Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. James H. Hildreth, Jr. ( 2016 )


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  •                Case: 15-13400      Date Filed: 07/11/2016     Page: 1 of 20
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    _________________________
    No. 15-13400
    _________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C
    POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS,
    Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
    versus
    JAMES HILDRETH, JR.,
    in his official capacity as Tax
    Assessor of Escambia County, Alabama,
    Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
    _________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Alabama
    __________________________
    (July 11, 2016)
    Before WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and RODGERS, * District Judge.
    *
    Honorable Margaret C. Rodgers, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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    PER CURIAM:
    The Poarch Band of Creek Indians (“Poarch Band”) sued James Hildreth,
    Tax Assessor of Escambia County, Alabama, for declaratory and injunctive relief
    to prevent the assessment of property taxes on lands owned by the Poarch Band in
    Escambia County, Alabama, and held in trust by the United States (“Trust
    Property”). The Poarch Band maintains the Trust Property is exempt from taxation
    pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”). See 25 U.S.C. § 465. 1
    The district court granted injunctive relief barring the tax assessment efforts during
    the pendency of the case, and Hildreth appeals. 2 Finding no abuse of discretion
    and no error of law, we affirm.
    I.
    The facts are largely undisputed. On June 4, 1984, the Secretary of Indian
    Affairs recognized and “acknowledge[d] that the Poarch Band of Creeks . . . exists
    as an Indian tribe within the meaning of Federal law . . . based on a determination
    1
    25 U.S.C. § 465 is part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79.
    Section 465 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land “for the purpose of providing
    land for Indians” and to hold it “in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indians for which the
    land is acquired.” Once entrusted to the United States, the land is “exempt from State and local
    taxation.” § 465.
    2
    We have also considered the amicus brief and oral argument of the United States
    offered in support of the Poarch Band.
    2
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    that the group satisfies the criteria set forth in 25 C.F.R. 83.7.”3 Final
    Determination for the Fed. Acknowledgment of the Poarch Band of Creeks, 49
    Fed. Reg. 24,083-01 (June 11, 1984). In making his final determination, the
    Secretary expressly acknowledged that “the contemporary Poarch Band of Creeks
    is a successor of the Creek Nation of Alabama prior to its removal to Indian
    Territory” and that “[t]he Creek Nation has a documented history back to 1540.” 4
    Final Determination for the Fed. Acknowledgment of the Poarch Band of Creeks,
    49 Fed. Reg. 24,083-01 (June 11, 1984). Following the Secretary’s determination,
    the United States took 229.54 acres of real property in Escambia County into trust
    as a reservation for the Poarch Band, see 50 Fed. Reg. at 15,502 (Apr. 18, 1985),
    and in 1992 and 1995, the Poarch Band conveyed additional land to the Secretary
    to be held in trust for the tribe. According to the deeds, all of the described
    properties were acquired by the Secretary pursuant to that part of the IRA which
    3
    See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1982); 43 Fed. Reg. 39361 (Sept. 5, 1978), redesignated at 47
    Fed. Reg. 13,327 (March 30, 1982). At the time, Regulation 83.7 required, among other things,
    proof that the tribe had been historically identified as an American Indian tribe “on a
    substantially continuous basis;” that a substantial portion of the tribe lived in a community
    distinct from other populations and had maintained tribal political influence; and that the tribe
    had satisfactory tribal membership rolls. The Secretary’s findings have not been previously
    challenged.
    4
    The Poarch Band was included on the first list of Indian Entities Recognized and
    Eligible to Receive Services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which was mandated by the
    Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a-1, see 60 Fed. Reg. 9250,
    9253, and the tribe remains on the list today. See 81 Fed. Reg. 26826 (May 4, 2016).
    3
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    exempts tribal lands held in trust by the United States from state and local taxation.
    See 25 U.S.C. § 465.
