Michelle Lee Helm v. Greg Carroll ( 2021 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11569
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cv-01152-ACA
MICHELLE LEE HELM,
Individually and as Guardian and next friend of TDH, a minor child,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RAINBOW CITY, ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants,
GREG CARROLL,
Chief of Police, Rainbow City, Alabama,
JAMES FAZEKAS,
Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Rainbow City Police
Department,
GEORGE MORRIS, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the
Rainbow City Police Department,
TIMOTHY KIMBROUGH,
JUSTIN GILLILAND,
Defendants - Appellants.
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________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(March 10, 2021)
Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
At the age of fifteen, a moving car hit T.D.H. as she walked home from a
friend’s house. T.D.H. sustained head trauma from the accident that now causes her
to experience grand mal seizures, during which her body stiffens, her arms and legs
flail, she spits and sometimes vomits, her eyes roll back, her head shakes rapidly,
and she makes guttural noises. When she comes out of a seizure, she does not know
where she is or what is happening, and it usually takes her several minutes to become
aware of her surroundings. In the past, she has also experienced seizures that
resulted in a catatonic state for up to two hours.
While attending a music concert with her younger sister and some friends,
T.D.H. experienced several grand mal seizures. During one seizure, a good
Samaritan in the crowd picked T.D.H. up from the concert floor and took her to the
lobby. Some of the other individuals she encountered that night, however, were not
as helpful. This appeal stems from their actions that night.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Use of force against T.D.H.
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On January 16, 2015, T.D.H. 1 attended a concert with her younger sister,
D.S.H., and some friends at a venue located in Rainbow City, Alabama. D.S.H.
knew of T.D.H.’s condition and had been previously instructed by doctors on how
to care for T.D.H. during her seizures. During the concert, T.D.H. began having a
grand mal seizure and fell to the floor. In response, D.S.H. started holding T.D.H.’s
head as she had been instructed to by the doctors.
Greg Carroll, the Rainbow City Chief of Police,2 and Rainbow City Police
Officers Timothy Kimbrough, Justin Gilliland, George Morris, and Jimmy Fazekas
were at the concert that night providing security. Officer Gilliland first spotted
T.D.H. and approached T.D.H. and D.S.H. D.S.H. told Officer Gilliland that T.D.H.
was suffering from a seizure and needed help. A man from the crowd picked up
T.D.H. and carried her to the lobby of the concert venue, where she began seizing
again as she sat in a chair. D.S.H. told Officer Gilliland that T.D.H. was having
another seizure. Officer Gilliland, Chief Carroll, and Officers Fazekas and
Kimbrough then held T.D.H. on the ground. Officer Gilliland directed another
officer to call for paramedics.
1
T.D.H. was seventeen years old on the date of the incident.
2
On the date of the incident—January 16, 2015—and at the time of the filing of the
complaint, Carroll was the Chief of Police for Rainbow City. Although he no longer serves in that
capacity, we will refer to him by his title on the date of the incident.
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As the officers held down T.D.H., Officer Morris entered the lobby and was
told that T.D.H. was having seizures. Officer Morris, however, claims he did not
hear anyone tell him about T.D.H.’s condition and instead encountered an “out of
control female.” Officer Morris then yelled at T.D.H.—while she was being held
down by the other officers—telling her that if she did not calm down, he would tase
her. Officer Morris unholstered his taser and waved it in front of T.D.H., repeating
his threat. Chief Carroll and Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough heard and saw
Officer Morris’s threat. Officer Morris then bent down and tased T.D.H. in the chest
using the “drive stun” mode, meaning that he pressed the taser directly on T.D.H.
and released an electric current without using probes. Using a taser in drive stun
mode is a “pain compliance tool” that, unlike when using a taser’s electro-muscular
disrupter probes, does not immobilize a person or disrupt that person’s muscle
control.
None of the officers attempted to stop Officer Morris from using his taser on
T.D.H. After witnessing Officer Morris tase T.D.H., Chief Carroll remained in the
lobby area for three to four minutes before leaving to place a call regarding the
paramedics’ arrival time. According to the district court’s view of the record, Chief
Carroll witnessed only one instance of Officer Morris tasing T.D.H.
Officer Morris yelled at T.D.H. to calm down or he would tase her again.
Officer Morris tased T.D.H. in the chest a second time and then a third time, each
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time using the drive stun mode while T.D.H. remained pinned down by four or five
officers. T.D.H. blacked out and regained consciousness while on a gurney on the
way to a hospital. T.D.H. was not arrested or charged with any crime.
Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland claim that, after her second seizure, T.D.H.
cursed and spit at them, told them to let her go, and tried to kick and bite the officers,
but D.S.H. maintains that T.D.H. never attempted to kick, bite, or spit at the officers
and never yelled at the officers or used vulgar language. Similarly, T.D.H. testified
that she blacked out during her first two seizures and remembers being held down
by various officers and asking, “What is going on? Y’all let me go. I don’t know
what is going on but I cannot breathe,” before blacking out again.
The officers do not dispute that T.D.H. presented no threat to them and, during
the tasings, was held down by four or five men. The officers also do not dispute
that, other than T.D.H.’s allegedly disorderly conduct while being held down,
T.D.H. committed no crime and there was no reason to arrest her.
B. Use of force against Michelle Helm
At some point that night, someone called Michelle Helm, T.D.H. and D.S.H.’s
mother, and told her that T.D.H. was suffering seizures at the concert. Helm drove
to the concert venue and, while approaching the entrance, saw a crowd of people
around a female she assumed was her daughter. Helm saw T.D.H. on the floor
seizing with various men holding her down. As Helm ran toward the venue, she
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yelled, “that’s my daughter, she’s having a seizure,” but an officer tackled her mid-
sentence before she entered the lobby. Another officer handcuffed Helm with her
arms behind her back and her face to the ground. While Helm lay handcuffed on the
floor, Officer Morgan—a nonparty to this case—took out his taser and told Helm
that he was going to tase her. Officer Morgan then tased Helm in the lower back
using the drive stun mode, causing Helm to urinate on herself. None of the other
named officers attempted to stop Officer Morgan from tasing Helm.
Officer Fazekas claims that, before witnessing Officer Morgan detain and tase
Helm, he saw Officer Morgan grab Helm’s arm to stop her and she pulled away from
him. Officer Fazekas stated that he handcuffed Helm after Officer Morgan tased
her. Moreover, Officer Fazekas contends that Helm first almost knocked him off his
feet, pushed him off when he tried to grab her, and entered the concert venue while
yelling and trying to remove the officers from T.D.H. This is disputed, as D.S.H.
claims her mother was tackled outside of the concert venue and never made it inside.
Helm was arrested for disorderly conduct and spent the night in jail. Rainbow City
later dismissed the charge against Helm.
C. Case Proceedings
Helm brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her individual capacity
and as guardian and next friend of T.D.H., a minor. Helm alleged multiple § 1983
claims, contending that Chief Carroll, the four named officers, and the City of
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Rainbow City, Alabama violated her and T.D.H.’s constitutional rights to be free
from the use of excessive force, failing to intervene in the use of that force, and
falsely imprisoning and falsely arresting her and T.D.H. Helm also alleged that
Rainbow City and Chief Carroll failed to appropriately train and supervise the other
named officers.
After taking discovery, Chief Carroll and Officers Morris, Fazekas and
Kimbrough jointly moved for summary judgment on all claims. As to Counts One,
Two, Three, Five, Seven, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen, which asserted
claims of excessive force and failure to intervene, Chief Carroll and Officers Morris,
Fazekas and Kimbrough argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity. They
also moved for summary judgment on the false imprisonment claims in Counts
Twenty-One and Twenty-Two. Officer Gilliland filed a separate motion for
summary judgment.3 As to Counts Six and Eight, which asserted failure to intervene
claims, Officer Gilliland likewise argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
Relevant to this appeal, the district court denied summary judgment on Counts
One, Two, Five, Eight, Eleven, Twelve (in part), and Twenty-Two. Specifically, the
district court rejected Officer Morris’s argument that he was entitled to qualified
3
Rainbow City also moved for summary judgment and the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Rainbow City and Chief Carroll on T.D.H. and Helm’s claims for failure to
appropriately train and supervise the other named officers (Counts Fourteen and Fifteen). The
district court’s order granting summary judgment on these counts in favor of Rainbow City and
Chief Carroll are not before this Court, and we therefore do not address them.
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immunity as to T.D.H.’s excessive force claim and further rejected Officer Morris’s
argument that record evidence did not support T.D.H.’s false imprisonment claim.
As to Chief Carroll 4 and Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough, the district court found
that they were not entitled to qualified immunity on T.D.H.’s claim that they failed
to intervene in Officer Morris’s use of excessive force. As to Officer Fazekas, the
district court found that Fazekas was not entitled to qualified immunity for Helm’s
claims that he failed to intervene in Officer Morgan’s use of force against her. This
timely appeal ensued, and the district court stayed the case as to the remaining claims
pending this appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo an order denying summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. See Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir.
2018). “When considering a motion for summary judgment, including one asserting
qualified immunity, ‘courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and when conflicts arise between the
facts evidenced by the parties, [they must] credit the nonmoving party’s version.’”
Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
4
As to Count Twelve, the district court denied summary judgment as to Chief Carroll on
the first tasing of T.D.H. but granted summary judgment in favor of Chief Carroll and against
T.D.H. as to the second and third tasings. That grant of summary judgement is not before us in
this interlocutory appeal.
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Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Summary judgment is
appropriate if ‘the evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.’” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Chief Carroll and Officers Morris, Fazakas, Kimbrough, and
Gilliland argue that the district court erred in denying them qualified immunity on
the claims remaining in the case—Counts One, Two, Five, Eight, Eleven, Twelve
(in part), and Twenty-Two. After reviewing the relevant legal framework, we will
address T.D.H.’s claims followed by Helm’s claims.
A. Qualified Immunity
In order to assert a qualified immunity defense, a government official must
show that “he was acting within his discretionary authority” during the alleged
wrongdoing. Glasscox, 903 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d
1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007)). If a government official makes this showing, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show (1) that the government official violated a
constitutional right and, if so, (2) that the constitutional right was clearly established
at the time of the wrongdoing. Id.; Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir.
2012). ‘“Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, ‘“the
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law was sufficiently clear that every “reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing”’ is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). An officer’s
unconstitutional use of force is therefore not actionable unless the officer was on
notice that his or her actions were clearly unlawful. Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1250. A
plaintiff has three ways to show that government officials were on notice regarding
the constitutionality of their actions:
First, the plaintiffs may show that a materially similar case has already
been decided. Second, the plaintiffs can point to a broader, clearly
established principle that should control the novel facts of the situation.
Finally, the conduct involved in the case may so obviously violate the
constitution that prior case law is unnecessary. Under controlling law,
the plaintiffs must carry their burden by looking to the law as
interpreted at the time by the United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit, or the [relevant State Supreme Court].
Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration and emphasis
in original) (quoting Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1255–56).
Moreover, “[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to
intervene when a constitutional violation . . . takes place in his presence, the officer
is directly liable under Section 1983.” Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.
1986). “This liability, however, only arises when the officer is in a position to
intervene and fails to do so.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 924
(11th Cir. 2000). The principle that an officer must intervene when he or she
witnesses unconstitutional force has been clearly established in this Circuit for
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decades. Id. at 927 (“That a police officer had a duty to intervene when he witnessed
the use of excessive force and had the ability to intervene was clearly established in
February 1994.”). When an officer witnesses another officer’s excessive use of force
and makes “no effort to intervene and stop the ongoing constitutional violation[,] . . .
[the witnessing officer] is no more entitled to qualified immunity than [the officer
using force].” Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
Here, because no dispute exists that the officers were acting within the scope
of their discretionary authority, we proceed to the next steps of the qualified
immunity analysis, i.e., whether the officers in question violated the constitutional
rights of T.D.H. or Helm and, if so, whether decisions of the Supreme Court, this
Court, or the relevant state supreme court—in this case, the Alabama Supreme
Court—clearly established that it was a violation. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
B. The Constitutional Violations
1. T.D.H.’s excessive force claim against Officer Morris (Count Five)
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual from excessive force during an
arrest or detention. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002). An
arresting officer’s use of force is excessive if a reasonable officer would believe it is
unnecessary in relation to the situation at hand. Id. Indeed, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’
of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
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officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). This objective reasonableness test depends on
the “facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Id. Because determining reasonableness is an objective test, we
do not consider an officer’s intent or motivation. Id. at 397. This Court also
considers the need for application of force, the relationship between the need and
amount of force used, and the extent of the injury inflicted by the arresting officer.
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198 & n.7. In conducting this analysis, “[t]he only perspective
that counts is that of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the events
unfolded.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1166 (11th Cir. 2009). We first
address whether T.D.H. and Helm have established a constitutional violation.
T.D.H. contends that Officer Morris violated her Fourth Amendment right to
be free from excessive force by tasing her during a medical emergency when there
existed no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to Officer Morris or
any of the other named officers. Officer Morris asserts that tasing T.D.H. three times
was a reasonable use of force and, even if it was not, he did not violate T.D.H.’s
clearly established constitutional rights. To support this argument, Officer Morris
characterizes T.D.H. as “‘incapable of making a rational decision’, had at best only
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a tenuous grasp on reality’ [sic] and therefore posed a rick [sic] to herself and others,
and was, at a minimum, not ‘fully secured.’” (citations omitted). Based on this
description of the events, Officer Morris relies on Estate of Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d
306 (6th Cir. 2017), Callwood v. Jones, 727 F. App’x 552 (11th Cir. 2018), Lewis v.
