Erin Wells v. Commissioner of Social Security , 430 F. App'x 785 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15630 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 15, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-01947-TGW
ERIN WELLS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 15, 2011)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Erin Wells appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Commissioner of
Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of child’s insurance benefits based on
Wells’s father’s Social Security retirement benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On appeal, Wells argues that her application was timely because the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) did not properly close out her protective filing date
established by her father’s 1998 application for retirement benefits, as required by the
SSA’s Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”). After thorough review, we
affirm.
“In Social Security appeals, we must determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations
omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.(quotation omitted). Under the Social Security Act, a child of an individual entitled
to old-age benefits may be eligible to receive child’s insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d). To obtain child’s insurance benefits, the claimant must file an application
while she is unmarrried and either: (1) under 18 years of age or a full-time elementary
or secondary school student under 19 years of age, or (2) suffers from a disability.
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(A) & (B).
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The SSA has promulgated the POMS as “publicly available operating
instructions for processing Social Security claims.” Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003). The
Supreme Court has noted that “these administrative interpretations are not products
of formal rulemaking.” Id. at 385. In the context of reviewing the Commissioner’s
calculation of disability benefits under the Social Security Act’s windfall elimination
provision, we have stated that, although the SSA’s POMS can be persuasive, it does
not have the force of law. Stroup v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003).
In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was based on
proper legal standards because he correctly concluded that the POMS does not have
the force of law, and, therefore, the Commissioner’s alleged failure to adhere to the
POMS does not entitle Wells to child’s insurance benefits. See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at
385 (stating that the POMS’s interpretations “are not products of formal
rulemaking”); Stroup, 327 F.3d at 1262 (concluding that the POMS does not have the
force of law). Furthermore, Wells’s reliance on Hall v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1981),1 is misplaced, because, unlike the ruling at issue in Hall, the POMS does
not constitute formal rules that bind the SSA. See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385; Hall,
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close
of business on September 30, 1981.
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660 F.2d at 119 n.4 (addressing Social Security Ruling 79-19 and noting that Social
Security Rulings “are binding on all components of the Administration”) (quotations
omitted). Moreover, the POMS at issue in this case does not relate to Wells’s
procedural rights at a hearing before the ALJ. Thus, the Commissioner did not
violate any rule, and the results of the hearing before the ALJ may stand. See Hall,
660 F.2d at 119. In addition, because the POMS does not have the force of law and
a violation of the SSA’s internal guidelines does not entitle Wells to the relief she
seeks, we need not address whether the Commissioner adhered to the POMS.
Finally, substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s denial of child’s
insurance benefits because the record demonstrated that Wells was not statutorily
eligible for those benefits. When she filed her application in 2003, Wells was over 18
years of age, was not a full-time elementary or secondary school student, and was not
disabled. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s denial of
child’s insurance benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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