Thai Meditation Association of Alabama, Inc. v. City of Mobile, Alabama ( 2020 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-12418
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00395-TFM-MU
THAI MEDITATION ASSOCIATION OF ALABAMA, INC.,
SIVAPORN NIMITYONGSKUL,
VARIN NIMITYONGSKUL,
SERENA NIMITYONGSKUL,
PRASIT NIMITYONGSKUL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(November 16, 2020)
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Before NEWSOM and BRANCH, Circuit Judges, and RAY,* District Judge.
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
Four individuals who incorporated the Thai Meditation Association of
Alabama, Inc., applied for zoning permits to construct a Buddhist meditation and
retreat center in a residential area of Mobile. Following expressions of intense
public opposition, the City denied the applications. The Association and its
incorporators sued, alleging violations of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection
Clauses of the United States Constitution, several provisions of the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Alabama Constitution,
and state common-law principles. The district court rejected all of the plaintiffs’
claims.
Because we conclude that the district court erred in its analysis of the
plaintiffs’ claims under the Free Exercise Clause, RLUIPA’s substantial-burden
provision, and the Alabama Constitution, we vacate in part and remand for further
proceedings. We affirm the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ remaining
claims.
*
Honorable William M. Ray II, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia,
sitting by designation.
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I
A
Mobile’s zoning ordinance divides the city into 15 different types of
districts, specifying for each the uses permitted “by right” and those requiring
“planning approval.” A “church or religious facility” is permitted by right in all
business districts but needs planning approval to locate in a residential district.
Accordingly, before locating in a residential district, a church or religious facility
must obtain permission from the City’s Planning Commission, which is tasked
with determining whether the facility would be appropriate to the area.
Thai Meditation Association is an organization affiliated with the
Dhammakaya school of Buddhism, a sect of Theravada Buddhism headquartered
in Thailand. The Association’s purpose is “teaching and research into growth and
development of mind and spirit through meditation” and “expand[ing] the
knowledge of Buddhism.” Its adherents engage in prayer, meditation, various
religious ceremonies, and lectures. The Association hosts weekly meditation
classes that include discussions of Buddhist scriptures and morality.
The Association began operating in 2007 out of a home in Mobile. When a
neighbor complained that a meditation center wasn’t permitted by right in a
residential zone, the plaintiffs applied for the necessary planning approval. After
encountering stiff community opposition, though, the Planning Commission
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recommended denial of the plaintiffs’ request. In 2009, the Association relocated
to a shopping center in a business district where it didn’t need special zoning
permission. The move, though, brought difficulties. The plaintiffs contend that
the shopping-center location impedes their religious exercise in several ways—
among others, they say, the traffic noise from the busy street interferes with
meditation, the building is too small to accommodate classes and lectures, and the
facility provides no place to host visiting monks for overnight retreats.
In an effort to alleviate these difficulties, the plaintiffs searched for another
property on which to build a properly equipped meditation center. In 2015, they
located—and ultimately purchased—a 6.72-acre property on Eloong Drive. Like
their original location, the Eloong Drive property is in a residential district—
meaning that the plaintiffs needed planning approval before they could begin
construction.1 Accordingly, after purchasing the parcel—and the 5,000-square-
foot home situated on it—the plaintiffs submitted planning-approval applications
to construct a 2,400-square-foot meditation building, a 2,000-square-foot cottage to
1
Before purchasing the Eloong Drive property, the plaintiffs attended a predevelopment meeting
with their attorney and two city planners to discuss the possibility of relocating the meditation
center. The meeting’s purpose was to enable the City to gather information about proposed uses
of the property and to educate the plaintiffs about the process for obtaining any necessary
approvals. As relevant to this appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the city planners told them during
the meeting that the meditation center would be treated as a religious facility for zoning
purposes. The City disagrees and further emphasizes that although the plaintiffs originally made
their purchase of the Eloong Drive property contingent on a determination that they had a right to
construct a meditation building and guest houses for monks, they removed these contingencies
before closing the sale.
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host visiting monks, a 600-square-foot restroom facility, and associated parking.
When the plaintiffs’ applications went before the Planning Commission, they were
met with strong community opposition. Some opponents emphasized traffic and
environmental concerns. Others were (to put it charitably) less charitable. During
one community meeting, for instance, attendees were “screaming and yelling,” “a
man was crying, saying that he was Christian [and that] this is unacceptable,” and
local residents said things like “We don’t want Buddhism” and “This is not a
church, this is a Buddhist temple, and we don’t need that.”
Residents separately questioned whether the plaintiffs’ proposed use of the
property was even religious—or whether, in fact, it envisioned a commercial
venture (similar to a yoga studio) that would be prohibited in a residential district.
The uncertainty surrounding the religious status of the Association’s operations
resulted, at least in part, from the Association’s sometime description of itself (in
promotional materials and elsewhere) as a “non-religious” organization. The
plaintiffs explain that, in context, the “non-religious” descriptor meant only that the
Association is “open to all” and “does not require rejection of the particular theistic
concepts that are central to Judeo-Christian notions of what is meant by ‘religion.’”
In any event, the Association’s religious-ness was questioned throughout the
zoning-application process, and the plaintiffs were required to submit
documentation to verify the Association’s religious bona fides—which, they say,
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the City had never required of a church. In the end, though, when the Planning
Commission ultimately considered the plaintiffs’ applications, it was urged to, and
seemingly did, apply the zoning standards pertinent to “church[es] or religious
facilit[ies].”
