Serless West v. City of Albany, Georgia ( 2020 )


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  •               Case: 19-11418    Date Filed: 10/02/2020   Page: 1 of 22
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-11418
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00102-LAG
    SERLESS WEST,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    THE CITY OF ALBANY, GEORGIA,
    JOELLEN BROPHY,
    THOMAS BERRY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ____________________________
    (October 2, 2020)
    Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Serless West appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her
    claims of race discrimination and retaliation against the City of Albany, JoEllen
    Brophy, and Thomas Berry. West argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists
    as to her claims of (1) race discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Equal
    Protection Clause, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) race discrimination in
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    violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) race
    discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
    et seq.; and (4) retaliation in violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A.
    § 45-1-4(d)(2). After consideration and with the benefit of oral argument, we
    conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    As this is a review of a summary judgment proceeding, we view the facts in
    the light most favorable to West as the nonmoving party. See Perez v. Suszczynski,
    
    809 F.3d 1213
    , 1217 (11th Cir. 2016).
    West is an African American woman who was employed with the City of
    Albany, Georgia from March 2005 until her termination on November 21, 2014.
    West initially enjoyed a smooth and gainful tenure within the City Finance
    Department, receiving positive performance reviews and promotions. But that
    changed in February 2014, when JoEllen Brophy became the Chief Financial Officer
    for the City.
    As CFO, Brophy repeatedly belittled African American employees. She
    referred to individual employees as “incompetent” or “incapable.” She required
    West to train less qualified white employees who were paid a higher salary than her.
    One such employee was Kayren Tomlinson. Brophy promoted Tomlinson,
    originally a secretary in the Finance Department, to the position of Grants Manager.
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    Brophy also gave Tomlinson a higher salary than West even though West had more
    experience and trained her. Brophy also asked West to double-check and correct the
    work of Tomlinson and two other white employees who also had higher salaries than
    West.
    During a meeting one afternoon, Brophy told West she needed to order herself
    business cards. West then heard from a coworker that Brophy wanted those cards to
    list West’s title as “Staff Accountant.” West emailed Brophy, expressing her
    discontent with that idea and stating “do you know what a Staff Accountant is? A
    Staff Accountant is an entry level position.” She further wrote “I am really amazed
    that you would try to belittle me and my work.”
    West spoke to Brophy about her concerns again a month later. She explained
    that she was training less qualified white employees for jobs that were higher paying
    than hers and that she was not receiving advancement opportunities. A few weeks
    later, Brophy recommended West be terminated.
    Brophy stated that she recommended termination because of West’s behavior
    the day before. On that day, West was moving offices and wanted to place her filing
    cabinet behind her desk. Brophy disagreed with this choice of furniture placement
    and became irate, chasing West down the hallway. Brophy then ordered West into
    her office. West requested that a neutral third-party observe the exchange and both
    the Human Resources Director, Henry Cohen, and West’s supervisor, Sandy LeMay,
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    witnessed the meeting. Brophy yelled at West, gesticulating aggressively with her
    finger. West responded, “you don’t put your hand in my face because slavery time
    is over with. I’m not a slave.”
    West objected to how Brophy treated her and Cohen suggested West return
    home for the day and put her concerns in writing. That evening, West sent Cohen an
    email detailing Brophy’s behavior. West stated that Brophy had an attitude and
    insulted her in front of other employees. She further alleged that several employees
    were “fed up” with Brophy and “ready to file a complaint because they are tired of
    being mistreated.” Finally, she predicted the department would fall apart if Brophy’s
    attitude did not change, referencing Brophy’s grudges against certain employees and
    saying she would “try to stop me from progressing in the department.” The next day,
    Cohen responded by asking West “who do you think you are?”
    The day after Brophy recommended that West be terminated, the Albany
    Herald published a statement by Brophy that “an employee in the city’s Finance
    office had indeed misinformed [the City Downtown Development Authority Board]
    about bond funding available to the agency.” It further stated “that the oversight had
    led to the dismissal of the employee responsible.” At that time, West was the only
    Finance Department employee assigned as the liaison to the Authority. But West had
    never made statements about bond funding capacity—that job fell under Brophy’s
    purview as CFO.
