United States v. Lorenzo D. Hood , 685 F. App'x 705 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •          Case: 15-13385   Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 1 of 41
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-13385
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00020-JES-CM-5
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    BOBBY LESANE, JR.,
    MAURY CARSON MORRIS,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    ________________________
    No. 15-14440
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00020-JES-CM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    Case: 15-13385       Date Filed: 04/12/2017      Page: 2 of 41
    LORENZO D. HOOD,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 12, 2017)
    Before TJOFLAT, HULL, and O’MALLEY, * Circuit Judges.
    O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge:
    In this consolidated appeal, defendants Bobby Lesane Jr., Maury Carson
    Morris, and Lorenzo D. Hood challenge their convictions. Defendant Lesane also
    challenges his sentence. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and
    with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
    I. BACKGROUND
    We address the background in four parts: the evidence supporting the
    defendants’ convictions, the proceedings in the district court, the defendants’
    convictions and sentences, and the circumstances surrounding this appeal.
    *
    Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley, United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit,
    sitting by designation.
    2
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 3 of 41
    A.    Facts Underlying the Defendants’ Convictions
    This case arises from a drug trafficking operation in Lee County, Florida.
    Below, we set forth the evidence pertaining to the operation and investigation of
    this drug activity.
    1.     Nixon’s Controlled Purchases
    In January 2013, an individual named Jason Nixon went to a house on Utana
    Avenue in Fort Myers, Florida to buy drugs from defendant Hood. During this
    meeting, Nixon noticed pots and pans for cooking drugs inside the house and a
    surveillance camera monitoring the front door. Nixon bought an ounce of cocaine
    from Hood during this January 2013 transaction.
    In February 2013, the Fort Myers Police Department (“FMPD”) began
    investigating Nixon for drug activity. On three separate occasions during that
    month, a confidential informant met with Nixon and bought marijuana and
    methylenedioxy-methamphetamine, also known as MDMA or ecstasy. In May
    2013, FMPD officers confronted Nixon about these drug sales. To avoid
    prosecution, Nixon agreed to cooperate with the FMPD and to participate in
    controlled drug purchases.
    With Nixon’s cooperation, the FMPD continued their ongoing investigation
    of a residence located at 6226 Demery Circle in Fort Myers (“6226 Demery”).
    Police had been investigating this home for drug activity since April 2013. Based
    3
    Case: 15-13385      Date Filed: 04/12/2017      Page: 4 of 41
    on their investigations, FMPD officers knew that the residence at 6226 Demery
    was equipped with surveillance devices so that the occupants could see any activity
    taking place outside the house. Officers also knew, based on their surveillance of
    6226 Demery, that defendant Hood was frequently at the residence, along with his
    brother James Hood and his girlfriend Edricka Cook.1
    Sometime in April or May 2013, Nixon conducted his first controlled drug
    transaction at 6226 Demery. FMPD officers monitored, but did not record, this
    first transaction. During this first controlled buy, Nixon went to 6226 Demery,
    where he met James Hood at the back door and asked for a “poolie”—around 3.5
    grams—of cocaine. After Nixon gave James Hood the money, defendant Morris
    came to the door and gave Nixon the cocaine. This amount of cocaine had a value
    of $160. After leaving 6226 Demery, Nixon handed the drugs over to FMPD
    officers.
    From May to September 2013, with Nixon’s help, the FMPD carried out and
    recorded eight controlled drug purchases at 6226 Demery. During each
    transaction, Nixon carried concealed video and audio recording devices. On May
    31, 2013, Nixon bought drugs from James Hood at 6226 Demery; defendant
    Lesane also was present. On June 26, 2013, Nixon again bought drugs from James
    1
    James Hood is not involved in this appeal but was charged along with defendants
    Lesane, Morris, and Hood. James Hood pled guilty before trial. FMPD officers interviewed
    James Hood during their investigation of 6226 Demery, but James Hood refused to cooperate as
    a confidential informant.
    4
    Case: 15-13385       Date Filed: 04/12/2017      Page: 5 of 41
    Hood at 6226 Demery. Nixon testified that defendant Hood was in the kitchen
    during this transaction. On June 28, 2013, Nixon bought cocaine from James
    Hood at 6226 Demery. An individual named Walter Campbell was present at the
    residence during that transaction.2 On July 3, 2013, Nixon went to 6226 Demery
    and bought cocaine from James Hood and Walter Campbell.
    On August 2, 2013, Nixon conducted another controlled buy at 6226
    Demery, during which he purchased cocaine from defendant Lesane. During this
    transaction, Nixon gave defendant Lesane money and told defendant Lesane how
    much cocaine he wanted to buy. Defendant Lesane then walked into the house,
    through the living room, and into a room off to the right. Defendant Lesane then
    came back and handed Nixon the drugs.
    On August 8, 2013, Nixon bought cocaine from defendant Hood at 6226
    Demery. James Hood and Walter Campbell were also present. During this August
    8 transaction, Nixon asked defendant Hood for a poolie of cocaine. Defendant
    Hood then walked into the house, through the kitchen, and into a room off to the
    right. Defendant Hood returned with a large bag of cocaine, from which he
    measured out a poolie for Nixon. Nixon paid defendant Hood $160 for this
    amount of cocaine.
    2
    Walter Campbell is not involved in this appeal but was charged along with defendants
    Lesane, Morris, and Lorenzo Hood. Walter Campbell pled guilty before trial.
    5
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 6 of 41
    On September 7, 2013, Nixon again bought drugs at 6226 Demery. For each
    of these controlled purchases, FMPD officers searched Nixon beforehand to ensure
    that he was not in possession of any other contraband. FMPD officers also
    provided Nixon with money for each controlled purchase. The amount varied, but
    the average transaction was for $160. After each recorded purchase, Nixon handed
    the drugs over to FMPD officers.
    2.     September 9, 2013 Search at 6226 Demery
    On September 9, 2013, FMPD officers executed a search warrant at 6226
    Demery. As officers approached the house, three people fled from the back door.
    Cook was the only person in the house when officers entered. Officers found Cook
    in a bedroom, where she was on her knees with her hands underneath the bed.