Citing concerns about site access, traffic, and compatibility with the
neighborhood, the Planning Commission unanimously denied the plaintiffs’
applications. The plaintiffs appealed to the City Council, which upheld the
Planning Commission’s decision following extensive discussion of both the
Association’s religious status and its neighborhood compatibility.
B
The plaintiffs subsequently filed this lawsuit in federal court, alleging that
the City’s denial of their applications violated (1) RLUIPA’s substantial-burden
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); (2) RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination provision,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2); (3) RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc(b)(1)2; (4) the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause; (5) the Fourteenth
2
The plaintiffs originally brought the three RLUIPA claims as both facial and as-applied
challenges, but the district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss the facial components of
those counts, so all that remains on appeal are the as-applied aspects of the RLUIPA claims.
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause; (6) the Alabama Constitution; and (7)
common-law principles forbidding negligent misrepresentations.
The parties filed dueling summary-judgment motions. The district court
granted the City’s motion with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA’s
substantial-burden and equal-terms provisions, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
Alabama Constitution. Following a bench trial, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination provision, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the common law.
This is the plaintiffs’ appeal.3
II
On appeal, the plaintiffs contest each of the district court’s adverse rulings.
In particular, they contend that the district court erred in the following ways: (1)
holding that the City’s actions didn’t substantially burden their religious exercise in
3
We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standards used by the district court.” Seff v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 691 F.3d 1221, 1222 (11th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). “In deciding whether a material disputed fact precludes summary
judgment, a court generally must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment.” Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. Fla. Nat’l Univ.,
Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court’s findings regarding discriminatory intent—for purposes of the
plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination provision and the Equal Protection
Clause—are governed by the deferential clear-error standard. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 290 (1982); Stout by Stout v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988, 1006
(11th Cir. 2018). The court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ negligent-misrepresentation claim is
subject to clear-error review to the extent it turns on factual findings and de novo review to the
extent it turns on conclusions of law. See Renteria-Marin v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 537 F.3d
1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
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violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause—specifically, they say, by
misapplying the standard for determining what constitutes a “substantial burden”;
(2) concluding that the plaintiffs failed to offer a similarly situated “comparator,”
necessary to their RLUIPA-based equal-terms claim; (3) misapplying the factors
relevant to determining whether the City acted with discriminatory intent, as
required for their claims under RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination provision and the
Equal Protection Clause; (4) misinterpreting the Alabama Constitution—in
particular, the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment—to require that a burden
on religious exercise be “substantial” despite that term’s absence from the
provision’s text; and (5) misapplying Alabama law in rejecting their negligent-
misrepresentation claim.
We will first address the plaintiffs’ federal-law claims, and then turn our
attention to those arising under state law.
A
Among the plaintiffs’ federal claims, the parties focus principally on those
arising under RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision and the Free Exercise
Clause. We will begin there, as well.
1
a
RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision states as follows:
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No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution—(A) is in furtherance of a compelling
interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The parties here agree that our decision in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004), sets out the governing standard for
determining whether government action constitutes a “substantial burden” within
the meaning of § 2000cc(a)(1). 4 They disagree vigorously, however, about how to
read Midrash and whether the district court properly applied it here.
Before jumping into the meat of the substantial-burden issue, a threshold
question: Are the plaintiffs here engaged in “religious exercise” within the
meaning of RLUIPA? We think it clear that they are. Under the statute, “the term
4
Happily for us, the parties also agree (on appeal, anyway) that one of RLUIPA’s jurisdictional
“hooks” is satisfied—in particular, that the alleged burden here was “imposed in the
implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a
government makes . . . individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property
involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). The City regulates land use through its zoning
ordinance, which, as explained, allows churches and religious facilities in business districts “by
right” but requires “planning approval” to locate in certain residential districts, such as the one at
issue here. The planning-approval process requires the City to determine whether a proposed use
is appropriate to a particular district by examining an applicant’s specific proposal—i.e., by
considering, among other things, transportation, traffic, parking, access, public utilities, and
facilities. These planning-approval standards ultimately result in a case-by-case evaluation of
each applicant’s proposal—in the statute’s words, an “individualized assessment[] of the
proposed uses for the property involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
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‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Even
more closely on point here, RLUIPA expressly defines “[t]he use, building, or
conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise” to constitute
“religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property
for that purpose.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). We thus have no difficulty
agreeing with the district court that the plaintiffs’ “building a center with the
alleged purpose of teaching Dhammakaya meditation falls squarely within
RLUIPA’s definition of ‘religious exercise.’”
So then, on to the main event: Did the City’s denial of the plaintiffs’ zoning
applications impose a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise as that term
is used in RLUIPA and explained in Midrash? Well, maybe. What we know for
certain is that in holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a substantial
burden, the district court misapplied the standard that we established in Midrash.
Rather than forging ahead to answer the substantial-burden question ourselves in
the first instance, we will correct the district court’s error and remand for a fresh
determination under the proper standard. Let us explain.
In Midrash, we held that a zoning ordinance excluding churches and
synagogues from a business district that allowed private clubs and lodges didn’t
violate RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision. 366 F.3d at 1228. The two
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synagogues involved in that case argued that because Orthodox Judaism forbids
adherents to use cars or other means of transportation during the weekly Sabbath,
requiring the synagogues to relocate to a permitted district would put them “out of
the required walking range for a significant number of their members, particularly
elderly ones,” and thus substantially burden their religious exercise. Id. at 1221.
