Eulalia Andres-Diego v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2020 )


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  •               Case: 19-12190    Date Filed: 03/16/2020   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-12190
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    Agency No. A209-007-422
    EULALIA ANDRES-DIEGO, et al.,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (March 16, 2020)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Eulalia Andres-Diego and her two minor children petition for review of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration
    Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
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    relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. After careful review,
    we deny their petition.
    I.
    Andres-Diego is a 25-year-old native and citizen of Guatemala. She married
    Juan De Diego Jacinto in April 2013. The couple welcomed two daughters, A. and
    M.,1 in 2013 and 2015. The family lived in San Miguel Acatán, Guatemala, from
    the time they married until April 2016.
    One night in April 2016, three masked men dressed in black and carrying
    guns came to Andres-Diego’s home. The men “pointed guns and demanded
    [Andres-Diego] give them 10,000 quetzales” or they would kidnap her children
    and likely kill Andres-Diego. Andres-Diego did not have this money, but the men
    told her they would come back in a week to collect the sum. Andres-Diego did not
    know who the men were. She thought the men “belong[ed] to a group” and that
    “somebody sent them.” She believed the men had targeted her because her father-
    in-law, who lived in the United States, sent her family money once or twice a
    month. Andres-Diego would pick up these remittances at a service called
    Intermex. Andres-Diego testified the thieves “probably . . . [thought] that I have
    money” because of her trips to Intermex.
    1
    A. and M. are also Guatemala natives and citizens.
    2
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    Scared by the three men’s threats, Andres-Diego quickly fled Guatemala
    with her two young daughters. She did not report the threats to the Guatemalan
    police because she had heard from others that “they don’t help even if you report.”
    Andres-Diego did not believe she could relocate within Guatemala because she is
    of Mayan ethnicity; her native language, Kanjobal, is not spoken anywhere else in
    the country; and she has a “very limited working knowledge of Spanish.” She also
    feared that “if we return, we will be killed because we did not pay the 10,000
    quetzales.”
    Andres-Diego and her daughters entered the United States on May 10, 2016.
    The following day, the Department of Homeland Security served them with
    Notices to Appear, charging them with being removable under Section
    212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
    § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as noncitizens present in the United States without being
    admitted or paroled. Andres-Diego and her children, through counsel, admitted
    these facts and conceded removability.
    In 2017, Andres-Diego applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Andres-Diego’s minor
    daughters were added as derivative beneficiaries of her application. In support of
    her asylum claim, Andres-Diego argued that she had been persecuted on account of
    her membership in two particular social groups (“PSG”): “the Diego Jacinto family
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    who live in the United States;” and “people in [the] Guatemala community who are
    identified as having access to money.” She also submitted that she was persecuted
    because of her political opinion, exhibited by her refusal to comply with the
    extortionate demands of the masked men.
    Following a hearing, an IJ denied Andres-Diego’s and her daughters’
    applications and ordered them removed to Guatemala. In an oral decision, the IJ
    found Andres-Diego credible but concluded she had failed to meet her burden of
    proof on any of her claims. For Andres-Diego’s asylum claim, the IJ determined
    she had not established past persecution. The IJ also found that any persecution
    Andres-Diego experienced was not related to her membership in a PSG or her
    political opinions. The IJ then concluded Andres-Diego could not establish a well-
    founded fear of future persecution. Because Andres-Diego was not eligible for
    asylum, the IJ also rejected her claim for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ
    found the Guatemalan government had not directed or acquiesced to any potential
    torture of Andres-Diego, defeating her claim for CAT protection.
    Andres-Diego appealed to the BIA. The BIA dismissed her appeal and
    adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Andres-Diego and her daughters timely
    petitioned this Court for review.
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    II.
    “When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
    extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision.” Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    427 F.3d 954
    , 956 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). If the BIA expressly adopts
    the IJ’s reasoning, we will also review the IJ’s decision. 
    Id. Here, the
    BIA
    expressly adopted the IJ’s reasoning, so we review both the IJ and the BIA’s
    decisions. See 
    id. We examine
    the agency’s factual determinations for substantial
    evidence and we review de novo its conclusions of law. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    820 F.3d 399
    , 403 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
    III.
    On the record before us, the IJ and the BIA properly denied Andres-Diego’s
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.
    We first address Andres-Diego’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal,
    then turn to her claim for CAT protection.
    A.
    To be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal, a noncitizen must
    prove she suffered persecution on account of a protected ground. Perez-Sanchez v.
    U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    935 F.3d 1148
    , 1158 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
    This connection between the persecution and the statutorily protected ground is
    known as the “nexus” requirement. 
    Id. To satisfy
    the nexus requirement, an
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    asylum applicant must establish that the protected ground was “at least one central
    reason” for her persecution. 