    When officers looked under the bed, they discovered a bag containing cocaine and
    heroin. In various places throughout the house, officers found more cocaine, cash,
    digital scales, and drug paraphernalia.
    In addition, officers recovered from the house several items of mail
    addressed to defendant Hood and Cook at the address 1606 Hibiscus Avenue in
    Lehigh Acres (“1606 Hibiscus”), including a “notice to pay rent or quit” addressed
    to Cook at 1606 Hibiscus. FMPD officers also recovered footage from the
    surveillance equipment used to monitor activity outside the residence. The
    footage, which spanned a period reaching back to about two weeks before the
    6
    Case: 15-13385      Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 7 of 41
    FMPD searched the residence, showed numerous people coming and going from
    6226 Demery on a regular basis. The footage also showed what police believed to
    be twenty or thirty drug transactions taking place at 6226 Demery over a two-week
    period.
    Based on the footage, FMPD officers believed that one group of people
    consistently worked inside the residence, while other individuals regularly came to
    the residence to purchase drugs. Defendants Lesane, Hood, and Morris, as well as
    Walter Campbell, all appear in the footage from 6226 Demery, apparently
    conducting drugs transactions.
    The portion of the footage covering September 9, 2013, shows that
    defendants Lesane and Hood, as well as Walter Campbell, were all present at 6226
    Demery on that day, but that they left a few hours before FMPD officers executed
    the search warrant. The September 9 footage also showed defendant Morris and
    James Hood fleeing the residence as officers arrived to execute the search warrant.
    3.    Herman’s Controlled Purchases
    After executing the search warrant on September 9, 2013, the FMPD
    continued their surveillance of 6226 Demery. During this period following the
    September 9 search, officers observed an individual named Nicholas Herman at
    6226 Demery on several occasions. Herman testified that he had been buying
    personal use amounts of cocaine and heroin from defendant Hood and his
    7
    Case: 15-13385      Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 8 of 41
    associates for eight or nine years. Herman testified that he bought drugs from
    defendant Morris and James Hood at least twenty times each. Herman also saw
    defendant Hood selling drugs to others.
    Sometime between September 9 and October 1, 2013, FMPD officers
    stopped Herman while he was driving away from a visit to 6226 Demery. Officers
    discovered that Herman was carrying drugs and eventually charged him with
    possession of cocaine and heroin. To avoid prosecution, Herman agreed to
    cooperate as a confidential informant.
    During October 2013, Herman made a series of controlled, recorded drug
    purchases from 6226 Demery. On October 1, Herman went to 6226 Demery and
    bought cocaine and heroin from James Hood. On October 15, Herman went to
    6226 Demery, gave money to defendant Hood, and received cocaine and heroin
    from someone else inside the house. On October 16, Herman went to 6226
    Demery and bought cocaine and heroin from James Hood. On October 17,
    Herman went to 6226 Demery and bought cocaine and heroin from someone who
    may have been James Hood. On October 18, Herman went to 6226 Demery, again
    purchasing cocaine and heroin.
    On October 23, Herman went to 6226 Demery, where he bought cocaine and
    heroin. The video from this transaction showed that defendant Morris entered the
    residence at 6226 Demery after Herman initially arrived. Herman testified that, on
    8
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 9 of 41
    that day, defendant Morris came from a different house, located next door to 6226
    Demery. Upon arriving at 6226 Demery from the house next door, Morris
    weighed out the drugs for Herman.
    After Herman completed this series of controlled buys, FMPD officers asked
    Herman to identify the individuals from whom he bought drugs at 6226 Demery.
    FMPD officers prepared photo lineups and asked Herman to identify the
    individuals with whom he dealt during the October 23 transaction. Using these
    lineups, Herman identified defendant Morris.
    4.   October 24, 2013 Search of 6226 Demery and 6220 Demery
    On October 24, 2013, FMPD officers executed a second search warrant at
    6226 Demery. When officers arrived at 6226 Demery, no one was inside the
    house; the defendants here—Hood, Lesane, and Morris— were all next door.
    During the search of 6226 Demery, FMPD officers found cocaine hidden in
    various places throughout the house. Officers also found two digital scales in the
    kitchen.
    At the same time, officers executed a search warrant for the residence next
    door—6220 Demery Circle (“6220 Demery”). Cook owned the property at 6220
    Demery. An individual named Terry Little, who lived at 6226 Demery during the
    fall of 2013, testified that defendant Hood lived next door at 6220 Demery.
    9
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 10 of 41
    Little also testified that, during the time he lived at 6226 Demery, he saw
    defendant Morris at 6226 Demery on a daily basis. In addition, Little testified that
    he bought cocaine from “pretty much everybody” at 6226 Demery, including
    defendants Hood and Morris, and James Hood. Little stated that everyone at 6226
    Demery seemed to be working for defendant Hood.
    5.     October 29, 2013 Arrest of Defendant Hood
    On October 29, 2013, FMPD officers, with the help of several United States
    Marshals, went to locate defendant Hood and execute a warrant for his arrest.
    Officers thought that they might find defendant Hood at 1606 Hibiscus, because
    his driver’s license listed this residence and because a motorcycle that defendant
    Hood regularly used was parked near the front door of that house.
    Before entering the house, officers surveilled the property for a period of
    two or three hours. During that period, officers observed someone peeking
    through the blinds of a window next to the front door on the north side of the
    house. It appeared that the person was using a black object to push through the
    blinds and look outside.
    Around two o’clock in the afternoon, a group of approximately six FMPD
    officers and marshals approached the house at 1606 Hibiscus, knocked on the front
    door, and announced their presence. After receiving no response for several
    minutes, officers breached the door. Once inside, the officers yelled for defendant
    10
    Case: 15-13385       Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 11 of 41
    Hood to come out. After a few seconds, he emerged from a room in the rear on the
    south side of the house and began to walk into the foyer toward the officers.
    Officers then took defendant Hood into custody in the foyer. After taking him into
    custody, officers took defendant Hood outside the home. One officer testified that
    defendant Hood’s attitude and conduct appeared to be “evasive.”
