USCA11 Case: 20-11386 Date Filed: 01/08/2021 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-11386
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60163-RKA
CHARLENE WALKER ROSA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. SATZ,
BROWARD COUNTY STATE ATTORNEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(January 8, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charlene Walker Rosa, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of her amended complaint filed under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Rosa argues that the district court erred in determining that her claim was barred by
Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), because her criminal conviction had not
been invalidated. Upon consideration, we conclude that Rosa’s arguments lack
merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Rosa was convicted of first-degree murder in 2007. In 2020, Rosa filed a pro
se complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court in forma pauperis and
filed an amended complaint soon after. In the amended complaint, she asserted
claims against the county state attorney and her state public defender for fraud,
malicious prosecution, and “protection against double jeopardy.” Specifically, she
alleged that the attorneys had acted in concert to prevent her from receiving a fair
trial. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically,
the district court reasoned that Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred
Rosa’s fraud claim because it would necessarily invalidate her conviction. Rosa
timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo and view the
allegations in the complaint as true.” Alba v. Montford,
517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2008). “The standards governing dismissals under [Federal] Rule [of Civil
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Procedure] 12(b)(6) apply to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a district court shall dismiss a case
proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines at any time that the complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See
28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We construe pro se pleadings liberally and hold them “to a less
strict standard than pleadings filed by lawyers.” Alba,
517 F.3d at 1252. But “we
cannot act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain
an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC,
981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). And “[w]e
can affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the record—
even if that ground was not considered or advanced in the district court.” United
States v. Muho,
978 F.3d 1212, 1219 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, ‘under color
of’ state law, deprives another of her ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution.’” Harper v. Prof’l Prob. Servs. Inc.,
976 F.3d 1236, 1240 (11th
Cir. 2020) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983). However, a Section 1983 complaint cannot
be used to collaterally attack a conviction unless the underlying conviction “has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck,
512 U.S. at 487 (citation omitted).
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Consequently, the district court must consider whether a favorable judgment for the
plaintiff would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction or sentence . . .
.”
Id. “[I]f it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated” in one of
the ways described above.
Id. If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate the invalidity of her
outstanding criminal judgment, then the Section 1983 action cannot proceed. See
id.
Rosa argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claims, but her
arguments fail for two reasons.
First, Heck bars Rosa’s claims in her amended complaint because they stem
from her underlying 2007 conviction. For her fraud claim, Rosa alleges that the
prosecution and defense conspired to commit fraud in order to wrongfully convict
her of murder. She concludes from that alleged conspiracy that her counsel was
deficient, which “renders the result of the trial unreliable and the proceedings
fundamentally unfair and result[s] in a miscarriage of justice in the criminal
proceedings.” Thus, her fraud claim necessarily implies the invalidity of her
conviction. But because Rosa has not demonstrated that her conviction has already
been invalidated, her claim is barred by Heck.
Second, even if Heck barred only the fraud claim and not the entire amended
complaint, Rosa’s remaining claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Even
liberally construing her claims as claims for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious
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prosecution, malicious interference, or discrimination, those claims are barred by the
relevant statutes of limitations. See
Fla. Stat. §§ 760.01–760.11 (prohibiting various
forms of discrimination) and § 95.11(3)(f) and (o) (prescribing a four-year statute of
limitations for actions “founded on a statutory liability” and “for assault, battery,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or
any other intentional tort,” except in limited instances not applicable to the instant
case). The district court therefore did not err in dismissing the amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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