Wilhen Hill Barrientos v. Corecivic, Inc. ( 2020 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-15081
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00070-CDL
WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ-GALICIA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
SHOAIB AHMED,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
CORECIVIC, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(February 28, 2020)
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Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN, * District Judge.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
In this case, Appellees Wilhen Hill Barrientos, Margarito Velazquez-Galicia,
and Shoaib Ahmed, current and former alien detainees, brought a class action
lawsuit against Appellant CoreCivic, Inc., a private contractor, which owns and
operates the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia (“Stewart”). Stewart
is a federal immigration detention facility where aliens are held during the
pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to enforcement of the
nation’s immigration laws. At Stewart, CoreCivic, as a private contractor, is
required to operate what is referred to as a “voluntary work program,” through
which detainees may perform work for compensation.
Appellees’ complaint alleged that, far from operating a “voluntary” work
program, CoreCivic coerces alien detainees to perform labor at Stewart by, inter
alia, the use or threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary
confinement, and the withholding of basic necessities. Appellees’ complaint
asserted that CoreCivic’s labor scheme violated, and continues to violate, the
forced-labor prohibition in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594–95, and Georgia law. The TVPA subjects to criminal and
*
Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Washington, sitting by designation.
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civil liability “[w]hoever” knowingly obtains the labor or services of a “person” by
any one of the prohibited coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1589(a), 1595.
CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the TVPA does
not apply to a private government contractor or cover labor performed in work
programs by alien detainees in lawful custody of the U.S. government. Although it
denied the motion, the district court certified for immediate appeal the narrow,
purely legal question of “[w]hether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal
immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors.” See 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted CoreCivic’s petition for permission to immediately
appeal the district court’s order.
After review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that:
(1) under the plain language of the statute, the TVPA covers the conduct of private
contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities; (2) the TVPA does
not bar private contractors from operating the sort of voluntary work programs
generally authorized under federal law for aliens held in immigration detention
facilities; but (3) private contractors that operate such work programs are not
categorically excluded from the TVPA and may be liable if they knowingly obtain
or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal
coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. Because our review is limited to the
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legal question of the TVPA’s applicability to private contractors operating federal
immigration detention facilities, we do not at this time address whether the factual
allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a TVPA claim.
I. BACKGROUND
The question certified by the district court concerns the TVPA and work
programs in federal immigration detention facilities. We review the TVPA, the
relevant work programs, and then the district court proceedings.
A. The TVPA
The TVPA prohibits knowingly “obtain[ing] the labor or services of a
person” by any one of, or combination of, the following means:
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of
physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person
or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;
or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or
physical restraint.
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (collectively, the “illegal coercive means”). Section 1589(a)
applies to “[w]hoever” knowingly provides or obtains such forced labor or services
from a “person.” Id.4
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In turn, § 1595(a) provides a private cause of action for any victim of a
violation of § 1589. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Under § 1595(a), “[a]n individual who
is a victim of a violation” of the TVPA “may bring a civil action against the
perpetrator,” as well as against anyone who “knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value,” from any such violation. Id.
B. Work Programs in ICE Detention Facilities
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detains certain aliens
during the pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to
enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. ICE detains some of those aliens in
facilities operated by private contractors. Appellant CoreCivic is a private
contractor that operates several detention centers throughout the country, including
the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, where Appellees were or are
being held. 1
CoreCivic, as a private contractor operating an ICE detention facility, is
subject to, and required to follow, the Performance-Based National Detention
Standards (“PBNDS”), the operative version of which was promulgated in 2011
and revised in 2016. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Performance-Based
National Detention Standards 2011 (rev. 2016), available at
1
CoreCivic operates the Stewart Detention Center through a contract with Stewart
County, Georgia. The County is a party to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with ICE,
pursuant to which it detains aliens on ICE’s behalf.
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https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf. The
PBNDS are designed to ensure a safe and secure detention environment that meets
detainees’ basic needs and is consistent with applicable legal requirements.
The PBNDS state that detention centers may require all detainees to
“maintain their immediate living areas in a neat and orderly manner” through
certain “personal housekeeping” tasks such as “making their bunk beds daily,”
“stacking loose papers,” and “keeping the floor free of debris.” Id. § 5.8(V)(C).