    Hildreth was aware of the first trust conveyances at least as early as 1986,
    when he wrote a letter to the Alabama Attorney General inquiring as to “whether
    the Indian reservation property will be exempt from taxation.” The Attorney
    General responded, “Your question is answered in the affirmative. Absent cession
    of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there is no authority for state
    taxation of Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on
    within the boundaries of the reservation,” citing § 465.
    In April 2012, approximately 20 years after the last conveyance at issue in
    this case, the Chairman of the Escambia County Commission wrote the Secretary
    of the Interior, asking for the Secretary’s “official position” regarding whether the
    Trust Property had been “illegally taken into federal trust” in light of the Supreme
    Court’s 2009 ruling in Carcieri v. Salazar, 
    555 U.S. 379
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 1058
    (2009).
    In Carcieri, the Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary’s authority to take tribal
    land into trust for the benefit of a tribe is limited to those tribes under federal
    jurisdiction in 1934, when the IRA was enacted. 5 
    Id. In the
    2012 letter, the
    5
    The Supreme Court reasoned that the plain language of the IRA only authorizes the
    Secretary to hold and provide land for “Indians” under 25 U.S.C. § 465, and that “Indian” is
    defined in the statute as a member of “any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
    jurisdiction,” 
    id. § 479
    (emphasis added)—with “now” being the date of the IRA’s enactment,
    1934. 
    Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387-96
    , 129 S. Ct. at 1064-68.
    4
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    Chairman stated his position that, because the Poarch Band was not officially
    recognized as an Indian tribe until 1984, it was not eligible to have lands
    transferred into federal trust beyond the reach of state and local taxation, and
    therefore, the Secretary’s action was unauthorized. The Chairman thus requested
    that the United States relinquish any interest in the Trust Property. In a brief
    response dated June 4, 2012, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
    Indian Affairs wrote, “the Department of the Interior can confirm that the land
    referenced in your letter was acquired in trust by the United States in 1984 and
    proclaimed to be a Reservation in 1985” and that the Trust Property at issue
    “enjoys all rights and privileges associated with being held in trust by the United
    States under Federal Law.”
    In January 2014, Hildreth informed the Poarch Band’s tribal chairman that
    some of the Poarch Band’s property in Escambia County, Alabama, had “escaped
    taxation,” and that the Poarch Band would be subject to an audit for the purpose of
    valuing the property and assessing it for taxation. Hildreth demanded “a full, true,
    and distinct statement” describing all of the Poarch Band’s lands in Escambia
    County, including exempt property. The Poarch Band provided an accounting of its
    Escambia County property except for the Trust Property, which Hildreth found
    “incomplete and non-responsive.” Over a year later, by letter dated February 26,
    2015, Hildreth informed the Poarch Band that his office had completed the
    5
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    appraisal of all of its property, and he requested a meeting with the tribe. In May
    2015, the Poarch Band brought suit to enjoin the taxation of the Trust Property.
    The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the suit pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1362, which extends federal court jurisdiction to actions brought by
    Indian tribes. In considering the motion for a preliminary injunction, the district
    court concluded that the Poarch Band is substantially likely to prevail on the merits
    of its claim based on the trust deeds. The district court rejected Hildreth’s
    Carcieri-based argument that the Secretary impermissibly took the land into trust,
    distinguishing Carcieri on the ground that it had been brought initially as a timely
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) challenge to the Secretary’s decision, see 5
    U.S.C. § 701, et seq., unlike this case, in which the Secretary’s decision had never
    before been the subject of an APA challenge. The district court also relied on a
    then-recent decision of the Middle District of Alabama that had considered a
    similar Carcieri-based argument that the Poarch Band’s property was not properly
    taken into trust because it was a post-1934 tribe and rejected the argument as a
    belated challenge to the Secretary’s decades-old decision in circumvention of APA
    procedure. See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 
    15 F. Supp. 3d 1161
    , 118082 (M.D.
    Ala. 2014), aff’d, 
    801 F.3d 1278
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2015). 6 Finding no reason to
    6
    In PCI Gaming, the State had brought suit challenging the Poarch Band’s commercial
    gaming activities under state nuisance law, in part claiming that the Poarch Band was not a
    properly recognized tribe in light of Carcieri. We subsequently affirmed the district court’s
    6
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    permit Hildreth to avoid the APA’s requirements, the district court concluded that
    the Poarch Band had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim.
