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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-10940
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-01509-ACA
MAGGIE J. ROBINSON,
CODY ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
LIBERTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP INC.,
Defendants-Appellees
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(May 11, 2020)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR and GRANT, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,* District
Judge.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
Alabama law requires courts to construe the terms of an insurance policy
according to their ordinary meaning. So unless the context suggests otherwise, the
terms of a policy should not be given a technical or scientific meaning. And that
rule controls this appeal. Maggie and Cody Robinson’s homeowners insurance
policy excluded coverage for property damage caused by insects or vermin, and
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company cited that exclusion to deny coverage for an
infestation of brown recluse spiders in the Robinsons’ home. The Robinsons then
sued for breach of contract and bad faith under Alabama law. Because brown
recluse spiders are both “insects” and “vermin” under the ordinary meaning of
those terms and the district court committed no error by consulting dictionaries to
determine those legislative facts, Fed. R. Evid. 201(a), we affirm the dismissal of
the Robinsons’ complaint for failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
I. BACKGROUND
After the Robinsons moved into their home, they discovered an infestation
of the highly venomous brown recluse spider. Following an attempt to eradicate
the infestation, the Robinsons obtained a homeowners policy from Liberty Mutual.
*
Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
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That policy “insure[d] against risk of direct loss to property . . . only if that loss is a
physical loss to property.” But the policy excluded from coverage any loss
“[c]aused by . . . [b]irds, vermin, rodents, or insects.” Liberty Mutual cited that
exclusion in its letter denying coverage for a claim the Robinsons filed for damage
to their home after further attempts to eradicate the infestation failed.
The Robinsons sued Liberty Mutual for breach of contract and for bad faith
refusal to pay. In their complaint, the Robinsons alleged that brown recluse spiders
infested every facet of their home, could not be eradicated, posed a deadly risk, and
presented “a dangerous and irreparable condition” that rendered their home
“unsafe for occupancy.” They alleged that their insurance policy covered the loss
because brown recluse spiders are neither insects nor vermin within the meaning of
the exclusion.
The district court dismissed the Robinsons’ complaint. It ruled that brown
recluse spiders are both insects and vermin within the meaning of the policy. So
the district court concluded that the Robinsons’ complaint failed as a matter of law.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Ga. State
Conference of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange,
940 F.3d 627, 631 (11th Cir.
2019). We accept “the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
The Robinsons argue that the district court erred in dismissing their
complaint because brown recluse spiders are neither insects nor vermin. But we
disagree. Based on the ordinary meaning of those terms, brown recluse spiders are
both insects and vermin.
“In Alabama, the interpretation of a contract, including an insurance
contract, is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co.,
480 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007). Alabama courts “enforce the
insurance policy as written if the terms are unambiguous.” Safeway Ins. Co. of
Ala., Inc. v. Herrera,
912 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Ala. 2005). Alabama courts give the
terms the meaning that “a reasonably prudent person applying for insurance would
have understood the term[s] to mean.”
Id. at 1144 (alteration adopted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). That is, Alabama courts ordinarily do “not define words
. . . based on technical or legal terms.”
Id. at 1143; see also Liggans R.V. Ctr. v.
John Deere Ins. Co.,
575 So. 2d 567, 571 (Ala. 1991); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 6, at 69 (2012) (“Words
are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context
indicates that they bear a technical sense.”). To be sure, when construing
“exceptions to coverage,” Alabama courts construe them “as narrowly as possible
in order to provide maximum coverage.” Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
505 So. 2d
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362, 365 (Ala. 1987); see also Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co.,
856 So. 2d 789,
806 (Ala. 2002). But those courts remain careful not “to rewrite policies to provide
coverage not intended by the parties.”
Johnson, 505 So. 2d at 365.
Spiders are “insects” under the ordinary meaning of that term. All
dictionaries we have reviewed, both modern and old, list spiders as an example of
an “insect.” See, e.g., Insect, Oxford English Dictionary Online (last visited May 9,
2020), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/96686; Insect (in American English),
Collins Dictionary Online (last visited May 9, 2020), https://www.collinsdictionary
.com/us/dictionary/english/insect; Insect, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th ed. 2007); Insect, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1993); Insect, Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1961); Insect,
Webster’s New International Dictionary (1st ed. 1920). And a “dictionary
definition” is “an assertion of th[e] very meaning that an ordinary person would
give a particular word” because it is “the result of an examination into the
interpretation that ordinary people would give the word.” Carpet Installation &
Supplies of Glenco v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co.,
628 So. 2d 560, 562 (Ala. 1993); see also
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law app. A, at 418 (“A dictionary definition states the
core meanings of a term.”).
The Robinsons maintain that, scientifically speaking, spiders are arachnids,
not insects. And even the dictionaries acknowledge this distinction by either
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specifying that spiders are insects in popular usage or stressing that spiders are
“technically” not “insects.” See, e.g., Insect, Oxford English Dictionary
Online,
supra (“[I]n popular use comprising, besides the animals scientifically so called . . .
, many other arthropods, [such] as spiders . . . .”); Insect, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate
Dictionary, supra (“[A]ny of numerous small invertebrate animals (as
spiders or centipedes) that are more or less obviously segmented — not used
technically.”). But that technical or scientific meaning does not control our
interpretation of the Robinsons’ policy. See
Safeway, 912 So. 2d at 1143–44;
Liggans, 575 So. 2d at 571; Scalia & Garner, Reading Law § 6, at 69.
