Cargo v. Alabama, Board of Pardons & Parole Division , 391 F. App'x 753 ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-14615                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUGUST 5, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 07-01065-CV-N
    ANN J. CARGO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    STATE OF ALABAMA,
    Board of Pardons and
    Parole Division,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (August 5, 2010)
    Before BARKETT, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff Ann Cargo appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    in favor of Defendant State of Alabama as to her complaint alleging a hostile work
    environment based on race, sex, and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
    Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in
    Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623. After review, we discern no error
    and affirm.
    Cargo’s argument on appeal is unclear. The argument section of her
    counseled appellate brief consists of: (1) the general legal standards concerning
    summary judgment and hostile work environment claims, (2) a large block quote
    containing factual allegations from her EEOC complaint, and (3) a conclusory
    statement that summary judgment should have been denied because the facts in the
    block quote were sufficient to create a triable issue if they were viewed in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff. Granting her brief a generous reading, it highlights
    her contention that summary judgment was improperly granted against her on her
    hostile work environment claim under Title VII to a degree that will we not deem
    that argument waived. That argument, however, was the only argument clearly
    raised and any further arguments are deemed abandoned.1
    1
    “[A] legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed
    abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). In order to properly raise an issue on appeal, the appellant must
    fully brief that issue in her appellate brief. 
    Id. The appellant
    must devote a discrete portion of
    2
    “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
    the record and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Fisher v.
    State Mut. Ins. Co., 
    290 F.3d 1256
    , 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment
    is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment
    as a matter of law. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 
    506 F.3d 1361
    , 1363 (11th
    Cir. 2007). “There is no genuine issue of material fact if the nonmoving party fails
    to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
    that party’s case and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
    Jones v. Gerwens, 
    874 F.2d 1534
    , 1538 (11th Cir. 1989). “A party opposing a
    properly submitted motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere
    allegations or denials of [her] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing
    that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Eberhardt v. Waters, 
    901 F.2d 1578
    , 1580
    (11th Cir. 1990) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual
    with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
    because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
    U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Although it does not specifically mention harassment,
    argumentation to that issue.” United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1283 n.8 (11th Cir.
    2003).
    3
    Title VII protects employees from being required “to work in a discriminatorily
    hostile or abusive environment.” Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 
    195 F.3d 1238
    , 1244
    (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A hostile work
    environment claim under Title VII is established upon proof that ‘the workplace is
    permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently
    severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create
    an abusive working environment.’” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 
    277 F.3d 1269
    , 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    ,
    21, 
    114 S. Ct. 367
    , 370 (1993)). “This court has repeatedly instructed that a
    plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work environment claim show: (1) that [s]he
    belongs to a protected group; (2) that [s]he has been subject to unwelcome
    harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a protected
    characteristic of the employee . . . ; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe
    or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
    discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is
    responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct
    liability.” 
    Id. In this
    case, Cargo has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as
    to at least the fourth element – whether any alleged harassment was sufficiently
    4
    severe or pervasive.2 “Establishing that harassing conduct was sufficiently severe
    or pervasive to alter an employee’s terms or conditions of employment includes a
    subjective and an objective component.” 
    Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246
    . “[T]he
    following four factors . . . should be considered in determining whether harassment
    objectively altered an employee’s terms or conditions of employment: (1) the
    frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct
    is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4)
    whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job
    performance.” 
    Id. Although Cargo’s
    brief is hardly clear on the point, she appears
    to point to several specific instances of harassing conduct: an incident wherein
    Cook allegedly lied to Cargo’s supervisor by claiming Cargo changed the office
    thermostat, an incident wherein Cook planned the going away party of one of
    Cargo’s subordinates, an incident wherein Cargo allegedly had to sit at a secondary
    table at an office lunch party, an incident wherein Cook complained that Cargo was
    not assigning vehicles correctly, an incident wherein Cook made an off-color
    2
    It is also likely that Cargo has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
    as to the third element – whether any alleged harassment was based on a protected characteristic.
    In the quotation from her EEOC complaint in her brief, Cargo alleges that Cook targeted her
    because she was “the person he had to discredit to get where he wanted to be professionally.”
    That statement and other evidence indicate that any animosity between Cargo and Cook was of a
    personal nature and was not based on a protected characteristic. In any event, we need not
    decide that issue because her failure to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the fourth
    element is sufficient to decide this case.
    5
    comment in front of Cargo for which he apologized later in the day, and an
    incident wherein Cook initiated disciplinary charges against her for not following
    proper procedure in disciplining another employee. All four factors point in favor
    of this conduct not being sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work
    environment claim. Five or six incidents over the course of three to four years is
    hardly frequent conduct. None of these incidents are severe. Instead they have the
    tenor of petty office squabbles. The only conduct that might be characterized as
    humiliating was the off-color comment about women made by Cook in front of
    another man. The comment, however, was in no way profane or derogatory.
    Moreover, Cook apologized to for the incident later that day. Finally, there is no
    indication that any of this conduct interfered with Cargo’s job performance. The
    record indicates that she continued to perform successfully in her desired position.
    Considering the four factors, Cargo has failed to point to evidence creating a
    genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered the severe or pervasive
    harassment required to support a hostile work environment claim.
    Because Cargo failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to one
    of the elements of her claim, the district court did not err in granting summary
    judgment in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court
    is affirmed.
    6
    AFFIRMED.3
    3
    Appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED.
    7