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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-11322
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A206-889-578
NELSY YAZMIN GIRON-GARCIA,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(February 1, 2021)
Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nelsy Yazmin Giron-Garcia, a citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration
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Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Giron-Garcia’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).1 On appeal, Giron-
Garcia argues that the BIA erred in determining that her due process rights were
not violated when the IJ allowed her attorney to withdraw on the day of her merits
hearing and allowed her to proceed pro se. Giron-Garcia also argues that the IJ
erred in finding that she did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution and finding that she could reasonably relocate within Guatemala.
After careful review, we deny Giron-Garcia’s due process claim and dismiss her
asylum claim for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
We review the decision of the BIA as the final judgment unless the BIA
expressly adopted the IJ’s decision, in which case we review the IJ decision to the
extent of the agreement. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th
Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Here, the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision and
issued a written decision solely addressing Giron-Garcia’s due process claim. But
because the due process claim was only raised before and addressed by the BIA,
we will review only the BIA’s decision as to that claim. See
id. (explaining that
1
Giron-Garcia did not appeal the BIA’s denial of her CAT claim here, so we do not
address it.
2
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where the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s decision or rely on its reasoning, we
review only the BIA decision).
In petitions for review of BIA decisions, we review de novo constitutional
challenges. Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
352 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam). Factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence test
and conclusions of law de novo. Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403. Under the substantial
evidence test, we “view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the
agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.”
Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
492 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotation marks omitted). We will affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by
“reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole,” and to warrant reversal, the record must compel a conclusion contrary to
the one reached by the BIA.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
II.
People who have been placed in deportation proceedings are entitled to due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
491 F.3d
1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). In immigration proceedings, due process requires
that a noncitizen be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Lapaix v. U.S.
Att’y Gen.,
605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “Due process is
satisfied only by a full and fair hearing.” Ibrahim v. U.S. I.N.S.,
821 F.2d 1547,
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1550 (11th Cir. 1987). To establish a due process violation, the petitioner must
show that she was deprived of liberty without due process of law and that the
purported errors caused her substantial prejudice. Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143. To
show substantial prejudice, she must demonstrate that, “in the absence of the
alleged violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
Further, noncitizens have the right to be represented by the counsel of their
choice in removal proceedings. Frech,
491 F.3d at 1281 (“The right to counsel in
the immigration context is an integral part of the procedural due process to which
the [noncitizen] is entitled.” (quotation marks omitted)). When a petitioner has
acknowledged that she understands her right to counsel, and then proceeds with the
hearing without counsel, she has waived this right. Cobourne v. I.N.S.,
779 F.2d
1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). This waiver need not be express but
may be inferred from the language and the acts of the petitioner.
Id.
Regardless of whether Giron-Garcia waived her right to counsel, she cannot
show her due process rights were violated because she has failed to show she was
prejudiced by the IJ’s actions. She was represented by counsel for more than two
years prior to her merits hearing, during which time she filed an I-589 application
with supporting documentation. And, even though she argues she was a child and
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did not have the legal capacity to defend her case,2 Giron-Garcia was involved in
and aware of her case enough to disagree with her attorney about their strategy to
the point that counsel felt it necessary to withdraw from representing her. In
addition, the IJ granted a pause in the proceedings so that Giron-Garcia’s counsel
could explain to her that she would need to put forward her case and should do so
by explaining what happened in her country that made her come to the United
States. Giron-Garcia then testified credibly at her hearing about the events that led
to her leaving Guatemala.
Giron-Garcia has not shown that an attorney would have presented any
additional evidence or how the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. See Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143. On appeal, Giron-Garcia is represented
by new counsel. Yet she does not point to any testimony or evidence that she
would have included at her hearing if she been represented by counsel. Rather, she
summarily asserts that she could have “put forward a particular social group that
included her relationship to her mother.” This means she has not pointed to any
evidence or made any arguments that could have been made by counsel at the
merits hearing that would have cured the deficiencies in her persecution and nexus
2
Giron-Garcia was 17 years old when her removal proceedings began, but she was 20 at
the time of her removal hearing.
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claims. As a result, she cannot demonstrate that she suffered substantial prejudice.
See id. at 1143.
III.
Giron-Garcia also challenges the merits of the BIA’s denial of asylum on the
grounds that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, and
that she could relocate within Guatemala safely. 3 However, we lack jurisdiction to
decide this issue.
We review de novo the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Indrawati v.
U.S. Att’y Gen.,
779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). We lack jurisdiction to
review final orders in immigration cases unless the petitioner has exhausted all
administrative remedies available as of right.
Id. A petitioner fails to exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to a particular claim when she does not raise
that claim before the BIA.
Id.
On appeal to the BIA, Giron-Garcia did not challenge the IJ’s conclusion
that she failed to demonstrate any nexus between her fear of future persecution and
3
To establish asylum eligibility, the noncitizen must establish (1) past persecution on
account of a statutorily listed protected ground, or (2) a well-founded fear that the statutorily
protected ground will cause future persecution. Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
596 F.3d 1329, 1332
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). An applicant does not have a well-founded fear of future
persecution if she could “avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s
[home] country,” where such relocation is reasonable.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii).
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a protected ground.4 She did state, in her notice of appeal, that the IJ erred by
finding she “failed to establish that any past harm or future fear thereof was on
account of a protected ground,” but she made no substantive argument to further
that claim. Although exhaustion of a claim does not require “a well-developed
argument,” Giron-Garcia must first provide the BIA with “her argument’s relevant
factual underpinnings.” Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1297–98 (quotation marks omitted
and alteration adopted). The one-sentence reference to the nexus requirement in
her notice of appeal was not sufficient to present the claim to the BIA. And,
because the adverse nexus finding is intertwined with Giron-Garcia’s asylum
claim, we cannot address the BIA’s underlying decision as to the merits of her
asylum claim. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (requiring an asylum applicant to
show that a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for
persecuting the applicant”). Therefore the issue of whether Giron-Garcia had a
well-founded fear of future persecution or could relocate safely within Guatemala
is not properly before us. See Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
764 F.3d 1282, 1290–91
(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that addressing an issue over which the court lacks
jurisdiction results in an impermissible advisory opinion).
PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
4
Giron-Garcia sought asylum based on her membership in a particular social group
related to an event where “unknown individuals with firearms arrived at [her] house and
attempted to break into it,” and she feared these individuals would strike again.
7
