Case: 19-13592 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-13592
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-05243-WMR
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA,
GEORGIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,
STATE OF GEORGIA,
SENTENCE REVIEW PANEL, et al.,
Defendants–Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 9, 2020)
Case: 19-13592 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 2 of 4
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Waseem Daker appeals pro se the dismissal of his amended complaint in
which he alleged that that he was entitled to review of his non-life sentences, see
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6 (2006), and that the retroactive repeal of section 17-10-6
violated his right to due process; and alleged that his inability to access a law
library and to make photocopies violated his right to access the courts. Daker also
contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying as moot his motions
for discovery, a preliminary injunction for law library access, and certification of
the question of the interpretation of section 17-10-6 to the Georgia Supreme Court.
And Daker moves this Court for certification of two questions to the Georgia
Supreme Court about the interpretation of section 17-10-6; leave to exceed the
word limit for his motion to certify; and a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order granting him access to a law library or, alternatively, remand to
the district court for that relief. We affirm and deny Daker’s motions as moot.
We review for an abuse of discretion the dismissal of a claim as frivolous,
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Miller v. Donald,
541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.
Id.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Daker’s
complaint for sentence review under section 17-10-6. Before its repeal in 2007,
2
Case: 19-13592 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 3 of 4
except in cases in which the death penalty was imposed or cases involving a
serious violent felony, defendants “[i]n any case” serving “a sentence of 12 or
more years, or several consecutive sentences which total 12 or more years, [which
was] fixed and imposed by a judge, without a jury,” could petition the Georgia
Sentence Review Panel. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6(a) (2006). But sentence review was
unavailable “in . . . cases in which a life sentence [was] imposed for murder.”
Id.
§ 17-10-6(f) (2006). Daker was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of life so he
was ineligible for relief under the plain language of section 17-10-6 regardless of
whether the Georgia Legislature violated the Constitution in repealing that statute.
Daker’s argument that his non-life sentences for his other crimes were
eligible for review by the state panel fails. The imposition of a life sentence in
Daker’s “case” made him ineligible for sentence review. The ordinary meaning of
the legal term “case” is “[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or
controversy at law or in equity.” Case, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
And, before its repeal, section 17-10-6(a) made clear that its use of the term “case”
referred to actions in which any defendant received multiple sentences because
review was available “[i]n any case” involving “several consecutive sentences
which total 12 or more years.”
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Daker’s
complaint insofar as it alleged that he had been denied access to a law library or to
3
Case: 19-13592 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 4 of 4
a photocopier. Daker failed to explain how those denials of access caused him any
legal injury. Wilson v. Blankenship,
163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998).
Denying Daker access to a law library or a photocopier could not have prejudiced
his complaint for sentence review because that complaint was frivolous. And
because that complaint was frivolous, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying as moot Daker’s motions for discovery, a preliminary injunction, and
certification. For the same reason, we too deny as moot Daker’s motions for
certification and for a preliminary injunction.
AFFIRMED.
4
