United States v. Aliet Hussein ( 2020 )


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  •          USCA11 Case: 19-14072       Date Filed: 11/10/2020   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-14072
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20942-RKA-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ALIET HUSSEIN,
    a.k.a. Aliet Pino Garcia,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 10, 2020)
    Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    USCA11 Case: 19-14072     Date Filed: 11/10/2020   Page: 2 of 10
    Aliet Hussein (“Hussein”) appeals the denial of her motion for specific
    performance of her plea agreement. Hussein argues that the government breached
    the plea agreement by advocating for a three-level aggravating role enhancement
    and opposing her motion for a downward variance. For the following reasons, we
    affirm.
    I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    From about February 2015 to December 2018, Hussein owned and operated
    Sky Pharmacy. Through Sky Pharmacy, Hussein engaged in a scheme in which she
    submitted, or caused the submission of, false Medicare Part D claims for
    prescriptions that were never filled. On December 6, 2018, the government charged
    Hussein with twelve counts of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347.
    On July 24, 2019, Hussein entered into a plea agreement with the government.
    Hussein agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, and the government
    agreed to dismiss the remaining counts after sentencing. Paragraph 7 of the plea
    agreement stated as follows:
    This Office and the defendant agree that, although not binding
    on the probation office or the Court, they will jointly recommend that
    the Court make the following findings and conclusions as to the
    sentence to be imposed:
    a.    Base Offense Level: the parties agree that the base offense
    level applicable to the defendant’s conduct is level six (6) pursuant to
    Sentencing Guidelines §2B1.1(a)(2).
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    b.    Intended Loss: the parties agree that the defendant’s
    participation in the offense caused an intended loss to Medicare
    exceeding $1.5 million but not exceeding $3.5 million, resulting in a
    sixteen (16) level enhancement pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines
    §2B1.1(b)(1)(I).
    c.    Federal Health Care Program: the parties agree that the
    defendant’s offense of conviction is a Federal health care offense
    involving a Government health care program, and the loss to the
    Government health care program exceeds $1 million but does not
    exceed $7 million, resulting in a two (2) level enhancement under
    Sentencing Guidelines §2B1.1(b)(7).
    Then Defendant remains free to advocate for or against any other
    sentencing adjustments under the guidelines, and to argue for
    sentencing variances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
    (emphasis in original). The government further agreed to recommend, under certain
    conditions, a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), an additional one-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1(b) if the offense level at the time of sentencing was sixteen or greater, and
    “that the Defendant receive a sentence at the low-end of the sentencing guidelines,
    as those guidelines are calculated by Probation.”
    In Paragraph 5 of the plea agreement, the government reserved its rights as
    follows:
    This Office reserves the right to inform the Court and the
    probation office of all facts pertinent to the sentencing process,
    including all relevant information concerning the offenses committed,
    whether charged or not, as well as concerning the defendant and the
    defendant’s background. Subject only to the express terms of any
    agreed-upon sentencing recommendations contained in this agreement,
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    this Office further reserves the right to make any recommendation as to
    the quality and quantity of punishment.
    The plea agreement included a warning that:
    [A]ny estimate of the probable sentencing range or sentence that the
    defendant may receive, whether that estimate comes from the
    defendant’s attorney, this Office, or the probation office is a prediction,
    not a promise, and is not binding on this Office, the probation office or
    the Court. The defendant understands further that any recommendation
    that this Office makes to the Court as to sentencing, whether pursuant
    to this agreement or otherwise, is not binding on the Court and the Court
    may disregard the recommendation in its entirety.
    Finally, the plea agreement included an integration clause, stating: “This is the entire
    agreement and understanding between this Office and the defendant. There are no
    other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings.”
    The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) mostly accorded with the plea
    agreement. Applying the 2018 Sentencing Guidelines, the PSI set the base offense
    level at six. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2). The PSI also recommended a sixteen-level
    enhancement because the loss amount was between $1.5 million and $3.5 million
    and a two-level enhancement because the conviction involved a loss of greater than
    $1 million to a federal health care program. See
    id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), (b)(7)(A).
    The
    PSI further recommended a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
    See
    id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b). The
    PSI departed from the plea agreement, however, in
    recommending a three-level enhancement because “the defendant was a manager or
    supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) of a criminal activity that was otherwise
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    extensive.” See
    id. § 3B1.1(b). The
    PSI calculated a total offense level of twenty-
    four. With a criminal history category of I, the recommended guideline range was
    fifty-one to sixty-three months of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table,
    ch. 5, pt. A. Had the PSI not applied the three-level role enhancement, the total
    offense level would have been twenty-one and the guideline range would have been
    thirty-seven to forty-six months’ imprisonment. See
    id. The statutory maximum
    sentence was ten years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a).
    Hussein filed objections to the PSI, specifically objecting to the three-level
    role enhancement. She also moved for a downward variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553. The government responded that the role enhancement was appropriate and
    opposed a downward variance. Hussein then moved for specific performance,
    arguing that the government had violated the plea agreement by advocating for the
    role enhancement and opposing a downward variance. Hussein argued that, because
    Paragraph 7 of the plea agreement specified that the defendant was free to advocate
    for or against additional sentencing adjustments, it unambiguously precluded the
    government from advocating for sentencing enhancements beyond those agreed to
    as part of the plea. She also attached email correspondence between herself and the
    government stating that “[i]f the Defendant goes to trial, we will seek enhancements
    for role.” Finally, Hussein argued that the plea agreement’s statement that she was
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    free to argue for a downward variance created the “‘reasonable understanding’ that
    the Government would not oppose her motion for a variance.”
    The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 4, 2019.