    While inside the home, officers conducted what they alleged to be a
    protective sweep search. Because defendant Hood emerged from a room in the
    rear on the south side of the house, the officers believed that someone else might
    have been in the front on the north side of the house—where they had seen
    someone peeking through the blinds.
    Officers first checked for other people in the kitchen area of the house.
    There, the officers found scales, drug paraphernalia, and what looked like crack
    cocaine residue on the counter.
    While checking the room with the window in which they had seen
    movement, officers found a rifle and an unattached rifle scope. According to two
    officers, this rifle scope was consistent with the object they previously saw poking
    through the blinds. Officers also noticed a closet inside this room, the door to
    which was ajar. Through the open closet door, officers could see a number of
    rifles and shotguns inside the closet.
    11
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 12 of 41
    Meanwhile, other officers looked through the south side of the house, from
    which defendant Hood had emerged. Officers found a variety of ammunition,
    some of which was compatible with firearms found in the house. In addition,
    officers found another rifle equipped with attachments like a tripod, scope, and
    light.
    In the master bedroom, officers found a box containing cocaine and a device
    commonly used to press loose cocaine into a block. On the dresser in the master
    bedroom, officers discovered mail addressed to defendant Hood at 1606 Hibiscus.
    According to an officer who participated, the sweep of 1606 Hibiscus lasted no
    longer than three or four minutes in total.
    Detective Christopher Tice testified that, on October 29, 2013, he received
    word from the Lee County Warrants Unit that officers were at 1606 Hibiscus
    executing an arrest warrant for defendant Hood. The officers told Tice that they
    saw narcotics-related items in plain view while sweeping the home. That same
    day, Detective Tice obtained a search warrant for 1606 Hibiscus, which he
    executed that same day. During his search of the residence, Tice took photographs
    of the drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and ammunition in the house.
    At trial, defendant Hood and the government entered a stipulation which
    stated that the parties “agree that, on October 29, 2013, the Defendant Lorenzo D.
    12
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 13 of 41
    Hood was a convicted felon whose rights to [possess] firearms and ammunition
    had not been restored by the State of Florida.”
    6.     March 14, 2014 Interview with Defendant Hood
    On March 14, 2014, an agent from the Drug Enforcement Administration
    interviewed defendant Hood. After being advised of his right to remain silent,
    defendant Hood stated that he sold drugs for financial gain and that he had sources
    of supply in Lee County and on Florida’s east coast. Defendant Hood further
    stated that he used 6226 Demery as a drug distribution location. In particular,
    defendant Hood admitted that he sold both cocaine and heroin.
    7.     Other Arrests and Statements in Jail
    On June 26, 2014, defendant Morris was arrested. Defendant Lesane, who
    was already in state custody, was transferred to federal custody after his indictment
    in this case. While they were incarcerated in the Charlotte County jail, defendants
    Hood and Morris discussed this case with inmate Gary Williams. Defendant Hood
    told Williams that he was selling cocaine at such a high rate that it did not matter
    that the cocaine was so expensive to obtain. He told Williams that the guns at his
    house were his, that he was unsure whether one of the guns at his house was fully
    automatic, and that he was concerned about receiving a sentence enhancement for
    having automatic weapons. Defendant Hood further told Williams that Cook was
    going to claim that the guns were hers because the house was in her name.
    13
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 14 of 41
    Defendant Morris told Williams that he sold small bags of heroin and cocaine out
    of one of the houses.
    B.    District Court Proceedings
    On May 14, 2014, the government filed a superseding indictment charging
    defendants Hood, Lesane, and Morris, as well as James Hood and Walter
    Campbell, with various drug and gun offenses. James Hood and Walter Campbell
    pled guilty to all charges against them.
    1.     Charges Against Defendants Lesane, Morris, and Hood
    The superseding indictment charged defendant Lesane with: conspiracy to
    distribute and possess cocaine, cocaine base, and heroin with intent to distribute,
    between 2004 and 2013, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); and possession
    of cocaine with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine, on August 2, 2013,
    in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 4).
    The superseding indictment charged defendant Morris with: conspiracy to
    distribute and possess cocaine, cocaine base, and heroin with intent to distribute,
    between 2004 and 2013, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); and possession
    of heroin with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin, on October 23, 2013,
    in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 7).
    The superseding indictment charged defendant Hood with: conspiracy to
    distribute and possess cocaine, cocaine base, and heroin with intent to distribute,
    14
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017      Page: 15 of 41
    between 2004 and 2013, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); possession of
    cocaine with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine, on August 8, 2013, in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 5); possession of
    cocaine and heroin with intent to distribute, on September 9, 2013, in violation of
    21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 6); possession of cocaine with
    intent to distribute, on October 29, 2013, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
    18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 8); and possession of firearms and ammunition as a
    previously convicted felon, on October 29, 2013, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
    (Count 9).
    2.     Defendant Hood’s Pretrial Motion to Suppress
    On August 25, 2014, defendant Hood filed a motion to suppress evidence
    obtained as a result of the October 29, 2013 sweep of the house at 1606 Hibiscus.
    In his motion, Hood argued that, after he was arrested and taken outside the home,
    officers re-entered the home without legal justification.
    On October 7, 2014, the magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion and,
    on October 20, 2014, the magistrate judge entered a report recommending that the
    motion to suppress be denied. In that report, the magistrate judge found that the
    officers who searched defendant Hood’s home had a reasonable belief that
    someone else was inside the house, and thus that they were entitled to engage in a
    protective sweep for their own safety. The magistrate judge further found that the
    15
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 16 of 41
    search was appropriate in scope and duration and that the evidence discovered in
    plain view could be properly used to obtain a search warrant, which officers then
    did at 1606 Hibiscus. Alternatively, the magistrate judge found that, even if the
    sweep was invalid, the officers had sufficient probable cause to seek a search
    warrant based on their discovery of drug paraphernalia in plain view so that the
    discovery of the confiscated evidence would have occurred in any event.
    On December 10, 2014, over defendant Hood’s objections, the district court
    adopted the magistrate judge’s report without alteration or addition, and denied the
    motion to suppress.