Beyond these basic required tasks, detainees “shall not be required to work,” and
all other “[w]ork assignments are voluntary.” Id. §§ 5.8(II)(2), 5.8(V)(C).
As to voluntary work, the PBNDS further state that “[d]etainees shall be
provided the opportunity to participate in a voluntary work program” through
which they may earn monetary compensation.2 Id. §§ 5.8(I), 5.8(V)(A) (emphasis
added). The purpose of such voluntary work programs is to reduce “[t]he negative
impact of confinement . . . through decreased idleness, improved morale and fewer
disciplinary incidents.” Id. § 5.8(II)(4). However, the facility administrator must
operate the voluntary work program in compliance with the PBNDS, which
regulate the selection of detainees, the hours of work (no more than 8 hours per
day and 40 hours per week), the minimum compensation for completed work (at
2
Since 1950, Congress has authorized ICE and its predecessor agencies to pay detained
aliens “for work performed” “while held in custody under the immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1555(d).
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least $1.00 per day), the number of work assignments a detainee can perform, and
the conditions under which that work occurs. Id. §§ 5.8(V)(D)–(O). The PBNDS
delegate the site-specific rules for each work program to the “facility
administrator.” Id. § 5.8(V)(D).
Detainees may be removed from the voluntary work program for causes
such as “unsatisfactory performance” or “disruptive behavior,” or as a “sanction
imposed . . . for an infraction of a facility rule, regulation or policy.” Id.
§ 5.8(V)(L). Additionally, the PBNDS specify that participants in the voluntary
work program are “expected to be ready to report for work at the required time,”
“may not leave an assignment without permission,” and “may not evade attendance
and performance standards in assigned activities nor encourage others to do so.”
Id. § 5.8(V)(M).
The PBNDS otherwise provide for disciplinary action against detainees
outside the context of the voluntary work program. See generally id. § 3.1. The
PBNDS identify four categories of offenses and prescribe appropriate sanctions for
each category. Id. §§ 3.1(V)(C), 3.1 app. A. Those categories are “greatest,”
“high,” “high moderate,” and “low moderate.”3 Id. According to the PBNDS, all
3
For example, the PBNDS define “[r]efusing to clean assigned living area” as a “high
moderate” offense, while “failing to keep self and living area in accordance with posted
standards” is a “low moderate” offense. PBNDS § 3.1 app. A. While the PBNDS define
“[e]ncouraging others to participate in a work stoppage or to refuse to work” as a “high” offense,
there is no specific offense prescribed in the PBNDS for a detainee who, after signing up for the
voluntary work program, refuses to complete his assigned tasks. See generally id.
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four categories of infractions are punishable by a “[l]oss of privileges”—including
“commissary, vending machines, movies, recreation, etc.”—and a “[c]hange [in]
housing,” among other sanctions. Id. § 3.1 app. A. Additionally, all but the
lowest category of infractions are punishable by the initiation of criminal
proceedings and “[d]isciplinary segregation” of varying length based on the
severity of the infraction. Id.
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. Complaint
In their complaint, Appellees alleged that the voluntary work program as
implemented by CoreCivic was, in fact, anything but voluntary. Rather, the
complaint alleged, aliens detained at Stewart work because they have no other
meaningful choice. The complaint alleged CoreCivic was operating, and continues
to operate, a “deprivation scheme” by which it forces detainees to participate in the
work program through threats of “serious harm” in the form of deprivation of
privacy and safety, threats of referral for criminal prosecution, and threats of
solitary confinement; through withholding basic necessities like food, toothpaste,
toilet paper, and soap; and through deprivation of outside contact with loved ones.
Appellees’ complaint claimed that, by engaging in this alleged forced-labor
“scheme,” CoreCivic ran afoul of §§ 1589(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) in that it
was knowingly “obtain[ing] . . . labor” by means of: (1) “force, threats of force,
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physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint”; (2) “serious harm or threats of
serious harm”; (3) “the abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal process”; and
(4) a “scheme . . . intended to cause [a] person to believe that, if that person did not
perform . . . labor or services, that person . . . would suffer serious harm or physical
restraint.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(1)–(4). Appellees’ complaint claimed that this
forced-labor scheme—which remains ongoing—operates as follows.