We disagreed. “While walking may be burdensome and ‘walking farther’ may be
even more so,” we held, “we cannot say that walking a few extra blocks is
‘substantial,’ as that term is used in RLUIPA.” Id. at 1228.
More important than our specific holding in Midrash—at least for purposes
of our decision today—was the way we explained the term “substantial burden.”
In doing so, we made several important observations. First, we emphasized that
because RLUIPA doesn’t define “substantial burden,” it must be given “its
ordinary or natural meaning.” Id. at 1226. Second, we said that preexisting Free
Exercise Clause precedent is “instructive in determining what Congress understood
‘substantial burden’ to mean in RLUIPA.” Id. On the one hand, we noted that we
had previously held “that an individual’s exercise of religion is ‘substantially
burdened’ if a regulation completely prevents the individual from engaging in
religiously mandated activity, or if the regulation requires participation in an
activity prohibited by religion.” Id. at 1227 (citing Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1522 (11th Cir. 1995)). On the other hand, we clarified that a substantial burden
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“requires something more than an incidental effect on religious exercise.” Id.
Looking to “[t]he combined import of these articulations,” we concluded that “a
‘substantial burden’ must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise,”
that “a ‘substantial burden’ is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces
the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly,” and that “a
substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego
religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct.” Id.
The plaintiffs in this case contend that the City’s denial of their zoning
applications substantially burdens their religious exercise because, they say, at the
Association’s current location, the traffic noise interferes with meditation, the
building is too small to accommodate classes and lectures, and there is no place to
host visiting monks for overnight retreats. The district court rejected the plaintiffs’
contention. In so doing, though, the court misread Midrash and thus misapplied
RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision.
Quoting one passage from Midrash, the district court observed that, “an
individual’s exercise of religion is ‘substantially burdened’ if a regulation
completely prevents the individual from engaging in religiously mandated activity
or if the regulation requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion.”
Dist. Ct. Order at 24 (quoting Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227). Then, after analyzing
both parties’ arguments, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
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meet “the binding Eleventh Circuit[] standard”—which, echoing another Midrash
passage, the court described as “whether Defendant has imposed pressure so
significant as to require Plaintiffs to forego their religious beliefs.” Id. at 36.
We see two problems. First, the district court’s articulation of the
substantial-burden standard—that, to qualify, a regulation must “completely
prevent[]” religious activity or “tend[] to force adherents to forego religious
precepts”—defies the “ordinary [and] natural meaning” of the term “substantial.”
Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1226. Whatever “substantial” means, it most assuredly does
not mean complete, total, or insuperable. See Roman Catholic Bishop of
Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 96 (1st Cir. 2013) (observing that
“[a] burden does not need to be disabling to be substantial”); Westchester Day Sch.
v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “a
burden need not be found insuperable to be held substantial”).
Second, the district court misread our opinion in Midrash. We didn’t say
there that to count as a “substantial burden” government conduct must “completely
prevent[]” religious exercise. Nor did we say (as the district court here
paraphrased) that government conduct must “impose[] pressure so significant as to
require Plaintiffs to forego their religious beliefs.” To be sure, the “completely
prevents” and “force . . . to forego” passages that the district court invoked appear
in the Midrash opinion. But they appear only as examples of the sort of conduct
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that clearly satisfies the substantial-burden standard—not as the standard itself. In
the course of fleshing out the substantial-burden standard, we described bookend
examples of conduct that plainly would and wouldn’t meet it. At one end of the
spectrum, we explained that a mere “incidental effect” or “inconvenience” on
religious exercise doesn’t constitute a substantial burden. 366 F.3d at 1227. At the
other end, we said that “a substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to
force adherents to forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates
religious conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). This latter form of conduct, our decision
made clear, is sufficient to demonstrate a substantial burden—but it is not, contrary
to the district court’s assumption here, necessary. The same holds for Midrash’s
“completely prevents” passage: All we said there—unremarkably—was that “[w]e
have held that an individual’s exercise of religion is ‘substantially burdened’ if a
regulation completely prevents the individual from engaging in religiously
mandated activity . . . .” Id. Again, a sufficient—but not necessary—basis for
demonstrating a substantial burden. Id.
The closest Midrash came to articulating a necessary condition—a baseline
standard—was its observation that “a ‘substantial burden’ is akin to significant
pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her
behavior . . . .” Id. And indeed, other circuits considering RLUIPA’s substantial-
burden provision have invoked Midrash in holding that a substantial burden exists
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when government action coerces or pressures religious adherents to “change [their]
behavior,” even if that coercion or pressure isn’t so extreme as to require them to
forgo their beliefs completely. Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 349 (defining
substantial burden as “government action that directly coerces the religious
institution to change its behavior, rather than government action that forces the
religious entity to choose between religious precepts and government benefits”)
(emphasis added) (citing Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227); see also Bethel World
Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 556 (4th Cir.
2013) (explaining that “a plaintiff can succeed on a substantial burden claim by
establishing that a government regulation puts substantial pressure on it to modify
its behavior”) (emphasis added) (citing Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227).
To summarize, then, the district court here just latched onto the wrong
language in Midrash. Under our decision there, “a ‘substantial burden’ is akin to
significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or
her behavior . . . .” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. The “completely prevents” and
“force . . . to forego” passages simply describe conduct that would (unlike an
“incidental effect” or mere “inconvenience”) suffice to demonstrate a substantial
burden. Accordingly, it isn’t necessary for a plaintiff to prove—as the district
court here seemed to assume—that the government required her to completely
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surrender her religious beliefs; modified behavior, if the result of government
coercion or pressure, can be enough.
