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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-13074
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A201-408-406
MUHAMMED ISLAM,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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(March 26, 2020)
Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Muhammed Islam, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitions for review
of an order affirming the denial of his application for asylum and withholding of
removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and for relief under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). The Board of
Immigration Appeals agreed with the immigration judge that Islam failed to
establish that he suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future
persecution in Bangladesh based on his affiliation with the Liberal Democratic
Party or that he was likely to be tortured if he returned to Bangladesh. We deny
Islam’s petition for review.
The Board affirmed the decision of the immigration judge, so we review
both their decisions. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
605 F.3d 941, 947–48 (11th Cir.
2010). Our review of the decision is “limited” by “the highly deferential substantial
evidence test,” under which “we must affirm if the decision of the Immigration
Judge is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
448 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the substantial evidence test, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision of the immigration
judge and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.
Id. at 1236. We
can reverse “only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record
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may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the
administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft,
386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc).
To qualify for asylum, Islam must prove that he is a “refugee,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), who is unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality
“because of persecution or a well–founded fear of persecution on account of” his
“membership in a particular social group,”
id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). He must present
specific and credible evidence of persecution, Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
440 F.3d
1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006), which is an “extreme concept” requiring evidence of
more than harassment or “a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or
intimidation,” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005).
We evaluate the harms suffered cumulatively in determining whether Islam was
persecuted. De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
525 F.3d 999, 1008 (11th Cir.
2008); Mejia v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
498 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007).
Our precedents set a high threshold for mistreatment to constitute
persecution. Evidence that an alien was imprisoned for 36 hours in a small cell
with 12 people, forced to drink a “very dirty liquid” and eat something “very bad,”
and endured being hit with a belt and kicked, which caused lacerations and
bruising that required treatment for two days in a hospital followed by two weeks
of rest did not compel a finding of persecution in Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514
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F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008). Nor, we concluded, was an alien
persecuted when he was imprisoned for four days, during which he was
interrogated for five hours and beaten, and then was monitored after his release.
Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353.
Extreme oppressive acts can rise to the level of persecution. For example, in
De Santamaria, we concluded that an alien suffered past persecution when
members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia threatened her over the
telephone and in emails, assaulted her and pulled her out of her vehicle by her hair,
tortured and murdered her family groundskeeper, and later kidnapped, beat, and
prepared to kill her before she was rescued by government
forces. 525 F.3d at
1003–05, 1008–09. Past persecution also occurred in Mejia, where the alien
endured threats and evaded attacks by the Revolutionary Armed Forces; its
members ambushed him on a roadway, threatened him at gunpoint, and used the
butt of a rifle to break his nose, which had to be repaired surgically; and sent him a
“condolence letter” that mentioned his “sure
death.” 498 F.3d at 1255. And in
Delgado v. United States Att’y Gen.,
487 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2007), we concluded
that a father and son were persecuted by opponents of Hugo Chavez when the two
men received threatening telephone calls, they had unloaded guns pointed at them
and the triggers pulled, the father twice had his car tampered with and defaced, and
the son was beaten until he was nearly unconscious.
Id. at 861.
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Substantial evidence supports the finding that Islam did not suffer the type
of “severe” and “sufficiently extreme [maltreatment] to constitute persecution.” De
Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1009. Islam received threatening telephone calls from and
had three encounters with “goons” of the Awami League, which was the ruling
party in Bangladesh, for his activities with the opposition Liberal Party. In
February 2017, League members interrupted a meeting of the Party and then
kicked, punched, and slapped Islam, after which he sought medical treatment and
received medicine for his “gas[,] . . . fear[,] and for pain” attributable to superficial
injuries to his back, chest, and face. In December 2017, League members
overturned a rickshaw from which Islam was promoting the Party and kicked and
punched him, but he treated his injuries with medicine that he bought at a
pharmacy. In March 2018, League members barged into a Party meeting and
struck Islam with weapons that cut his head and knee, broke two of his teeth, and
led to a nine-day stay in a hospital. While the last incident was detestable, Islam’s
combined experiences with the League are more akin to the intimidation and abuse
in Djonda and Kazemzadeh than the recurring and brutal harms suffered by the
aliens in De Santamaria, Mejia, and Delgado. The record does not compel the
conclusion that Islam suffered past persecution.
Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Islam lacks a reasonable
fear of future persecution in Bangladesh. A well-founded fear of future persecution
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exists only if an alien establishes that there is a reasonable possibility he will be
singled out for persecution and that his fear is “subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable.”
Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1352. Relocation to another part
of Bangladesh is a viable option for Islam, which suggests that his fear is not
reasonable. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
241 F.3d 1320,
1327 (11th Cir. 2001). Islam testified that, after the March 2018 incident, he lived
in Dhaka for four months without incident, and his wife and child reside there
peacefully. The record supports the finding of the Board that League members lack
“a willingness and an ability to harm [Islam] throughout Bangladesh.”
Islam does not qualify for withholding of removal. That form of relief
requires proof that an alien’s “life or freedom would be threatened in [Bangladesh]
because of” his political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Because Islam cannot
satisfy the standard to obtain asylum relief, he necessarily fails to qualify under the
more stringent standard imposed for withholding of removal. See
Sepulveda, 401
F.3d at 1233.
To qualify for relief under the Convention, Islam has to “establish that it is
more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to [Bangladesh].” 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Torture occurs when an act intended to cause “severe pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
Id.
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§ 208.18(a)(1). Torture also involves “be[ing] individually and intentionally
singled out for harsh treatment,” Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y. Gen.,
500 F.3d 1315,
1324 (11th Cir. 2007), that “the government [is] aware of, yet . . . [refrains from]
interven[ing]” to prevent, Rodriguez Morales v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
488 F.3d 884, 891
(11th Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence supports the finding that Islam is unlikely to be tortured
if he returns to Bangladesh. Islam submitted news articles and a County Report
stating that organizations affiliated with the League intimidated and abused
participants in opposition groups, but Islam was never tortured and his successful
relocation suggests that the League is disinterested in pursuing him. Although
Islam argues that government officials are unwilling or unable to protect him, he
reported only the third incident to law enforcement officers. Islam testified that the
officers “kicked [him] out of the police station [and] said . . . we’re not taking any
complaint[s] against the government,” yet he testified that law enforcement
officers came to his aid during the second incident, which caused his assailants to
flee. And the Country Report states that, despite “[p]olitical affiliation often
appear[sing] to be a factor in claims of arrest and prosecution,” “[t]he government
continue[s] to take steps to improve police professionalism, discipline, training,
and responsiveness . . . .” The record does not compel a conclusion that Islam
would be tortured at the direction or acquiescence of the Bangladeshi government.
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We DENY Islam’s petition for review.
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