City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009), and Buckley v. Haddock,
292 F. App’x 791 (11th Cir. 2008). He claims that these cases establish that tasing
T.D.H. three times was not excessive and that he did not violate her clearly
established rights. We find this argument without merit.
In Estate of Hill, the Sixth Circuit established a test to determine whether force
is objectively reasonable under Graham when an officer is responding to a medical
emergency, rather than making an arrest. See 853 F.3d at 313–14. The Sixth Circuit
noted that the traditional excessiveness test does not lend itself to analyzing use of
force during a medical emergency and concluded that, in the latter case, courts
should ask:
(1) Was the person experiencing a medical emergency that rendered
him incapable of making a rational decision under circumstances that
posed an immediate threat of serious harm to himself or others?
(2) Was some degree of force reasonably necessary to ameliorate the
immediate threat?
(3) Was the force used more than reasonably necessary under the
circumstances (i.e., was it excessive)?
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Id. at 314. “If the answers to the first two questions are ‘yes,’ and the answer to the
third question is ‘no,’ then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. The
court then applied this test to the facts before it: a diabetic person experiencing a
hypoglycemic episode who was fighting off paramedics as they attempted to help
him. See id. at 314–15. The court found that the officer’s single use of a taser was
not excessive because the patient was suffering from a life-threatening medical
emergency, incapable of making rational decisions as a result, and was actively
combative with the paramedics who were trying to provide much-needed medical
care. Id.
In Callwood, this Court, in an unpublished decision, considered two officers’
use of their tasers against a naked man covered in scratches who was running through
streets and oncoming traffic. See 727 F. App’x at 555. The first officer on the scene
believed the man to be mentally ill or under the influence and tased him when he
continued approaching the officer despite commands to stop. Id. Both officers then
tased the man after failed attempts to pin him down and as the man continued to
violently resist arrest. Id. Even as he was handcuffed on the floor, the man continued
to struggle and kick, resulting in the officers “hog-tying” him with leg irons and flex
cuffs and applying pressure on his back. Id. at 555–56. We found that the use of
tasers on the man, even as he fell to the ground, was not excessive because the man
continued struggling and violently resisting arrest. Id. at 559–60. We also noted
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that “the point at which a suspect falls to the ground . . . is not the dividing point
between excessive and non-excessive force. Instead that point usually turns on
whether the suspect is completely restrained or otherwise resisting arrest.” Id.
Similarly, in Lewis, officers also subdued and “hogtied” a man who appeared
to be disoriented and agitated and with a tenuous grasp on reality, as the man had
resisted arrest and ran into traffic while appearing under the influence of some
narcotic. See 561 F.3d at 1290. The altercation resulted in the man’s death. Id. In
finding that the restraints employed on the man did not violate his clearly established
rights, we emphasized that “Lewis did not remain compliantly restrained” and
“continued to struggle.” Id. at 1292.
Officer Morris also relies on Buckley, an unpublished decision, to establish
that a handcuffed person is not necessarily “fully secured,” such that the person can
still resist and pose a danger. See 292 F. App’x at 795–96 (finding that an officer
acted reasonably by deploying his taser on a handcuffed suspect that was resisting
arrest and disobeying commands). However, in Buckley, the plaintiff was “a 23–
year–old young man who weighed 180 pounds and was 6 feet, 2 inches tall” and
displayed erratic, self-destructive, and defiant behavior during a traffic stop. Id. at
792–93. Moreover, in finding that the officer’s use of a taser on the plaintiff was
reasonable, we emphasized that the plaintiff was defying the most minimal
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commands from the officer and was able to move around on a busy road, thereby
endangering himself, the officer, and the public. Id. at 794–95.
None of the cases Officer Morris relies on are on all fours with this case.
Unlike in Callwood, Buckley, and Lewis, it is undisputed here that at least four adult
men were holding down T.D.H.—a teenage female—as she continued suffering
from grand mal seizures. And resolving disputed factual issues in T.D.H.’s favor,
she was not resisting, kicking, spitting, or biting. She was therefore “fully secured”
and “completely restrained.” Similarly, unlike in Estate of Hill, T.D.H. was not
combative, posed no threat to others, and, to the extent she posed a risk to herself,
that risk could have been managed by simply holding her head to prevent injury from
her uncontrollable movements—the technique doctors had taught her family and that
her younger sister used before T.D.H. was carried out to the lobby. Officer Morris’s
use of his taser in drive stun mode, which is meant only to inflict pain, while four
men held her down was unnecessary to alleviate T.D.H.’s medical condition or
facilitate medical care.