Rather than apply Midrash’s proper standard to the plaintiffs’ substantial-
burden claim ourselves, we will vacate and remand for the district court to do so in
the first instance. In determining whether the City’s denial of the plaintiffs’ zoning
applications was “akin to significant pressure which directly coerce[d the
plaintiffs] to conform [their] behavior,” the district court should consider, among
others, the following factors:
• whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine need for new or more
space—for instance, to accommodate a growing congregation5 or to
facilitate additional services or programming 6;
• the extent to which the City’s decision, and the application of its zoning
policy more generally, effectively deprives the plaintiffs of any viable
means by which to engage in protected religious exercise7;
5
See Bethel World Outreach, 706 F.3d at 558 (finding a substantial burden where insufficient
space to accommodate a large congregation caused the church to have multiple, shorter services,
thereby interfering with Communion and cutting short the church’s “Altar Call” practice); see
also Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895,
898–901 (7th Cir. 2005); Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d
1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011); Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist.
Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 188–90 (2d Cir. 2014).
6
See, e.g., Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore Cty., 915 F.3d 256, 261 (4th
Cir. 2019) (observing that a burden is “usually” substantial where “where use of the property
would serve an unmet religious need”), see also Bethel World Outreach, 706 F.3d at 552, 558
(providing educational programs and counseling at a church); Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at
347–48, 352 (expanding the offerings at a religious school).
7
See, e.g., Bethel World Outreach, 706 F.3d at 557–58 (observing that a substantial burden may
exist “even though other suitable properties might be available, because the ‘delay, uncertainty,
and expense’ of selling the current property and finding a new one are themselves burdensome”
(quoting Sts. Constantine & Helen, 396 F.3d at 899–901); Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352
(considering whether the applicant has “quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives . . .
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• whether there is a meaningful “nexus” between the allegedly coerced or
impeded conduct and the plaintiffs’ religious exercise8;
• whether the City’s decisionmaking process concerning the plaintiffs’
applications reflects any arbitrariness of the sort that might evince animus
or otherwise suggests that the plaintiffs have been, are being, or will be
(to use a technical term of art) jerked around 9;
• whether the City’s denial of the plaintiffs’ zoning applications was final
or whether, instead, the plaintiffs had (or have) an opportunity to submit
modified applications that might satisfy the City’s objections 10; and
• whether the alleged burden is properly attributable to the government (as
where, for instance, a plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of using its
property for religious exercise 11) or whether the burden is instead self-
imposed (as where the plaintiff had no such expectation or demonstrated
an unwillingness to modify its proposal in order to comply with
applicable zoning requirements12).
to meet its religious needs absent its obtaining the construction permit”).
8
See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 349 (“There must exist a close nexus between the
coerced or impeded conduct and the institution’s religious exercise for such conduct to be a
substantial burden on that religious exercise.”).
9
See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352 (emphasizing that a zoning board’s
decisionmaking was characterized by “an arbitrary blindness to the facts”); Roman Catholic
Bishop of Springfield, 724 F.3d at 96–97 (observing that evidence that “regulators disregard[ed]
objective criteria and instead act[ed] adversely to a religious organization based on the objections
of a ‘small but influential’ group in the community” counsels in favor of finding a substantial
burden (quoting Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 346)).
10
See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 349 (“[W]hether the denial of the application was
absolute is important; if there is a reasonable opportunity for the institution to submit a modified
application, the denial does not place substantial pressure on [a plaintiff] to change its
behavior.”); see also Bethel World Outreach, 706 F.3d at 558 (emphasizing that whether the
denial is conditional or absolute is a factor to consider in the substantial-burden analysis).
11
See, e.g., Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, 915 F.3d at 261; Bethel World Outreach, 706
F.3d at 557.
12
See, e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 989–990 (9th
Cir. 2006); see also Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, Va., 813 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir.
2016); Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 1004 (6th Cir. 2017);
Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007).
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If, based on such considerations, the district court concludes that the
plaintiffs have demonstrated that the City’s zoning decisions substantially
burdened their religious exercise, it must then proceed to determine whether the
City’s conduct satisfies strict scrutiny. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). It would be
premature for us to consider that issue now.
b
The plaintiffs also (and relatedly) contend that the City’s denial of their
zoning applications violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. That
Clause—which applies to states and localities through the Fourteenth
Amendment—provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause claim on
summary judgment. Rather, though, than independently evaluating the free-
exercise issue, the court simply cross-referenced its analysis of the plaintiffs’
substantial-burden claim under RLUIPA, concluding (1) that “the burdens
Plaintiffs experience are nothing more than inconveniences incidental to [the
City’s] denial of their [a]pplications,” and (2) that the City’s denial “does not
restrict Plaintiffs’ current religious practice but, rather, prevents a change in their
religious practice.” Because the district court expressly tethered its rejection of the
plaintiffs’ claim under the Free Exercise Clause to its treatment of their substantial-
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burden claim under RLUIPA, we will vacate and remand the free-exercise claim
for reconsideration alongside the substantial-burden claim.
2
The plaintiffs separately argue that the City’s rejection of their applications
violated RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision, which states that “[n]o government
shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). To be sure, Mobile’s zoning ordinance
doesn’t single out churches and religious organizations for unfavorable treatment;
rather, it lumps them in with other non-religious entities in requiring planning
approval for projects in residential districts. Nonetheless, we have held that even
“a truly neutral statute” can violate RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision if, as relevant
here, it “is selectively enforced against religious, as opposed to nonreligious,
assemblies or institutions.” Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc.
v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). In order to prove an as-
applied equal-terms claim, a plaintiff “must present evidence that a similarly
situated nonreligious comparator received differential treatment under the
challenged regulation.” Id. at 1311 (emphasis omitted). “If a plaintiff offers no
similarly situated comparator, then there can be no cognizable evidence of less
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than equal treatment, and the plaintiff has failed to meet its initial burden of proof.”
