USCA11 Case: 20-11977 Date Filed: 01/08/2021 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-11977
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-00792-NPM
WAYNE LAND, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 8, 2021)
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Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wayne Land appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
Administration’s (“SSA”) partially favorable decision granting him disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”), pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Land argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed to
comply with Social Security Ruling 83-20 (“SSR 83-20”), see SSR 83-20,
1983-
1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 49 (Jan. 1, 1983), when the ALJ determined that he
became disabled on September 23, 2016, rather than on an earlier date. 1 Land asserts
that, because the record was ambiguous and required an inference as to when his
avascular necrosis condition became severe and rendered him disabled, SSR 83-20
required the ALJ to call a medical advisor to testify at the disability hearing. Land
further asserts that substantial evidence showed that he was disabled before
September 23, 2016.
We review de novo the legal principles upon which the ALJ’s decision is
based, but the ALJ’s factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
906 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018);
1
SSR 83-20 was rescinded by Social Security Ruling 18-01p (“SSR 18-01p”) on October
2, 2018. SSR 18-01p,
83 Fed. Reg. 49613, 49613 (Oct. 2, 2018). However, because SSR 18-01p
does not apply retroactively and the ALJ rendered her decision on February 5, 2018, SSR 83-20
applies. See
id. at 49616.
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Wilson v. Barnhart,
284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). Additionally, we review
de novo the district court’s determination as to whether the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence. Wilson,
284 F.3d at 1221. “Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363
F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan,
125 F.3d 1436, 1439
(11th Cir. 1997)). We will deem the Commissioner’s decision supported by
substantial evidence even if the preponderance of the evidence weighs against it.
Id.
at 1158–59. However, we will not “affirm simply because some rationale might
have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.” Owens v. Heckler,
748 F.2d 1511, 1516
(11th Cir. 1984). Moreover, an ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence if she reached it by “focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring
other parts of the record.” McCruter v. Bowen,
791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986)
(reversing the denial of an application for SSI where the ALJ ignored objective
medical evidence regarding the applicant’s physical condition and disregarded the
vocational expert’s testimony). And we will not decide the facts anew, make
credibility determinations, or reweigh the evidence. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec.,
631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
The ALJ has a duty to develop a full and fair record whether or not the
claimant is represented by counsel, although we have stated that the ALJ has “a
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special duty when an unrepresented claimant unfamiliar with hearing procedures
appears before [her].” Cowart v. Schweiker,
662 F.2d 731, 735–37 (11th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Clark v. Schweiker,
652 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1981)) (determining that
the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record where he did not ask the pro se
claimant’s husband any questions about the claimant’s condition, elicit testimony or
make findings regarding adverse effects of the claimant’s prescribed medications,
discuss the jobs that the claimant was capable of performing, or specify what weight
he gave each piece of evidence). This duty requires the ALJ to “scrupulously and
conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts.” Henry v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cowart,
662
F.2d at 735). In addition, “the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to
different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel,
631 F.3d at 1179.
In determining whether it is necessary to remand a case for development of
the record, we consider “whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in
unfairness or ‘clear prejudice.’” Brown v. Shalala,
44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Smith v. Schweiker,
677 F.2d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, a
claimant must show that she was prejudiced in order to prevail on a claim that the
record was inadequately developed.
Id.
An individual seeking SSI must prove that she is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). In order to determine whether a claimant is
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disabled, the ALJ applies a five-step sequential analysis. See
20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. This process includes an analysis of whether the claimant:
(1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets
or equals a listed impairment and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform
her past relevant work, in light of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5)
can make an adjustment to other work, in light of her RFC, age, education, and work
experience.
Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
The second step of the sequential analysis requires the ALJ to consider, as a
threshold matter, “the medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s).” Schink
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
935 F.3d 1245, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in
original) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)). An
impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly
limit the claimant’s ability to perform “basic work activities,” which include
walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, and pulling.
Id. at 1265 (quoting
20
C.F.R. § 404.1522(a)). “[A]n ‘impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is
so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere
with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work
experience.’”
Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Bowen,
800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir.
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1986)). Although the claimant bears the burden to establish that an impairment is
severe, that burden is “mild.”
Id. (quoting McDaniel,
800 F.2d at 1031).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers all
symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which those symptoms are reasonably
consistent with objective medical evidence.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a)(1),
416.929(a)(1). Once a claimant establishes that his pain or other subjective
symptoms are disabling, “all evidence about the intensity, persistence, and
functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms must be considered in
addition to the medical signs and laboratory findings in deciding the issue of
disability.” Foote v. Chater,
67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). The ALJ will
also consider a number of other factors, including the claimant’s work history, his
daily activities, and treatment or other measures taken to alleviate pain or other
symptoms.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).
Social security rulings are binding on the SSA. Noble v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
963 F.3d 1317, 1324 n.12 (11th Cir. 2020). Although we are not bound by such
rulings, we afford them deference.
Id. SSR 83-20 provides that, in addition to
determining whether the claimant is disabled, the ALJ must determine the onset date
of a claimant’s disability. SSR 83-20, 1983-
1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 49. It
explains that the ALJ should consider a claimant’s allegations, work history, and
medical and other evidence in making this determination.
Id. It clarifies, however,
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that allegations and work stoppage are only significant if they are consistent with the
severity of the claimant’s condition as shown by the medical evidence, which
“serves as the primary element in the onset determination.”
Id.
In a section titled “Onset in Disabilities of Nontraumatic Origin,” SSR 83-20
explains that, in the case of slowly progressing impairments where it is impossible
to obtain medical evidence regarding the precise onset date or where the alleged
onset date is far in the past, “it will be necessary to infer the onset date from the
medical and other evidence that describe the history and symptomatology of the
disease process.”
Id. In a separate section titled “Precise Evidence Not Available—
Need for Inferences,” SSR 83-20 further explains that:
In some cases, it may be possible, based on the medical evidence to
reasonably infer that the onset of a disabling impairment(s) occurred
some time prior to the date of the first recorded medical examination,
e.g., the date the claimant stopped working. How long the disease
may be determined to have existed at a disabling level of severity
depends on an informed judgment of the facts in the particular case.
This judgment, however, must have a legitimate medical basis. At
the hearing, the [ALJ] should call on the services of a medical
advisor when onset must be inferred.
Id. The section then states that “[t]he available medical evidence should be
considered in view of the nature of the impairment” and that “[t]he onset date should
be set on the date when it is most reasonable to conclude from the evidence that the
impairment was sufficiently severe to prevent the individual from engaging in
[substantial gainful activity] for a continuous period of at least 12 months or result
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in death.”
Id. As an example, the ruling provides a scenario involving a claimant
who alleged that he became unable to work on April 13, 1979, and submitted only
one piece of medical evidence, which was dated January 23, 1980, which required
the ALJ to infer an onset date based in part on information obtained from the
claimant’s employer and testimony from the claimant’s physician.
Id.
Here, we find that the ALJ complied with SSR 83-20 and her decision was
supported by substantial evidence. SSR 83-20’s rule regarding the calling of a
medical advisor did not apply because the record included several years of medical
evidence documenting Land’s impairments and treatment leading up to September
23, 2016. Even if SSR 83-20’s rule applied, the ALJ was not required to call a
medical advisor because the record was adequately developed. Moreover,
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Land’s avascular
necrosis became severe on September 23, 2016, even though it had been diagnosed
before that time. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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