    3.     Trial
    On March 10, 2015, defendants Lesane, Morris, and Hood jointly proceeded
    to jury trial. None of the defendants moved to sever their trial from that of the
    others. During opening statements, counsel for the government made the
    following comment about the nature of the case:
    As Judge Steele told you earlier today, this case is about drugs and it’s
    about guns. The defendants Lorenzo Hood, Bobby Lesane, and
    Maury Morris are each charged with conspiracy to possess and
    distribute cocaine, cocaine base or crack cocaine, and heroin. That
    conspiracy began back around 2004 and continued into 2013.
    Morris’s counsel did not object to this statement.
    At the close of the government’s case, defendant Hood moved for a
    judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1, 6, and 9. Defendants Morris and Lesane each
    16
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 17 of 41
    moved for a judgment of acquittal as to Count 1. The district court denied all of
    these motions.
    After the denial of the Rule 29 motions, defendants Hood, Morris, and
    Lesane announced their intention not to testify. Defendants Hood and Lesane
    rested without presentation of evidence. Defendant Morris presented the testimony
    of Angelique Brown, his fiancée. Brown testified, among other things, that she
    never saw defendant Morris with James Hood, defendant Hood, defendant Lesane,
    or Walter Campbell.
    During closing statements, counsel for the government made the following
    statement about footage showing defendant Morris at 6226 Demery:
    Now, somewhat similarly to Bobby Lesane, on [the government’s
    video exhibit], for one, you see Maury Morris chasing after
    somebody. Mr. Morris comes out the door, goes back in, comes out
    again, with something that, quite frankly, appears to be a handgun in
    his left hand, and he chases after somebody.
    Again, Morris’s counsel did not object to this statement. Instead, he discounted
    this evidence during his closing statement, noting that the government had not
    taken the time to blow up or enhance the image to show whether he was, in fact,
    carrying a firearm.
    17
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 18 of 41
    C.    Convictions and Sentences
    1.     Lesane
    On March 20, 2015, the jury found defendant Lesane guilty of Counts 1 and
    4. On July 20, 2015, the district court held a sentencing hearing as to defendant
    Lesane. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) indicated that defendant
    Lesane qualified as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. See
    generally U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The PSR stated that defendant Lesane’s offenses of
    conviction constituted controlled substance offenses, and that he also had two prior
    felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
    First, in 2005, defendant Lesane was convicted of possession with intent to sell a
    controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of marijuana
    with intent to sell (both on the same occasion). Second, on October 24, 2014,
    defendant Lesane pled nolo contendere to burglary of an unoccupied dwelling.
    With the career offender enhancement, the PSR calculated defendant Lesane’s total
    offense level as 32 and his criminal history category as VI. This yielded a
    guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.
    At the sentencing hearing, defendant Lesane did not formally object to any
    aspect of the PSR. The district court adopted the factual statements in the PSR
    and, in turn, the PSR’s application of the guidelines. Before the district court
    pronounced sentence, counsel for defendant Lesane offered argument regarding the
    18
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 19 of 41
    2014 conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Defendant Lesane’s
    attorney made the following statements during the hearing:
    Mr. Lesane is a career offender because of the two offenses. The
    second offense is burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, unarmed. That
    case was from 2014, or after the offenses for his conviction in federal
    court. Or after the timing of the convictions in federal court. Or when
    he committed those offenses.
    Right now he’s pled guilty, but is waiting on sentence . . . . [H]e pled
    guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. He has not been adjudicated
    guilty, however, he’s pled in open court with a plea agreement that’s
    been accepted by the judge.
    Under 4b1.1 that is a determination of guilt, Your Honor. But for that
    one offense, which occurred after the transaction for which he went to
    trial here, Your Honor, that takes him up eight levels, as a career
    offender . . . .
    We would argue, Your Honor, that under 4A1.3, that that is—would
    over-represent his criminal history, a likelihood that Mr. Lesane
    would commit other crimes and respectfully request a downward
    departure.
    When asked by the district court whether he was “contesting the accuracy of
    [defendant Lesane’s] classification of being a career offender,” the attorney
    responded:
    I cannot do that because the language says that the guilt—the guilt of
    the Defendant has been established whether by guilty plea, trial, or
    plea of nolo contendere. Which he’s made the guilty plea, but he did
    not get adjudicated. It doesn’t say you have to be adjudicated in a
    state court. But our main argument, the offense that determines him
    to be a career offender is after the drug transaction conspiracies for
    which he was convicted, Your Honor.
    19
    Case: 15-13385      Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 20 of 41
    The district court noted that it was “required to impose a sentence that is
    sufficient, but not greater than necessary, after considering all the factors in Title
    18, United States Code, Section 3553, and that it “considered those factors,
    whether we discuss them individually or not.” The district court then sentenced
    defendant Lesane to 210 months’ imprisonment on both convictions, to run
    concurrently.
    2.     Morris
    The jury found defendant Morris guilty of Count 1, but only with respect to
    cocaine and heroin, not as to cocaine base in particular. The jury also found
    defendant Morris guilty of Count 7.
    The district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment on both
    convictions, to run concurrently. He does not challenge his sentence on appeal.
    3.     Hood
    The jury found defendant Hood guilty of Counts 1, 5, 6, 8, and 9. The
    district court sentenced defendant Hood to 235 months’ imprisonment on Counts 1,
    5, 6, and 8, and to 120 months’ imprisonment on Count 9, all to run concurrently.
    He does not challenge his sentence on appeal.
    D.    Appeal
    On July 28, 2015, defendants Morris and Lesane timely filed their notices of
    appeal. On October 5, 2015, defendant Hood filed a notice of appeal in a separate
    20
    Case: 15-13385      Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 21 of 41
    case. On October 20, 2015, the government filed an unopposed motion to
    consolidate these appeals, which this Court granted. Below, we address the issues
    on appeal as they relate to each defendant.
    II. LESANE
    A.    Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Heroin Conviction
    First, Lesane contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conspiracy conviction as it relates to heroin. We review de novo the sufficiency of
    the evidence to support a guilty verdict. United States v. Isnadin, 
    742 F.3d 1278
    ,
    1303 (11th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility
    choices in favor of the verdict. 
