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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-13204
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-22661-UU
DONALD YOUNG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FCI MIAMI WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 5, 2020)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Young, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion seeking post-judgment relief under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 60(b) on the basis that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in his
federal criminal case by coercing him to agree to waive indictment and to plead
guilty to a crime he did not commit.
The relevant background is this. Young was convicted and sentenced in 2006
after pleading guilty to retaliation against a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(a)(1)(B).1 In 2007, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal and to raise
certain errors at sentencing. That motion was dismissed with prejudice in 2009. In
2017, he filed a § 2241 habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed in part as an
unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion. Then, Young twice sought post-
judgment relief under Rule 60(b)(6) in the § 2241 case based on ineffective
assistance by trial counsel. This appeal arises from the summary denial of the second
Rule 60(b) motion, filed in July 2019.
On appeal, Young argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6)
because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during his federal criminal case and
because he was actually innocent of the offense. He requests that we vacate his
conviction and sentence and acquit him of all charges.
1
The 78-month federal prison sentence was imposed to run consecutive to an undischarged
state sentence.
2
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Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that permits reopening of a judgment
when the movant shows “any . . . reason that justifies relief” other than the more
specific circumstances set out in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
“Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) . . . requires showing extraordinary
circumstances justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Arthur v. Thomas,
739
F.3d 611, 628 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
At the outset, we must address whether the district court had jurisdiction to
consider Young’s Rule 60(b) motion. See Williams v. Chatman,
510 F.3d 1290,
1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Federal courts are obligated to inquire into subject-matter
jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” (quotation marks omitted)).
We review jurisdictional issues de novo.
Id. We liberally construe pro se filings “to
discern whether jurisdiction . . . can be founded on a legally justifiable base.”
Fernandez v. United States,
941 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1991).
Although Rule 60(b) generally applies in § 2255 cases, the rule cannot be used
to circumvent restraints on filing second or successive § 2255 motions. Farris v.
United States,
333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a prisoner seeking to file a “second or
successive” § 2255 motion must “first file an application with the appropriate court
of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider it.” Id.; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h) (outlining the requirements an applicant must meet to obtain an order
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authorizing a successive § 2255 motion). Without authorization from a court of
appeals, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive motion.
Farris,
333 F.3d at 1216.
So, we must determine whether permitting a movant to bring a motion under
Rule 60(b) “would be inconsistent with the restrictions imposed on successive
petitions by the AEDPA.”
Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293. To do so, we must identify
the type of argument presented in the Rule 60(b) motion.
Where the Rule 60(b) motion presents a new ground for relief from a
judgment of conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim
on the merits, we will treat the motion as, in substance, a successive § 2255 motion
that must comply with AEDPA’s restraints on successive motions. See Gonzalez v.
Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005) (addressing a § 2254 habeas petition). But where
the Rule 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of
a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas
proceedings,” the motion is properly brought under Rule 60(b) and is not subject to
those same restraints.2
Id.
2
For example, there is no bar to filing a Rule 60(b) motion that alleges a “fraud on the
federal habeas court” or that “asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination
was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or
statute-of-limitations bar.” Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 532 nn.4 & 5 (2005).
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Here, we are required to construe Young’s Rule 60(b) motion as a successive
§ 2255 motion. The motion did not raise any defect in the integrity of the original
§ 2255 proceeding. See
id. Rather, it raised new claims for relief from his conviction
and sentence. See
id. In particular, Young alleged in the motion that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance in his federal criminal case by coercing him to waive
indictment and advising him to plead guilty to a crime he was actually innocent of.
Because Young’s Rule 60(b) motion was, in substance, a successive § 2255
motion, he was required to comply with AEDPA and obtain this Court’s
authorization before filing it in the district court. See
Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216.
Without our authorization, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
motion,
id., and should have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction rather than
summarily denying it, see Franqui v. Florida,
638 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 2011)
(vacating the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion and remanding with instructions to
dismiss the motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as an unauthorized
successive habeas petition). Accordingly, we vacate and remand with instructions
to dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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