Ellis Joey Boudreaux v. Ronald M. McArtor , 681 F. App'x 800 ( 2017 )


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  •            Case: 15-15353   Date Filed: 03/02/2017    Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-15353
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00293-RV-EMT
    ELLIS JOEY BOUDREAUX,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    RONALD M. MCARTOR,
    Individually,
    CITY OF MARY ESTHER, FLORIDA,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (March 2, 2017)
    Before HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-15353     Date Filed: 03/02/2017   Page: 2 of 10
    Ellis Joey Boudreaux appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    in favor of Ronald McArtor and the City of Mary Ester, Florida, on his First
    Amendment retaliation claim brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . Upon review of the
    record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
    I
    Mr. Boudreaux began working for the City in 1997 as a firefighter under the
    supervision of Fire Chief Ronald McArtor. In April of 2007, he was given the job
    of Fire Inspector, which he later requested to leave because he was not permitted to
    earn overtime pay and did not have sufficient time for additional outside work.
    In January of 2010, Mr. Boudreaux was promoted to the position of Shift
    Captain. Mr. Boudreaux alleges that in January of 2013, he learned that Chief
    McArtor and Assistant Chief Frank Matheny wanted to demote him to make the
    position available for Assistant Chief Matheny’s son. In October of 2013, Mr.
    Boudreaux was transferred back to the position of Fire Inspector, which he
    considered a demotion. He alleges that Chief McArtor ordered him to take the
    position because it needed to be filled.
    On October 7, 2013, Judy Boudreaux, Mr. Boudreaux’s mother, met with
    City Manager Lynne Oler to express concerns about her son’s transfer and possible
    violations of the nepotism policy. She again contacted Ms. Oler to express
    concerns about the safety of the Fire Department’s operations after seeing a fire
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    truck traveling at a high rate of speed with no lights or sirens on. On November 19,
    2013, Ms. Boudreaux filed a complaint with the Florida Ethics Commission
    alleging violations of the Florida Code of Ethics against Chief McArtor, Assistant
    Chief Matheny, Ms. Oler, and the City.
    Before his mother’s ethics complaint was filed, Mr. Boudreaux received a
    number of disciplinary actions for violating department guidelines and substandard
    performance in March, May, August, and November of 2013. After the complaint
    was filed and before his termination, he also received two employee coaching
    forms with warnings to improve his performance. On December 12, 2013,
    Chief McArtor wrote to Ms. Oler, attaching the coaching forms and notices of
    disciplinary action and stating that, due to his “continued sub-standard
    performance, work ethic and decision making[,]” Mr. Boudreaux could not be
    relied upon in his position. See D.E. 65-3. Chief McArtor wrote that he was turning
    the matter over to Ms. Oler “for immediate and appropriate action as [she deemed]
    necessary[.]” 
    Id.
     At least three other firefighters submitted statements or letters to
    Chief McArtor regarding their complaints about Mr. Boudreaux’s performance.
    On January 16, 2014, the City terminated Mr. Boudreaux’s employment.
    The notice of dismissal signed by Chief McArtor and Ms. Oler stated that, despite
    repeated feedback and coaching, Mr. Boudreaux’s work performance had not
    improved and the City had lost confidence in his leadership. Mr. Boudreaux
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    appealed his termination through the City’s three-step grievance procedure, but his
    termination was upheld.
    Mr. Boudreaux then filed this suit, asserting claims against Chief McArtor
    and the City for First Amendment retaliation based on his mother’s protected
    speech and his protected association with his mother. Both Chief McArtor and the
    City filed motions for summary judgment. After holding a hearing on the motions,
    the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chief McArtor and the
    City.
    II
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
    the same legal standard used by the district court and drawing all factual inferences
    in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents,
    
    263 F.3d 1234
    , 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate when
    “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
    together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986). In order to overcome a
    motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present more than a
    mere scintilla of evidence supporting his position, and must make a sufficient
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    showing that a jury could reasonably find in his favor. See Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n
    of Jefferson Cty., Ala., 
    446 F.3d 1160
    , 1162 (11th Cir. 2006).
    III
    Mr. Boudreaux argues that his mother engaged in protected speech through
    her complaints, and that he was terminated in retaliation for his mother’s First
    Amendment rights and his right to intimate association with her. He argues that the
    district court erred in granting Chief McArtor qualified immunity and in
    determining that the City was not liable because (1) Chief McArtor was not a final
    policymaker, and (2) Ms. Oler had no illegal or improper motive in terminating
    him.
    A
    To be entitled to relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was
    deprived of a right secured by federal law, such as the United States Constitution.
    See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 
    526 U.S. 40
    , 49–50 (1999). “[N]o matter
    how discriminatory or wrongful” the challenged conduct may have been, there can
    be no relief under § 1983 if the claim is not tied to a federally protected interest.
    See id. at 50. Qualified immunity shields government employees from individual
    liability if their conduct does not violate constitutional or statutory rights of which
    a reasonable person would have known. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 
    516 U.S. 299
    ,
    305–06 (1996).