    Id. If a
    reasonable trier of fact could find that the
    evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is sufficient to
    support the conviction. 
    Id. To convict
    a defendant for conspiracy, the government must establish that
    (1) an illegal agreement existed, (2) the defendant knew about the agreement, and
    (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined it. United States v. McDowell,
    
    250 F.3d 1354
    , 1365 (11th Cir. 2001). The government need not prove the
    defendant’s participation in the conspiracy by direct evidence. 
    Id. A common
    purpose or plan may be inferred based on “a development and collocation of
    circumstances.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Khoury, 
    901 F.2d 948
    , 962 (11th
    21
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 22 of 41
    Cir. 1990)). Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to sustain a
    conspiracy conviction. 
    Id. Presence is
    probative, however, of the defendant’s
    knowing and voluntary participation in the illicit endeavor. 
    Id. Here, Lesane
    claims that his conviction cannot stand as it related to heroin
    because the government did not show that he sold any of the heroin used as
    evidence in the case. According to Lesane, the only evidence linking him to the
    heroin conspiracy consisted of: (1) heroin transactions for which he was not the
    direct seller; and (2) amounts of heroin recovered during a search of 6226 Demery.
    Though Lesane acknowledges that the government’s evidence showed him making
    drug transactions, he maintains that the government failed to prove that any of
    these transactions involved heroin.
    We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Lesane’s
    conspiracy conviction, including as it related to possession and distribution of
    heroin. Lesane does not dispute on appeal his extensive participation in the
    conspiracy with respect to cocaine. That participation necessarily placed him in
    regular contact not only with the other defendants, but also the customers and
    residences central to the conspiracy. In particular, though the evidence did not
    include a specific instance in which Lesane sold heroin, there was ample evidence
    showing that his associates sold heroin at 6226 Demery on a number of
    occasions—and that Lesane was frequently present at the residence while this drug
    22
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 23 of 41
    activity was ongoing. Nixon, for example, testified that Lesane was present during
    controlled drug transactions at 6226 Demery and even delivered drugs to
    customers. Likewise, footage of controlled transactions showed Lesane at the
    house while the drug operation was ongoing.
    Under these circumstances, we find that a reasonable jury could have
    concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement to possess and
    sell cocaine and other drugs, including heroin, that Lesane knew of this agreement,
    and that he voluntarily participated in it. Accordingly, we affirm Lesane’s
    conspiracy conviction to the extent that he challenges his criminal liability for
    possession with intent to sell heroin.
    B.    Application of the Career Offender Sentencing Guideline
    Second, Lesane contends that the district court erred in classifying him as a
    career offender, because his 2014 burglary conviction does not qualify as a
    predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines. The district court’s decision to
    classify a defendant as a career offender is a question of law that we ordinarily
    review de novo. United States v. Gibson, 
    434 F.3d 1234
    , 1243 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Where the defendant did not raise his objection in the district court, however, we
    review the issue only for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 
    751 F.3d 1244
    ,
    1257 (11th Cir. 2014). Where a defendant actually invites error, we are wholly
    23
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 24 of 41
    precluded from reviewing the error on appeal. United States v. Harris, 
    443 F.3d 822
    , 823-34 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Before we address whether the district court incorrectly applied the career
    offender enhancement, we must determine whether this issue is amenable to
    review, and, if so, under what standard. While the government suggested in its
    brief that, by acknowledging that the guideline calculations in the PSR were
    appropriate, Lesane invited this error, the government retreated from that position
    at oral argument and stated that they were not asking us to bar review of Lesane’s
    sentencing appeal. We accept that concession.
    Indeed, we do not believe that Lesane conceded that the career offender
    enhancement applied. Lesane’s counsel argued that the application of the career
    offender enhancement was too harsh because the 2014 burglary conviction
    occurred after Lesane was arrested for the drug conspiracy in 2013. Specifically,
    Lesane urged the district court to depart from the enhanced guidelines range,
    arguing that the application of the career offender enhancement would distort the
    reality of Lesane’s criminal history at the time of the offense of conviction.
    Although Lesane’s counsel phrased his position as one seeking a departure, the
    point regarding the timing of the second conviction clearly was made. Though
    inartfully, we believe Lesane’s counsel preserved his objection to application of
    the career offender enhancement.
    24
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 25 of 41
    Under these circumstances, we may consider the merits of that objection.
    Because Lesane did not actually object to the guideline calculations in the PSR,
    however, we review this issue for plain error. See 
    Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1257
    .
    Under that standard of review, we may only reverse where there is plain error that
    affects substantial rights. United States v. Williams, 
    469 F.3d 963
    , 966 (11th Cir.
    2006).
    Under § 4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines, a defendant qualifies as a career
    offender only where he has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime
    of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The
    sentencing guidelines further provide that “[t]he term ‘two prior felony
    convictions’ means . . . the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction
    subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of
    violence or a controlled substance offense . . . .” 
    Id. § 4B1.2(c)
    (emphasis added).
    Here, Lesane’s 2014 conviction for burglary of an unarmed dwelling could
    not serve as a predicate crime of violence under the career offender provisions.
    Federal authorities arrested Lesane in connection with the instant federal offense in
    October 2013. Lesane pleaded nolo contendere to the burglary offense in October
    2014. Though a plea of nolo contendere is sufficient to constitute a felony
    “conviction” within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines, see United States v.
    Elliot, 
    732 F.3d 1307
    , 1313 (11th Cir. 2013), a conviction only qualifies as a
    25
    Case: 15-13385      Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 26 of 41
    “prior” felony conviction where it occurs before the defendant commits the instant
    offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c). Under the language of the sentencing
    guidelines, this 2014 burglary offense does not qualify as a prior felony conviction
    vis-à-vis Lesane’s 2013 drug crime. See United States v. Williams, 
    29 F.3d 172
    ,
    174 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[C]onvictions sustained subsequent to the conduct forming
    the basis for the offense at issue cannot be used to enhance a defendant’s status to
    career offender.”). The government concedes this point.
