impeded a prosecution and his obstructive
conduct related to his offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. A defendant
obstructs justice when he commits perjury, which is “false testimony concerning a
material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a
result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Duperval,
777
F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Testimony is
material where, if believed, it would tend to influence or affect the issue under
determination. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment (n. 6). Typically, material testimony
goes to the issue of a defendant’s guilt. See United States v. McKinley,
732 F.3d
1291, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2013).
Here, the district court did not err in determining Robaina obstructed the
prosecution of his case by providing deliberately misleading testimony. At trial,
Robaina represented that: (1) he was not aware of any fraud occurring at
Culumbia; (2) he rarely went to visit Culumbia’s and Esmeralda Medical’s offices;
(3) he did not pay recruiters to bring patients to Culumbia; and (4) he did not know
Culumbia’s patients were not receiving treatments. Those representations were
directly contradicted by the testimony of other participants in the conspiracy,
12
Case: 19-11171 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 13 of 13
including Hernandez. And the representations were unquestionably material, as
they went to the core issue of his guilt: whether he conspired to commit healthcare
fraud. See
id. at 1297–98.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s guidelines calculation and the
resultant sentence the court imposed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Robaina’s convictions and
sentences.
AFFIRMED.
13