    Looking specifically at Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 7, the district court found “that
    the most reasonable reading of the plea agreement is that the plea agreement is
    unambiguous in allowing either the government or probation, or both, to seek
    enhancements, allowing [Hussein] to seek reductions, and, of course, allowing
    [Hussein] to oppose those enhancements, if they are advocating for those
    enhancements.” The district court, therefore, concluded that the government did not
    breach the plea agreement by advocating for a role enhancement and opposing a
    downward variance.
    Next, the district court addressed the merits of the three-level role
    enhancement. The court sustained in part and overruled in part Hussein’s objection,
    finding that she was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of criminal activity,
    but that the government had not met its burden to prove that the criminal activity
    was “otherwise extensive.” The court therefore imposed a two-level enhancement
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), rather than the three-level enhancement
    recommended in the PSI. This resulted in an offense level of 23 and a guideline
    range of forty-six to fifty-seven months of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing
    Table, ch. 5, pt. A. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government advocated for a
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    sentence of forty-six months, the low end of the range. The government also
    reiterated its opposition to a downward variance. Hussein argued in favor of a
    downward variance, requesting house arrest. She called two witnesses in support of
    her argument and testified on her own behalf. The court denied the downward
    variance and sentenced Hussein to forty-six months of imprisonment, as well as
    restitution of $1,884,867.09, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special
    assessment. This appeal ensued.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “We review de novo whether the government breached a plea agreement.”
    United States v. Thomas, 
    487 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (11th Cir. 2007).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of
    the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
    such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 262 (1971).
    Plea agreements are typically interpreted using contract interpretation tools. United
    States v. Jeffries, 
    908 F.2d 1520
    , 1523 (11th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the
    government breached a plea agreement, we must first ascertain the scope of the
    government’s promises. United States v. Copeland, 
    381 F.3d 1101
    , 1105 (11th Cir.
    2004). “The district court’s factual findings on the scope of the agreement will be
    set aside only if they are clearly erroneous.”
    Id. 7
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    Hussein contends that the plea agreement prohibited the government from
    advocating for a role enhancement or opposing a downward variance. In Paragraph
    5 of the plea agreement, the government plainly reserved its rights to “inform the
    Court and the probation office of all facts pertinent to the sentencing process” and
    to “make any recommendation as to the quality and quantity of punishment.” The
    government did just that when it advocated for a role enhancement and opposed a
    downward variance. This reservation of rights was “[s]ubject only to the express
    terms of any agreed-upon sentencing recommendations contained in th[e]
    agreement.” Hussein argues that this language means that the government was not
    authorized to make recommendations beyond those expressly agreed to in the plea.
    But a plain reading of this language indicates that the government could not
    contradict the express terms of the plea. On matters where the plea agreement was
    silent, including a role enhancement and downward variance, the government was
    free to “make any recommendation as to the quality and quantity of punishment.”
    Cf. 
    Raulerson, 901 F.2d at 1012
    (“Raulerson failed to negotiate for or failed to obtain
    the government’s silence at his sentencing hearings; thus, we hold that the
    government did not breach its agreement regarding standing mute.”).
    Hussein argues that Paragraph 5 conflicts with Paragraph 7 and that because
    Paragraph 7 is more specific, it should control. See United States v. Pielago, 
    135 F.3d 703
    , 710 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When two contract terms conflict, the specific term
    8
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    controls over the general one.”). Hussein further argues that because Paragraph 7
    gave her, and not the government, the right to advocate for sentencing adjustments
    and variances, the government’s right to advocate beyond the terms of the agreement
    was limited through omission. We conclude, however, that the two paragraphs are
    not in conflict but rather, they complement each other. Paragraph 7 lays out specific
    terms of the plea agreement and reserves Hussein’s rights, while Paragraph 5
    reserves the government’s rights. Reading both paragraphs together, it is clear that
    the government and Hussein were jointly bound to make the recommendations listed
    in Paragraph 7, Hussein was “free to advocate for . . . any other sentencing
    adjustments,” and the government reserved its rights to “make any recommendation
    as to the quality and quantity of punishment,” which Hussein was “free to advocate
    . . . against.” Likewise, although Paragraph 7 made clear that Hussein was “free . . .
    to argue for sentencing variances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” the plea agreement
    neither made a promise nor contained any language precluding the government from
    opposing the request for a sentence variance.
    We find this Court’s decisions in United States v. Boatner, 
    966 F.2d 1575
    (11th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Taylor, 
    77 F.3d 368
    (11th Cir. 1996),
    instructive regarding the type of inconsistent statements at sentencing that could
    constitute a breach of the plea agreement by the government. In Boatner, the
    government “provid[ed] information to the court in the presentence investigation
    9
    USCA11 Case: 19-14072       Date Filed: 11/10/2020    Page: 10 of 10
    report which contradicted a factual stipulation with the 
    defendant.” 966 F.2d at 1576
    . In Taylor, the government “promise[d] to recommend a ten-year sentence”
    but then “[a]dvoca[ted] [for] a position requiring a greater 
    sentence.” 77 F.3d at 370
    .
    Here, in contrast, there was no contrary statement of fact, nor did the plea
    agreement promise that the government would recommend a particular sentence.
    Rather, in the plea agreement, the government promised that it would make five
    discrete recommendations: (1) a base offense level of six; (2) a sixteen-level loss
    amount enhancement; (3) a two-level federal health care offense enhancement; (4) a
    three-level acceptance of responsibility reduction, subject to certain conditions; and
    (5) a sentence on the low end of the guideline range. The record shows that the
    government made each of the five promised recommendations.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    Because we find that the terms of the plea agreement were unambiguous, and
    that the government did not breach those terms, we affirm the district court’s denial
    of Hussein’s motion for specific performance.
    AFFIRMED.
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