[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 11, 2006
No. 05-13448
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-01112-CV-ORL-28-DAB
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant,
TED MAINES,
Intervenor-Plaintiff-
Appellee,
versus
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 11, 2006)
(As Amended August 31, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and GOODWIN,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Federal Express ("FedEx") appeals a jury verdict finding in favor of
Theodore Maines, its onetime employee on his claim of retaliation in violation of
Title VII. FedEx asserts that it was entitled to a judgment in its favor as a matter of
law. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") appeals,
asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Maines’ motion
for front pay, limiting his award to backpay and compensatory damages. The
EEOC further appeals the district court's denial of nearly all the injunctive relief it
requested. We find no reversible error.
First, judgment as a matter of law should be granted only when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the facts and
inferences point so strongly in favor of one party that reasonable persons could not
arrive at a contrary verdict. See Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550,
1558 (11th Cir. 1988). We do not find that to be the case here. When viewed in
the light most favorable to Maines, the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding of retaliation.
*
Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
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We also find no merit to Maines’ claim for front pay. Prevailing Title VII
plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to either reinstatement or front pay as part of
Title VII’s remedial “make whole” policy. The district court properly held that
reinstatement was not feasible in this case. Moreover, we do not find that the facts
on this question are so overwhelmingly skewed toward Maines that a reasonable
judge could not have found that the presumption in Maines’ favor had been
overcome.
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the EEOC’s claim for
injunctive relief. This Court has indicated its agreement with the Seventh Circuit
that “the EEOC is normally entitled to injunctive relief where it proves
discrimination against one employee and the employer fails to prove that the
violation is not likely to recur.” Massey Yardley,
117 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing EEOC v. Harris Chernin,
10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Mindful of the prophylactic purposes of the such relief, the court concluded that
“the violation is not likely to recur,” stating that the retaliation “was an isolated
incident by a single manager who is no longer employed by FedEx.” We find no
error in that determination.
AFFIRMED.
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