In support of her argument that Officer Morris’s use of force was excessive
and a violation of the Fourth Amendment, T.D.H. relies on Oliver v. Fiorino, 586
F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2009). In Oliver, officers encountered a man standing on the
grassy median of the road who waved for help. Id. at 901. Although the man was
behaving erratically, he “never acted in a threating or belligerent manner toward the
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officers, nor did he even curse at them.” Id. at 902. One of the officers without
warning tased Oliver, causing him to lose control of his body and fall onto to the
“scorching hot asphalt.” Id. at 902–03. Following the first tasering, Oliver “never
hit, kicked, punched, or threatened the officers.” Id. at 903. The officer tased him
seven more times, and as a result, Oliver suffered a seizure and died. Id. at 903–04.
This Court held that the officer violated Oliver’s Fourth Amendment rights and
concluded that “the force employed was so utterly disproportionate to the level of
force reasonably necessary that any reasonable officer would have recognized that
his actions were unlawful.” Id. at 908.
Similar to the plaintiff in Oliver, T.D.H. was not suspected of a crime, posed
no danger, did not act belligerently or yell at the officers, and did not disobey or
resist the officers. See 586 F.3d at 906. T.D.H. had the misfortune of suffering a
grand mal seizure in a public venue. Officer Morris’s use of his taser on T.D.H.
three separate times, while T.D.H. was held down by four men while suffering a
grand mal seizure, “was grossly disproportionate to any threat posed and
unreasonable under the circumstances.” See id. at 907; see also Saunders v. Duke,
766 F.3d 1262, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding the gratuitous use of force on a
compliant and restrained suspect is excessive). When viewed in the light most
favorable to T.D.H., no reasonable officer in this situation would believe that the use
of a taser against T.D.H. was necessary. Moreover, a jury could find that Officer
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Morris’s repeated tasings of T.D.H. amounted to excessive force. See Lee, 284 F.3d
at 1197 (noting that reasonableness of use of force depends on “whether a reasonable
officer would believe that this level of force is necessary in the situation at hand”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that on this summary
judgment record T.D.H. has established a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We now turn to the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry. Officer Morris is entitled to qualified immunity unless his use of force was
not only a violation of the Fourth Amendment, as we have determined, but also a
violation of clearly established laws at the time. Officer Morris argues that he was
confronted with unique circumstances “in the specific medical-emergency context,”
and thus there was no “controlling” authority establishing that his actions were
unlawful. Based on our precedent, we find this argument unpersuasive.
“Oliver clearly established that administering multiple taser shocks can
amount to excessive force.” Glasscox, 903 F.3d at 1218. As discussed above, in
Oliver, this Court held that an officer’s use of his taser on the plaintiff was so “utterly
disproportionate . . . that any reasonable officer would have recognized that his
actions were unlawful.” 586 F.3d at 908. The plaintiff in that case “was not accused
of or suspected of any crime, let alone a violent one; he did not act belligerently or
aggressively; he complied with most of the officers’ directions; and he made no
effort to flee.” Id. Based on the facts viewed in the light most favorable to T.D.H.,
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Oliver is materially indistinguishable from this case. See Glasscox, 903 F.3d at
1219. Indeed, this Court has previously held that Oliver, along with this Court’s
decision in Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997), “clearly establish that
the repeated tasing of a subdued arrestee who has ceased any resistance or
threatening conduct is excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” See
Glasscox, 903 F.3d at 1219; see also Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197 (concluding that “[t]he
Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force.”).
However, even if no preexisting case fits the facts of this case, Officer
Morris’s actions fall within the narrow “obvious clarity” exception to establish a
violation of clearly established rights. Under the “obvious clarity” exception, this
Court looks to the officer’s conduct and “inquires whether that conduct ‘lies so
obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the
unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to [the officer], notwithstanding
the lack of fact-specific case law.” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1291
(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1355 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Officer Morris deployed his taser on a teenage girl three times as she lay
immobilized on the floor with at least four to five adult men holding down her arms
and legs while she suffered a medical emergency—a grand mal seizure. She was
not suspected of committing a crime, and she posed no threat to others. This is one
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of those cases that lies at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits.
Tasing an individual once (let alone three times) when the individual poses no threat
to the officers or others and is experiencing a medical emergency goes so far beyond
the sometimes-blurred border between reasonable and unreasonable force that
“qualified immunity will not protect [an officer] even in the absence of case law.”
