Michael George Bruno, Sr. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections , 700 F.3d 445 ( 2012 )

Case: 11-10255 Date Filed: 10/30/2012 Page: 1 of 2
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-10255
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:06-cv-60370-MGC
MICHAEL GEORGE BRUNO, SR.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 30, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael George Bruno, Sr., a Florida death row inmate, appeals from the
district court’s denial of his first federal habeas corpus petition, brought pursuant
Case: 11-10255 Date Filed: 10/30/2012 Page: 2 of 2
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This case is currently under submission after briefing and
oral argument.
On October 24, 2012, Mr. Bruno’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss appeal
because he was notified on October 23 that Mr. Bruno died of natural causes. The
Florida Department of Corrections’ website now also indicates that Mr. Bruno is
deceased. See Offender Search, Florida Department of Corrections, (last updated
October 23, 2012).
The death of the habeas petitioner renders a habeas action moot. See Dove
v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 96 S. Ct. 579 (1976). In light of this, we vacate the
judgment and remand the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the
case as moot. See Knapp v. Baker, 509 F.2d 922, 922–23 (5th Cir. 1975);1 see
also Griffey v. Lindsey, 349 F.3d 1157, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003); McMillin v.
Bowersox, 102 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 1996); Hillman v. McCaughtry, 14 F.3d 350,
350 (7th Cir. 1994); Hann v. Hawk, 205 F.2d 839, 839–40 (8th Cir. 1953).
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
2