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    West appealed Brophy’s termination recommendation and Defendant-
    Appellee Thomas Berry, the Interim County Manager, held a hearing on the appeal
    on August 22, 2014. Berry did not force Brophy to reconcile her contradictory
    statements and ignored West’s protestations that she had not been insubordinate.
    Instead, Berry suspended West, required her to attend behavioral counseling, and
    transferred her to the Utility Department as a Teller Supervisor.
    While with the Utility Department, West discovered that its employees were
    handling cash in a manner she believed to be improper. Specifically, another Teller
    Supervisor told West to place her cash till in an unsecure and unlocked location one
    day while she went to lunch. West’s till subsequently came up $100 short and she
    was given a written reprimand. Around two weeks later, West sent a memorandum
    to the teller supervisor outlining her concerns regarding the need for appropriate
    financial controls within the Department. Five days after she sent that memorandum,
    West was fired.
    West then filed a complaint in the Middle District of Georgia alleging race
    discrimination and retaliation by Brophy, Berry, and the City of Albany. During
    discovery, West sought to depose the City under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    30(b)(6) on ten subject matters. The City moved for a protective order regarding two
    of those subject matters under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The district court
    granted that motion as to only one of West’s requests: to depose the City regarding
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    any audits, investigations, analyses of financial procedures, financial protocols, and
    financial irregularities involving any tellers in the Utility Department.
    The defendants then moved for summary judgment on all claims. West filed
    two 44-page documents in support of her response to that motion: one outlining
    disputed facts and another providing paragraph-by-paragraph rebuttals to the
    defendants’ list of undisputed facts. In support of their reply brief, the defendants
    filed an 80-page response to West’s statement of disputed facts. The district court
    rejected both West’s 44-page paragraph-by-paragraph rebuttal and the defendants’
    80-page response as not contemplated by the local rules and granted the defendants’
    motion for summary judgment. West then filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II. DISCUSSION
    West raises five issues on appeal. She first argues that the district court abused
    its discretion by (1) partially granting the City of Albany’s motion for a protective
    order limiting the scope of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and (2) refusing to consider
    her response to the defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. As to the merits of her
    claims, she argues that the district court erroneously (1) concluded she did not plead
    a viable retaliation claim, (2) determined Tomlinson was not a similarly situated
    comparator and West had not proven a city policy condoning discrimination for
    purposes of her race discrimination claims, and (3) retained jurisdiction over her
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    state-law whistleblower claim and determined her pre-termination disclosure did not
    allege a violation of law for purposes of that claim.
    West also argues the district court erred by granting Berry and Brophy
    qualified immunity—an issue the district court never reached. Because we hold
    summary judgment was appropriate on West’s race discrimination and retaliation
    claims, we need not address whether Berry and Brophy are entitled to qualified
    immunity on those claims. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    750 F.3d 1238
    , 1242 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating this Court can affirm the district court “on
    any ground supported by the record”). We discuss the remaining issues in turn.
    A. The District Court Did Not Err by Limiting the Scope of West’s 30(b)(6)
    Deposition
    We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion and will
    not disturb those rulings unless the district court made clearly erroneous factual
    findings or applied the wrong legal standard. See Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence
    Repairs, Inc., 
    662 F.3d 1292
    , 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). “The district court has wide
    discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery,” and does not abuse its
    discretion by limiting the scope of discovery if the parties are given “an opportunity
    to conduct adequate discovery.” Avirgan v. Hull, 
    932 F.2d 1572
    , 1580 (11th Cir.
    1991).
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), a party seeking to depose a
    governmental agency must “describe with reasonable particularity the matters for
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    examination.” Those matters, like all discovery, “should be tailored to the issues
    involved in the particular case.” See Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
    Corp., 
    959 F.2d 1566
    , 1570 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of
    Educ., 
    105 F.R.D. 49
    , 55 (D.N.J. 1985)). And any information sought during
    discovery “must be relevant and not overly burdensome to the responding party.”
    Id. If the requested
    discovery would result in “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
    or undue burden or expense,” the responding party may move for a protective order
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). If the district court decides a protective
    order is warranted, it has broad discretion in determining the scope of that protection.
    See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 
    467 U.S. 20
    , 36 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) confers
    broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate
    and what degree of protection is required”).