See Fils, 647 F.3d at 1291–92 (finding that an officer’s use of his taser on a non-
violent person who was not resisting arrest violated clearly established law based on
materially similar case law and under the “obvious clarity” approach); Vinyard, 311
F.3d at 1355 (holding that “no factually particularized, preexisting case law was
necessary for it to be very obvious to every objectively reasonable officer” that it
was unconstitutional to pull a suspect from the back of a police car, after she was
secure, in order to pepper spray her for being rude). Indeed, we “have repeatedly
ruled that a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment, and is denied qualified
immunity, if he or she uses gratuitous and excessive force against a suspect who is
under control, not resisting, and obeying commands.” Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1265
Here, the use of force by Officer Morris was so patently excessive that the
constitutional violation was clearly established “because no reasonable officer could
have believed that [Officer Morris’s] actions were legal.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to T.D.H., Officer Morris’s
repeated tasings amounted to excessive force prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
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Because the constitutional violation here was clearly established based on both
materially similar case law and the obvious clarity exception, we conclude that the
district court properly denied qualified immunity to Officer Morris, and we affirm
the district court’s denial of summary judgment on Count Five.
2. T.D.H.’s failure to intervene in the use of force claims against Chief
Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland (Counts Eight,
Eleven, and Twelve (in part))
We now consider Chief Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland’s
arguments that they are entitled to summary judgment on the counts alleged by
T.D.H. pertaining to their failure to intervene in the use of excessive force by Officer
Morris. First, they argue that they cannot be found liable for failing to intervene
because Officer Morris’s use of force is entitled to qualified immunity. As discussed
above, because Officer Morris was not entitled to qualified immunity for his use of
force against T.D.H., this argument fails.
Second, Chief Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland rely on cases
from this Court that acknowledge that an officer must be “in a position to intervene”
to be held liable for failing to prevent excessive force. They argue that Officer
Morris’s tasings of T.D.H. happened quickly under rapidly evolving circumstances
and that they did not have an opportunity to intervene. They further assert that
Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland, who held down T.D.H. during all three tasings,
could not intervene because they were busy tending to T.D.H.’s medical emergency.
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As to Chief Carroll, who the district court found was only present during the first
tasing, he contends that T.D.H. failed to present evidence that he could do anything
but observe the incident.
All of these arguments, however, are based on reading disputed factual issues
in a light most favorable to the officers, and, as recognized by the district court,
“[t]he timing of events is difficult to discern.” While the defendants assert that the
tasings occurred in quick succession, the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to T.D.H., shows that Chief Carroll and Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough
heard and saw Officer Morris threaten to tase T.D.H. and then proceed to carry out
that threat and tase T.D.H. three separate times. Moreover, the record shows that,
by holding down T.D.H., Chief Carroll and Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough were
in close proximity to Officer Morris as he approached with his taser and placed it on
T.D.H.’s chest. This suggests that these officers were close enough to at least
attempt to intervene and stop Officer Morris. Indeed, there is nothing in the record
to suggest that Chief Carroll and Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough were prevented
from speaking or yelling at Officer Morris to stop tasing T.D.H. while holding her
down.
As to their argument that it was medically necessary to hold down T.D.H.,
Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough ignore the reasonable inference that it may not
have been necessary for four men to hold down T.D.H. by each of her limbs, while
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Officer Gilliland held her in a headlock. One or both officers could have instead
tried to prevent Officer Morris—either physically or verbally—from tasing T.D.H.
And as to Chief Carroll, the district court limited T.D.H.’s claim against him
to the first tasing because he was not present for the second or third tasing. With
respect to the first tasing, Chief Carroll testified that he participated in holding
T.D.H. down for a “couple of minutes.” Thus, a reasonable jury could find that, like
Officers Gilliland and Kimbrough, Chief Carroll, who was Officer Morris’s
superior, had sufficient time and opportunity to intervene and stop the first tasing.
Put simply, the record presents genuine disputed issues of material fact
regarding how the events unfolded and whether, during that timeframe, Chief Carroll
and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland were close enough to see Officer Morris’s
use of excessive force and then attempt to intervene. Because a reasonable jury
could find these Defendants failed to intervene in the use of excessive force by
Officer Morris, despite having the opportunity to do so, we affirm the district court’s
denial of summary judgment on Counts Eight, Eleven and Twelve (in part). See
Priester, 208 F.3d at 925.
Finally, Officer Gilliland argues that the district court should have conducted
an officer-specific analysis to determine whether his failure to intervene violated
clearly established law. He claims a lack of controlling authority that would have
put him on notice that, under the unique circumstances of this case, he should have
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intervened. However, as this Court expressed in Priester, “[t]hat a police officer had
a duty to intervene when he witnessed the use of excessive force and had the ability
to intervene was clearly established in February 1994.” Id. at 927. Moreover, in
cases where the use of force is declared clearly unconstitutional, the officers that
failed to intervene are “no more entitled to qualified immunity than [the officer using
force].” Edwards, 666 F.3d at 1298. Once this Court establishes that the use of
force is not entitled to qualified immunity and other officers could have intervened
but did not, the Court does not conduct a separate clearly established analysis
pertaining to each officer’s failure to intervene. See id. We note, as well, that Officer
Morris tased T.D.H. not once or twice, but three times, and there is no indication
that Officer Gilliland orally told Officer Morris not to use the taser.
