Joshua Issiah Shuler v. Okeechobee CI Warden ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •             Case: 19-12089   Date Filed: 06/25/2020   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-12089
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-14027-JEM
    JOSHUA ISSIAH SHULER,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    OKEECHOBEE CI WARDEN,
    CAPTAIN ROGERS,
    et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 25, 2020)
    Before GRANT, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 19-12089      Date Filed: 06/25/2020    Page: 2 of 5
    Joshua Shuler, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal with
    prejudice of his civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for abuse of process. He argues that
    although he did not understand every rule and procedure, he was prejudiced by the
    magistrate judge’s failure to appoint him counsel and that the district court abused
    its discretion in dismissing his case. He further argues that he was not allowed to
    adequately present his case or prove his suffering because he was denied the
    necessary documentation and records and was unable to call witnesses. He also
    argues that the judges racially discriminated against him, conspired to have his
    case dismissed with prejudice, and did not want the defendants to be held
    accountable for their actions.
    We review a Rule 41(b) dismissal for abuse of discretion. Gratton v. Great
    Am. Commc’ns, 
    178 F.3d 1373
    , 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). A district court abuses its
    discretion when it sua sponte dismisses a civil action with prejudice where (1) the
    court fails to make a finding that the plaintiff acted willfully or that a lesser
    sanction would not have sufficed, and (2) nothing in the record supports a finding
    that the plaintiff acted willfully or that a lesser sanction would not have sufficed.
    Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 
    432 F.3d 1333
    , 1337-42 (11th Cir. 2005).
    We have repeatedly held that we will not consider an issue not raised in the
    district court and raised for the first time in an appeal. Access Now, Inc. v.
    Southwest Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover,
    2
    Case: 19-12089     Date Filed: 06/25/2020     Page: 3 of 5
    “prisoners raising civil rights claims, like other civil litigants, have no absolute
    constitutional right to counsel.” Kilgo v. Ricks, 
    983 F.2d 189
    , 193 (11th Cir.
    1993). Rather, appointment of counsel in civil cases is a privilege justified only by
    exceptional circumstances such as the presence of facts and legal issues so novel or
    complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.
    Id. “Pro se
    pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
    by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
    States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    , 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, once a pro se litigant
    proceeding in forma pauperis is in court, “he is subject to the relevant law and
    rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome,
    
    863 F.2d 835
    , 837 (11th Cir. 1989). “These rules provide for sanctions for
    misconduct and for failure to comply with court orders.”
    Id. Rule 12(b)(6)
    of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal
    of a complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Moreover, Rule 41(b) provides that if the plaintiff fails to
    prosecute or to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure or a court order, a
    defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    41(b). Additionally, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a case under the
    authority of either Rule 41(b) or the court’s inherent power to manage its docket.
    Betty K 
    Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337
    .
    3
    Case: 19-12089       Date Filed: 06/25/2020       Page: 4 of 5
    “The severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice . . . can be imposed only in
    the face of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” State
    Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v. M/V Wesermunde, 
    838 F.2d 1576
    , 1582
    (11th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks omitted). However, “[w]hile dismissal is an
    extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the
    litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.” 
    Moon, 863 F.2d at 837
    .
    We will not consider Shuler’s arguments that the judges in his case racially
    discriminated and conspired against him because he has presented those arguments
    for the first time on appeal. See Access 
    Now, 385 F.3d at 1331
    . Moreover, his
    argument that the magistrate judge denied him the documents and witness
    testimony he needed to prove his case is irrelevant here. Shuler’s claim that he
    was prejudiced by the district court’s failure to appoint him counsel is misplaced
    because he had no absolute right to counsel for this case. See 
    Kilgo, 983 F.2d at 193
    . Moreover, Shuler’s liberally construed argument that the district court abused
    its discretion by dismissing his case with prejudice fails. Shuler’s conduct was
    willful and lesser sanctions would not have sufficed. See Betty K 
    Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337
    -42. The record fully supports both findings. See
    id. Accordingly, we
    affirm.1
    1
    Shuler’s motion to file a reply brief out of time is DENIED.
    4
    Case: 19-12089   Date Filed: 06/25/2020   Page: 5 of 5
    AFFIRMED.
    5