The conditions at Stewart are alleged to be poor, particularly in the “open
dormitories,” which detainees refer to as the “Chicken Coop” due to the unsanitary
conditions and overcrowding. The showers in the Chicken Coop, for example, are
said to be moldy and without temperature control. CoreCivic allegedly does not
provide detainees with basic hygiene products, including toilet paper, soap, and
toothpaste. Detainees must purchase these items from the commissary when they
run out. They also must purchase expensive “phone cards” from the commissary if
they wish to speak with loved ones who are unable to make the trip to the detention
center.
Detainees who participate in CoreCivic’s voluntary work program, however,
are spared some of Stewart’s more unfavorable conditions and—because they are
paid between $1.00 and $4.00 per day—are able to purchase necessities from the
commissary. For example, according to Appellees’ complaint, work program
participants are not housed in the “Chicken Coop,” but are provided two-person
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cells, a shared common area, a bathroom shared with only one other cellmate, and
a shower with temperature control. Appellees’ complaint alleged that, once
detainees are in the work program, CoreCivic threatens to harm or actually harms
those who refuse to work.
In short, Appellees’ complaint alleged that CoreCivic subjects detainees to
inhumane conditions by depriving them of basic necessities and livable
accommodations, detainees join the so-called voluntary work program to alleviate
these conditions, and CoreCivic then threatens any program participants who
refuse to work. In this way, Appellees claim, CoreCivic effectively forces
detainees to continually work and participate in the program. Appellees allege that
this provides CoreCivic with a cheap supply of labor to operate the facility with,
which enables CoreCivic to increase its profits.
The three named plaintiffs—Barrientos, Velazquez-Galicia, and Ahmed—all
either are working or previously worked as kitchen workers as part of the voluntary
work program at Stewart. However, they all claimed their participation in the
work program was not voluntary in any meaningful sense, as they were subject to
the above-described “deprivation scheme.” Additionally, all three alleged they
were subject to or witnessed threats from CoreCivic employees once they began
participating in the work program.
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Barrientos, a citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States,
earned between $1.00 and $4.00 per day as part of the voluntary work program,
though he makes up to $8.00 per day if CoreCivic requires him to work 12 hours or
more in one day. He alleged CoreCivic threatened to transfer him to the Chicken
Coop, revoke his access to the commissary, and put him in solitary confinement if
he stopped working, called in sick, refused to change shifts, or encouraged others
to stop working.
Velazquez-Galicia is a citizen of Mexico who intends to seek relief from
deportation and whose wife and two children are U.S. citizens. He too is employed
as a kitchen worker and is paid between $1.00 and $4.00 per day or up to $8.00 per
day if he is required to work more than 12 hours in one day. He alleged he
witnessed CoreCivic employees threaten to transfer detainees who declined to
work from the preferable two-person cells to the Chicken Coop.
Ahmed is a citizen of Bangladesh who was detained at Stewart until
February 2018, when he allegedly opted to give up his asylum case in part due to
his desire to escape Stewart’s poor conditions. Ahmed was paid $4.00 per day as a
kitchen worker. Like the other plaintiffs, he earned additional money if he worked
12 hours or more. He alleged that CoreCivic employees threatened to place him in
solitary confinement if he stopped working, and actually did place him in solitary
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confinement for ten days when he threatened a work stoppage after he was not
paid.
B. District Court’s Order
CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Appellees’
complaint failed to state a claim under the TVPA because Congress did not intend
the statute to apply at all to alien detainees in the lawful custody of the U.S.
Government or to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities.
The district court disagreed, finding “the plain language of the statute” clearly
encompassed claims brought by alien detainees held in privately run detention
facilities. The district court “decline[d] to read an implied exclusion for lawfully
confined victims into the statute.”
The district court recognized, however, that “[w]hether the TVPA applies to
work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-
profit contractors is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion.” We agreed, and granted CoreCivic’s petition
for immediate appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Our Limited Review
As an initial matter, we clarify the scope of our review. Although the
district court identified a discrete legal question in its order, “appellate jurisdiction
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[under § 1292(b)] applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not
tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.” Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S. Ct. 619, 623 (1996). Thus,
while we “may not reach beyond the certified order,” we “may address any issue
fairly included within the certified order.” Id. That said, we think it appropriate to
limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue the district court identified.
See McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The
legal question must be stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the
question out of the details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give it
general relevance to other cases in the same area of law.”).
Because we limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue of the
TVPA’s applicability to a certain class of cases, we are not concerned with the
specific factual allegations in the complaint, apart from the nature of the parties
(legally detained immigrants seeking to assert claims against a private, for-profit,
government contractor) and, to a lesser extent, the fact that the claims arise out of
the operation of a work program required by the PBNDS. In other words, we do
not address whether the complaint in this case sufficiently alleged a violation of the
TVPA, assuming it applies to private contractors like CoreCivic. We also do not
offer any opinion on CoreCivic’s operation of work programs generally. Indeed,
we decline to address the adequacy of the complaint—or any other fact-intensive
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inquiry—at this stage in the litigation. See Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304,
1312–13 (11th Cir. 2016) (declining to address, in an interlocutory appeal, whether
a complaint stated a claim for relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act
because the issue did not ask the court “to decide a pure or abstract question about
the TVPA itself”). 4
B. Analysis
As to the discrete legal question before us, CoreCivic has not asked us to
adopt a construction of the statute that would exempt federal contractors from any
and all liability under the TVPA. Rather, CoreCivic asks us to hold that the TVPA
(specifically § 1589) can never apply in the specific context of a “federally
mandated voluntary work program in a detention setting,” even where the work
performed through that program is obtained through, for example, force, physical
restraint, or threats of serious harm. CoreCivic insists that its construction of the
4
We deny Appellees’ request to set aside the motions panel’s order granting Appellant
CoreCivic permission to appeal. We recognize that, like any decision made by a motions panel,
a petition for interlocutory review under § 1292(b) may be improvidently granted. See 11th Cir.
R. 27-1(g); McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1253. Appellees insist that CoreCivic essentially asks us to
consider fact-driven issues not appropriate for review under § 1292(b) and that, contrary to the
district court’s conclusion, the unambiguous language of the statute leaves no room for a
substantial difference of opinion.
However, we agree with the district court that its order involves a pure question of law
that controls at least a substantial part of the case and about which there is substantial ground for
a difference of opinion, and that its resolution may well substantially reduce the amount of
litigation necessary on remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A ruling in favor of CoreCivic on this
pure question of law would eliminate Appellees’ sole federal claim and leave behind only one
state law claim. And our answer to the legal question presented does not depend on any facts or
the factual record below. In short, this appeal satisfies § 1292(b)’s requirements.
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statute would be consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of the TVPA. In
support of its argument, CoreCivic points to: (1) the text of § 1589, particularly the
requirement that one “obtain[] the labor or services of a person”; (2) the fact that,
when Congress enacted the TVPA, it had long authorized labor by alien detainees;
(3) the fact that courts have consistently held that alien detainees can be required to
perform labor while in detention; (4) the express purpose of the TVPA, as well as
the legislative history leading to its enactment; and (5) the rule of lenity, which
CoreCivic argues favors judicial restraint in the construction of this criminal
statute.
The question of statutory interpretation is a legal issue we review de novo.
Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015). “The
interpretation of a statute begins with its language.” United States v. St. Amour,
886 F.3d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 205 (2018); see also Artis
v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 594, 603 (2018) (“In
determining the meaning of a statutory provision, we look first to its language,
giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” (quotation marks omitted)). We
first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning,” and, “[i]f so, we need go no further.” St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013
(quotation marks omitted).
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As laid out above, the TVPA creates a cause of action—both criminal and
civil—against “[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a
person” by various illegal coercive means. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), 1595(a). We,
like the district court, find this language to be “plain and unambiguous.” See St.
Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013. The use of the general terms “[w]hoever” and “person”
evinces no intent on the part of Congress to restrict the application of the statute to
particular actors or particular victims. Instead, the clear and unambiguous
language of the statute limits liability only by reference to the actions taken by a
would-be violator: it applies to anyone who knowingly “obtains the labor or
services of a person” through one of the four illegal coercive means explicitly
listed in the statute. No other limiting principle is evident from the plain text.
Indeed, the Dictionary Act—which provides the definition of various terms
for courts to use in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress”—states that
the word “whoever” when used in a statute “include[s] corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. Congress’s express inclusion of corporations and
companies in the general definition of “whoever” presumptively indicates that a
private, for-profit government contractor—like CoreCivic—falls within the
meaning of “[w]hoever” for purposes of the TVPA.