Id.
Here, in an argument that can most charitably be described as summary—
occupying as it does only a single paragraph in their opening brief—the plaintiffs
assert that they were treated less favorably than The Alba Fishing and Hunting
Club, which they assert is a valid comparator.
Even though Alba is located in the same basic vicinity as the plaintiffs’
Eloong Drive property, the district court rejected it as a valid comparator for two
reasons. First, the court explained that unlike the plaintiffs here, Alba “was not
seeking to put its property to a new use” but, rather, sought permission to expand
its long-time use of the same parcel as a recreational club. In particular, Alba
sought planning approval “to allow the expansion of an existing recreation club,”
to replace a portion of its clubhouse damaged by Hurricane Katrina, and to add a
meeting hall to the site. Second, and relatedly, the court emphasized that Alba was
not a new entrant into the neighborhood but, rather, “ha[d] been associated with
[its current] location since 1921, before the area was incorporated into the City of
Mobile.”
We agree with the district court that those two features suffice to distinguish
Alba for comparator purposes. Although both Alba and the plaintiffs here sought
planning approval for special use in a single-family residential district, they did so
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for different reasons—Alba to repair and expand an existing club, and the plaintiffs
here to construct an entirely new facility. It seems to us clear that repairing and
expanding an existing facility differs from building an entirely new structure on
(and introducing an entirely new use of) a piece of property: In the former
situation, the applicant has a reasonable expectation that its preexisting use was—
and remains—acceptable to and harmonious with the surrounding area, whereas
the applicant in the latter situation does not. That is especially true here, where
Alba’s ownership and use of its property dates to a time before it was incorporated
into Mobile, and thus necessarily to a time when it wasn’t even subject to the
presently prevailing zoning restrictions. See Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty.,
Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 196–98 (2d Cir. 2014)
(concluding that a library was not a proper comparator for religious organization’s
RLUIPA equal-terms claim in part because its expansion was approved 50 years
earlier “pursuant to a different land use regime”).
Because of these material distinctions between the two organizations, the
plaintiffs have shown only that they “received different treatment, not unequal
treatment,” which isn’t enough. Primera, 450 F.3d at 1313. We therefore affirm
the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ equal-terms claim.
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3
Rounding out their federal claims, the plaintiffs contend that the City
discriminated against them on the basis of religion in violation of RLUIPA’s
nondiscrimination provision and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. The former states that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of
religion or religious denomination,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2), and the latter
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The district court allowed the plaintiffs’ nondiscrimination and equal-
protection claims to proceed beyond summary judgment but ultimately rejected
both following a bench trial. In so doing, the court analyzed the two claims
together, reasoning that the governing legal standards are “nearly identical.” As
relevant here, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs hadn’t demonstrated—
based on the factors set out in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)—that the City officials who had
rejected their applications were motivated by discriminatory intent.13
13
The district court separately held that the plaintiffs had failed to identify a similarly situated
religious institution to serve as a comparator for their RLUIPA-based nondiscrimination claim.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that RLUIPA doesn’t require a comparator for
nondiscrimination claims. We needn’t address that issue, because even if we were to assume
that a comparator isn’t required, we would affirm the rejection of the plaintiffs’
nondiscrimination and equal-protection claims on the ground, explained in text, that they haven’t
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The plaintiffs agree that “[d]iscriminatory intent must be proven for both”
their nondiscrimination and equal-protection claims—they simply contend that the
evidence adduced at trial sufficed to show it. See Br. of Appellant at 35. But
because the district court ruled against them following a bench trial, the plaintiffs
have a steep hill to climb on appeal. As we have recently reiterated, we review a
district court’s findings concerning the existence—or absence—of discriminatory
intent only for clear error. See Stout by Stout v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 882
F.3d 988, 1006 (11th Cir. 2018). Under that deferential standard, “[i]f the district
court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even [if] convinced that had it been
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id.
(citations and quotations omitted).
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court provided a list of considerations
that bear on the question whether discriminatory intent was a “motivating factor”
in an allegedly discriminatory decision. 429 U.S. at 265–66. A reviewing court
may consider, for instance, (1) any disproportionate “impact” caused by the
decision, (2) the decision’s “historical background,” (3) the “specific sequence of
events leading up” to the decision, (4) “departures from the normal”
shown that the district court clearly erred in finding a lack of discriminatory intent.
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decisionmaking process, and (5) any “legislative or administrative history” in the
form of contemporary statements by the decisionmakers. Id. at 266–68.
Drawing principally on the historical-background and legislative-history
factors, the plaintiffs here emphasize that there was strong community opposition
to the meditation center’s location in a residential district and that City officials
“respon[ded]” to that opposition by rejecting the zoning applications. And indeed,
the record is replete with evidence that could reasonably be understood as
reflecting local residents’ anti-Buddhist sentiment. A sampling of residents’
statements from a November 2015 community meeting concerning the plaintiffs’
proposal is illustrative. Witnesses testified, for instance, that—
• “a man was crying, saying that he was Christian [and that] this is
unacceptable”;
• “[o]ne person stood up and said: ‘Oh, so you’re bringing a big
Buddhist congregation into the area, are you?’”;
• another said, “[w]e don’t want Buddhism”;
• one objected, “[t]his is not a church, this is a Buddhist temple, and we
don’t need that”; and
• another complained, “[w]e don’t need [Buddhism]—this is not a
Buddhist neighborhood.”