    Id. (quoting 8
    U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Protected
    grounds include “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
    Assuming that Andres-Diego can establish past persecution through
    evidence of the death and kidnapping threats made against her and her family, she
    does not show this harm occurred because of her membership in a PSG or her
    political opinion. We therefore affirm the IJ’s denial of her claims for asylum and
    withholding of removal.
    1. Andres-Diego’s Proposed PSGs
    Andres-Diego claimed membership in two PSGs in support of her claims:
    being a person identified in the Guatemalan community as having access to money,
    and being a part of the Diego Jacinto family who live in the United States.2
    Neither PSG, however, supports her eligibility for asylum or withholding of
    removal.
    2
    The government contends that Andres-Diego improperly articulates two new proposed
    PSGs in her opening brief, and thus she has abandoned the two PSGs she proposed to the IJ. To
    the extent that Andres-Diego reformulated her two proposed PSGs in her brief, we cannot
    consider them because she did not propose them to the BIA and exhaust her administrative
    remedies. See Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    463 F.3d 1247
    , 1250 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
    curiam) (explaining this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims not raised before the BIA).
    Nevertheless, because we affirm denial of Andres-Diego’s application on the merits, we decline
    to address the distinction made by the government regarding the PSGs Andres-Diego asserted
    before the IJ, and those she asserts here.
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    Andres-Diego’s first proposed PSG, “people in [a] Guatemala community
    who are identified as having access to money,” is not cognizable because the group
    is defined by the harm Andres-Diego suffered as a victim of extortion. See
    Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    446 F.3d 1190
    , 1198 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The risk
    of persecution alone does not create a particular social group within the meaning of
    the [Immigration and Nationality Act].”). Beyond this, asylum applicants who
    were targeted for extortion solely because of their wealth or perceived wealth
    cannot show a nexus between their persecution and a protected ground. Compare
    Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    487 F.3d 815
    , 821–23 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying a
    petition for review of an asylum application because there was “substantial
    evidence to support the Immigration Judge’s finding that the motive of the FARC
    [a Colombian rebel group] for persecuting the petitioners’ [wealthy] family was to
    raise funds”), with Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    492 F.3d 1223
    , 1234–35
    (11th Cir. 2007) (granting a petition for review because “[a]lthough the FARC did
    demand financial support from [the asylum applicant], the record as a whole
    compels the conclusion that the FARC also targeted [him] because of his political
    activities”).
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    Andres-Diego’s second proposed PSG, “the Diego Jacinto family who live
    in the United States,” bears no nexus to the harm she suffered.3 Andres-Diego’s
    account of the masked men’s extortion and death threats does not show that the
    men targeted her because she was part of the Diego Jacinto family. Indeed,
    Andres-Diego testified that she did not know why the masked men threatened her.
    She could only guess that the men found out her father-in-law sent her money from
    the United States because the men saw her visit Intermex. She did not introduce
    any evidence of harm befalling any other Diego Jacinto family members in
    Guatemala. On this record, Andres-Diego showed no nexus between belonging to
    the Diego Jacinto family and the extortion she experienced. See Perez-Zenteno v.
    U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    913 F.3d 1301
    , 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (denying a petition for
    review because the asylum applicant did not introduce enough evidence of nexus
    between a violent attack she suffered and her family’s connections to the United
    States); Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    735 F.3d 1302
    , 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2013)
    (per curiam) (denying a petition for review because the asylum applicant “failed to
    show that the harm he feared . . . arose from his [family] membership,” and the
    3
    We assume, without deciding, that Andres-Diego’s family-membership PSG is
    cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581,
    586 (A.G. 2019) (holding that an asylum applicant proposing a PSG based on family
    membership “must establish that his specific family group is defined with sufficient particularity
    and is socially distinct in his society”).
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    record established other reasons behind the killing and kidnapping of his family
    members).
    2. Andres-Diego’s Political Opinion
    Finally, Andres-Diego argued before the IJ that her refusal to pay the
    masked men constituted a political opinion against extortion. Andres-Diego does
    not repeat these arguments in her brief to this Court, so we cannot consider them.
    See United States v. Nealy, 
    232 F.3d 825
    , 830–31 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that
    issues not raised in an initial brief are abandoned).
    The record reflects that Andres-Diego and her children were victims of a
    frightening and serious crime. But evidence that is “consistent with acts of private
    violence” or that “merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal
    activity[] does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily
    protected ground.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    440 F.3d 1247
    , 1258 (11th Cir. 2006)
    (per curiam). For all these reasons, the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions to deny
    Andres-Diego asylum and withholding of removal were proper.
    B.
    In the proceedings below, Andres-Diego also applied for protection under
    the CAT. The IJ and BIA denied her CAT relief. But Andres-Diego does not
    challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief in her brief to this Court. As a result,
    we do not pass on the merits of her CAT claim. See Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y
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    Gen., 
    577 F.3d 1341
    , 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding a petitioner abandoned his
    CAT claim by failing to raise more than a “passing reference” to it in his brief).
    For the reasons given, we deny Andres-Diego’s petition for review.
    PETITION DENIED.
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