    Given the effect this error had on Lesane’s guidelines range, we also
    conclude that this error affects his substantial rights. The PSR reflects—and the
    government concedes—that, without the career offender enhancement, Lesane’s
    offense level only would have been twenty-four; combined with his criminal
    history category of VI, that would have yielded a guidelines range of 100 to 125
    months’ imprisonment as opposed to 210 to 262 months. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt.
    A. Where, as here, the district court sentenced the defendant under an incorrect
    guidelines range, the defendant obviously can show a reasonable probability that
    the district court would have imposed a different sentence under the correct
    guidelines range. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1338
    , 1349 (2016).
    And where that reasonable probability exists, the defendant succeeds in showing
    that the error affected his substantial rights and, thus, was plain. 
    Id. 26 Case:
    15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 27 of 41
    We conclude that the district court plainly erred in sentencing Lesane as a
    career offender based on his 2014 conviction for burglary of an unoccupied
    dwelling. We accordingly vacate Lesane’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
    C.    Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence
    Third, Lesane contends that his sentence is unreasonable under United States
    v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005). Under Booker and its progeny,
    when we review the reasonableness of a sentence, we review for abuse of
    discretion. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). We must first ask
    whether the district court committed a significant procedural error, such as
    improperly calculating the guidelines range or failing to consider the factors set
    forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
    Id. If the
    sentence is procedurally sound, we then
    must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the totality of
    the circumstances. 
    Id. Because we
    remand for resentencing in light of the erroneous application of
    the career offender enhancement, we need not decide the reasonableness of
    Lesane’s sentence under Booker. After recalculating Lesane’s guidelines range
    under the appropriate principles, the district court should impose a sentence it
    deems appropriate in light of the factors set forth in § 3553(a).
    27
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 28 of 41
    III. MORRIS
    A.    Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Conspiracy Conviction
    First, Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his drug
    conspiracy conviction under Count 1. Morris does not raise a sufficiency of the
    evidence challenge to his conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin
    under Count 7.
    As noted above, we review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support a guilty verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government and resolving all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor
    of the verdict. 
    Isnadin, 742 F.3d at 1303
    (11th Cir. 2014).
    Here, Morris contends, in cursory fashion, that “the government offered no
    evidence directly showing . . . Morris’s participation in drug-related activities.”
    According to Morris, his continued presence at 6226 Demery is explained by his
    employment with a landscaping company that operated out of that residence. In
    sum, Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was
    actually involved in the conspiracy.
    We disagree. The evidence adduced at trial showed that Morris was present
    at 6226 Demery on a regular basis while drug activity was ongoing. The evidence
    indicated that Morris participated directly in the enterprise by selling drugs to
    confidential informants. Herman testified, for example, that he bought drugs from
    28
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 29 of 41
    Morris upwards of twenty times. And recordings of controlled purchases with
    confidential informants showed Morris’s involvement in the sale of drugs at 6226
    Demery in particular. Corroborating this evidence, Morris himself told a cellmate
    in the Charlotte County jail that he was responsible for selling small amounts of
    cocaine and heroin out of 6226 Demery.
    To the extent Morris argues that his conspiracy conviction cannot stand
    because the evidence does not show that he was involved in the conspiracy for its
    entire duration, we reject that contention as well. The government need not prove
    that each conspirator participated in every aspect of the enterprise or for the
    entirety of its operation. United States v. Vernon, 
    723 F.3d 1234
    , 1273 (11th Cir.
    2013); United States v. Hansen, 
    262 F.3d 1217
    , 1247 (11th Cir. 2001). It is clear
    that Morris participated in some affirmative conduct in furtherance of the drug
    enterprise at 6226 Demery, and that is all the law requires.
    After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is
    sufficient to show that Morris knew of the overall drug conspiracy and voluntarily
    participated in it. See 
    McDowell, 250 F.3d at 1365
    . We therefore affirm Morris’s
    drug conspiracy conviction.
    B.    Prosecutorial Misconduct
    For the first time on appeal, Morris contends that the prosecutor engaged in
    misconduct by making certain statements about the role that guns played in the
    29
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 30 of 41
    drug conspiracy at 6226 Demery. Morris submits that, in light of this alleged
    misconduct, he is entitled to a reversal of both his drug conspiracy conviction
    (Count 1) and his substantive drug conviction (Count 7).
    Ordinarily, we review a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct de
    novo. United States v. Merrill, 
    513 F.3d 1293
    , 1306 (11th Cir. 2008). Where the
    defendant fails to object to a prosecutor’s statements at trial, however, we review
    only for plain error “that is so obvious that failure to correct it would jeopardize the
    fairness and integrity of the trial.” 
    Id. at 1306-07
    (quoting United States v. Bailey,
    
    123 F.3d 1381
    , 1400 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under plain error review, we reverse based
    on alleged prosecutorial misconduct only where the alleged misconduct is “so
    pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.”
    United States v. Crutchfield, 
    26 F.3d 1098
    , 1099 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
    States v. McLain, 
    823 F.2d 1457
    , 1462 (11th Cir. 1987)).
    To establish prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the
    prosecutor made improper remarks and (2) the remarks prejudicially affected the
    defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Eckhardt, 
    466 F.3d 938
    , 947 (11th
    Cir. 2006). The misconduct results in prejudice to the defendant’s substantial
    rights where, if not for the allegedly improper remarks, the outcome of the trial
    would have been different. 
    Id. Hence, where
    there is sufficient independent
    30
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 31 of 41
    evidence in the record to support the defendant’s guilt, the alleged error is
    harmless. 
    Id. Morris takes
    issue with several prosecutorial comments and with the way the
    government presented its case at trial. From the outset, Morris argues that the
    prosecutor acted improperly during his opening statement by telling the jury that
    the case was about drugs and guns. According to Morris, this suggested to the jury
    that Morris was involved in firearms offenses even though only defendant Hood
    was charged with a gun-related crime. In addition, Morris asserts that the
    government front-loaded its case-in-chief with evidence regarding guns, devoting
    approximately the first five hours of testimony to the firearms found during the
    search of 1606 Hibiscus. Morris also takes issue with the government’s closing
    statement, arguing that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by improperly
    suggesting to the jury that a video of 6226 Demery showed Morris carrying a gun
    in his hand. Ultimately, Morris contends that these improper statements had the
    cumulative effect of linking guns and drugs with all the defendants, resulting in the
    undue suggestion that Morris was involved in more illegal activity than the
    evidence shows.