    West sought 30(b)(6) depositions of the City on ten subjects, and the City
    moved for a protective order regarding two of those subjects. The district court
    granted the motion only as to one: West’s request for a deposition regarding any
    audits, investigations, analyses of financial procedures, and financial irregularities
    involving any tellers in the Utility Department. West sought that information to
    support her claim that the City violated the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. §
    45-1-4(d)(2), by terminating her in retaliation for her disclosing financial
    irregularities within the Teller Division of the Utility Department.
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    Under the Act, a public employer may not “retaliate against a public employee
    for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either
    a supervisor or a government agency.” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2). West argues that
    the district court abused its discretion by granting the protective order because her
    request was tailored to the issue of whether she sufficiently “disclos[ed] a violation
    of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.” And, if she did, her subsequent
    termination could be considered retaliatory under the Act.
    We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
    West’s request was overbroad, vague, at risk of causing the City undue burden and
    expense, and of questionable relevance disproportionate to the needs of her case.
    The Act requires that an employee disclose a suspected legal violation, not prove
    that the violation actually occurred. See Forrester v. Georgia Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
    
    708 S.E.2d 660
    , 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).The information West requested would not
    make the fact of her disclosure more or less true; the information would only
    establish that the conduct she complained of actually occurred. Accordingly, West’s
    discovery request was only tangentially relevant to her claim and we affirm the
    district court’s grant of a partial protective order to the City on that request.
    B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Applying the Local Rules
    We defer to a district court’s interpretation of its own rules, reviewing that
    interpretation only for abuse of discretion. See Reese v. Herbert, 
    527 F.3d 1253
    ,
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    1267 n.22 (11th Cir. 2008). In the Middle District of Georgia, “[t]he respondent to a
    motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a separate and concise
    statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends
    there exists a genuine dispute to be tried.” M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. Local Rule 7.4 requires,
    absent a showing of good cause, that briefs in support of or in response to any motion
    be limited to twenty pages and reply briefs be limited to ten pages.
    Neither of West’s 44-page documents in response to the defendants’ motion
    for summary judgment complied with Local Rule 56’s concision requirement or
    Local Rule 7.4’s page limit. But the district court accepted the first document,
    despite its noncompliance, because Local Rule 56 allows for a statement of material
    facts in response to a motion for summary judgment. The district court rejected the
    second filing because Rule 56 does not allow for a paragraph-by-paragraph rebuttal
    in addition to that statement of material facts. The district court also rejected the
    defendants’ rebuttal document for the same reason.
    West argues that the district court’s rejection of her rebuttal document was
    “the harshest of penalties” and “an overly aggressive reading of Local Rule 56.” But
    Local Rule 56 explicitly requires one “separate and concise statement of material
    facts” in response to a motion for summary judgment, not multiple filings exceeding
    Local Rule 7.4’s page limit. And the district court did consider West’s statement of
    material facts, which West concedes included all facts she believed to be in dispute.
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    Further, because both parties failed to “succinctly and accurately present the relevant
    issues,” the district court explicitly examined the entire record when ruling on the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment, not just the statements of fact and
    briefings. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by interpreting
    Local Rule 56 to require that West respond to the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment with only one succinct statement of material facts.
    C. The Equal Protection Clause Does Not Provide a Cause of Action for
    Retaliation and West Never Pleaded One Otherwise
    In Count I of the complaint, West alleged that “Defendants violated her rights
    to equal protection by taking adverse and retaliatory employment actions” against
    her. The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Equal
    Protection Clause does not establish a right to be free from retaliation. West
    responded by alleging retaliation under Title VII but without amending the
    complaint to include that claim. The district court granted summary judgment on her
    Title VII retaliation claim because she did not allege it in her complaint and on her
    Equal Protection Clause claim because the Equal Protection Clause does not provide
    a right to be free from retaliation. West argues that the district court erred by not
    interpreting the complaint to allege retaliation under each of her federal statutory
    claims.
    “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
    the same legal standards that controlled the district court’s decision.” Levinson v.
