Debra McConnell v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. , 168 F. App'x 911 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 23, 2006
No. 05-15604 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00694-CV-T-E
DEBRA MCCONNELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WESTPOINT STEVENS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(February 23, 2006)
Before DUBINA, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Debra McConnell appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the employer on her retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). Because McConnell could not
establish either that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity or that her
employment was terminated because of her protected activity, we affirm.
I. Background
The facts of this case, presented in the light most favorable to McConnell,
are as follows: McConnell was employed by WestPoint Stevens, Inc. (“WestPoint
Stevens”) as an occupation health nurse until her termination on October 29, 2003.
At the time she was terminated, McConnell was under the direct supervision of
Kim Williams and Chad Butts. Williams was supervised by both Butts and
Woodrow “Woody” Sluss. Butts was in turn supervised by Tommy Bledsoe.
In July 2003, McConnell learned that Djuna Black, a nurse under her
supervision, planned to resign. She met with Williams and Butts to discuss the
resignation, and Butts told her to begin looking for a replacement. McConnell also
discussed Black’s resignation with Bledsoe. McConnell understood from her
conversation with Bledsoe that he would temporarily transfer another WestPoint
Stevens nurse to assist McConnell while she searched for a permanent
replacement. Bledsoe disputes McConnell’s recollection of their conversation,
claiming that he specifically instructed McConnell not to hire a replacement.
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McConnell eventually hired a nurse to fill Black’s position. When she
realized that she had misunderstood Bledsoe’s instructions, she rectified the
situation (the woman she hired withdrew). Nevertheless, McConnell was
subsequently terminated for committing “gross insubordination” by disobeying
Bledsoe’s orders. The parties do not dispute that, although McConnell was
informed of her termination by Butts and Williams, the decision to terminate her
was made by Bledsoe and Sluss (Bledsoe asked Sluss to investigate the matter).
McConnell claimed that she was not terminated for hiring a replacement for
Black, but rather in retaliation for previously complaining to Butts and Williams
that Angela Michelle Davidson, another employee, was being sexually harassed by
her supervisor, Terry Edmonson. McConnell also believed that Leroy Abney,
another supervisor, was contributing to the harassment at Edmonson’s direction.
Shortly thereafter, McConnell went to Williams and reported that Edmonson
did not like Davidson. She suggested to Williams that Edmonson’s negative
feelings toward Davidson stemmed from a failed relationship between Edmonson
and a former employee with whom Davidson had been friendly.
In August 2003, McConnell reported to Butts that Davidson felt that she was
being harassed and was considering filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). McConnell further stated that “if [the
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EEOC] were to question me, I would have to tell the truth and have to tell them . . .
I felt like Terry harassed her.”
McConnell never specifically complained to either Sluss or Bledsoe about
Edmonson’s alleged harassment of Davidson. McConnell did mention
Edmonson’s harassing behavior to Bledsoe in passing, but did not specifically
mention Davidson’s name. At the time they decided to terminate McConnell,
neither Sluss nor Bledsoe knew about McConnell’s complaints to Butts and
Williams regarding Edmonson’s alleged harassment of Davidson.
Davidson herself complained about Edmonson’s conduct to Butts, Williams,
Bledsoe, and Sluss. She ultimately filed an EEOC complaint on October 16, 2003,
although her complaint does not mention McConnell’s name and does not indicate
that another employee made complaints to management on her behalf. A copy of
Davidson’s complaint was forwarded to Sluss by the EEOC on October 23, 2003,
six days before McConnell was terminated.
McConnell filed a Title VII employment action against WestPoint Stevens,
Inc. (“WestPoint Stevens”), alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for
reporting the sexual harassment of another employee.1 WestPoint Stevens moved
1
In her complaint, McConnell also included a count of negligent training under state law.
The district court dismissed that claim without prejudice. Because McConnell does not
challenge that decision on appeal, she has abandoned it. Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1382
n.1 (11th Cir. 1998).
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for summary judgment, asserting that McConnell failed to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation because she could not show that she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity or that there was a causal connection between her conduct and
her termination. Alternatively, WestPoint Stevens argued they had a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for terminating McConnell: her gross insubordination in
disobeying a direct order. The court granted summary judgment, finding that
McConnell had not engaged in a statutorily protected activity.
II. Discussion
McConnell argues that the district court applied the wrong standard when it
concluded that she had not engaged in a statutorily protected activity. She argues
that she was not required to show that Edmonson actually engaged in sexual
harassment to establish an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s
conduct was unlawful. She further asserts that she provided sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had an objectively
reasonable belief that her employer acted unlawfully. According to McConnell,
her actions were objectively reasonable in light of her co-worker’s repeated
complaints about sexual harassment, the fact that management took no steps to
resolve the problem, and her own observation of the harassment.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Skrtich v.
Thorton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002).
Pursuant to Title VII, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . , because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . , or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, “a plaintiff must show that (1)
she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action,
and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Stavropolous v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616 (11th Cir.
2004). Here, the parties agree that McConnell suffered an adverse employment
action.
To establish that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity, McConnell
must show that she “had a good faith, reasonable belief that [WestPoint Stevens]
was engaged in unlawful employment practices.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp.,
291 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). McConnell must
establish not only that she subjectively believed her employer was engaged in
unlawful employment practices, but also that her belief was objectively reasonable
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in light of the facts. Id. To determine whether McConnell’s belief was objectively
reasonable, we consider the existing substantive law. Clover v. Total Sys. Servs.,
Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). That said, the allegedly harassing
conduct complained of by McConnell need not actually be sexual harassment, “but
it must be close enough to support an objectively reasonable belief that it is.” Id.Here, the conduct alleged by McConnell was not remotely close enough to
support an objectively reasonable belief that it constituted sexual harassment.
Instead, the supervisors’ conduct towards Davidson appears to have been
motivated, at most, by personal animosity or jealousy, and not sex. And in any
case, McConnell failed to establish a causal connection between her internal
complaint and her discharge. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613
(11th Cir. 1995). McConnell failed to establish that either Bledsoe or Sluss, the
parties who made the decision to terminate her employment, was aware that she
had complained of Edmonson’s harassment of Davidson or that she had indicated
that she would tell the EEOC, if asked, that she felt Davidson had been harassed.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of WestPoint Stevens.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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