    Morris acknowledges that his counsel did not object to any of these matters
    at trial. Accordingly, we review only for plain error. See 
    Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1306
    . On the record before us, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s statements or
    31
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 32 of 41
    overall presentation resulted in any prejudice to Morris, let alone prejudice so
    obvious and injurious that failure to correct it would jeopardize the fairness or
    integrity of the proceedings.
    Nothing about the prosecutor’s opening statement was improper or
    prejudicial. It is true that the prosecutor framed the case from the outset as being
    about guns and drugs, but this does not mean that the prosecutor improperly
    suggested to the jury that Morris himself was responsible for the gun offense with
    which defendant Hood was charged. The indictment and the verdict forms made it
    clear that Morris was not charged with anything other than drug crimes. This was
    reiterated in the jury instructions, where the district court stated that the firearms
    charge only applied to “Defendant Lorenzo D. Hood.” Beyond the single opening
    phrase, the prosecutor never linked Morris to any crime relating to firearms—on
    the contrary, the government went on to explicitly state which defendants were on
    trial for which specific charges.
    Nor was it improper or prejudicial for the government to begin its case-in-
    chief with testimony regarding Hood’s firearms. There is nothing abnormal about
    coconspirators being tried together, and Morris acknowledges that there was
    nothing improper about his being tried alongside Hood. See United States v.
    Astling, 
    733 F.2d 1446
    , 1454 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[C]oconspirators should be tried
    jointly . . . and severance is not warranted despite the fact that a defendant may
    32
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 33 of 41
    have participated in only a single aspect of the conspiracy.”). None of the
    defendants in this case requested that they be tried separately. Thus, Morris should
    have expected that the jury would hear evidence at some point supporting the gun
    charges against Hood. The government’s first witnesses, who did focus primarily
    on the guns found at 1606 Hibiscus, never suggested that anyone other than Hood
    was in possession of them. Indeed, Morris was not even mentioned until the
    government called Nixon to testify on the third day of trial.
    We additionally conclude that there was no prejudicial misconduct when the
    prosecutor suggested, during closing argument, that Morris was carrying a gun in
    video footage of him at 6226 Demery. This Court has long recognized the close
    connection between guns and drugs. United States v. Lopez, 
    649 F.3d 1222
    , 1242
    (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that guns go “hand-in-hand” with illegal drug operations
    and that guns are the “tools of the [drug] trade”). In light of this close connection
    between firearms and drug trafficking operations, we doubt that the suggestion that
    Morris was carrying a gun would have shocked or swayed the jury with respect to
    its finding that Morris was engaged in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and heroin.
    That is, we do not believe that such a suggestion is unduly prejudicial.
    Either way, in light of the substantial evidence linking Morris to the drug
    conspiracy at 6226 Demery, we cannot say that, but for the prosecutor’s comments
    and presentation, the outcome of the trial likely would have been different.
    33
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 34 of 41
    Eckhardt, 
    466 F.3d 947
    . This is especially true under the present circumstances,
    where we review the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct for plain error; we cannot
    conclude that even an assumed error associated with these comments would be “so
    pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.”
    
    Crutchfield, 26 F.3d at 1099
    ; 
    Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1306
    -07. The comments the
    prosecutor made were isolated and minimal in comparison to the other evidence
    adduced at trial regarding Morris’s illegal conduct. Morris’s counsel diffused the
    effect of those remarks in his own closing. And the order of the evidence could not
    have been so disruptive as to change the outcome of the proceedings. In short, we
    reject Morris’s argument that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct had the
    cumulative effect of prejudicing his substantial rights. 
    Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947
    .
    Therefore, we affirm both his conspiracy conviction (Count 1) and his
    substantive drug conviction (Count 7).
    IV. HOOD
    A.    Motion to Suppress
    First, Hood submits that the district court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress the evidence found during the search of 1606 Hibiscus. In particular, he
    argues that the officers who swept the house lacked articulable facts suggesting
    that there was an individual in the home who might pose a threat to officers
    executing the arrest warrant.
    34
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 35 of 41
    On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
    court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law de novo,
    construing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.
    United States v. Lewis, 
    674 F.3d 1298
    , 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2012).
    Though the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires law enforcement to
    obtain a warrant before searching a home, our constitutional jurisprudence allows
    officers to conduct a warrantless “protective sweep” of a house while arresting a
    suspect inside the home. Maryland v. Buie, 
    494 U.S. 325
    , 331-35 (1990). A
    “protective sweep” is defined as “a quick and limited search of premises, incident
    to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.” 
    Id. at 327.
    These sweeps are confined to a “cursory visual inspection of those places in
    which a person might be hiding.” 
    Id. As a
    rule, officers may, “without probable
    cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately
    adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.”
    
    Id. at 334.
    But to search areas beyond the immediate vicinity of the place of arrest,
    officers must have “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
    inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
    believing that the area to be swept harbors” an individual posing a threat. Id.;
    United States v. Delancy, 
    502 F.3d 1297
    , 1307 (11th Cir. 2007). In the course of a
    lawful protective sweep, officers are “free to seize any evidence they discovered in
    35
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 36 of 41
    plain view within the proper scope of the protective sweep.” United States v.
    Tobin, 
    923 F.2d 1506
    , 1513 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
    Here, Hood contends that, when officers swept 1606 Hibiscus after taking
    him into custody, they exceeded the scope of a permissible protective sweep.
    Hood asserts that the officers moved him outside the home, at which point the need
    to sweep for dangerous individuals was extinguished. In addition, Hood argues
    that the officers who conducted the sweep had no basis for believing that there was
    anyone else inside the home who presented a danger. We find these arguments
    unpersuasive.
    Because they are crucial to our resolution of this issue on appeal, we briefly
    revisit the facts on which the district court relied in denying the motion to suppress.