The cases Officer Gilliland relies on do not suggest otherwise. In Jones v.
Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999), this Court recognized that “[t]here
is no controlling authority clearly establishing that once a police officer knows
another officer has fabricated a confession in a police report for a warrantless arrest,
that police officer has a constitutional duty to intervene to stop the other officer’s
conduct.” But Jones does not deal with the failure to intervene in the use of
excessive force and is therefore inapplicable to this case. See id. In Ensley v. Soper,
142 F.3d 1402, 1407–08 (11th Cir. 1998), this Court held that an officer did not
violate clearly established law by not intervening in another officer’s use of force,
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but, as distinguishable to the facts here, it did so based on a conclusion that “no
reasonable juror could find that [the officer] was ‘in a position to intervene.’” Again,
in light of Priester, which holds that officers have a clearly established duty to
intervene in the use of excessive force when they have “the ability to intervene,”
Jones and Ensley are inapplicable to the facts of this case. See Priester, 208 F.3d at
927. Because the facts taken in the light most favorable to T.D.H. establish that
Chief Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland violated a clearly established
right by failing to intervene, the district court did not err in concluding that they are
not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial
of summary judgment on Counts Eight, Eleven, and Twelve (in part).
3. T.D.H.’s false imprisonment claim against Officer Morris (Count
Twenty-Two)
A false imprisonment claim under § 1983 requires meeting the common law
elements of false imprisonment and establishing that the imprisonment was a due
process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Campbell v. Johnson, 586
F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). Because Officer Morris does not argue on appeal
that T.D.H. failed to meet the common law elements for false imprisonment, we do
not address that prong. As to the second prong, in order to establish a due process
violation, a plaintiff must show that the officer acted with deliberate indifference,
i.e., demonstrating that the officer “had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm and disregarded that risk by actions beyond mere negligence.” Id. If an officer
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has arguable probable cause to seize an individual, that finding may defeat a claim
of deliberate indifference. See May v. City of Nahunta, 846 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2017). Arguable probable cause exists when “a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in
question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of
well-established law.” Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.
1994)); accord May, 846 F.3d at 1328 (explaining that to demonstrate arguable
probable cause, “the facts and circumstances must be such that the officer reasonably
could have believed that probable cause existed” (quoting Montoute v. Carr, 114
F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997))).
Here, Officer Morris asserts entitlement to summary judgment on T.D.H.’s
false imprisonment count because (1) “there was no evidence . . . that [Officer]
Morris acted with deliberate indifference in restraining or confining T.D.H.,” as
T.D.H. “reasonably appeared to [Officer] Morris to be ‘disorderly,’ ‘out of control,’
and posing a risk to herself, the involved officers, or both,” and (2) “there was
arguable probable cause to detain or arrest T.D.H.” for disorderly conduct. Both
these arguments suffer from the same infirmity—they rely on disputed factual issues
and inferences drawn in Officer Morris’s favor. The facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to T.D.H., do not support a finding that Officer Morris had arguable
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probable cause “to either detain T.D.H. or arrest her for disorderly conduct.” Viewed
in that light, T.D.H. was experiencing a medical emergency while she was being
held down, and Officer Morris knew that she was experiencing a medical
emergency. While Officer Morris claims that T.D.H. was “out of control,” he does
not explain how a reasonable officer who is told that someone is suffering from
medical seizures—and then, in fact, witnesses those seizures—could have arguable
probable cause to believe that person is being disorderly.
Similarly, Officer Morris’s argument that it was necessary for him to detain
T.D.H. for medical attention is without merit. In support of this argument, Officer
Morris relies on May, but May does not absolve Officer Morris of liability here. In
May, we considered qualified immunity for an officer that confined and transported
the plaintiff to a hospital for psychological evaluation. See 846 F.3d at 1325–26.
There, the plaintiff’s family was concerned that the plaintiff would not get out of
bed, and the family called 911. Id. at 1325. In response to the 911 call, four
emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) arrived at the house and woke up the
plaintiff, who declined to go to the hospital and became upset and “combative to
herself.” Id. In the interim, an officer received a call from 911 requesting assistance.
Id. Upon his arrival, one of the EMTs advised the officer that the plaintiff had been
hitting herself on the head. Id. After observing the plaintiff himself and hearing the
statements about the plaintiff’s behavior from the EMTs, the officer decided to
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detain the plaintiff and transport her to the hospital in his police car for a
psychological evaluation, and the plaintiff’s family did not object. Id. at 1325–26.
