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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-14651
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-20436-DLG-17
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS FLORES LOPEZ,
a.k.a. Mono Dos,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 12, 2020)
Before WILSON, GRANT and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Carlos Lopez, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
denial of his second motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. The district
court found that it lacked authority to reduce Lopez’s sentence because, even after
applying Amendment 782, 1 the sentence was at the bottom of the amended guideline
range. The government has moved for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing
schedule.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such
as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where
rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is
clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is
frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).2
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of
its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. United
States v. Anderson,
772 F.3d 662, 666 (11th Cir. 2014). But we review a district
1
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (2014).
2
We are bound by cases decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.
Bonner v. City of Pritchard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
2
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court’s decision to grant or deny a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) only for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Caraballo-Martinez,
866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2017). Arguments not raised before the district court and raised for the first
time on appeal are deemed waived. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d
1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
A district court has discretion to reduce an imprisonment term if a defendant’s
sentence is based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the
Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). District courts conduct a two-
step process in determining whether to apply a retroactive amendment to an eligible
defendant:
First, the court must substitute the amended guideline range for the
originally applied guideline range and determine what sentence it
would have imposed. In undertaking this first step, only the amended
guideline range is changed. All other guideline application decisions
made during the original sentencing remain intact. Second, in light of
the conclusion reached in the first step, the court must consider the
factors listed in § 3553(a) and determine whether or not to reduce the
defendant’s original sentence.
United States v. Vautier,
144 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
However, the district court is not required to reduce the defendant’s sentence; the
determination is discretionary.
Id.
Section 3582(c)(2) does not place any limitations on a district court’s
jurisdiction to consider successive motions based on the same Guidelines
amendment.
Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1243. A district court cannot reduce
3
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a defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2) below the amended guideline range
unless the defendant was granted a downward departure for providing substantial
assistance at his original sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2); see also United States
v. Colon,
707 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2013).
Section 2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides base offense levels
for drug offenses based on the type and quantity of drug involved. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c). Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines altered the base offense
levels applicable to certain drug offenses. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (2014).
Under Amendment 782, the base offense level for a drug offense involving between
30,000 to 90,0000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent is 36. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(2).
Finally, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, both the district court and our
Court are bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law made by our Court on a
prior appeal of the same case unless “(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially
different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of
law applicable to that issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
work manifest injustice.” United States v. Stinson,
97 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir.
1996).
As an initial matter, the government’s position that Lopez’s appeal is
foreclosed by the law-of-the-case doctrine is incorrect as a matter of law. See
4
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Groendyke Transp.,
Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. The government correctly cites our law-
of-the-case doctrine precedent for the proposition that we are bound by findings of
fact and conclusions of law that we made in a prior appeal in the same case but, as
the government concedes, Lopez did not appeal from the denial of his first
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. See
Stinson, 97 F.3d at 469. The government’s position that
we are bound by the district court’s denial of Lopez’s prior § 3582 motion because
he did not appeal is not supported by our precedent and is an improper application
of the law-of-the-case doctrine. See
id.
Nonetheless, the government’s contention that the district court lacked
authority to reduce Lopez’s sentence below the amended guideline range after
application of Amendment 782 is correct as a matter of law. See Groendyke Transp.,
Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. The district court had jurisdiction to consider Lopez’s second
§ 3582(c)(2) motion even though it was also based on Amendment 782 because we
have held that there are no jurisdictional limitations in § 3582(c)(2) that prohibit
district courts from hearing successive § 3582 motions based on the same
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. See
Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at
1243. Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2), which incorporates the changes made by
Amendment 782, Lopez’s base offense level was reduced two levels to 36. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). Applying the two-level increase he received for abuse of
trust, his adjusted offense level was 38. See
Vautier, 144 F.3d at 760. Accordingly,
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after application of Amendment 782, Lopez’s amended guideline range was 235 to
293 months’ imprisonment. U.S.S.G. App. G, Sentencing Tbl. Thus, because Lopez
was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, the district court correctly determined
that, under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2), it could not reduce Lopez’s sentence further.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2).
Finally, to the extent Lopez sought to challenge the quantity of drugs he was
attributed with for sentencing purposes in his second § 3582(c)(2) motion, that
challenge was outside the scope of § 3582(c)(2) and would have been cognizable in
a direct appeal from the criminal judgment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). To the
extent Lopez referenced Amendment 750 3 and the First Step Act 4 in his appellate
brief in an attempt to raise sentence reduction arguments under those authorities, he
has waived this Court’s consideration of those arguments by raising them for the
first time on appeal. See Access Now,
Inc., 385 F.3d at 1331.
Thus, because there is no substantial question that the district court was
prohibited from further reducing Lopez’s sentence after application of Amendment
782, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lopez’s second
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. See Groendyke Transp.,
Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Accordingly,
3
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 750 (2011).
4
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
6
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the government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and its motion to
stay the briefing schedule is DENIED as moot.
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