    Additionally, the court determined that the tax assessment would violate the
    Poarch Band’s tribal sovereignty, constituting irreparable injury, and that this
    injury outweighed any “minimal” harm Hildreth would experience as the result of
    a delayed tax assessment if Hildreth ultimately prevailed. Finally, the district court
    recognized that an injunction to enforce compliance with federal law would serve
    the public interest. Accordingly, the district court granted the motion for
    preliminary injunction.
    Hildreth appeals, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction over the action
    and the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1).
    “The subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is a question of law, and
    therefore, subject to de novo review.” Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe
    of Indians of Fla., 
    999 F.2d 503
    , 506 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
    Perez, 
    956 F.2d 1098
    , 1101 (11th Cir. 1992)). We review the district court’s grant
    of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, “giving no deference to the
    rejection of that challenge, finding, “[t]he proper vehicle for Alabama to challenge the
    Secretary’s decisions to take land into trust for the Tribe is an APA claim.” Alabama v. PCI
    Gaming Auth., 
    801 F.3d 1278
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2015).
    7
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    district court’s legal determinations.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading
    Inc., 
    51 F.3d 982
    , 985 (11th Cir. 1995). Reversal is warranted only if the district
    court applied “an incorrect legal standard,” followed “improper procedures,” relied
    on “clearly erroneous factfinding,” or arrived at a conclusion that is “clearly
    unreasonable or incorrect.” Forsyth Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
    633 F.3d 1032
    , 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 
    403 F.3d 1223
    , 1226 (11th Cir. 2005)).
    III.
    A. Jurisdiction
    As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts possess “only that power
    authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 1059
    , 1064 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377, 
    114 S. Ct. 1673
    , 1675 (1994)). District courts have original
    jurisdiction over all civil actions “brought by any Indian tribe or band with a
    governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the
    matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
    States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1362. The party invoking the court’s jurisdiction has the
    burden to make a prima facie showing that federal jurisdiction exists. See Butler v.
    Sukhoi Co., 
    579 F.3d 1307
    , 1313 (11th Cir. 2009).
    8
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    The controversy now before us undoubtedly arises under federal law—the
    Poarch Band is seeking to enjoin state taxation of lands held in trust for the tribe by
    the United States, see 25 U.S.C. § 465—and the Supreme Court long ago
    determined that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341,7 does not bar a suit by
    an Indian tribe challenging a state tax. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and
    Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 
    425 U.S. 463
    , 472–75, 
    96 S. Ct. 1634
    ,
    1640-42 (1976). Despite Moe, Hildreth argues that the district court lacks
    jurisdiction because the Poarch Band was not an Indian tribe under federal
    jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in 1934. Relying on United States v. State
    Tax Comm’n of Miss., 
    505 F.2d 633
    (5th Cir. 1974),8 Hildreth reasons that § 479 of
    the IRA defines “Indian” as a member of a tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934,
    and therefore, the Poarch Band cannot be considered a “duly recognized” Indian
    tribe for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1362. We reject this
    argument for several reasons.
    First, § 1362’s language is plain and unambiguous and authorizes a district
    court to exercise jurisdiction over a civil action by a tribe “duly recognized” by the
    7
    “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
    collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in
    the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
    8
    We recognize all former Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to the close of business
    on September 30, 1981, as binding precedent on this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 
    661 F.2d 1206
    (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
    9
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    Secretary. 28 U.S.C. § 1362. Construing the plain language of the statute
    according to its common and ordinary meaning, “duly” means simply “[i]n a
    proper manner; in accordance with legal requirements.” Duly, Black’s Law
    Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Sphinx Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
    of Pittsburgh, Pa., 
    412 F.3d 1224
    , 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying on Webster’s
    dictionary definition of “duly” as meaning “in a due manner, time, and degree” in a
    Florida insurance case). There is no indication in the record that the Secretary
    failed to properly follow established procedures for taking the land into trust, and,
    in any event, as discussed below, any such assertion is long overdue. To the
    contrary, the record reflects that the Secretary took the Poarch Band’s property into
    trust after finding the then-existing regulatory criteria implementing § 465 were
    satisfied and that the deeds, which were properly executed in the 1980s and 1990s,
    effectively conveyed title to the United States for the benefit of the Poarch Band.