On appeal, we found that the officer had arguable probable cause to detain the
plaintiff for medical reasons and thus, as to the false imprisonment claim, the
plaintiff could not show that the officer acted with deliberate indifference to her right
to be free from unlawful detention. Id. at 1329.
Here, construing the facts in T.D.H.’s favor, even after Officer Morris was
informed that T.D.H. was suffering from a medical emergency and witnessed that
fact himself, he tased her three times. The repeated tasings occurred even though
paramedics were on their way to the concert venue to tend to T.D.H. All that was
required for T.D.H.’s well-being in the interim was for someone to hold her head
and to make sure she did not harm herself during the seizures. In other words, unlike
in May, Officer Morris lacked arguable probable cause to detain T.D.H. for
disorderly conduct, as T.D.H.’s medical condition and the circumstances
surrounding the detention did not justify the alleged imprisonment. Moreover, in
May, we found that, while the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for his
decision to initially detain the plaintiff, he was not entitled to qualified immunity for
the manner in which he detained the plaintiff. See id. at 1331–33 (finding that factual
questions remained as to whether the officer’s conduct violated the female plaintiff’s
constitutional right to personal security where the officer detained the plaintiff in a
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locked room for twenty minutes and forced the plaintiff to disrobe after she asked
the officer to leave and without the presence of the female EMT). As discussed
above pertaining to Officer Morris’s use of force, the manner in which Officer
Morris seized T.D.H., i.e., by tasing her three times—let alone once—is
unreasonable. As such, May does not establish that Officer Morris is entitled to
qualified immunity for the false imprisonment count. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of summary judgment on T.D.H.’s false imprisonment claim
(Count Twenty-Two) against Officer Morris.
4. Helm’s failure to intervene claims against Officer Fazekas (Counts
One and Two)
Helm’s failure to intervene claims against Officer Fazekas both relate to
nonparty Officer Morgan’s use of his taser on Helm while she lay handcuffed facing
the ground. Officer Fazekas argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because
Officer Morgan’s use of force was not clearly unconstitutional.5 Specifically,
Officer Fazekas argues that “Helm was, in circumstances that were already
extremely chaotic, invading an area that [Officer] Fazekas was trying to secure and
protect from a gathering, raucous crowd . . . [and] [Officer] Morgan had the right to
5
Officer Fazekas also argues that evidence does not support a finding that he was able to
intervene because there is nothing showing that he was even present at the scene or observed
Officer Morgan tasing Helm. The district court expressly disregarded this issue because Officer
Fazekas did not make this argument in his motion and, at most, “cursorily addresse[d]” it in his
reply brief. We agree and decline to consider this argument made for the first time on appeal. See
Finnegan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 926 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2019).
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arrest Helm” for disorderly conduct and obstructing the officers’ governmental
operations. Officer Fazekas’s characterization of the events, however, runs contrary
to the facts when those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Helm. In that
light, Helm was: (1) tackled before entering the lobby of the venue; (2) did not have
the opportunity to explain why she was there or what was happening to T.D.H.; (3)
was restrained and handcuffed with her face to the floor; and (4) after being
restrained, was gratuitously tased in the back. Furthermore, Helm had not been
accused of a crime and did not pose a threat prior to being tackled or detained.
Moreover, even if Officer Morgan had probable cause to arrest Helm, her
claims against Officer Fazekas are based on his failure to intervene in the subsequent
tasing, not the initial detainment. Officer Fazekas fails to address the undisputed
evidence that Helm was handcuffed and restrained on the floor when Officer Morgan
deployed his taser. Officer Fazekas argues that “[Officer] Morgan used an amount
of force that was necessary to effect the arrest.” However, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Helm, her claim falls squarely within the clearly established
principles discussed above—that “a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment,
and is denied qualified immunity, if he or she uses gratuitous and excessive force
against a suspect who is under control, not resisting, and obeying commands.”
Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1265. Because a jury could reasonably infer that Officer
Fazekas was in a position to intervene against Officer Morgan’s unlawful use of
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excessive force against Helm and failed to do so, the district court did not err in
concluding that at this stage Officer Fazekas was not entitled to qualified immunity
on Helm’s failure to intervene claims. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial
of summary judgment on Counts One and Two.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary
judgment as to Chief Carroll as to Count Twelve (in part) and affirm the district
court’s denial of summary judgment as to Officers Morris, Kimbrough, Gilliland and
Fazekas as to Counts One, Two, Five, Eight, Eleven, and Twenty-Two.
AFFIRMED.
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