USCA11 Case: 19-14679 Date Filed: 03/23/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-14679
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00009-CAR-CHW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TEO A. JAMISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(March 23, 2021)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Teo Jamison entered into a written plea agreement with the government,
pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). As part of his plea agreement, he
waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence with few exceptions.
One of those exceptions permitted Jamison to appeal his sentence “in the event that
the District Court imposes a sentence that exceeds the advisory guideline range as
that range has been calculated by the District Court at the time of sentencing . . . .”
Doc. 30 at 4. 1 The district court informed Jamison that he was waiving the right to
appeal his sentence unless it was “in excess of that provided by [his] advisory
sentencing guideline range.” Doc. 57 at 16. The court accepted his guilty plea
and, after determining that Jamison was a career offender and calculating a
guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment, sentenced Jamison to 151
months’ imprisonment.
Jamison appealed his sentence, contending that the district court erred in
sentencing him as a career offender. The government moved to dismiss Jamison’s
appeal based on the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. A judge of this Court
denied the government’s motion.
In its brief on the merits, the government renews its contention that the
appeal waiver bars Jamison’s appeal, urging us to vacate the previous order
1
“Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
2
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denying the motion to dismiss based on this Court’s recent decision in United
States v. Boyd,
975 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020). We have the authority to do what
the government asks, and we do so today. See 11th Cir. R. 27-1(g) (“A ruling on a
motion or other interlocutory matter, whether entered by a single judge or a panel,
is not binding upon the panel to which the appeal is assigned on the merits, and the
merits panel may . . . vacate it.”).
“We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.” United States
v. Johnson,
541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). We will enforce a sentence
appeal waiver only if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v.
Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was
made knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) “the
district court specifically questioned the defendant” about the waiver during the
plea colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that “the defendant otherwise
understood the full significance of the waiver.”
Id. at 1351.
“An appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or
debatable legal issues or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry,
399
F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). However, we have noted that “[i]n extreme
circumstances—for instance, if the district court had sentenced [the defendant] to a
public flogging—due process may require that an appeal be heard despite a
previous waiver.” United States v. Howle,
166 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.5 (11th Cir.
3
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1999). Nonetheless, “[w]e have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary
appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb,
451 F.3d
1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006).
In Boyd, which was decided after the motion to dismiss in this appeal was
denied, the defendant sought to challenge his sentence despite a sentence appeal
waiver in his plea agreement. 975 F.3d at 1187. The appeal waiver contained an
exception that permitted him to appeal his sentence if it “exceed[ed] the advisory
guideline range.” Id. at 1190. The defendant argued that the provision was
ambiguous because it failed to specify what guideline calculation triggered the
exception—the district court’s, the government’s, his counsel’s, or the probation
office’s. Id. This Court held that the provision unambiguously referred to the
district court’s calculation. “It is well-established that only the district court
determines the guideline range.” Id. And “the remainder of [the] plea agreement
put to rest any doubt as to the final arbiter of the guideline range” because it
“emphasized repeatedly that the district court would determine the guideline
range” and that other estimates were nonbinding. Id. at 1191.
Under Boyd, the appeal waiver in this case is valid and enforceable. The
relevant provision in Jamison’s plea agreement stated that Jamison “waives any
right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon” him, “except in the event that the
District Court imposes a sentence that exceeds the advisory guideline range as that
4
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range has been calculated by the District Court at the time of sentencing . . . .”
Doc. 30 at 4. The agreement in this case was more specific than the one in Boyd.
Like in Boyd, Jamison’s plea agreement stated that the district court would
“determine an advisory guideline sentencing range” after the presentence
investigation report was completed. Id. at 3. The agreement further stated that the
district court was “not bound by any estimate of the advisory sentencing range”
that Jamison may have been given by his counsel, the government, or the probation
office. Id. Jamison signed the agreement and initialed every page; he testified that
he read “[e]very word” of it. Doc. 57 at 13.
During his plea colloquy, the district court advised Jamison that it would
calculate his guideline range and that it could sentence him outside of that range.
The court also advised Jamison that he could not appeal his sentence unless it was
“in excess of that provided by [Jamison’s] advisory sentencing guideline range.”
Doc. 57 at 16. Jamison argues that the district court did not specifically advise him
that the district court’s calculation of the guideline range was what mattered for
purposes of the appeal waiver provision.2 This argument is similar to the one the
2
The district court also failed to state that the appeal waiver was inapplicable if the
sentence imposed was above the statutory maximum and failed to reference the collateral appeal
waiver. And the court incorrectly attributed the collateral appeal waiver’s exception for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims to Jamison’s sentence appeal waiver. Jamison has not,
however, asserted that these failures rendered the appeal waiver invalid such that he can pursue
his current sentencing challenge.
5
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defendant made in Boyd: that a nonspecific statement of the exception renders the
appeal waiver unenforceable. But Jamison’s plea agreement—and the entirety of
the plea colloquy—“put to rest any doubt” about what calculation was
determinative, Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1191, and the record demonstrates that Jamison
read and understood the terms of his plea agreement, Bushert,
997 F.2d at 1351.
Thus, the district court’s statement did not render the exception to the appeal
waiver unenforceable.
Moreover, Jamison’s appeal is within the scope of his valid appeal waiver.
His sentence was not above his guideline range as calculated by the district court
and does not exceed the statutory maximum. Lastly, Jamison’s 151-month
sentence, imposed at the bottom of his advisory guideline range, does not
constitute the type of extreme due process violation that would necessitate review
despite his valid appeal waiver. See Howle,
166 F.3d at 1169 n.5.
Since the appeal waiver is enforceable and applies to Jamison’s claim, we
are “required to dismiss his appeal.” United States v. DiFalco,
837 F.3d 1207,
1215 (11th Cir. 2016). 3 This Court’s earlier order is therefore VACATED, and the
appeal is DISMISSED.
3
Even if we were not required to dismiss Jamison’s appeal, we would uphold his career
offender designation based on his 2010 and 2014 Georgia aggravated assault convictions for the
reasons stated in the government’s brief.
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