    The record thus contains sufficient evidence to show that the Poarch Band was
    “duly recognized” by the Secretary within the meaning of § 1362 well before this
    suit was filed.
    Additionally, we stand by the “eminently sound and vital canon” that
    statutes benefitting Indian tribes “are to be liberally construed,” with any doubts
    resolved in favor of the Indians. Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 
    426 U.S. 373
    , 392, 
    96 S. Ct. 2102
    , 2112 (1976) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 
    425 U.S. 649
    , 655
    10
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    n. 7, 
    96 S. Ct. 1793
    , 1797 (1976) and Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 
    248 U.S. 78
    , 89, 
    39 S. Ct. 40
    , 42 (1918)). Looking at § 1362, there is nothing to
    suggest that “duly recognized” was intended to be read narrowly or synonymously
    with “under Federal jurisdiction in 1934,” as used in § 479 of the IRA. 9
    Congress’s intent in enacting § 1362, which we note was enacted 32 years after the
    IRA, was to broaden judicial access for Indians. 10 See 
    Moe, 425 U.S. at 473
    –74,
    96 S. Ct. at 1641. If Congress had intended § 1362 to narrowly apply only to those
    Indian tribes recognized in 1934, it could have stated this intention expressly in the
    statute or clarified it by statute after Carcieri, neither of which it has done. See
    Santiago–Lugo v. Warden, 
    785 F.3d 467
    , 474 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating “Congress
    knows how to limit courts’ subject matter jurisdiction . . . when it wishes to do
    so”).
    Second, Hildreth’s reliance on State Tax Commission of Mississippi is
    misplaced. In that case, jurisdiction was challenged in the context of a suit brought
    9
    It is also instructive that a 1994 amendment to the IRA defines “Indian tribe” broadly as
    “any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary
    of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 479a(2) (emphasis added).
    There is no question that the Secretary acknowledged the Poarch Band’s existence as an Indian
    tribe in 1984, long before this suit was filed.
    10
    Legislative history reflects that the purpose of § 1362 was to permit Indians to sue
    without regard to the then-existing amount-in-controversy limit on federal-question jurisdiction
    and to codify the practice of allowing Indian tribes to sue for relief from state and local taxes to
    the same extent as the United States. See H.R. Rep. 89-2040 (1966), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
    3145, 
    1966 WL 4399
    .
    11
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    by the United States to prevent the state’s taxation of a private corporation, which
    had been formed by the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. The former Fifth
    Circuit rejected the two jurisdictional grounds asserted by the United States, see 28
    U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1362, finding first that § 1345, which provides original
    jurisdiction over suits brought by the United States, did not confer jurisdiction
    because the private corporation was the real party-plaintiff in interest, not the
    United States. See State Tax Comm’n of 
    Miss., 505 F.2d at 638
    . Regarding § 1362,
    the court similarly concluded that it did not confer jurisdiction over the suit
    because the private corporation was not an Indian tribe and the statute plainly
    applies only to Indian tribes. In the end, the court found that the suit was barred by
    the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.11 See 
    id. Although this
    holding was
    dispositive of the appeal, the court nonetheless continued in its opinion, offering a
    lengthy recitation of the history of the Choctaw Indians in Mississippi to show that
    they did not have tribal status in 1934 and thus were not an Indian tribe, as defined
    in the IRA. See 
    id. at 638–42.
    Based on this factual determination, the court
    concluded alternatively that even “if we are mistaken in our first holding that the
    United States is not a real party in interest . . . the result is the same” (i.e., the
    district court lacked jurisdiction). See 
    id. at 643.