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Despite the statute’s use of general terms to describe its coverage, CoreCivic
asks us to read into the statute a limiting principle: that Congress could not have
intended alien detainees participating in voluntary work programs to sue and make
use of this statute. But “the presumed point of using general words is to produce
general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc exceptions.”
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 101 (2012). The primary textual argument CoreCivic makes is that the
words “obtains the labor or services of a person” do not naturally encompass
federally mandated voluntary work programs for alien detainees of the type run by
CoreCivic. This is because CoreCivic, like any contractor operating an
immigration detention facility on ICE’s behalf, is required to provide a voluntary
work program for detainees, and thus it cannot illegally “obtain[] the labor” of
detainees through such a program. See PBNDS § 5.8(V)(A).
But the fact that the PBNDS require CoreCivic to operate a work program
for detainees does not mean that such a program can never be operated in a
manner—i.e., by forcing labor through illegal coercive means—that violates the
TVPA. If CoreCivic, or any other private for-profit contractor, actually forces
detainees to provide labor (whether through a work program or not) through any of
the illegal coercive means explicitly proscribed by the TVPA, it has “obtain[ed] the
labor or services of a person” in violation of the TVPA. Again, nothing in the text
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of the statute excludes federal contractors providing immigration detention services
from liability under the TVPA, even when that liability might arise out of the
operation of a federally mandated work program. And nothing in the PBNDS
permits CoreCivic, or other private contractors operating immigration detention
facilities, to force detainees to perform labor (beyond personal housekeeping
tasks), and certainly not through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the
TVPA.
CoreCivic warns us against the unintended consequences of this construction
of the statute, implying that this decision could open up criminal liability in any
number of custodial settings in which detainees or prisoners are incentivized or
required to perform work. As CoreCivic notes, however, Congress itself has long
authorized paid work by detained aliens, and federal courts (including this Court)
have long held that such detainees or inmates can be required to perform labor
while in detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d); see, e.g., Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d
202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[N]o Court of Appeals has ever questioned the power
of a correctional institution to compel inmates to perform services for the
institution without paying the minimum wage.” (quotation marks omitted)). Our
decision here does nothing to call this precedent into question.
To be clear, our opinion should not be read to call into question the legality
of voluntary work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, or to call
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into question longstanding requirements that detainees or inmates be required to
perform basic housekeeping tasks.5 But the mere fact that CoreCivic—or any
other private government contractor—is operating a work program at the behest of
the federal government does not, in and of itself, shield CoreCivic from liability
under the TVPA if it in fact obtains the forced labor of program participants
through the illegal coercive means explicitly proscribed by the TVPA. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1589(a) (listing specific illegal coercive means). All we hold today is that the
plain language of the TVPA brings within its scope for-profit government
contractors operating work programs in federal immigration detention facilities,
and such entities are not categorically excluded or shielded from liability under the
TVPA.
C. Purpose and Legislative History
Having concluded that the “language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning,” “we need go no further.” St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013 (quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“[I]f the statute’s language is clear, there is no need to go beyond the statute’s
plain language into legislative history.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
5
As discussed above, in the interest of maintaining order in an immigration detention
facility, the PBNDS authorize punishments for detainees who, among other things, refuse to
complete basic personal housekeeping tasks or organize work stoppages. See generally PBNDS
§ 3.1. Our decision should likewise not be read to imply that these basic disciplinary measures,
on their own, give rise to TVPA liability.
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denied, 140 S. Ct. 157 (2019).6 We do acknowledge CoreCivic’s arguments
concerning the purpose and legislative history of the TVPA, but where, as here, the
statutory text is not ambiguous, “[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from [the statutory]
language.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2902
(1985) (quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,
75, 105 S. Ct. 479, 482 (1984) (“When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous,
judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and exceptional circumstances.”
(quotation marks omitted)). We do not find any such extraordinary showing of
contrary intentions here.
As CoreCivic correctly points out, Congress enacted the TVPA as part of the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 “to combat trafficking
in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of
traffickers, and to protect their victims.” Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101). Congress supported that purpose with 24
6
CoreCivic’s argument that the rule of lenity weighs in favor of its preferred construction
of the statute is similarly foreclosed by our conclusion that the statutory text is unambiguous.