    Officers sought to locate Hood because they were tasked with executing a warrant
    for his arrest. These officers believed that Hood might be inside the residence at
    1606 Hibiscus because his driver’s license listed that address and because officers
    saw a motorcycle parked near the front of the house which matched the description
    of one he was known to use. While conducting surveillance, officers noticed
    someone peeking out of the blinds of a window with a black object on the north
    side of the front room of the house.
    After officers entered the house, Hood emerged from an area to the rear on
    the south side of the house, opposite the area in which officers saw someone
    36
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 37 of 41
    peeking through the blinds. Officers arrested Hood while he was still inside the
    house, and then took him outside. One officer noted that Hood’s attitude and
    conduct appeared to be evasive. Several officers testified that they feared someone
    else might be hiding in other areas of the house.
    When officers walked into the room from which they saw someone moving
    the blinds, they saw, in plain view, a rifle and scope, which looked like the object
    they had seen earlier peeking through the blinds. Officers looked into an open
    closet door, where they believed someone might be hiding, and found several more
    firearms. Other officers checked the kitchen and rooms on the south side of the
    house to ensure that no one was inside. These officers found ammunition, drugs,
    and drug paraphernalia. Hood does not argue that these factual findings were
    erroneous.
    After careful consideration, we agree with the district court that the officers
    did not exceed their authority in conducting the protective sweep. Accordingly, we
    conclude that the district court did not err in denying Hood’s motion to suppress
    the evidence found during the 1606 Hibiscus search.
    Contrary to Hood’s assertion, the officers had a sufficient factual basis to
    justify their belief, after taking him into custody, that there may have been
    someone else inside the home who still posed a danger to officers. The officers
    saw someone manipulate the blinds in the front of the house from a room on the
    37
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017    Page: 38 of 41
    north side, whereas Hood emerged from an entirely different part of the house. In
    addition, officers noted that Hood exhibited evasive behavior after being taken into
    custody. These facts, which were specific and articulable, would lead a reasonable
    officer to believe that someone else might be in the house and that a protective
    sweep was necessary for safety reasons. See 
    Buie, 494 U.S. at 334
    ; see also
    United States v. Carballo, 
    595 F.3d 1214
    , 1223 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
    protective sweep was justified based on the defendant’s conduct, which included
    “nervous” behavior).
    We also reject Hood’s contention that the officers’ sweep was unjustified
    because he was taken outside after being placed in custody. A protective sweep of
    a home is authorized, even where a suspect is apprehended outside of a house, so
    long as officers have reason to believe that there is someone inside the building
    who would still pose a danger to officers. United States v. Burgos, 
    720 F.3d 1520
    ,
    1525 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that officers conducted a reasonable sweep
    inside the home after taking a suspect into custody outside the home based on their
    belief that someone was inside and potentially armed). Here, Hood was
    apprehended inside the house under circumstances that led officers to believe that
    someone else was inside who might pose a threat to their safety. This is
    particularly true given the fact that the window—in which movement had been
    observed—had line-of-sight to where the officers’ vehicle was located. A brief
    38
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 39 of 41
    visual inspection of the front bedroom revealed that the occupants of the home had
    access to weapons that could be used to harm the officers, given that line-of-sight.
    On this record, there was nothing unreasonable about the officers’ decision to
    conduct a protective sweep despite having taken Hood outside.
    In addition, we disagree with Hood’s assertion that the protective sweep
    exceeded its permissible scope under Buie. The officers entered rooms throughout
    the house to conduct a quick visual sweep of any areas that might harbor
    dangerous individuals. There is nothing in the record indicating that officers either
    searched an area that could not harbor an individual or needlessly extended the
    search’s duration. In particular, one officer testified that the sweep took no longer
    than three or four minutes, lending support to the conclusion that the sweep was
    cursory in nature. Under such circumstances, the protective sweep was lawful.
    
    Buie, 494 U.S. at 334
    .
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the denial of Hood’s motion to suppress
    evidence seized during the search of 1606 Hibiscus.
    B.    Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to Cocaine Charges
    Second, Hood asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of acquittal on his cocaine convictions in Counts 5, 6, and 8. Hood’s
    argument on this issue is limited to a single sentence, in which he contends that
    there was “no evidence to support” his substantive cocaine charges.
    39
    Case: 15-13385     Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 40 of 41
    As an initial matter, it bears noting that an appellant is deemed to have
    abandoned a claim where he raises it in a perfunctory manner without meaningful
    argument or citation to authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 
    739 F.3d 678
    , 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Hood has abandoned this claim because of the way in
    which he raised the issue. He cites no authority, articulates no specific issue, and
    provides no examples from the record to support his position.
    Even so, were we to address his assertion on the merits, a thorough review
    of the record leads us to conclude that the district court properly denied Hood’s
    motion for judgment of acquittal. The evidence confirms that confidential
    informant Nixon bought cocaine from Hood during a controlled purchase at 6226
    Demery. In addition, during a search of 6226 Demery, officers found cocaine and
    heroin inside the house, along with evidence indicating that Hood resided in that
    house with his girlfriend. Another confidential informant testified that it appeared
    that the people working inside 6226 Demery were working for Hood. The drug
    paraphernalia discovered at this house also tended to show that Hood was
    trafficking in cocaine. Finally, when officers arrested Hood at 1606 Hibiscus, they
    found a substantial amount of cocaine inside the master bedroom, as well as more
    drug paraphernalia.
    Under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court
    did not err in denying Hood’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the
    40
    Case: 15-13385    Date Filed: 04/12/2017   Page: 41 of 41
    government’s case. Because there was substantial evidence from which a
    reasonable jury could conclude that Hood was guilty of the various individual
    cocaine crimes with which he was charged, we affirm the denial of his Rule 29
    motion. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    834 F.3d 1206
    , 1214 (11th Cir. 2016).
    V. CONCLUSION
    In accordance with the foregoing, as to the convictions of Lesane, Morris,
    and Hood, we affirm. With respect to the district court’s finding that Lesane
    qualified as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines, we vacate and
    remand for resentencing.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    41