    11
    “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
    collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in
    the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
    12
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    It is this alternative “holding” in State Tax Commission of Mississippi that
    Hildreth insists is binding authority for our interpretation of § 1362, compelling a
    conclusion that the phrase “Indian tribe … duly recognized by the Secretary” is
    limited by the definition of “Indian” under § 479 of the IRA. According to
    Hildreth, this is fatal to the district court’s jurisdiction in this case because the
    Poarch Band was not officially recognized as a tribe under federal jurisdiction in
    1934. We disagree. The portion of State Tax Commission of Mississippi on which
    Hildreth so heavily relies is not binding precedent for two reasons. First, although
    we refer to this portion of the case loosely as an alternate “holding,” it is not on
    equal footing with the actual holding in the case because it could apply only in the
    unlikely event the court was mistaken in its findings regarding the real party in
    interest.12 The former Fifth Circuit’s superfluous discussion about the origins of
    the Choctaw tribe, on whose behalf the United States purported to bring the suit,
    was not in any way necessary to the court’s decision in the case, which rested
    12
    While we are bound by prior panel precedent, see, e.g., Smith v. GTE Corp., 
    236 F.3d 1292
    , 1303 (11th Cir. 2001), including precedent of the former Fifth Circuit, see Bonner at 1209
    –10, we are not required to follow prior panel dicta that is unnecessary to the decision. See
    McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 
    99 F.3d 1068
    , 1077 (11th Cir. 1996); Great Lakes Dredge
    & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 
    957 F.2d 1575
    , 1578 (11th Cir. 1992); see generally
    United States v. Hunter, 
    172 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (“But while the prior [panel]
    precedent rule requires us to follow the holding of an earlier decision, it does not require us to
    follow the language of the accompanying opinion that is unnecessary to the decision, i.e., we are
    not required to follow dicta.”) (Carnes, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In this instance, State
    Tax Commission of Mississippi provided an alternate conclusion that could stand as an additional
    ground for the decision only if we assume facts different from those supporting the first holding,
    that is, that the private corporation in fact was not the real party in interest.
    13
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    squarely on the fact that there was no jurisdiction for a private corporation seeking
    to evade a state tax. Thus, we view the alternate “holding” in State Tax
    Commission of Mississippi as more akin to dicta than binding precedent on the
    jurisdictional issue presented here. Second, any precedential value in the court’s
    alternative “holding” that the Choctaws did not have tribal status in 1934 and
    therefore were not covered by the IRA was subsequently eroded by the Supreme
    Court in United States v. John, 
    437 U.S. 634
    , 
    98 S. Ct. 2541
    (1978). In John,
    decided four years after State Tax Commission of Mississippi, the Supreme Court
    surveyed the history of the Choctaw tribe in the context of determining whether
    there was federal jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense committed on the
    Choctaw reservation in Mississippi. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
    lower courts had relied on State Tax Commission of Mississippi to find that the
    United States had no authority to prosecute the offense as having been committed
    in “Indian Country” for purposes of the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153,
    because the Choctaw tribe was not under federal jurisdiction at the time the IRA
    was passed in 1934, having lost its tribal status in 1830. The Court expressly
    disagreed and found instead that the IRA did apply to the Choctaw Indians, who
    had never lost their tribal status, and thus there was federal jurisdiction to
    prosecute.13 See 
    John, 437 U.S. at 650
    , 98 S. Ct. at 1249. Although the Supreme
    13
    The Supreme Court recognized that the Choctaws had inhabited large areas of land in
    14
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    Court did not directly comment in John on the former Fifth Circuit’s § 1362
    jurisdictional analysis, John’s conclusion regarding the Choctaw’s 1934 tribal
    status completely undermines the factual assumptions supporting the court’s
    alternate “holding” in State Tax Commission of Mississippi. For these reasons, we
    do not consider the alternate “holding” binding on us. 14
    In sum, we find it unnecessary to resolve Hildreth’s challenge to the
    Secretary’s 1984 administrative decision to recognize the Poarch Band as an Indian
    tribe in order to decide that the district court has jurisdiction over this tax
    controversy. 15 We conclude on the record before us that the Poarch Band was duly
    recognized by the Secretary as an Indian tribe within the meaning of § 1362 at the
    time this suit was brought.
    what is now Mississippi since before the American Revolution. See 
    John, 437 U.S. at 638
    , 98 S.