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    Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 
    245 F.3d 1321
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). Section 1981 and
    Title VII clearly establish a right to be free from retaliation; the Equal Protection
    Clause does not. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 
    553 U.S. 442
    , 457 (2008)
    (“42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation”); Watkins v. Bowden, 
    105 F.3d 1344
    , 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A pure or generic retaliation claim . . . simply
    does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause.”). “At the summary judgment stage,
    the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint
    in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A plaintiff may not amend her complaint
    through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates,
    McDonald & Co., 
    382 F.3d 1312
    , 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Shanahan v. City of
    Chicago, 
    82 F.3d 776
    , 781 (7th Cir. 1996))). And it is well established that this Court
    will not consider issues asserted for the first time on appeal. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.
    Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).
    West raised retaliation only in Count I of her complaint, alleging the
    defendants’ actions violated the Equal Protection Clause. Now, for the first time on
    appeal, she argues that she alleged retaliation under both Title VII and Section 1981
    by incorporating by reference all preceding paragraphs in the complaint for each of
    her federal statutory claims. Confoundingly, the only provision she now argues she
    did not raise retaliation under is the Equal Protection Clause, the lone provision
    referenced in Count I of her complaint.
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    We agree with the district court that West asserted only retaliation in violation
    of the Equal Protection Clause. She has now abandoned that Equal Protection
    retaliation claim; she cannot pursue a new claim under Title VII or Section 1981 that
    was not included in her complaint. She has identified no basis to reverse the district
    court’s judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment on West’s retaliation claim.
    D. West Failed to Identify a Valid Comparator or Plead a Mosaic Theory
    The heart of West’s complaint in the district court was her race discrimination
    claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which she alleged that the defendants
    violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause and Section 1981. This Court
    applies the same standards of proof and analytical framework to discrimination
    claims brought under either statute. Bryant v. Jones, 
    575 F.3d 1281
    , 1296 n.20 (11th
    Cir. 2009) (first quoting Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 
    520 F.3d 1149
    , 1170 (10th
    Cir. 2008) republished at Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 
    614 F.3d 1132
    (10th Cir.
    2008); and then citing Cross v. Alabama, 
    49 F.3d 1490
    , 1507–08 (11th Cir. 1995)).
    If a party is unable to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent, she must
    establish intentional race discrimination through either a “convincing mosaic” of
    circumstantial evidence or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
    framework. Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 
    918 F.3d 1213
    , 1220 n.6 (11th Cir.
    2019) (en banc).
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    West failed to rely on a mosaic theory in her complaint or response to the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We will not entertain that new argument
    on appeal. Accordingly, we consider only West’s arguments regarding the district
    court’s McDonnell Douglas analysis.
    1. Race Discrimination Claims Against Berry and Brophy
    Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a party must first establish a
    “prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that she belongs to a protected
    class, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that she was
    qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated ‘similarly
    situated’ employees outside her class more favorably.” 
    Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220
    –21
    (citing Holifield v. Reno, 
    115 F.3d 1555
    , 1561–62 (11th Cir. 1997)). To satisfy this
    fourth requirement, a party must first identify a specific, similarly situated employee,
    “in court-speak, a ‘comparator.’”
    Id. at 1217
    (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff.s v.
    Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 258–59 (1981)).
    We have recognized that identifying a comparator is often the most difficult
    part of the McDonnell Douglas framework and, therefore, do not require that the
    comparator be in an identical position to the complaining party. See
    id. at 1226.
    Rather, the comparator must be “similarly situated in all material respects.”
    Id. This standard “will
    turn not on formal labels, but rather on substantive likenesses,” such
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    as whether the two “have engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct),” and
    have a similar “employment or disciplinary history.”
    Id. at 1227.
    The district court reasoned that West’s race discrimination claims failed
    because, although she established the first three McDonnell Douglas requirements,
    she failed to identify a valid comparator. West argues that her former coworker,
    Tomlinson, is a valid comparator. The district court held that Tomlinson is not a
    valid comparator because the two employees’ employment and disciplinary histories
    are qualitatively different.
    Although the district court did not have the benefit of our decision in Lewis
    when it analyzed the comparator issue, the district court reached the correct bottom-
    line conclusion. West identifies some similarities between herself and Tomlinson.