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    The First Amendment protects not only a citizen’s right to speak, but also
    his right to associate freely with other speakers of similar opinions. See Roberts v.
    U.S. Jaycees, 
    468 U.S. 609
    , 618 (1984). To determine which line of cases—
    freedom of speech or freedom of association—is most instructive, “we look at the
    manner in which [Mr. Boudreaux’s] ‘beliefs’ became known to the outside world.”
    Berry v. Bailey, 
    726 F.2d 670
    , 673 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984). Because Mr. Boudreaux is
    not alleging that he was retaliated against for his beliefs due to his own speech or
    actions, but rather for his association with his mother, who made her beliefs
    known, the freedom of association line of cases is most instructive here. See 
    id.
     See
    also Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage for Bibb Cty., 
    809 F.2d 1546
    ,
    1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (determining that claims were based upon freedom of
    association where employee alleged that she was denied a position at a school
    because she associated with parents and others who protested the school board’s
    plan to close certain schools).
    “[The] right to freedom of association extends to public employees being
    able to engage in associative activity without retaliation.” Hatcher, 
    809 F.2d at 1558
    . To establish a retaliation claim, a factfinder must determine whether the
    associational activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s
    retaliatory action, and, if so, whether a preponderance of evidence supports the
    conclusion that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the
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    associational activities. See 
    id.
     “Finally, the factfinder should determine whether
    the balance between [the employee’s] interest in engaging in the associational
    activity, and the [City’s] interest as an employer in promoting efficient operation
    . . . , supports the challenged action.” 
    Id.
     (citing Pickering v. Bd of Educ., 
    391 U.S. 563
    , 568 (1968)).
    Mr. Boudreaux has not established that his associational activity was a
    substantial or motivating factor in the City’s decision to terminate his employment.
    Chief McArtor and the City submitted evidence documenting Mr. Boudreaux’s
    substandard work performance for months before his mother filed the ethics
    complaint; coaching forms with warnings to improve his performance after his
    mother’s complaint was filed; and letters from other firefighters reflecting his poor
    performance. Chief McArtor’s letter notified Ms. Oler of Mr. Boudreaux’s
    continued substandard performance and his unwillingness to improve, and the
    impact of his behavior on the Fire Department.
    In his notice of termination, Mr. Boudreaux was informed that his work
    performance had not improved, despite repeated feedback and coaching from his
    supervisor. At no time during the appeal of his termination did Mr. Boudreaux
    indicate that he thought he was terminated because of his mother’s ethics
    complaint—rather, he alleged he was wrongfully terminated because Chief
    McArtor was threatened by him and was highly volatile.
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    In contrast, the only evidence submitted by Mr. Boudreaux to support his
    argument that the ethics complaint was the motivating factor in his termination was
    (1) his belief, and his mother’s belief, that he was terminated because of the
    complaint, and (2) the proximity of the complaint, filed on November 19, 2013, to
    his termination, issued on January 17, 2014. These contentions are not sufficient to
    create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mr. Boudreaux’s termination was
    retaliatory.
    Even if his interest in his association with his mother carried greater weight
    than the City’s interest in the efficient running of its Fire Department, see
    Pickering, 
    391 U.S. at 568
    , Mr. Boudreaux has not shown that, but for his mother’s
    ethics complaint, he would not have been terminated. Moreover, even if Chief
    McArtor was improperly attempting to oust Mr. Boudreaux to make room for other
    firefighters, “no matter how discriminatory or wrongful” the challenged conduct
    may have been, there can be no relief under § 1983 if Mr. Boudreaux cannot show
    he was deprived of a constitutional right. See Am. Mfrs., 
    526 U.S. at
    49–50. We
    therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that Chief McArtor is entitled to
    qualified immunity, and the grant of summary judgment in his favor.
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    B
    Mr. Boudreaux’s claim against the City similarly fails. For a government
    body to be held liable under § 1983, a plaintiff may demonstrate that he has been
    deprived of his constitutional rights through (1) an express policy; (2) a widespread
    practice so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom; or (3) an act or
    decision of an officer with final policy-making authority. See Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of
    Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 
    285 F.3d 962
    , 966–68 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Mr. Boudreaux argues that the City is liable because Ms. Oler was the final
    policymaker with regard to employee terminations, given that there was no
    meaningful review of her decision. He argues in the alternative that Ms. Oler
    ratified the purported illegal and retaliatory recommendation by Mr. McArtor to
    terminate his employment. The City maintains that Mr. Boudreaux’s theory before
    the district court was that Mr. McArtor—not Ms. Oler—was in the position of
    policymaker or had been delegated policymaking authority.
    Whether Ms. Oler or Mr. McArtor retained final policymaking authority,
    however, is of no moment. As established above, the termination decision did not
    violate any constitutional right because Mr. Boudreaux has not demonstrated that
    he would not have been terminated but for his mother’s ethics complaint. He
    therefore cannot show that his termination was based on unlawful retaliation.
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    IV
    Because Mr. Boudreaux has failed to establish that he was deprived of a
    constitutional right, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
    favor of Chief McArtor and the City.
    AFFIRMED.
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