    Ct. at 2543.
    14
    Carcieri, which is binding precedent, held that a tribe’s status as of 1934 was crucial to
    the Secretary’s exercise of his authority to take tribal lands into trust on behalf of the United
    States pursuant to § 465. The jurisdictional question presented in that case, however, related to
    the Secretary’s authority to take tribal land into trust, not to whether an Indian tribe could bring
    suit in federal court to enjoin a tax assessment. Because the Supreme Court did not discuss §
    1362 jurisdiction at all or the interplay, if any, between § 1362 and the IRA, Carcieri does not
    control our decision on the jurisdictional question in this case.
    15
    Hildreth’s defense that the Secretary acted without authority in recognizing the tribe in
    1985, to the extent it even could be raised in this untimely manner, is intertwined with the merits
    and does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to decide the dispute. When a defendant’s
    jurisdictional challenge implicates an element of the cause of action, “the proper course of action
    for the district court . . . is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct
    attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s case.” See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 
    919 F.2d 1525
    , 1529 (11th
    Cir. 1990) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 
    645 F.2d 404
    , 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    454 U.S. 897
    , 
    102 S. Ct. 396
    (1981)). We cannot help but note, however, that on the record before us,
    Hildreth’s defense appears to be foreclosed but we leave that decision in the first instance to the
    district court.
    15
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    B.     Preliminary Injunction
    Injunctive relief may be granted on a showing that the moving party “(1) has
    a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be
    suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
    outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing
    party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.”
    Siegel v. LePore, 
    234 F.3d 1163
    , 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam). No
    evidentiary hearing is necessary “where material facts are not in dispute, or where
    facts in dispute are not material to the preliminary injunction sought.” McDonald’s
    Corp. v. Robertson, 
    147 F.3d 1301
    , 1313 (11th Cir. 1998).
    We first conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not
    holding an evidentiary hearing. Although Hildreth disputed the tribe’s 1934 status,
    he concedes that the Secretary conveyed the Trust Property in 1984 and he has not
    before challenged that decision under the APA. Thus, no material facts necessary
    to the legal determination on which the district court based its decision were in
    dispute, and no evidentiary hearing was required. See 
    id. Hildreth’s arguments
    against the Poarch Band’s likelihood of success on the
    merits overlap with his jurisdictional challenge and stem from his belated
    contention that the tribe’s claim to a § 465 tax exemption fails due to its post-1934
    recognition as a tribe. Again, relying on Carcieri, Hildreth argues that the
    16
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    Secretary lacked authority to acquire the Trust Property under § 465 for an Indian
    tribe not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, and therefore, the Poarch Band lacks
    standing and fails to state a claim for tax exemption under § 465.
    In Carcieri, the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary’s authority to
    take property into trust turned on whether the tribe had been a “recognized Indian
    Tribe” in 1934. 