“Few zoological terms have been more loosely used both by scientific and
popular writers” than the term “insect.” Insect, 14 The Encyclopædia Britannica
(11th ed. 1911). The term “insect” “was introduced to English readers in a
translation (1601) of Pliny’s Natural History by Philemon Holland, who defined
‘insects’ as little vermine or smal[l] creatures which have . . . a cut or division
betwe[en] their heads and bodies.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the
mid-1700s, Carolus Linnæus created the basis for the modern classification
system, with six classes of animals, including Insecta. See A.J. Cain, Taxonomy,
Encyclopædia Britannica (last updated Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.britannica.com
/science/taxonomy. Linnæus’s class “Insecta” included all creatures in the modern-
day classes Arachnida and Insecta. See E. Ray Lankester, The Structure and
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Classification of the Arthropoda, 47 Q.J. Microscopical Sci. 523, 524 n.1 (1904).
Only “by causes which [are] not easy to trace” did “the word ‘Insect’ . . . become
limited” to exclude certain creatures, like spiders.
Id. That change in meaning was
largely due to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck in the early 1800s, who created the separate
classes Arachnida and Crustacea and “assign[ed] . . . them equal rank with the
remaining Insecta of Linnæus.” Id.;
Cain, supra. So even the scientific community
earlier afforded the term “insect” a broad definition that included spiders.
Today, we accept that the scientific community distinguishes between
arachnids and insects, but Alabama law cautions against using technical or
scientific definitions to interpret the terms of an insurance contract. See
Safeway,
912 So. 2d at 1143–44;
Liggans, 575 So. 2d at 571. And dictionary definitions of
“insect” establish that an ordinary person would still understand the term “insect”
to include spiders. That the average person has yet to adopt the scientific
vernacular is not unexpected; after all, not every adult recalls the basics of their
childhood science lessons as well as they should. Cf. Nix v. Hedden,
149 U.S. 304,
307 (1893) (concluding a tomato was a vegetable despite its botanical
classification as a fruit because it is a vegetable “in the common language of the
people”).
Brown recluse spiders are also “vermin” under the ordinary meaning of that
term. Vermin include “small common harmful or objectionable animals (as lice or
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fleas) that are difficult to control.” Vermin, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary, supra. The term refers to “noxious or objectionable” creatures and
includes “creeping or wingless insects (and other minute animals) of a loathsome
or offensive appearance or character, esp. those which infest.” Vermin, Oxford
English Dictionary Online (last visited May 9, 2020), https://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/222579; see also Vermin, American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language Online (last visited May 9, 2020), https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/
search.html?q=vermin; Vermin, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary,
supra.
The allegations of the Robinsons’ complaint alone establish that brown
recluse spiders are vermin. The Robinsons alleged that their house “was infested
with a large colony of highly venomous brown recluse spiders” that have “become
so pervasive that a clear and present danger exists.” Despite their efforts, they have
been unable to eradicate the spiders, nor can they find a pest control company
willing to guarantee that the infestation can ever be eradicated. We must accept
those allegations as true, Ga. State
Conference, 940 F.3d at 631, and those
allegations make clear that brown recluse spiders are “small common harmful or
objectionable animals . . . that are difficult to control,” Vermin, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate
Dictionary, supra, “injurious to health,” Vermin, American Heritage
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Dictionary of the English Language
Online, supra, and capable of infesting,
Vermin, Oxford English Dictionary
Online, supra.
The few decisions that have refused to apply an exclusion from coverage for
vermin are inapposite. Almost all these decisions involved mammals for which the
definition of “vermin” was ambiguous. See Marcelle v. S. Fid. Ins. Co., 954 F.
Supp. 2d 429, 436–37 (E.D. La. 2013) (bats); Jones v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co.,
672
S.W.2d 879, 880 (Tex. App. 1984) (squirrels); Umanoff v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins.,
442 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893–94 (Civ. Ct. 1981) (racoons); see also Sincoff v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
183 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1962) (carpet beetles).
Although “vermin” might be ambiguous as to other animals, we conclude that an
ordinary person would understand “vermin,” in this context, to include brown
recluse spiders. See Gregory v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 611 F. App’x 410, 411–
12 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the term “vermin” in an exclusion from
coverage in an insurance policy included mites, an arachnid); Christ Episcopal
Church of Bastrop v. Church Ins. Co.,
731 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1999)
(concluding that the term “vermin” in an insurance policy is unambiguous as to
mice and rats); N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Mercer,
84 S.E.2d 570, 571
(Ga. 1954) (concluding that the term “vermin” in an insurance policy, although
unambiguous as to rats and mice, plainly did not include squirrels); Scalia &
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Garner, Reading Law at 32 (“A word or phrase is ambiguous when the question is
which of two or more meanings applies . . . .”).
We also reject the Robinsons’ argument that the district court could not take
“judicial notice” of dictionary definitions without first affording them a hearing.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Rule 201 permits courts to take notice of “an adjudicative
fact” that is “generally known” and “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned,” so long as it affords the parties an opportunity to be heard on the
propriety of doing so if requested. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)–(b), (e). But Rule 201
“governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.” Fed. R.
Evid. 201(a). “[A]djudicative facts are those developed in a particular case,” while
“[l]egislative facts are established truths, facts or pronouncements that do not
change from case to case but apply universally.” W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v.
Williamson,
900 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee’s note to 1972
proposed rule (“Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case.”).
Dictionary definitions establish legislative facts when used to answer a question of
law, such as how to interpret contractual terms. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory
committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule (“Legislative facts . . . are those which
have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process . . . in the formulation
of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court . . . .”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the dismissal of the Robinsons’ complaint.
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