See United States v. Maturin, 499 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Because [the statute] is
clear, we need discuss neither legislative history nor the rule of lenity.” (citing Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 66, 118 S. Ct. 469, 478 (1997))).
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legislative findings, all of which focus on human trafficking and involuntary
servitude. Id. § 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466–69. And the legislative history indicates
that § 1589 in particular was “intended to address the increasingly subtle methods
of traffickers who place their victims in modern-day slavery.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-
939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
We do not find a private government contractor’s obtaining forced labor
through actual or threatened force, restraint, or serious harm to be so far removed
from the purpose Congress identified as to cause us to look beyond the plain
statutory language. Just because Congress may have had in mind a particular
narrow objective—here, combatting human trafficking—does not on its own
justify a departure from the principle that we should give general terms their
general meaning. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 103–04 (“The argument most
frequently made against giving general terms their general meaning is the one
made (and rejected) in the Slaughter-House cases—that those who adopted the
provision had in mind a particular narrow objective (equal protection for blacks)
though they expressed a more general one (equal protection for ‘any person’).”).
As the Supreme Court has remarked, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
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which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).7
We also are not persuaded by CoreCivic’s resort to Supreme Court decisions
it claims counsel against adopting a construction of a criminal statute, like the
TVPA, that may lead to results disconnected from Congress’s purpose. See
Marinello v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018); Yates v. United
States, 574 U.S. 528, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844,
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). Those cases all involved some disconnect between the
purpose of the statute and the nature of the conduct alleged. Here, in contrast,
Appellees have alleged that CoreCivic engaged in precisely the type of conduct
prohibited by the TVPA: obtaining labor by the specific illegal coercive means
explicitly set out in the statute. CoreCivic’s argument is not that it is incapable of
carrying out the prohibited conduct; instead, it insists that, even if it—or any other
private contractor operating an immigration detention facility—engaged in the
proscribed conduct, it cannot be the “[w]hoever” envisioned by the statute. We see
7
What’s more, as the government notes in its amicus brief, “Congress has repeatedly
emphasized that it seeks to stamp out any use of forced labor by federal contractors.” See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7. Pointing to this history,
along with the text and purpose of the TVPA, the government has adopted the position that “the
TVPA does not contain an implicit exception for private providers of immigration detention
services” and that Appellees “are not categorically barred from bringing a TVPA suit based on
the conduct of a contractor or subcontractor that provides immigration detention services to the
United States.” Id. at 8. The government’s position reinforces our conclusion that the results
here are not wholly disconnected from Congress’s purpose in enacting the TVPA.
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no reason to read this limiting principle into the statute. Congress wrote this
statute plainly, and it is up to Congress, not us, to rewrite it.
We further note that, while none of our sister circuits has addressed the
specific application of the TVPA now before us, they have found § 1589
applicable outside the core human-trafficking context to which CoreCivic would
apparently have us limit the statute’s reach. See, e.g., Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt.,
Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that § 1589(a)’s prohibition
against obtaining labor through threats of serious harm applied to “an immigrant
lawfully in this country on a temporary guest worker visa alleging that his
employers threatened to revoke their sponsorship, thereby subjecting him to
deportation”); Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849, 871 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding
that plaintiffs, all former members of a church, had plausibly alleged violations of
the TVPA against the church leader by alleging that they “were threatened with
force, kidnapped, physically restrained, [and] threatened with other harms” if they
failed to follow orders from church leaders); United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d
606, 617 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The statute’s express terms do not limit its application
to immigrant victims or sex workers. Rather, § 1589(a)’s proscription against the
exploitation of the labor or services of ‘a person’ by prohibited means
encompasses any person, no matter her nationality or place of birth.”). To clarify,
we are not hereby approving the specific holdings or analyses in these decisions,
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but cite them to show that federal courts have concluded that § 1589 is not limited
to cases of overt human trafficking.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s denial of
CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss Appellees’ complaint, and hold that the TVPA
applies to private for-profit contractors operating federal immigration detention
facilities. We express no opinion on the question of whether the factual allegations
in Appellees’ complaint, taken as true, are sufficient to establish a violation of the
TVPA.
AFFIRMED.
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