    See 555 U.S. at 387
    –91, 129 S. Ct. at 1063–65. The Court’s
    conclusion was based on a plain language analysis of § 479 and § 465 of the IRA
    in the context of a timely APA challenge. The district court in this case correctly
    distinguished Carcieri as a case involving a direct and timely APA challenge. As
    noted previously, 
    see supra
    , n.6, and accompanying text, after the district court
    entered its order in this case, we drew the same distinction. See PCI 
    Gaming, 801 F.3d at 1290
    –91. In PCI Gaming, we held that the “proper vehicle” for
    challenging the Secretary’s authority to take tribal lands into trust is a timely APA
    claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702, not a collateral challenge to a long-ago decision
    of the 
    Secretary. 801 F.3d at 1290
    –91,; see also Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band
    of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, ___U.S.___, ___,
    132 S. Ct. 2199
    , 2208 (2012)
    (characterizing a challenge to the Secretary’s authority to take property into trust as
    a “garden variety” APA claim); Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 
    789 F.3d 947
    , 952–53 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (rejecting a Carcieri-based argument that
    was raised outside the APA context and concluding that to allow a belated
    17
    Case: 15-13400        Date Filed: 07/11/2016        Page: 18 of 20
    collateral attack would circumvent the APA’s statute of limitations). At the time
    the district court issued the preliminary injunction in this case, Hildreth had no
    APA claim pending against the Secretary; it was undisputed that the Secretary
    recognized the Poarch Band in 1984 and placed its property in trust beginning in
    1985, approximately 30 years before this suit was filed; and, as reflected in the
    record, Hildreth was aware of the Secretary’s actions as early as 1986.16 We
    squarely rejected this type of collateral challenge to the Secretary’s decades-old
    decision as procedurally improper in PCI 
    Gaming, 801 F.3d at 1291
    (“We hold
    that Alabama cannot raise in this lawsuit a collateral challenge to the Secretary’s
    authority to take the lands at issue into trust.”). The district court did not abuse its
    discretion in determining that the Poarch Band has a strong likelihood of success
    against Hildreth’s defenses.
    Hildreth argues that the Secretary’s ultra vires decision to take the land into
    trust constitutes a valid exception to the APA limitations period. We rejected the
    same argument on similar facts in PCI Gaming, refusing to “carve out an exception
    to the six-year statute of limitations” where it was clear that the State of Alabama
    16
    We note that the posture of this case has shifted significantly in the district court since
    Hildreth noticed this interlocutory appeal. Hildreth has amended his answer, adding
    counterclaims and joining the Secretary of the Interior, among other federal defendants. The
    counterclaims include an APA challenge to the Secretary’s land-in-trust decisions and a
    corresponding request for a declaratory judgment that the Trust Property does not enjoy § 465
    protection. Nevertheless, for purposes of this appeal, we consider only the posture of the case
    when the preliminary injunction was issued. Any subsequent proceedings in the district court are
    beyond the scope of this appeal and will not be addressed.
    18
    Case: 15-13400     Date Filed: 07/11/2016    Page: 19 of 20
    knew of the Secretary’s action and could have brought a timely APA 
    challenge. 801 F.3d at 1292
    . The record in this case similarly reflects that Hildreth, like the
    State of Alabama in PCI Gaming, was well aware of the Secretary’s decision to
    take the Poarch Band’s property into trust close in time to the decision—he made a
    written inquiry of the Secretary in 1986 regarding the effect of the conveyance. To
    recognize an exception and permit a collateral challenge nearly 30 years later,
    where the record clearly reflects that Hildreth could have raised a timely challenge
    but did not, would turn PCI Gaming on its head.
    The district court also did not abuse its discretion in weighing the balance of
    harms. We are satisfied that a state tax assessment would amount to irreparable
    violation of tribal sovereignty. See Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray
    Reservation v. Utah, 
    790 F.3d 1000
    , 1005–07 (10th Cir. 2015) (invasion of tribal
    sovereignty constitutes irreparable injury). This harm outweighs any potential
    temporary harm to Escambia County that would result from a delayed tax
    assessment. See Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 
    443 F.3d 1247
    , 1256 (10th Cir.
    2006) (harm of invasion of sovereignty outweighs harm of delayed enforcement of
    gaming laws). Also, it is reasonable to conclude that enforcing the existing federal
    statutory and regulatory structure applicable to Indian tribes would serve the public
    interest.
    IV.
    19
    Case: 15-13400     Date Filed: 07/11/2016    Page: 20 of 20
    Having found that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
    civil action and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
    preliminary injunction, the district court’s decision is AFFIRMED.
    20
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-13400

Filed Date: 7/11/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021

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