It’s not enough, though, for the plaintiffs to show that community members
opposed their applications on prohibited grounds—they must prove that the city
officials who rejected them acted with discriminatory intent. And we cannot
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attribute the residents’ purported bias to city officials absent at least some proof
that the officials “ratified” it. See Hallmark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 466
F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006). The closest, it seems, that the plaintiffs can get
to hard evidence that any city official harbored discriminatory intent is the
following remark by the City’s attorney: “This is not a religious facility. The
application was for Meditation Center of Alabama or whatever. This is not the
Baptist church or the Episcopal church.” But even that statement isn’t sufficient
because the fate of the plaintiffs’ applications rested in the hands of the Planning
Commission and the City Council, and we have held that we won’t impute the
discriminatory intent of one or a few decisionmakers to the entire group—let alone,
as here, of a subordinate non-decisionmaker to the final decisionmakers. See
Matthews v. Columbia Cnty., 294 F.3d 1294, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2002).
The plaintiffs separately emphasize Arlington Heights’ sequence-of-events
and departure-from-the-normal-process factors, arguing that “[n]o other church
applicant has ever had to prove that it was sufficiently ‘religious.’” Br. of
Appellant at 41. We see two problems. First, the plaintiffs fail to recognize that
what they call “the religious issue”—i.e., the need to determine whether the center
was indeed a “religious facility” within the meaning of the City’s zoning code—
arose, as the district court found, because the Association had in the past repeatedly
referred to itself as a “non-religious organization” and to meditation as a
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“nonreligious . . . technique.” To be sure, the plaintiffs insist that those descriptors
meant only that the Association is “open to all” and “does not require rejection of
the particular theistic concepts that are central to Judeo-Christian notions of what is
meant by ‘religion.’” Be that as it may, the uncertainty caused by the
Association’s own marketing tends to undercut the inference that requiring it to
demonstrate its own religious-ness bespeaks discrimination. Second, and
separately, whatever confusion initially attended “the religious issue,” the evidence
indicates (1) that the plaintiffs’ counsel, the Planning Commission’s lawyer, and
the Planning Commission’s chairman all urged the Commission to judge the
plaintiffs’ applications by the criteria applicable to “religious facilit[ies],” and (2)
that the Commission did so.
In sum, having reviewed the relevant record evidence, we simply cannot
conclude that the district court committed clear error in finding that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that a majority of the members of either the Planning Commission
or the City Council acted with an intent to discriminate against them on the basis of
religion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’
claims under RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination provision and the Equal Protection
Clause.
* * *
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To recap our decisions concerning the plaintiffs’ federal claims—before
addressing those arising under state law—we hold that the district court applied the
wrong standard in evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA’s substantial-
burden provision and the Free Exercise Clause, and that the court should
reconsider those claims on remand under the proper standard, but that the district
court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA’s equal-terms and
nondiscrimination provisions and the Equal Protection Clause.
B
We turn, then, to the plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The plaintiffs contend that
the City’s denial of their zoning applications (1) violated the Alabama
Constitution—in particular, the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment—and (2)
constituted common-law negligent misrepresentation. The district court rejected
both contentions—the first on summary judgment, the second following a bench
trial. We will review them in turn.
1
The Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment was ratified in 1998 and is
now codified at § 3.01 of the Alabama Constitution. In relevant part, ARFA’s
operative provision states as follows:
(a) Government shall not burden a person’s freedom of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b).
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(b) Government may burden a person’s freedom of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
interest.
Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01(V). The plaintiffs emphasize that ARFA’s text—unlike
RLUIPA’s—doesn’t require proof that the government “substantially” burdened
religious exercise, only that it “burden[ed]” it. Thus, they insist, the Alabama
Constitution requires strict scrutiny of any burden on religious exercise, even if
that burden is insubstantial.
The district court disagreed. It “interpret[ed] ARFA in light of the case law
decided under RLUIPA” and thus came to “the same conclusion [it] reached in
Plaintiffs’ federal Substantial Burden claim: Plaintiffs’ claim would be
unsuccessful.” Importantly for present purposes, the district court expressly
“refuse[d] to hold a government violates ARFA when its actions incidentally”—
rather than substantially—“burden a plaintiff’s religious exercise.” “To hold that
‘any’ burden includes those that are minimal, insignificant, or incidental,” the court
held, would be “to adopt an interpretation that runs afoul of the judiciary’s efforts
in controlling the floodgates of litigation.”
The plaintiffs’ ARFA claim thus tees up an important and sensitive question
of state law: Is the Alabama Constitution markedly more protective of religious
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exercise than federal law in that it requires a plaintiff to show, as prerequisite to the
application of strict scrutiny, only that government action “burdened”—rather than
“substantially burdened”—his religious exercise?
Before rushing headlong into that state-law briar patch, a word about the
possibility of certifying this question to the Alabama Supreme Court:
Certification, frankly, was our preference—so much so, in fact, that, having raised
the issue with the parties at oral argument, we directed them to file supplemental
briefs addressing the possibility. This, after all, strikes us as precisely the sort of
question that a state court should definitively resolve: It is purely legal, it
implicates fundamental constitutional and public-policy interests, and it is
unsettled—as the district court observed, “there is little to no Alabama case law
providing guidance on what [ARFA] means.” Regrettably, though, we have
concluded that the question doesn’t satisfy the certification standard under
Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18. In relevant part, that rule states that a
federal court may certify a question when three conditions are met: (1) the question
is one concerning the “law of this State” (i.e., Alabama); (2) the question is
“determinative of said cause”; and (3) “there are no clear controlling precedents”
from the Alabama Supreme Court. Ala. R. App. P. 18(a).