    West and Tomlinson were both accountants reporting to Brophy. Tomlinson also
    had a similar run-in with Brophy: on one occasion, Tomlinson got into a heated
    argument with Brophy, crying and yelling at her for telling Tomlinson to move
    personnel files. But that is where their similarities end. The two women did not
    engage in the same basic conduct. West behaved insubordinately toward Brophy on
    several occasions. In an email about business cards, she accused Brophy of
    attempting to belittle her. During a meeting with other employees present, she
    accused Brophy of treating her like a slave. And, after that meeting, she wrote a
    disrespectful email about Brophy to Cohen.
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    West argues that this Court should ignore those instances because Brophy
    never explicitly called West “insubordinate” on those occasions. But that fact is
    irrelevant to the question of whether West and Tomlinson are “similarly situated in
    all material respects.” Because both the quality and quantity of West and
    Tomlinson’s interactions with Brophy differ, they are not. We affirm the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment as to West’s race discrimination claims against
    Berry and Brophy.
    2. Race Discrimination Claims Against the City
    West argues that she presented sufficient evidence to the district court that the
    City violated her rights under Section 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause by
    maintaining a policy that constituted deliberate indifference to her right to be free
    from race discrimination. For a local government entity to be liable under Section
    1983, there must have been a constitutional violation, a governmental custom or
    policy of deliberate indifference, and “the execution of [the] government’s policy or
    custom … [must have] inflict[ed] the injury;” liability will not stand for “an injury
    inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C.,
    
    436 U.S. 658
    , 694 (1978); see also McDowell v. Brown, 
    392 F.3d 1283
    , 1289 (11th
    Cir. 2004).
    West alleged that the City violated her constitutional rights by maintaining “a
    pattern and practice of unlawful racial discrimination.” But, as explained above,
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    West has failed to establish racial discrimination as a matter of law. Thus, West has
    not met the first element of her Section 1983 claim against the City: that her
    constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, we need not reach the questions of
    a custom of deliberate indifference or of causation. We affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment on West’s Section 1983 claim against the City.
    D. The District Court Properly Disposed of West’s Whistleblower Claim
    West argues that the district court mishandled her Georgia Whistleblower Act
    claim in two ways: first, by retaining jurisdiction over it, and second, by concluding
    that she had failed to disclose a violation of state law. The defendants first respond
    that retaining supplemental jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
    Second, the defendants argue that the conduct about which West complained to her
    supervisor did not constitute a violation of state law. We agree with the defendants.
    1. The District Court Properly Retained Supplemental Jurisdiction
    West filed the complaint in federal district court and asked that court to
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her Georgia Whistleblower Act claim under
    Section 1367. She does not argue that the district court improperly exercised that
    jurisdiction; all parties agree that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over
    West’s state law claim under Section 1367(a). And West never asked the district
    court to later reject that exercise of jurisdiction. Instead, West argues that the district
    court erred by retaining that jurisdiction and granting summary judgment on her
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    whistleblower claim rather than sua sponte dismissing the whistleblower claim so
    that she could bring it again in state court.
    The district court’s decision to either retain or reject jurisdiction over state law
    claims under Section 1367(c) is “purely discretionary” and “not a jurisdictional
    matter.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
    556 U.S. 635
    , 639–40 (2009)
    (collecting cases) (quoting 16 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 106.05[4],
    p. 106–27 (3d ed. 2009)). As such, we review a district court’s decision to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium
    Lab’ys, Inc., 
    803 F.3d 518
    , 532 (11th Cir. 2015). And “[t]he district court cannot
    abuse its discretion by failing to consider arguments that are not before it.” Smith v.
    Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 
    750 F.3d 1253
    , 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). Because West did not
    raise this issue before the district court, we believe she has waived it. See
    id. (citing Ramirez v.
    Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    686 F.3d 1239
    , 1249 (11th Cir. 2012)); cf.
    Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 
    114 F.3d 999
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe by Fein v.
    District of Columbia, 
    93 F.3d 861
    , 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Myers v. Cnty. of Lake,
    Ind., 
    30 F.3d 847
    , 850 (7th Cir. 1994).