While we are convinced that the question whether ARFA requires a plaintiff
to show only that the government has “burdened” (rather than “substantially
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burdened”) religious exercise meets the first and third conditions, we are equally
convinced that it doesn’t meet the second. The phrase “determinative of said
cause” is hardly self-defining. (In fact, it’s downright opaque—for instance, there
isn’t even an earlier “cause” to which the phrase refers, as the adjective “said”
would suggest.) As other courts interpreting similar provisions have observed,
though, the phrase could be understood in any of several ways—e.g., determinative
of the entire case as to all parties, determinative of the case with respect to one
party or group of parties, determinative of a single identifiable claim, or (perhaps)
determinative of a key legal issue. See, e.g., Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. v. Ricci,
137 P.3d 1161, 1163–64 (Nev. 2006) (comparing competing interpretations of the
phrase “determinative of [the] cause” in state certification provisions); see also
17A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4248 (3d ed. 2020) (same).
Here, it seems clear that none of the first three possibilities is satisfied. Not
only is the “burden” question not determinative of the entire case, it’s not even
determinative of the plaintiffs’ ARFA claim. No matter how the burden question
comes out, either party could ultimately go on to prevail on the merits. Even if the
plaintiffs are correct that a mere (i.e., insubstantial) burden is sufficient to trigger
ARFA’s protections, the City could still (at least theoretically) win by surviving
strict scrutiny. And even if the City is right that a substantial burden is required,
the plaintiffs could nonetheless win by showing that the City’s zoning decisions
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constitute a substantial burden and don’t satisfy strict scrutiny. Either way—
however the burden question is answered—there’s more work to be done to decide
how the plaintiffs’ ARFA claim should be resolved. Accordingly, we must
conclude that the burden question isn’t “determinative” of either the entire case or
even of the plaintiffs’ ARFA claim.
So among the possible interpretations of the phrase “determinative of said
cause,” the only one that the burden question could satisfy is “determinative of [a
key issue]” (or the like). Unfortunately, we don’t think that “determinative of said
cause” can be read so broadly. First, and most obviously, doing so just stretches
the ordinary meaning of the word “cause” too far. See, e.g., Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “cause,” in relevant part, to mean “[a]
lawsuit; a case”). Second, we find it significant that (1) many states modeled their
certification provisions on a 1967 uniform act that permitted certification of
questions that “may be determinative of the cause,”14 (2) in 1995 the uniform-act
drafters “substantially broadened the provision’s scope by altering the language to
permit certification when a question’s answer ‘may be determinative of an issue in
pending litigation,’”15 (3) multiple states have adopted the 1995 act’s “issue”-based
framing, but (4) Alabama has not (yet) followed suit.
14
Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act (1967 Act) § 1, 12 U.L.A. 86 (1996) (amended
1995).
15
Volvo, 137 P.3d at 1164 n.2; see also Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act (1995 Act) §
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So alas, it seems that the certification option is off the table—and it thus falls
to us to interpret ARFA for ourselves. Two cardinal rules of construction convince
us that the plaintiffs’ “burden-only” reading is the better one. First, under Alabama
law—as in the law more generally—the words employed in a written provision
“must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning,
and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to
mean exactly what it says.” IMED Corp. v. Sys. Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d
344, 346 (Ala. 1992); accord, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: An Interpretation of Legal Texts 56, 69 (2012). Second, under Alabama
law—again, as in the law more generally—a court “cannot supply words purposely
omitted.” State v. Calumet & Hecla Consol. Copper Co., 66 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala.
1953); accord, e.g., Pace v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 578 So. 2d 281, 284 –
85 (Ala. 1991) (“[G]enerally courts may neither insert words in the statute . . . .”);
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 93.
ARFA is perfectly clear both in what it says and in what it doesn’t. First,
what it says: ARFA repeatedly states that, except in extraordinary circumstances,
the government may not “burden” religious exercise. In its “findings” section,
ARFA provides that “[g]overnments should not burden religious exercise without
3, 12 U.L.A. 73 (1996 & Supp. 2006).
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compelling justification.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01(II)(3) (emphasis added). So
too, in its “purpose” section, ARFA declares its objective “to guarantee that the
freedom of religion is not burdened by state and local law” and to provide a claim
or defense to those whose “religious freedom is burdened by government.” Id. §
3.01(III) (emphasis added). Finally, and most importantly, ARFA’s operative
provision states (1) that, as a general matter, “[g]overnment shall not burden a
person’s freedom of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability” and (2) that “[g]overnment may burden a person’s freedom of
religion only if” it satisfies the traditional strict-scrutiny standard. Id. §
3.01(V)(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
So what doesn’t ARFA say? It never once uses the phrase “substantial
burden.” And given the historical backdrop against which ARFA was adopted, the
absence of the term “substantial” is so conspicuous that we can only conclude that
its omission was intentional. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated
RLUIPA’s predecessor, the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act—at least
insofar as it applied to the states—in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997). The very next year, the Alabama Legislature proposed ARFA, and the
people of Alabama ratified it as part of the state constitution. One of the legislative
findings underlying ARFA—indeed, the only one that doesn’t track RFRA’s own
findings—makes it clear that ARFA was adopted in response to the Supreme
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Court’s decision in Boerne, and to fill a void left by RFRA’s invalidation:
“Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, to
establish the compelling interest test set forth in prior federal court rulings, but in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the United States Supreme Court
held the act unconstitutional stating that the right to regulate was retained by the
states.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01(II)(6).
Not surprisingly, therefore, ARFA reads like a carbon copy of the stricken
RFRA—with one very notable exception: In every place that RFRA employed the
term “substantial burden,” ARFA uses “burden.” The following side-by-side
comparison of RFRA and ARFA, we think, speaks for itself, and confirms that the
use of the term “burden” in place of the more familiar “substantial burden” was
deliberate:
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Section RFRA ARFA
Findings The Congress finds that … governments The Legislature makes the following findings
should not substantially burden concerning religious freedom: …
religious exercise without compelling Governments should not burden religious
justification …. exercise without compelling justification.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01(II)(3)
Purposes The purposes of this chapter are (1) to The purpose of the Alabama Religious
restore the compelling interest test … Freedom Amendment is [1] to guarantee that
and to guarantee its application in all the freedom of religion is not burdened by
cases where free exercise of religion is state and local law; and [2] to provide a claim
substantially burdened; and (2) to or defense to persons whose religious freedom
provide a claim or defense to persons is burdened by government.
whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)–(2) Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01(III)
Operative (a) Government shall not substantially (a) Government shall not burden a person’s
Provision burden a person’s exercise of religion freedom of religion even if the burden results
even if the burden results from a rule of from a rule of general applicability, except as
general applicability, except as provided provided in subsection (b).
in subsection (b).
(b) Government may substantially (b) Government may burden a person’s
burden a person’s exercise of religion freedom of religion only if it demonstrates
only if it demonstrates that application that application of the burden to the person …
of the burden to the person … (1) is in (1) [i]s in furtherance of a compelling
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [i]s the least
governmental interest; and (2) is the restrictive means of furthering that compelling
least restrictive means of furthering that governmental interest.
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01(V)
Given the post-RFRA context in which ARFA was adopted, and its pointed
rejection of the phrase “substantially burden” in favor of “burden” simpliciter, we
conclude that qualifier’s omission was intentional. No matter how tempting it may
be—whether to harmonize state and federal law or, as the district court suggested,
to “control[] the floodgates of litigation”—we aren’t at liberty to graft the adverb
“substantially” onto a provision (or set of provisions) that won’t accommodate it.
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Under Alabama law, our job (giving it our best Erie guess) is to “interpret
[ARFA’s] language to mean exactly what it says.” IMED Corp., 602 So. 2d at
346. And what ARFA says is that any burden—even an incidental or insubstantial
one—suffices to trigger strict scrutiny.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s decision rejecting the plaintiffs’
ARFA claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with our interpretation.
2
Finally, the plaintiffs briefly contend that the city planners’ statement during
the predevelopment meeting that their proposal for the Eloong Drive property
would be treated as a “religious” use for zoning purposes constituted an actionable
negligent misrepresentation under Alabama law. In order to establish a negligent-
misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a misrepresentation of
material fact, (2) made willfully to deceive, recklessly, without knowledge, or
mistakenly, (3) which was reasonably relied on by the plaintiff under the
circumstances, and (4) which caused damage as a proximate consequence.” Bryant
Bank v. Talmage Kirkland & Co., Inc., 155 So. 3d 231, 238 (Ala. 2014) (citations
omitted).
Following the bench trial, the district court found (1) that the city planners
hadn’t told the plaintiffs that their meditation center would be treated as a religious
facility, (2) that the plaintiffs hadn’t shown that the city planners intended to
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deceive them, (3) that the plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate the element of
reasonable reliance” because they “conclusively knew” that the final determination
rested with the Planning Commission and the City Council, and (4) that the
plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate any damages” because their applications were
ultimately considered under the planning-approval criteria applicable to religious
facilities. The district court thus found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove every
element of their negligent-misrepresentation claim.
On appeal, the plaintiffs take issue with each of the district court’s
determinations, but they haven’t shown any reversible error. With respect to the
district court’s finding that the planners hadn’t told them that their center would be
treated as a religious facility, for instance, all the plaintiffs say is that it is
contradicted by testimony at trial. But the plaintiffs haven’t provided any basis for
concluding, as they must, that the district court’s no-misrepresentation finding was
clearly erroneous. Nor, we conclude, have the plaintiffs provided any good reason
for rejecting either of the district court’s “in any event” determinations—namely,
(1) that the plaintiffs knew that the fate of their applications ultimately rested with
the Planning Commission and the City Council, and, thus, that they couldn’t have
reasonably relied on statements made by city planners during preliminary
meetings; and (2) that the plaintiffs’ application was ultimately considered under
the religious-facility planning-approval criteria anyway, and, thus, that they
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couldn’t prove any damages based on any supposed contrary statement during the
pre-planning stages.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’
negligent-misrepresentation claim.
* * *
Recapping our determinations concerning the plaintiffs’ state-law claims, we
hold that the district court misread the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment
and should reconsider the plaintiffs’ ARFA claim under our interpretation, but that
the court correctly rejected the plaintiffs’ negligent-misrepresentation claim.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s decision rejecting
the plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision, the Free
Exercise Clause, and the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment. We affirm the
district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims.
VACATED and REMANDED in part and AFFIRMED in part.
38