    But even if West has not waived this argument, “a district court does not abuse
    its discretion when it has a range of choices and the court’s choice does not constitute
    a clear error of judgment.” Est. of Amergi ex. rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Auth., 
    611 F.3d 1350
    , 1365 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Section 1367(a) allows federal courts
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    with original jurisdiction over a claim to exercise “supplemental jurisdiction over all
    other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
    jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
    the United States Constitution.” Under Section 1367(c)(3), “district courts may
    decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . .
    . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
    The district court may likewise decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
    Section 1367(c)(4) “in exceptional circumstances” when “there are other compelling
    reasons for declining jurisdiction.”
    West does not identify which provision of Section 1367(c) she believes
    compelled the district court to reject supplemental jurisdiction over her
    whistleblower claim. Because the whistleblower claim does not raise a “novel or
    complex issue of State law” or “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims
    over which the district court has original jurisdiction,” (c)(1) and (c)(2) do not apply.
    Accordingly, we analyze whether the district court abused its discretion under (c)(3)
    and (c)(4).
    When a district court has discretion under Section 1367(c) to either retain or
    reject supplemental jurisdiction, it should consider the factors the Supreme Court
    announced in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 
    383 U.S. 715
    , 726 (1966):
    judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See 
    Ameritox, 803 F.3d at 537
    ;
    19
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    see also Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 
    22 F.3d 1559
    , 1569 (11th Cir.
    1994) (“while supplemental jurisdiction must be exercised in the absence of any of
    the four factors of section 1367(c), when one or more of these factors is present, the
    additional Gibbs considerations may, by their presence or absence, influence the
    court in its decision”). All four Gibbs factors weigh in favor of the district court
    retaining jurisdiction. West requested that the district court exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction over her state law claim. At the time of the summary judgment, the case
    had been pending in district court for nearly five years and both parties had briefed
    responses to the relatively simple question of state law: whether West disclosed a
    violation of state law, rule, or regulation as defined by the Act. Because judicial
    economy, convenience, fairness, and comity all weighed in favor of the district court
    retaining jurisdiction over West’s whistleblower claim, it did not abuse its discretion
    by doing so.
    2. West Did Not Disclose a Violation of State Law, Rule, or Regulation
    A party establishes a prima facie case under the Georgia Whistleblower Act
    by showing that (1) she works for a public employer; (2) she disclosed a violation
    of, or noncompliance with, a law, rule, or regulation to a supervisor or agency; (3)
    she experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) there is a causal relationship
    between that disclosure and the adverse employment action. Lamar v. Clayton Cnty.
    Sch. Dist., 605 F. App’x 804, 806 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Forrester v. Ga. Dep’t of
    20
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    Hum. Servs., 
    708 S.E.2d 660
    , 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)). It is undisputed that West
    worked for a public employer. West argues that she satisfied the second element by
    disclosing inadequate cash-control protocols to her supervisor. But she never
    contends that those protocols violate any law, rule, or regulation.
    Georgia courts have dismissed whistleblower claims in similar factual
    scenarios. See Coward v. MCG Health, Inc., 
    802 S.E.2d 396
    , 400 (Ga. Ct. App.
    2017); Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 
    689 S.E.2d 352
    , 357
    (Ga. Ct. App. 2009), disapproved in part on other grounds, Wolfe v. Bd. of Regents
    of the Univ. System of Ga., 
    794 S.E.2d 85
    (Ga. 2016). In Coward, two nurses alleged
    that they were terminated as retaliation for speaking out against 
    understaffing. 802 S.E.2d at 318
    . But the court held that one of the plaintiff’s complaints “identified
    only internal operating procedures . . . as the basis for her concerns,” not a violation
    of “any law, rule, or regulation.”
    Id. at 400.
    Thus, her complaints were not “the type
    of protected activity the Whistleblower Statute was intended to protect.”
    Id. at 400.
    Similarly, here West complained to her supervisor about lax internal cash-control
    protocols. Those protocols, or any violation of those protocols, did not constitute a
    violation of any law, rule, or regulation. And West did not allege otherwise.
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    Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate. We affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment on West’s whistleblower claim.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by partially granting the City’s
    motion for a protective order or refusing to consider West’s rebuttal to the
    defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. It did not err by concluding that West did
    not plead viable retaliation or race discrimination claims. And it properly retained
    jurisdiction over and granted summary judgment on her Georgia Whistleblower Act
    claim. Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.
    22